




In the early twentieth century, international oil corporations emerged as a new kind of 
political actor. The development of the world oil industry, argues Katayoun Shafiee, was 
one of the era’s largest political projects of techno-economic development. In this book, 
Shafiee maps the machinery of oil operations in the Anglo-Iranian oil industry between 
1901 and 1954, tracking the organizational work involved in moving oil through a variety 
of technical, legal, scientific, and administrative networks. She shows that, in a series of 
disagreements, the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, which later 
became BP) relied on various forms of information management to transform political 
disputes into techno-economic calculation, guaranteeing the company complete control 
over profits, labor, and production regimes. She argues that the building of alliances and 
connections that constituted Anglo-Iranian oil’s infrastructure reconfigured local politics 
of oil regions and examines how these arrangements in turn shaped the emergence of 
both nation-state and transnational oil corporation.
 Drawing on her extensive archival and field research in Iran, Shafiee investigates 
the surprising ways in which nature, technology, and politics came together in battles 
over mineral rights; standardizing petroleum expertise; formulas for calculating prof-
its, production rates, and labor; the “Persianization” of employees; nationalism and oil 
nationalization; and the long-distance machinery of an international corporation. Her 
account shows that the politics of oil cannot be understood in isolation from its technical 
dimensions.
Katayoun Shafiee is Assistant Professor in the History Department at the University of 
Warwick.
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“This book integrates Middle East studies with business history and science and tech-
nology studies. The technical development of oil in the Middle East and the political 
development of nation-states are shown to be two sides of the same coin. Techniques 
of extracting and selling oil demanded new workers, property rights, engineering skills, 
scientific knowledge, accounting methods, and political relations. Mathematical formu-
las shaped the world as much as they were shaped by it. This thrilling analysis reveals 
how the actions of states and oil companies became intertwined in the previous century. 
This book is obligatory reading for anyone interested in the current politics, science, and 
technologies of sustainable energy.”
Wiebe E. Bijker, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Maastricht University
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 The former headquarters of the international oil corporation that every-
one knows today as British Petroleum (BP) were located in the historic 
Britannic House, Finsbury Circus, in London. The building has a notable 
history, having been designed between 1921 and 1925 by the celebrated 
British imperial architect, Sir Edwin Landseer Lutyens, marking his fi rst 
foray into the design of large corporate buildings ( fi gure 0.1 ). To the 
left of the entrance to the building is the stone sculpture, “Persian Scarf 
Dancer,” of a woman performing a traditional Persian dance, by Francis 
Derwent Wood ( fi gure 0.2 ). The sculpture, along with the building itself, 
announces the British imperial origins of the oil company in Iran and its 
former identity as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd. At the time of 
the building’s construction between the two World Wars, transnational 
oil corporations, including what is now known as BP, emerged as a new 
kind of political actor in the twentieth century. The building of the world 
oil industry served as the occasion for one of the largest political proj-
ects of technoeconomic development in the latter half of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Along with railroads, dams, electricity and 
communication networks, and other large-scale technical systems, a vast 
global network of oil wells, pipelines, refi neries, and transoceanic ship-
ping resulted from this enterprise. One way social scientists explain the 
development of this energy system is to think of oil as a natural resource 
that affects political systems, social and economic orders, and state for-
mation from the outside while simultaneously blocking the emergence of 
democratic forms of politics. 1 Such an account reduces oil to its economic 
properties as a rent while ignoring the materiality of oil infrastructure 
in shaping the state and the powers of the transnational oil corpora-
tion. 2  Machineries of Oil avoids this account of an inside and an out-
side to oil operations. It does this by following the transformation of oil 
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 Figure 0.1 
 Facade of the former headquarters of BP at Britannic House, Finsbury Circus, London. 
 Source : James H. Bamberg,  The History of the British Petroleum Company , Volume 2: 
 The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
Reproduced with the permission of the BP Archive. 
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 Figure 0.2 
 Derwent Wood’s “Persian Scarf Dancer.” Photo by Robert Freidus.  Source :  The Victorian 
Web: Literature, History & Culture in the Age of Victoria ,  http://www.victorianweb.org/
art/architecture/lutyens/1.html . 
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the Anglo-Iranian oil industry in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century 
to the company’s dramatic departure and subsequent return as BP during 
Iran’s oil nationalization crisis over fi fty years later. 
 The origins of the fi rst oil industry in the Middle East reside in a 
little-known part of southwest Iran, now known as Khuzistan Province, 
bordering the Persian Gulf ( fi gure 0.3 ). The region forms part of the 
Zagros basin of southwest Iran, which is characterized by limey-shale 
formations that stretch across the border into Iraq and other Persian 
Gulf areas. 3 The carbon-rich source rocks are the product of sea-level 
rises as well as low-oxygen and nutrient-rich environments stretching 
back hundreds of millions of years. Tectonic stresses and salt movements 
in the subsurface produced large “whaleback”-shaped folds, known as 
anticlines, trapping enormous amounts of oil and gas. But when Brit-
ish investors, led by William Knox D’Arcy, signed the fi rst oil conces-
sion agreement with the Iranian government in 1901, they knew little 
about oil development. That said, British fi nanciers held interests in 
other oil companies formed earlier—in the 1880s and 1890s—such as the 
Burmah Oil Company, Royal Dutch, and the Shell groups. American oil 
companies such as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil had been around 
since the 1870s. However, these companies built their initial successes on 
the distribution and sale of oil as kerosene for heating and lighting, oil’s 
main marketable use in the early years. The growing popularity of the 
gasoline-powered combustion engine marked a gradual displacement of 
coal by oil as  the power source for the industrial world. Rival imperial 
navies also transitioned to oil in the early twentieth century. 4 Between 
1910 and 1916, oil went from supplying only 5 percent of world com-
mercial energy supplies to over 50 percent. 5 During the course of this 
global-industrial energy shift from coal to oil, in 1908 D’Arcy’s team of 
drillers fi rst extracted oil from under the ground in southwest Iran. With 
commercial backing guaranteed by the British Admiralty, the new oil 
company, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, produced fuel oil for export 
by the start of the First World War. 
 In the following two decades, AIOC (renamed the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company in 1935, abbreviated AIOC) embarked on building 
research-and-development departments to learn more about the prop-
erties of Anglo-Iranian oil, recruiting consulting geologists and engi-
neers with previous oil experience in Southeast Asia, the United States, 
and Mexico. British business people and drillers designated Khuzistan 
Province as the site of the region’s fi rst foreign-controlled oil industry. 
In the span of fi ve decades, technologies of oil exploration, production, 
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 Figure 0.3 
 Map of concessionary activity in Khuzistan Province, 1928.  Source : R. W. Ferrier,  The 
History of the British Petroleum Company , Volume 1:  The Developing Years, 1901–1932 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), xxvii. Reproduced with the permission of 
the BP Archive. 
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distribution, refi ning, and marketing would get worked out with political 
consequences of sovereignty, government, and revolutionary movements 
that remain relevant to the Middle East today. 
 While everyone is aware of the importance of oil to the history of the 
modern Middle East, surprisingly little is known about how its social 
and technical properties shaped that history. Histories of oil are dom-
inated by Daniel Yergin’s well-known work,  The Prize , which, while a 
comprehensive history of the oil industry, typifi es the standard history 
of oil as a story of corporate titans whose actions determine political 
transformations. 6 No history of oil addresses the ways the technical and 
social aspects of the industry interacted to shape the state and to open or 
close political possibilities.  Machineries of Oil draws on interdisciplinary 
thinking in science and technology studies (STS) to argue that the techni-
cal development of oil in the Middle East did not encounter society and 
the economy as preexisting spheres. 7 Rather, techniques of extracting and 
selling oil demanded the development over several decades of new kinds 
of workers, property rights, engineering skills, geological and economic 
knowledge, transportation systems, methods of accounting, and political 
forces. Taking the example of the region’s fi rst oil industry, this study 
reassembles the politics of the modern Middle East through a study of the 
British-controlled oil industry in Iran between 1901 and 1954. It inves-
tigates how the building of alliances and connections that constituted 
Anglo-Iranian oil’s infrastructure reconfi gured the local politics of the 
oil regions and how these arrangements in turn shaped the emergence 
of both the national state and the transnational oil corporation now 
known as BP. 
 In the early years of oil development, the dominant oil companies 
either purchased oil territories from landowners or signed oil conces-
sion contracts with foreign governments in locations extending from 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and California in the United States to the oilfi elds 
of Baku in Russia, Sumatra in Indonesia, Austrian Galicia, and Roma-
nia. By 1910, they had expanded their concessionary reach to Mexico, 
Venezuela, and the oilfi elds of the Middle East in Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. 
These companies made their fortunes by monopolizing control over 
everything from production wells to transport and distribution technol-
ogies, such as pipelines, railways, and tankers, marketing arrangements, 
and fi lling stations. They were rivals when it came to controlling the 
fl ow of oil from the wellhead to the market in the United States, Europe, 
and Asia, but they also coordinated in managing production and pricing 
during recurring periods of oil glut by relying on the device of the cartel 
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arrangement (a group of suppliers in oil with the purpose of maintaining 
high prices and restricting competition). In the fi rst half of the twen-
tieth century, oil managers, government offi cials, lawyers, accountants, 
drillers, engineers, geologists, and laborers laid the groundwork that 
would constitute the powers of the transnational oil corporation and the 
oil-producing state. 
 Compared with Standard Oil, the Royal Dutch Shell groups, and the 
Burmah Oil Company, AIOC was relatively small, making it vulnerable 
to the growing power of the world oil cartels. It also maintained a pecu-
liar status, having been seminationalized through commercial backing 
by the British Navy shortly before World War I. As growing world pow-
ers, the United States and Russia possessed vast oil reserves within their 
borders, but the dominant imperial power, Britain, did not. Instead, 
Britain possessed signifi cant quantities of coal within its borders, making 
the government’s decision to switch from coal to oil highly controversial. 
Through what techniques and controls would a private British company 
with special government backing get transformed into a formidable rival 
of the largest oil corporations already in existence, when it could only 
rely on the oil regions of one foreign country, Iran? Rather than limit-
ing the discussion to the “hardware” of oil infrastructure alone,  Machin-
eries of Oil answers this question by tracking the organizational work 
involved in moving Anglo-Iranian oil from under the ground through a 
variety of technical, legal, scientifi c, and administrative networks for its 
production and sale on multiple temporal-spatial scales. 8 This political 
process of alliance building and maintenance simultaneously relied on a 
diverse set of equipment to remain stable. 
 Sociotechnical Assemblages as Matters of Politics 
 The reorganization of fossil fuel networks to rely on oil rather than coal 
in the fi rst half of the twentieth century altered the possibilities for dem-
ocratic politics in Iran. It is well known that countries that enjoy large 
oil revenues face unusual challenges in economic development and in 
creating democratic forms of politics. 9 Yet the reasons for this “oil curse” 
are poorly understood, because oil is typically studied only in terms of 
its fi nancial revenues and their impact. 10 An Iranian political scientist, 
Hossein Mahdavy, fi rst coined the term  rentier state through an inves-
tigation of Iran’s economic history in the twentieth century. 11 Iran’s his-
torical trajectory was particular, yet generally applicable to other Middle 
Eastern oil-producing countries relying on oil rents because they faced 
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similar obstacles to democracy. Studies say little about the sociotechnical 
arrangements through which oil is produced and circulated. For oil to be 
transformed into profi ts, it must rely on a set of technical arrangements, 
human forces, political powers, distribution systems, forms of expertise, 
and coercive mechanisms. 
 Through the course of some of the most controversial disputes in 
Iran’s history, AIOC relied on various forms of information manage-
ment to transform political issues into technoeconomic calculation, thus 
guaranteeing total control of its profi ts, labor, and production regimes. 
AIOC’s accountants, managers, and petroleum experts constructed for-
mulas, technical devices, and expert knowledge about oil to build a 
world, their world. 12 In their different variants, the oil company enacted 
several political arrangements between which the Iranian government, 
oil workers, and public opinion were expected to choose. Each chapter 
investigates the specifi c ways various technologies were constructed to 
alter the political possibilities in relation to Anglo-Iranian oil. As rival oil 
fi rms scrambled for concessions to protect oil markets and keep profi ts 
high, the interwar years marked the eruption of a series of concession 
disputes in Iran that increasingly involved the question of the national 
control of oil. AIOC responded by constructing mathematical formulas, 
legal arguments, and scientifi c representations about oil that established 
spaces of negotiation for managing political outcomes in favor of Brit-
ish concessionary control and undermined the sovereignty of the Iranian 
state. With the exception of Thomas Hughes’s investigation of Thomas 
Edison’s use of formulas for the building of an electrifi cation network 
in the United States and Europe, historians have not accounted for the 
history of a formula or a concession contract as a technique of political 
management. 13 The offi cial history of AIOC discusses controversies over 
profi ts, labor, and production but makes no mention of the role of for-
mulas or the machinery of concession terms in shaping these disputes. 14 
Thus,  Machineries of Oil goes further by placing the organizational work 
of formulation and calculation (e.g., technical, administrative, govern-
mental) at the center of the analysis. 15 In doing so, I reveal the pivotal role 
that the sociotechnical properties of oil played in the co-constitutive pro-
cess of building the Iranian state and the transnational oil corporation, 
particularly as they confronted the rising threat of militant nationalism 
and populist politics. 16 
 A central aim of this book is to bring to the surface the differences in 
calculative equipment of the agencies involved within each battle over 
oil. STS scholarship has shown the multiple ways technical devices and 
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calculating technologies shape agencies, particularly in markets. 17 The 
analytical framework of sociotechnical  agencement takes into account 
the diversity of calculative equipment of agencies involved in a market, 
but also in science and politics. 18 For example, in his infl uential study, 
“Sociology of Translation,” Michel Callon details the advantages of a 
sociotechnical approach as a mode of inquiry because it enables one 
to view the simultaneous production of knowledge  and the construc-
tion of a network of relationships in which social and natural entities 
mutually control who they are and what they want. 19 The approach 
demands following both human and nonhuman actors through their 
construction-deconstruction of nature and society, forming relationships 
and adjusting these connections  only in action . The outcome reveals how 
differences in the calculative equipment of the actors is a political issue, 
shaping relationships of domination, and provides a point of entry into 
the analysis of power struggles. 20 For instance, as operations expanded, 
AIOC accountants devised formulas for managing the company’s labor 
recruitment policy to delay the replacement of British workers with Ira-
nian ones at higher skill levels. This tactic, in the shape of a formula, had 
a legitimating function for a racially organized labor regime with a colo-
nial legacy of hierarchy across the world’s mineral frontiers. During the 
course of concession disputes, this calculating technology strengthened 
the British side’s bargaining position by allowing them to make their case 
numerically in terms of a lack of Iranian workers with adequate training 
to support increased economic output. AIOC’s labor formula played a 
pivotal role in this vast political project of sociotechnical engineering by 
the transnational oil corporations, which aimed to inhibit unions. The 
ease with which the company managers, government offi cials, and oil 
workers passed from the so-called technical world of oil to the world of 
society, geopolitics, and petroleum economics demonstrates that there is 
no rupture between the two worlds, but, as Bruno Latour says, it is “a 
seamless cloth.” 21 Technical problems about the oil, its extraction, trans-
port, and refi ning needed to be solved for decisions about politics, labor, 
property, and pricing to be made. 
 The difference that a sociotechnical approach can make in historical 
and political analysis works in two ways. On the one hand, the book 
draws on interdisciplinary methods from STS to introduce new puzzles 
to the fi elds of Middle East studies and global history concerning oil, 
state formation, technoscientifi c expertise, and democracy. Strands of 
research within STS have examined the ways infrastructures embody 
controversies, politics, and the constituting and excluding of subjects. 22 
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Other studies in the sociology and history of sociotechnical devices have 
opened up the black box of formulas as market devices. For example, 
Donald MacKenzie’s history of the Black-Scholes option pricing equa-
tion, the most fundamental equation in modern fi nancial economics, 
exposes the considerable creativity and inventiveness involved in the 
equation’s construction. Early disagreements in the design of the pricing 
formula gave it a kind of fl exibility that enabled rival actors to attach 
to it differently, frame interests in advantageous ways, and construct 
and maintain the fi nancial worlds they claimed to describe as economic 
equations. 23 These studies map how the hypothetical world built into 
the model equation or product formula increasingly becomes more real, 
but with the understanding that this is contested terrain and at all times 
uncertain. Yet, in the focus on the performativity of economics and vari-
ous fi nancial markets, less emphasis has been placed on the role of techni-
cal devices in politics. 24  Machineries of Oil brings the study of the Middle 
East to the fi elds of STS and the history of technology, which show a bias 
toward the investigation of small-scale economic and scientifi c exper-
iments, technical systems, and laboratories. 25 Recovering the organiza-
tional work of BP in Iran exemplifi es the ways sociotechnical devices 
worked as  political devices and played a pivotal role in organizing rela-
tions between countries of the Global North and Global South in the 
twentieth century. 26 
 Reassembling the politics of the Middle East as sociotechnical, there-
fore, requires a number of provocations. The fi rst is to think about the 
oilfi elds of Khuzistan as a laboratory or site of experimentation for pro-
ducing knowledge about nature and society. 27 Building AIOC’s oil infra-
structure on the ground involved the setting up of oil derricks, an 8-inch, 
130-mile pipeline, an oil refi nery, and housing facilities for employees 
divided according to race. In addition to organizing social relations, 
the building of oil infrastructure involved the construction of scientifi c 
descriptions for quantifying and qualifying the oil. British geologists 
arrived in Khuzistan only to discover that the properties of Anglo-Iranian 
oil, such as its viscosity and sulfur content, were not the same as those of 
the oil in Burma, the United States, or Mexico. Even worse, the high levels 
of sulfur made it unsuitable for use as kerosene for lighting. To overcome 
this costly setback, they needed to work on the environment and coordi-
nate with the international scientifi c community to generate profi ts while 
also overcoming the constant disruptions posed by striking oil workers 
demanding more control. 
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 The second provocation is to inquire into the operations of the trans-
national oil corporation, not as an all-encompassing abstract authority 
based in the metropole, such as BP in London, but sociotechnically, as a 
long-distance machinery of concession terms, formulas, laws, and disci-
plinary regimes for managing international oil markets at multiple sites 
in Iran and abroad. 
 The third provocation is to open up the black box of not just the 
fi nancial but the  directly political construction of this machinery. The 
political construction of these management technologies was central to 
the resolution of Iran’s oil disputes and often worked in favor of the 
British company’s calculations. When it did not succeed, other devices 
were invoked, such as US national security, to redirect political outcomes 
against the threat of militant nationalism allied with nationalization of 
the oil industry. 
 The fi nal provocation is to think about these spaces as “technological 
zones” for the exercise of mechanisms of economic governance and man-
aging political uncertainty by policing boundaries between knowledge 
(inside oil operations) and ignorance (outside, local society, the state). 28 
In this way, it becomes possible to view how local disputes about oil were 
rapidly amplifi ed through the existence of global zones of law, fi nance, 
and security. In many instances, these zones were transformed by their 
encounter with oil. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, concession disputes 
about Anglo-Iranian oil triggered the development of new international 
legal doctrines concerning the rights of new states in the so-called Third 
World to confront foreign fi rms and make claims to nationalization of an 
industry in terms of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 
On the other hand, local disputes often could not be transposed to a 
global stage because of the particular interests at stake. Questions about 
improving the conditions of oil workers, for example, were overlooked 
using strategies of temporization when addressing the activities of oil 
operations. 
 Writing a sociotechnical history that seeks to overcome the widening 
gap between studies of society across diverse geographies, on the one 
hand, and studies of technology and the fi rm on the other, cannot occur 
without drawing inspiration from certain pathbreaking works. Stud-
ies in environmental history, STS, and the history of technology have 
transformed the writing of history by taking seriously the nature of tech-
nological and infrastructural transformations in relation to society and 
politics. 29 Timothy Mitchell’s  Carbon Democracy is the most prominent 
example of a work that extends this scholarship on the study of politics 
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in the Middle East. 30 Mitchell argues that rather than viewing mecha-
nisms for democracy as confl icting with mechanisms of carbon energy 
production, distribution, and usage, or studying how one impacts the 
other from the outside, investigators should treat the two mechanisms as 
inextricable. The set of practices involved in transforming Anglo-Iranian 
oil from a liquid to a profi t were simultaneously organizational, eco-
nomic, and political, contributing to the construction of local, state, and 
corporate settings. 31 
 The recurrence of unexpected objects in the history of BP in Iran, such 
as formulas, concession terms, and international law, is not a choice I 
made as a researcher, but one made by the actors themselves. As the chap-
ters reveal, each calculating technology, when successful, can organize 
heterogeneous behaviors, political decisions, and economic outcomes. 
But some actors, such as oil workers allied with militant nationalism, are 
able to deconstruct formulas to open new situations in which alternative 
formulations are proposed. Working out the mechanisms of this calcula-
tive equipment was simultaneously a battlefi eld of technicality and polit-
ical contestation, (re)formulating similar but moving problems over the 
course of fi fty years. 
 Governing Oil Infrastructure in the Middle East and Its Limits 
 The history of AIOC in the fi rst half of the twentieth century is in part 
a long history of relations with the Iranian government over the control 
and distribution of oil. The working of concession contracts, the manage-
ment of oil workers and production rates, and the controversies they gen-
erated, were all events that contributed to constituting the Iranian state 
and the organization and strategic priorities of the largest transnational 
oil companies. This history was punctuated by dramatic crises over the 
terms of these relations organized around oil. In each crisis, the strategy 
followed by AIOC centered on defi ning the terms of the concession con-
tract or a formula and policing its limits. AIOC also used other measures 
to resolve critical moments, such as international law and disciplinary 
regimes, economic sanctions and boycotts, forms of coercion, and an 
engineered overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953. In each contro-
versy, the cultivation of strategic uncertainties, forms of ignorance, and 
temporization played a useful role in the organizational life of the indus-
try because it allowed the oil company to negotiate possible compro-
mises and avoid reaching a more equitable solution. 32 Thus, the forging 
of the historical identity of the actors involved in the governance of oil 
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infrastructure—the transnational oil corporation and other institutions 
such as the International Court of Justice and the World Bank—can be 
thought of as a political process of separating between a well-governed 
(global/Western) oil economy and forms of (non-Western) state gover-
nance, mismanagement, and violence, which are taken to exist outside 
the space of this economy. The effort to forge a distinction between what 
the infrastructure of oil governance is and what it is not, as it operates 
locally in the Middle East, helps constitute its historical identity. 
 By this account,  Machineries of Oil challenges the dominant histor-
ical narrative about oil governance in Iran. 33 This historical moment is 
usually framed as one about the role of the British Empire in the Middle 
East with Iran serving as a buffer region between Russia and India, but 
British imperial rule can be seen as a byproduct of the global energy 
shift to fossil fuels. 34 Kenneth Pomeranz explains that this shift, coupled 
with the ecological relief provided by Europe’s ties to the Atlantic slave 
trade and the acquisition of colonial territories, enabled countries such as 
Britain to trade a growing volume of manufactured products for a grow-
ing volume of land-intensive products such as food, cotton, and other 
industrial crops. 35 These kinds of developments in land, energy, and labor 
contributed to the development of fossil fuel–based mass production cen-
tered in cities, and thus to the building of world imperial powers such as 
Britain. But the infrastructure that emerged out of the global energy shift 
from coal to oil also marked a point of vulnerability for British imperial 
power. The largest refi nery in the world was located in Abadan, Iran, on 
the Persian Gulf and constituted the British Empire’s largest single over-
seas asset. Britain imported much of its oil from Iran, and with AIOC’s 
exclusive rights to develop and market Anglo-Iranian oil, the country 
was able to pay for the oil in its own currency, pounds sterling. 36 As 
chapter 5 explains, the Iranian government’s decision to nationalize the 
oil industry and evict AIOC in 1951 represented more than a challenge 
to British imperial infl uence, it risked devastating the pound sterling for 
the United Kingdom, opening the door to US dollar dominance as the 
preferred reserve and trading currency in a new post–World War II petro-
leum order. New strategies such as economic sanctions and an oil boycott 
were devised, in part, to manage fl ows of oil and fl ows of fi nance for 
restoring AIOC’s former standing in Iran. 
 Contrary to what the dominant narrative suggests, the energy needs of 
the British Navy were only a partial connection in the political project to 
build a British-controlled oil industry in Khuzistan, Iran. During the inter-
war period, the major oil companies, such as AIOC, were the fi rst and 
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largest of the new transnational corporations of the twentieth century to 
emerge at this moment of political power jockeying and energy shifting, 
coinciding with the collapse of an imperialist “old form of empire.” 37 
But they did not come into being with their agency and powers already 
formed. The history of AIOC’s formation is usually told as if the com-
pany operated within its own world, independently of the Iranian state, 
as a commercial concern, and was then simply boosted by the British gov-
ernment and the navy’s decision to switch to fuel oil. Scholarship on oil 
companies examines the ways corporate managers organize a set of deci-
sions about what to control or not to control. The organizational form 
of the state and its relation to the transnational corporation are treated 
as two separate entities, tied to one another by an external relationship. 38 
However, keeping these relations undefi ned allows one to follow which 
boundaries close and which are left open. The following chapters trace 
the techniques and controls that organize spaces of immense political and 
economic signifi cance such as cartel arrangements, international law, oil 
diplomacy, economic sanctions, and US national security. The outcome is 
to view the simultaneous construction of the power of the transnational 
oil corporation as a long-distance mechanism for placing limits on oil 
supplies, keeping profi ts high, and undermining Iranian state sovereignty, 
making it very diffi cult to view certain actors as states and others as 
private companies. 
 Together with the oil companies, oil-producing states such as Iran 
played a pivotal role in the battle over shaping the oil infrastructure that 
emerged out of the global energy shift to oil. 39 In the 1930s, these bat-
tles intensifi ed as protesting governments and oil workers in Iran, Mex-
ico, Venezuela, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Iraq, demanded better 
contractual terms regarding profi ts, production levels, and the treatment 
and training of domestic labor. The period was marked by the increas-
ing appeal of populist and nationalist forms of politics allied with calls 
to expropriate and nationalize the foreign-controlled oil industry. The 
dubious honor of having the fi rst commercially exploitable oilfi elds in the 
Middle East affected and perhaps made possible the very formation of 
the modern state of Iran in this period. Theories of the state, however, 
tend to focus on questions of sovereignty and executive power. 40 As a 
result, they overlook the large-scale technical projects of infrastructure 
and energy networks that have often represented the most widespread, 
complex, and localized forms of state power and authority. 41  Machiner-
ies of Oil starts from this premise to examine the building of oil infra-
structure in the making of the global oil economy in the Middle East. 
Introduction  15
However, it uses a specifi c and local history in Iran to map the anatomy 
of one company, now known as BP, and the mechanisms through which 
its political agency was assembled. It is not possible to make sense of 
the simultaneous rise of mass politics and democracy in the West and of 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East without following the material 
and organizational work involved in building a world to rely on fossil 
fuels such as oil. 42 
 Structure of the Book as the Structure of the Oil Concession 
 The importance of raw materials, such as oil, to the global economy has 
always been understood. The problem is that the materials were located 
principally in the “developing world.” 43 When the oil resources of the 
former Ottoman Empire were distributed among the British and French 
mandate powers, the resources of these territories were understood as 
“belonging to humanity as a whole.” Equipped with a rhetoric originat-
ing in the mandate era, Western imperial powers and fi nanciers competed 
for contracts in oil to fuel navies, warplanes, tanker fl eets, and eventually 
the cars of ordinary consumers. Thus, the history of different forms of 
contractual agreement organized around oil, originally known as conces-
sions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, played a piv-
otal role in the twentieth-century history of the Middle East. In practice, 
countries in the region often defi ned their borders at the point at which 
“oil companies required maps delineating their concessions.” 44 There 
were maps of nations and maps “showing the region cut up into squares 
along the coast, marked with initials” of oil companies. 45 Previous for-
eign concessionary projects in Iran—such as the Reuter Concession, or 
Russian, French, Belgian, and Austrian propositions for concessions in 
roads, railways, utilities, and factories, for example—made no signifi cant 
contribution to the political economy of the country. 46 On the contrary, 
they often helped trigger revolutionary movements such as the famous 
Tobacco Revolt, which constituted one of the fi rst organized and popular 
rejections of the British-controlled tobacco concession in 1890. 47 Thus, 
the structure of  Machineries of Oil loosely follows the structure of the 
Anglo-Iranian oil concession. Each chapter considers a pivotal dispute in 
the history of Anglo-Iranian oil by examining the terms of the oil conces-
sion contract regarding property and mineral rights, petroleum expertise, 
royalties, labor, international legal arbitration, and the cancellation of 
the concession in favor of political sovereignty. The goal is not to com-
pare the representation of oil in contractual terms with its reality on the 
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ground, or to view how the two (abstract versus the material) affected 
each other in terms of an external relationship. Rather, I follow how 
the terms of the concession embodied a world that became more real, 
equipping heterogeneous actors with differing degrees of agency but with 
the understanding that this was highly contested terrain and at all times 
uncertain. 
 One of the fi rst sociotechnical problems British investors had to solve 
was how to attach property rights to a subsoil material owned by a for-
eign government in a region where local forms of property ownership 
already existed. The fi rst chapter, “Properties of Petroleum,” starts by 
asking why British investors designated southwest Iran as the site for 
oil extraction when other regions of the Middle East were known to 
have more easily accessible reserves. By what political methods did Brit-
ish investors impose the concessionary rule of property in southwest 
Iran, particularly since this confl icted with older forms of property and 
local claimants to the land? Through a careful examination of the 1901 
D’Arcy Concession’s articles on property, I argue that they fi rst appeared 
as a legal text between two contractually equivalent parties that seemed 
to guarantee a kind of absolute authority. In practice, however, many 
rules of concessionary property confl icted with the building of a series 
of international cartel arrangements among the major oil companies to 
protect oil markets in Asia by limiting oil production from the Middle 
East in the early years of the concession’s existence. The concession con-
tract was a useful political weapon, but it was highly porous because 
its articles maintained an ambiguity that could be exploited by both the 
British and Iranian sides, as well as by local nomadic groups with claims to 
the land. 
 Securing access to the subsoil through the format of a concession con-
tract was not enough. AIOC was confronted immediately with another 
sociotechnical problem in producing and refi ning the oil that was coming 
out of the ground. The second chapter, “Petroleum Knowledge,” paints 
a precise picture, at the local and international levels, of the scientifi c 
knowledge and technical expertise that allowed for the mastery of the 
political project to extract and process oil in southwest Iran in the early 
twentieth century. I track how British oil managers, engineers, and geol-
ogists constructed and monopolized knowledge about Anglo-Iranian oil 
to maintain a distance from political issues such as national control. I 
argue that placing techniques of standardizing oil at the center of the 
analysis reveals how power relations were worked out in the oil regions 
of southwest Iran, Tehran, and London with political consequences for 
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the formation of the Iranian state and its claims to sovereignty over a 
natural resource. As a business strategy, techniques of standardization 
and forms of information management equipped AIOC with the tools to 
build a world in which its oil could thrive. 
 Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Iranian government continued to 
push for higher production rates, royalties, and more technical informa-
tion about its oilfi elds. Such demands confl icted with secret, international 
cartel arrangements to place limits on world oil supplies and keep profi ts 
high. This controversy culminated in the ruling monarch’s abrupt cancel-
lation of the 1901 concession in 1932 and increasing calls for national 
control. It triggered the largest interwar dispute between a foreign com-
pany and a national government. Chapter 3, “Calculating Technologies 
in Crisis,” opens up the royalty clause of the 1901 concession in order to 
map the multiple sociotechnical arrangements that would help maintain 
an economy of oil involving an artifi cial system of scarcity. As a weapon, 
the company, in collaboration with its largest shareholder, the British 
government, transported the dispute to the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice to create delays and to ensure the continued blockage of the 
increased fl ow of oil from Iran. I elaborate in detail how, with the help 
of formulas, AIOC managers and accountants worked to manufacture a 
kind of ignorance about the nature of royalty calculations and the failure 
to replace foreign workers with Iranian workers. The problem was that 
such concerns were already entangled with other kinds of calculation, 
such as the threat of nationalist politics rendering the energy network 
highly unstable. 
 The interwar concession crisis between AIOC and the Iranian gov-
ernment helped transform the question of the Persianization of the 
British-controlled oil industry—the gradual replacement of foreign 
employees with Iranian workers at higher skill levels—into a major point 
of dispute that went unresolved. This episode coincided with a series 
of labor strikes between the 1920s and 1950s, when oil workers trans-
formed the oilfi elds, pipelines, and refi nery of southwest Iran into sites 
of intense political struggle. These controversies opened up the defi nition 
of the kind of worker the oil industry required to survive. In the fourth 
chapter, “What Kind of Worker Does an Oil Industry Require to Sur-
vive?,” I track the most pivotal oil worker strikes and the construction 
of a racial-technical oil labor regime in work and housing on the oil-
fi elds. The chapter, on the one hand, emphasizes the importance of social 
technologies that worked with certain calculating technologies, discussed 
in the previous chapter, for measuring and controlling the degree of 
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Persianization of employees at AIOC. The sophistication of these social 
and calculating technologies reveals the extreme inventiveness of AIOC 
and other oil companies, which transformed political questions of labor 
into technical and economic issues and often collaborated in the manage-
ment of labor in the Middle East and Latin America. 
 The next sociotechnical problem I investigate has to do with the ques-
tion of how to manage the economic order of moderate nationalism 
in the Middle East while avoiding the more dangerous alliance of mil-
itant nationalism, communism, and national control of oil operations. 
Chapter 5, “Assembling Intractability: Managing Nationalism, Combat-
ing Nationalization,” argues that the resolution of Iran’s oil nationaliza-
tion crisis occurred on terms set by the different international regulatory 
regimes and techniques of intervention, such as an oil boycott, involved. 
These technologies worked as strategies to block nationalization by ren-
dering the oil dispute intractable and by framing issues in ways that sepa-
rated political questions from economic and technical ones. Technologies 
of temporization and delay constituted the last set of weapons available 
to manage oil crises in a way that would strengthen the bargaining power 
of Western governments and oil companies to the detriment of the Ira-
nian government and oil workers. 
 The fi nal sociotechnical problem tracks the machinery involved in 
reconfi guring Iran’s oil nationalization crisis through the working out of 
an international oil consortium between 1952 and 1954. The reconfi g-
uration took place within a post–World War II international petroleum 
order that witnessed the building of a peculiar relationship among oil 
currency fl ows, the US arms industry, fi nancial and technical aid, and 
the fi ght against communism. Chapter 6, “Long-Distance Machineries 
of Oil,” maps in detail the anatomy of the oil corporation as a type of 
long-distance machinery for placing limits on new oil discoveries in the 
Middle East. A new set of mechanisms and justifi cations was devised to 
place limits on the fl ow of Iranian oil, namely, the consortium arrange-
ment, US national security, and the calculating technology of the “Aggre-
gated Programmed Quantity,” to limit production levels in coordination 
with the leading international oil corporations. Anglo-American interests 
sought to build a new international order that entertained the wording of 
nationalization but only as a means of preserving old and new contrac-
tual relations between national governments and foreign fi rms. 
 Drawing on primary material from government and business archives 
in Iran, the United Kingdom, and the United States,  Machineries of Oil 
comprises six chapters, tracking the oil as it was transformed in southwest 
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Iran into an elaborate machinery, marking the closure of democratic 
forms of politics at specifi c points of vulnerability in the energy system. 
Each chapter therefore marks the transformation of oil from a material 
substance into its representation and abstraction as concession terms, 
a form of industrial science, mathematical formulas, and a hierarchical 
labor regime with a specifi c kind of worker. The excesses of coercion 
and violence involved in the resolution of the disputes under discussion 
spilled into national politics. These controversies were explained away 
in terms of blocking the threat of militant nationalism, the lack of ade-
quately trained domestic labor, and the need to pursue oil operations 
within global oil infrastructures set up by the seven dominant oil corpo-
rations, famously known as the “Seven Sisters.” 48 
 *** 
 What kinds of technopolitical collectives have emerged from this story, 
enabling the closure of more democratic forms of politics? The oilfi elds 
of southwest Iran served as a kind of laboratory in which the political 
agency of the oil corporation was formatted to fi t the hypothetical world 
claimed to be described in contract terms and inscribed within various 
zones of measurement, regulation, and qualifi cation. But in practice, oil 
infrastructure—a set of alliances and interconnections and all the knowl-
edge constructed about them—makes possible the global oil economy. 
As Andrew Barry has observed, “the question of how and whether par-
ticular oil developments are included or excluded from particular zones 
of measurement and regulatory and quality assessment is critical to the 
contemporary politics and economy of oil.” 49 The process of assembling 
this machinery, shaping who can act and on what terms, occurs locally 
starting with a rhetoric that renders the local knowledge of property 
claimants, oil workers, and a national government as defective, by appre-
hending them in terms of the economic rationality they lack. Practices of 
abstraction manifested in concession terms, formulas, and international 
law are the outcome of the sociotechnical process under examination, 
allowing relations between politics and international oil markets to 
remain predictable and stable. 
 The origins of BP’s dramatic success over the course of the twentieth 
century reside in a little-known region of southwest Iran. By plunging 
into the technicality of the battle over oil, this study exposes the powers 
of the oil corporation precisely in the organizational work of each dis-
pute. The power of an account of a boundary between an outside and an 
inside to oil operations does not arise from the accuracy of its descrip-
tion of the socioeconomic relations of oil. It comes from the tools and 
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arguments made available for handling the organization of oil infrastruc-
ture. Decisions about profi ts, production rates, and labor were directly 
tied to the ways the control and distribution of oil were organized in the 
oilfi elds of the Middle East. These decisions did not determine political 
outcomes but rendered the authority of oil concessions highly uncertain 
and the shape of the oil industry open to alternative possibilities. The 
politics of the Middle East or of any oil-producing region of the world 
cannot be understood adequately without giving serious consideration to 
its technical dimensions, and the technical world of oil can be understood 
properly only in terms of the historical and political forces through which 
that world has been shaped. 
 The Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the Concessionaire 
… exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for 
trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite 1 … 
throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of 60 years … . 
 This privilege shall comprise the exclusive right of laying the pipelines necessary 
from the deposits where there may be found one or several of the said products 
up to the Persian Gulf. … [This privilege also includes] the right of constructing 
and maintaining all and any wells, reservoirs, stations and pump services, accu-
mulation services and distribution services, factories and other works … . 
 The Imperial Persian Government grants gratuitously to the Concessionaire all 
uncultivated lands belonging to the State which the Concessionaire’s engineers 
may deem necessary for the construction … of the … works. As for cultivated 
lands belonging to the State, the Concessionaire must purchase them at the fair 
and current price of the Province. 
 The Government also grants the Concessionaire the right of acquiring all and 
any other lands … necessary for the said purpose, with the consent of the pro-
prietors, on such conditions as may be arranged between him and them without 
their being allowed to make demands of a nature to surcharge the prices ordi-
narily current for lands situate in their respective localities. Holy places … are 
formally excluded. (Articles 1–3, D’Arcy Concession, 1901) 
 When William Knox D’Arcy signed the fi rst oil concession agreement 
in the Middle East with the Qajar government in 1901, he immediately 
encountered numerous technical and fi nancial problems. 2 This was due in 
part to the costliness of the venture and his failure to strike commercially 
producible quantities of oil in the fi rst seven years of the concession’s exis-
tence. The problem was that the 1901 oil concession did not say much 
about the oil itself or where to fi nd it. Most of the document concerns 
the question of property or the “Concessionaire’s” rights to access and 
develop the land and petroleum resources underground, as defi ned within 
 1 
 Properties of Petroleum 
 Chapter 1 
 Properties of Petroleum 
 © Massachusetts Institute of Technology All Rights Reserved 
22  Chapter 1
the concession area. The text of the concession was originally written in 
French and then translated into Persian and English. The English trans-
lation of Article 1 of the concession, quoted above, grants D’Arcy auto-
matic and exclusive access to produce, transport, refi ne, and sell Iran’s 
oil. Article 3 identifi es the “Imperial Persian Government” as owner of 
all lands, “cultivated and uncultivated,” “belonging to the State.” In addi-
tion to granting D’Arcy access to all state-owned lands for the purposes 
of oil development, the concession also grants him, as “Concessionaire,” 
the legal privilege of purchasing all non-state-owned lands from “propri-
etors” within the concession area. 
 But did access to and ownership of the oil and lands above it, as 
defi ned in the concession contract, imply the same meanings in English 
as in Persian? Since the sixteenth century, all natural resources in Iran, 3 
including those underground, were owned by the ruling monarch ( shah ). 4 
This meant that mining operations such as in oil could only take place 
with his permission. In Article 1, the ruling government of the Qajar 
shah grants to D’Arcy complete access and control over the subsoil for 
the purposes of oil development, but the subsequent article, Article 3, 
makes a peculiar distinction between lands owned by “the State” versus 
“other proprietors,” implying that property relations in Iran work the 
same way they do in the West, in terms of a distinction between pub-
lic (state-owned) and private (local proprietors) ownership. Following 
this framing of the terms, D’Arcy is granted automatic access to the 
subsoil to search for, take away, and sell the “natural gas, petroleum, 
asphalt and ozokerite” contained within the concession area, regardless 
of whether the surface is owned and controlled by the state or by a local 
proprietor. 
 In contrast to those governed by the rule of private landed property 
practiced in other Western countries—especially the United States, a pio-
neer in the oil industry and one of its leading producers—D’Arcy and his 
fellow British investors seemed to be at an immediate advantage. 5 Article 
1 guarantees that “for a term of 60 years,” D’Arcy and his team of drillers 
and engineers would have automatic access to the petroleum resources of 
the “Persian Empire,” regardless of the nature of property ownership on 
the surface. This exclusive access had the potential to change the shape 
of the oil industry. For approximately the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century, the United States produced over half the world’s output of 
petroleum, but the US rule of private property posed a problem for the 
extraction of oil since such a right gave individual owners of the soil 
automatic authority over the subsoil. Problems related to property laws 
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concerning oil had their origins in US Supreme Court decisions of the 
late nineteenth century, which drew an analogy between oil and gas and 
 ferae naturae of English common law. Thus, “if a wild pheasant ran from 
one person’s property to another’s, ownership of the pheasant changed as 
well.” 6 Whoever caught the oil fi rst could keep it. Because a potential oil-
fi eld can cover several private lots, private ownership of the subsoil cre-
ated the problem of multiple producers attempting to extract oil as fast 
as possible for their own gain, otherwise known as the “rule of capture.” 
For a major oil company such as Standard Oil, “the obstacle represented 
by small private landed property caused companies such as [John D.] 
Rockefeller’s to monopolize downwards” in transportation, refi ning, and 
marketing to avoid the problems associated with production. 7 American 
oil investors such as Rockefeller also headed abroad because of the high 
price of US oil. The high price had originally been artifi cially imposed by 
the Texas Railroad Commission and later by federal import quotas to 
confront the high degree of competition resulting from the rule of cap-
ture. In order for Rockefeller to maintain control and prevent competi-
tors from undercutting him, Standard Oil ventured into other parts of the 
world such as Venezuela and eventually Saudi Arabia, seeking to “fi nd 
new fi elds and initiate extraction but based on state landed-property 
which they helped impose.” 8 British fi nanciers such as D’Arcy appeared 
to have avoided the US problem of private control of the subsoil because 
the concession identifi es the ruling government of Iran as maintaining 
total (state-owned) control over it. 
 The signatories to the legal text of the 1901 concession recognize two 
contractually equivalent parties, the British concessionaire (D’Arcy) and 
the Iranian government. It suggests that along with third-party propri-
etors, they are the only actors involved in this story. But did the oil com-
pany’s concessionary terms of representing land in a foreign language and 
according to the rules of Western property ownership simply get imposed 
as a legal text between the two parties? This chapter starts from the con-
cession agreement itself, treating the articles on property not just as a text 
over which the main actors disagreed, but as an apparatus through which 
actors take on new powers and politics. I investigate the ways the con-
cession contract operates as a kind of device helping to give actors their 
bargaining power and shaping who can act and on what terms. 
 Property agreements such as a concession are not simply a question 
of new rights, a legal document, and a contractual agreement. There 
remains the problem of what actors will be party to the agreement and 
what actors will be excluded. One party involved a new kind of actor, the 
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transnational oil corporation. What was the status of this actor? What 
was its power? The powers of actors are formed partly in the agreements 
they make. The text of an agreement such as a concession helps defi ne 
their powers—it is a device that helps create agency. 9 For the concession 
terms on property to succeed in oil development, the British concession-
aire needed to impose and stabilize the proposed property arrangements 
defi ned in Articles 1 and 3. Multiple devices such as concession terms but 
also technologies for measuring and valuating oil needed to be mobilized 
and attach themselves to diverse actors to achieve the goal of fi nding, 
producing, transporting, and selling oil. Over the years, British investors 
(D’Arcy, AIOC, the British government) increasingly placed the 1901 
concession’s terms between themselves and all other entities, such as local 
political groups and the Iranian government. Along with oil workers, 
landowners and other claimants to the land battled to defi ne their identi-
ties otherwise in the pursuit of more equitable forms of oil development, 
namely, national control. Thus, struggles over a text’s details, the proper-
ties of petroleum in this instance, matter. 
 The history of the relations between the oil, the British oil company, 
and the Iranian government can therefore be understood, in part, as a 
series of crises over the property rights of an oil corporation in relation 
to a sovereign government and local claimants to the land. Concessions, 
formally defi ned as “grants by a state to citizens, aliens, or other states of 
rights to carry out specifi c economic activities and of capitulatory rights 
on its territory,” have existed in Iran since the sixteenth century. 10 How-
ever, no existing history of Iran, or of any other country in the Middle 
East, deals closely with the development of oil in particular by taking 
seriously its technical and concessionary history. Scholars have not taken 
into account the peculiar properties of oil embedded in Iran’s 1901 con-
cession contract, but rather focus on the date of the concession’s signing, 
the most powerful parties involved, and certain disputes over its fi nancial 
terms. 11 But most of the document concerns the question of property 
rights insofar as the British investors can access and develop the land and 
underground petroleum resources located within the concession area. By 
placing technologies of accessing, measuring, valuating, and selling oil 
at the center of this analysis, I retrace the organizational work of British 
concessionary property within the larger history of modern property in 
Iran. The approach also makes visible the properties of petroleum, or all 
the people and things and forms of knowledge attached to the oil but 
silenced in the oil concession. While not mentioning many of them explic-
itly, the concession contract enabled the different actors involved—the 
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Iranian government, the British investors, and claimants to the land—to 
negotiate possible compromises and open or close alternative political 
possibilities in the control and distribution of oil. British investors, man-
agers, and engineers arrived in southwest Iran with a peculiar understand-
ing of the properties of oil, and of the terms and politics through which 
they would access and exploit oil as spelled out in the concession’s text. 
They also confronted what they viewed as a desolate backwater inhab-
ited by a population lacking adequate technical knowledge and skills 
for modern energy development, yet possessing claims to ownership of 
the regions targeted for oil extraction. Placed by the company in appar-
ent opposition to the history of democracy and modernity of the West, 
these local actors created an uncertainty most evident in the problems 
that emerged around the question of British concessionary control over 
the oil. 
 This chapter recounts a different history of oil by exploring disputes 
over the properties of Anglo-Iranian oil in fi ve parts. The fi rst section 
tracks how another article, Article 6 of the 1901 concession, concerning 
the right to construct a pipeline to the Persian Gulf, initially worked in a 
remarkable way to block rival fi rms and delay the launching of the fi rst 
oil industry in the Middle East, in Iran. The analysis exposes how and 
why British investors and technologists chose to explore for oil in south-
west Iran in the fi rst place, knowing that other more easily accessible 
locations for oil development existed in neighboring Mesopotamia and 
Egypt. The second section considers in more detail the text of the fi rst 
three articles on property to expose the problems that emerged around 
the question of land ownership in southwest Iran. I then consider the 
specifi c ways local forms of property challenged the British strategy of 
accessing oil and its response to the uncertainties built into the conces-
sion. The third section looks at how the oil company bypassed its own 
concessionary authority in favor of alternative arrangements with local 
actors who worked to redefi ne the nature of ownership over oil. The 
fourth section reveals how technical problems of valuating oil shed light 
on the power of concessionary property in creating or limiting political 
possibilities. Forms of property ownership and valuation were deemed 
legal or not depending on the interests involved (local, national, oil com-
pany) and the political consequences of more equitable forms of con-
trol. This section as well as the fi fth one explore the ways AIOC and the 
Iranian state increasingly cooperated in the deployment of technologies 
of control, compulsion, and eviction of local land claimants to stabilize 
concessionary rule. I point to how the powers of the transnational oil 
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corporation were worked out locally, in a southwest corner of Iran, and 
the kinds of political closure that the machinery of the British-controlled 
oil concession helped bring about. 
 Article 6 and the Move to Southwest Iran 
 The privilege granted by these presents shall not extend to the Provinces of 
Azerbadjan, Ghilan, Mazendaran, Asdrabad, and Khorassan, but on the express 
condition that the Persian Imperial Government shall not grant to any other 
person the right of constructing a pipeline to the southern rivers or to the south 
coast of Persia. (From Article 6, D’Arcy Concession, 1901) 
 British commercial interest in mineral development and the Iranian gov-
ernment’s interest in revenues from such development combined to estab-
lish the fi rst concessionary oil agreement in the Middle East. Antoine 
Kitabji, Director of Persian Customs, fi rst made the offer to D’Arcy by 
way of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, 12 British Minister in Tehran, to 
acquire the right to explore, extract, and exploit oil in Iran using the 
legal format of a concession. 13 Having already made a fortune from an 
Australian gold mining venture, D’Arcy accepted the offer to acquire 
an oil concession in Iran, not including the fi ve northern provinces (i.e., 
Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad, and Khorasan), which were 
under Russian infl uence. 14 
 Article 6 of the concession agreement stipulated that the privileges 
granted to the British concessionaire would not extend to the fi ve north-
ern provinces on the condition that Iran’s government would likewise 
prohibit any other company from building a pipeline across the con-
cession territory to the Persian Gulf. The exclusion of the fi ve northern 
provinces from the British concession was connected to Russia’s imperial 
ambitions in Iran, but perhaps more so to Russia’s commercial oil inter-
ests in Far Eastern markets. In the pre–World War I oil industry, anyone 
who could load oil in the Persian Gulf would have a signifi cant compet-
itive advantage in Asian markets over oil exported from the Black Sea 
through the Suez Canal because it was cheaper. 15 Russia’s commercial 
ambitions centered on a plan for a Transcaucasus–Persian Gulf pipeline 
route starting in Baku and backed by the major Russian oil producers, 
namely, the Swedish Nobel family and the French Rothschild banking 
fi rm. Such a pipeline would be a serious blow to competitors in Asian 
markets, particularly Standard Oil, the largest of the world’s oil fi rms 
and the company to beat from the late nineteenth century to World War 
Properties of Petroleum  27
II. There was only one problem: the British concession was blocking the 
way to Iran. 16 
 In the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, Russia exhibited more 
infl uence on the Qajar government and in the northern provinces than 
Britain, which lost popularity and prestige as a consequence of the nation-
wide tobacco revolt against the British tobacco concession in 1890. 17 The 
Nobel and Rothschild fi rms, the leading Russian oil producers, backed 
Russia’s goal of a government-sponsored consortium consisting of the 
major Russian oil fi rms, to compete against and collaborate with Stan-
dard Oil and consolidate their control of the Russian oil industry. Col-
laboration often helped oil fi rms strengthen their monopoly control so 
oil fi rms engaged in both competition and collaboration depending on 
the targeted markets. In 1902, the Russian minister of transportation 
pursued this goal by making a loan to the Qajar government conditional 
on a concession for a pipeline to the Persian Gulf to transport Baku oil 
to Far East markets. 18 
 Scholars often rely on an imperialist framing to argue that a strictly 
imperial pursuit was what drove Great Britain and Russia’s quest for 
oil in Iran and the greater Middle East and that the aim of the inves-
tors in pursuing concession agreements was to  discover oil, not  delay its 
development. 19 In its early years, D’Arcy’s 1901 oil concession in Iran 
appeared to work more effectively as a mechanism for blocking rivals 
and delaying rather than producing any oil. Article 6 of the concession 
guaranteed that so long as he was exploring for oil, no other investor or 
government could build a pipeline across the concession area to the Per-
sian Gulf. 20 In the meantime, D’Arcy did not strike much oil and believed 
that Mesopotamia was a more promising location for oil development. 21 
He tried to relieve himself of the fi nancial responsibilities of maintaining 
the 1901 concession (e.g., drilling for oil and setting up a company) by 
attempting to organize a syndicate prior to the creation of an oil com-
pany, which he was in no position to do without oil. He approached 
the rival Rothschild fi rm, with oil interests in Baku, for fi nancial sup-
port. But that strategy created a problem for another competitor—the 
Burmah Oil Company. An alliance between D’Arcy and the Rothschild 
fi rm would potentially speed up pipeline construction to transport Rus-
sian oil from Baku to the Persian Gulf and thereby disrupt Burmah Oil’s 
monopoly control over the large kerosene market in India. Alternatively, 
it would have brought Rothschild-owned Iranian production onto the 
market. D’Arcy’s negotiations with the Rothschild fi rm helped trigger 
Burmah Oil’s decision to “play along with D’Arcy” by providing fi nancial 
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backing to his concession through the formation of the Concessions 
Syndicate. 22 
 In 1905, D’Arcy formally agreed to share his concession rights in Iran 
with the Burmah Oil Company, the second largest oil company in the 
British Empire after Shell. 23 However, Burmah’s aim, Timothy Mitch-
ell explains, was to rescue the failing British venture in order to gain 
control of the concession as a mechanism for  delay and blockage rather 
than opening up the production of Middle East oil. 24 Burmah Oil was 
facing its own threat with the creation of another rival company, Asi-
atic Petroleum, a jointly held subsidiary of the Rothschild fi rm, Royal 
Dutch, and Shell, whose goal was to fl ood the Indian market with oil 
that could “undersell Burmah’s.” 25 As a result, Burmah Oil was forced to 
enter a cartel arrangement (a group of suppliers in oil with the purpose 
of maintaining high prices and restricting competition) with Asiatic in 
1905. For Burmah Oil, keeping D’Arcy’s concession intact ensured, at 
the very least, the blockage of Russian oil from fl owing through a Persian 
Gulf pipeline, and therefore a degree of protection of its interests in the 
Indian market. 
 In the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, Standard Oil and the Euro-
pean oil companies “created arrangements to restrict the production of 
oil, control its worldwide marketing—and simultaneously address the 
threat of oil from the Middle East.” 26 Securing and coordinating the 
control of concessionary arrangements in each oil region was central to 
achieving this strategy. 27 A related threat was that the Russian producers 
at Baku would shorten the route to Asia by building a pipeline to the Per-
sian Gulf. To block these threats, the three largest British and European 
oil fi rms purchased concession rights to explore for oil in the Middle 
East: Deutsche Bank in northern Mesopotamia (the Ottoman provinces 
of Mosul and Baghdad) in 1904, Burmah Oil in Iran in 1905, and the 
Shell group in Egypt in 1908–1910. 28 
 In the fi rst decade of its existence, the 1901 D’Arcy Concession arrange-
ment lent its British investors and the future British oil company, AIOC, a 
kind of power to control markets and join international oil cartels to man-
age oil production (in the Middle East and elsewhere) precisely through 
its control over concessionary property and the building of a pipeline. 
But why move to southwest Iran in the fi rst place, especially when more 
easily accessible fi elds were already known to exist in Mesopotamia and 
Egypt? The ruling Qajar government (1794–1925) fi rst commissioned a 
series of scientifi c missions in 1890 led by a French geologist, Jacques de 
Morgan, who published a volume analyzing oil prospects for potential 
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petroleum development. 29 Boverton Redwood, the leading British expert 
in petroleum matters, arranged on D’Arcy’s behalf for a subsequent land 
survey to be conducted in 1901 by a British geologist, H. T. Burls. 30 Burls 
confi rmed de Morgan’s conclusions on oil prospects in the concession 
area: “The territory as a whole is one of rich promise.” 31 Based on Burls’s 
report, Redwood advised D’Arcy to begin drilling not at Masjid Suleiman 
where the fi rst commercially producible oil reserves would be found but 
further north at Chah Surkh, located near the border with Mesopotamia. 
In 1892, de Morgan had fi rst published a report on oil deposits at Chah 
Surkh in the journal  Annales des Mines . 32 However, by drilling at Chah 
Surkh, Mitchell explains, D’Arcy was again blocking a potential bypass 
route for the pipeline to Baku, obstructing an increase in Caspian exports 
to India. 33 
 Failing to strike oil at Chah Surkh, drillers eventually moved south-
east, in 1906, to Khuzistan Province. 34 Activities progressed slowly, in 
part because D’Arcy did not have the funds to drill in more than one 
location at a time. He instructed George Reynolds, a British graduate of 
the Royal Indian Engineering College with previous oil drilling experi-
ence in Sumatra, to head south and explore possible sites for drilling on 
the basis of W. H. Dalton’s geological report and to make agreements 
with local landowners for such activities. Working on behalf of D’Arcy, 
Reynolds hoped to drill in 1904, but activities were delayed until a sat-
isfactory arrangement could be made with the Bakhtiyari khans, local 
claimants to the land who were demanding a percentage of future oil 
profi ts. Burmah Oil’s lack of interest in oil development along with a 
series of other delays, such as with the construction of a road to transport 
equipment, meant that drilling at Masjid Suleiman did not begin until 
January 1908, fi nally yielding commercial quantities the following May. 
 The oil at Masjid Suleiman was naturally high in sulfur, which pre-
sented an additional set of problems for its use either as gasoline or 
as kerosene for illumination—oil’s main marketable use in these early 
years. Thus, British investors in AIOC and the Burmah Oil Company 
“organized the oil’s weaknesses and their business needs into an imperial 
interest, as fuel oil for steam or diesel engines.” 35 The problem was that 
most imperial powers were coal based in the early twentieth century. Few 
oil-powered engines were used anywhere near Iran and the company faced 
bankruptcy in its early years. In a bid to cover its costs, AIOC offered 
discounted prices to the British Navy. The British government rescued 
AIOC in 1914 by purchasing 51 percent of the company’s shares. 36 The 
British government’s participation as the primary shareholder in AIOC 
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transformed the company into a leading member of the emerging inter-
national oil cartel, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). The threat of 
potential oil development in Mesopotamia had helped trigger the 1914 
agreement among America’s Standard Oil Company and Europe’s prin-
cipal oil companies, including AIOC, to control oil supplies and protect 
international oil markets by agreeing not to undertake oil production 
anywhere in the Ottoman Empire unless jointly through TPC (discussed 
in chapter 3). 37 The concluding phase of negotiations to establish TPC 
coincided with the British government’s decision to fi nance AIOC. The 
1901 D’Arcy Concession involved many more actors and cartel agree-
ments than its terms would suggest. It also enabled a foreign national 
(British) government and oil company (AIOC) to share in the project to 
hinder the development of both Mesopotamian and Iranian oil, threaten-
ing both the European and Asian markets. 
 Rather than enabling any oil development, at least in the early years, 
the concession’s terms—Article 6 in particular—worked as a kind of 
management and control tactic through which the powers of the transna-
tional oil corporation were forming precisely by keeping actors such as 
the British government, Admiralty, and Burmah Oil in, and other rivals, 
especially Russian oil, out. Article 6 lent D’Arcy the power to ensure 
that as long as he met the concession’s contractual obligations to explore 
for oil, the Russian pipeline project could not happen. Not mentioned 
in the concession’s terms was the role of a new set of actors such as the 
Burmah Oil Company and the British government, which rescued D’Ar-
cy’s failing oil venture in order to protect Far East oil markets and to 
purchase fuel oil for the British Navy at discounted prices, respectively. 
The powers of the future oil company were forming as a long-distance 
machinery for organizing the energy network. These powers worked ini-
tially by delaying the arrival of new oil supplies from the Middle East, 
precisely through the terms of Article 6 and in coordination with other 
cartel arrangements, helping to make the international market in oil more 
predictable. Further, the organizational form of AIOC was emerging as 
a mixture of so-called public (government) and private (nongovernment) 
interests from the start. It was not simply boosted by British government 
funds as the BP company history suggests. The fl ow of new supplies of 
oil from the Middle East was a looming threat to world markets. 38 The 
1901 concession’s terms on property and oil development in Iran would 
have to be executed in the oil regions to help build a world in which any 
future uncertainty was eliminated. 
Properties of Petroleum  31
 Rules of Concessionary Property 
 1901 was not the fi rst time the central government had granted a conces-
sion to a foreign concern. Since the sixteenth century, ruling governments 
had granted economic concessions to promote the exploitation of Iran’s 
natural resources. The granting of the fi rst concession in the history of 
Iran related to carbon-based energy was shaped by the British pursuit of 
another fossil fuel—coal. In July 1872, the Qajar government granted 
Baron Julius de Reuter an extensive concession for exclusive rights in 
railroad and streetcar construction, mineral extraction, irrigation works, 
a national bank, and various industrial and agricultural projects. 39 Nasir 
al-Din Shah, the ruling monarch of Iran, was reported to have granted 
concessions such as this with a “lavish hand” during his reign from 1848 
to 1896. 40 The British minister in Iran persuaded the shah to issue a royal 
proclamation guaranteeing “the sanctity of private property throughout 
the realm.” 41 In 1889, the minister then set up a new concession on Reu-
ter’s behalf (his fi rst concession was canceled in November 1873) with 
the right to exploit Iran’s minerals for sixty years. 42 Reuter eventually 
sold his mineral and oil rights to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corpo-
ration, whose directors included his son, George de Reuter, and George 
Curzon, British Member of Parliament and future Viceroy of India. The 
bank spent three years looking for oil. Curzon was at the time writing 
 Persia and the Persian Question , which was to “advert hopefully to Iran’s 
mineral resources,” including coal, but warned about the dangers of 
allowing Russia to build a railway to the Persian Gulf. 43 Along with a 
group of India-based British imperialists, Curzon helped portray Russia 
as a military threat rather than a commercial rival by not mentioning that 
the purpose of the railway and pipeline was to export Russian oil from 
Baku. Led by Curzon, these British Indian imperialists helped “arrange 
for Burmah Oil to invest in D’Arcy’s scheme [the 1901 concession] and 
keep alive his monopoly rights both to Persian oil and to the building of 
a trans-Persian pipeline.” 44 A strictly imperial pursuit to discover, pro-
duce, and sell oil as quickly as possible did not drive Great Britain and 
Russia’s quest for mineral concessions in Iran. Rather, Great Britain and 
Russia embarked on a kind of battle over the coordination and control 
of various concessionary and cartel agreements, managed in part through 
D’Arcy’s 1901 concession. These arrangements ensured that oil from Iran 
and the greater Middle East would not fl ow immediately or fall into the 
wrong hands (Russia), disrupting world oil supplies and the maintenance 
of high profi ts, particularly in Asian markets. 
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 Iranian offi cials were only able to pursue the 1901 concessionary 
arrangement after the concessionary privileges of the Persian Bank Min-
ing Rights Corporation lapsed in 1898. D’Arcy requested and received 
British diplomatic support for his concessionary application, as was nor-
mal practice at the time. 45 He secured the concession with the Imperial 
Government of Persia in May 1901. One of the fi rst problems D’Arcy 
and his fellow investors and technologists confronted was how to apply 
the terms of the concession and establish property rights over a subsoil 
and mobile material such as oil in a foreign country. As discussed at the 
start of this chapter, the concession’s articles on property told D’Arcy 
nothing about where the oil was located and what his specifi c rights were 
in relation to the population inhabiting the lands where he would extract 
any oil he found. What was the basis or precedent for such a legal right 
granted to a foreign concessionaire that extended across a vast terri-
tory totaling 480,000 square miles (e.g., the equivalent of over 100,000 
London Heathrow Airports)? How did this novel form of securing legal 
ownership over a foreign property—a concession—work in practice? 
 Prior to the arrival of British investors and technologists in Khuzistan, 
the particular properties of this region interacted with an entirely differ-
ent set of political claims to the land, with its organization within the 
local population, and in relation to the ruling Qajar government. Claims 
to land were made in terms of the revenue extracted from inhabitants 
through taxes imposed by the Qajar government on local profi ts made 
from the province’s exports. 46 The land where the oil was found was not 
an object to which a single individual claimed an absolute right. 
 The Qajar government did not directly rule the land that would become 
the site of oil extraction, transport, and refi ning. As the largest landowner 
in Arabistan Province, Shaykh Khaz‘al claimed the region bordering the 
Shatt al-Arab and extending inland to the land dominated by the Bakh-
tiyari confederation, which extended further inland and found its limits 
at the Bakhtiyar Mountains. Sixty percent of the Bakhtiyari district was 
mountainous, and given the relative inaccessibility of the region, was usu-
ally beyond the direct control of the government. 47 The region controlled 
by the shaykh marked the future location of a section of pipelines and 
the main refi nery at Abadan 48 and its port, while that of the Bakhtiyari 
marked the other half of the pipeline and the main oilfi elds at Masjid 
Suleiman. 
 These nomadic groups, other village populations, and  ra’iyat (“peas-
ants” or farmers) inhabiting southwest Iran had long experience with 
 naft (oil). 49 Material practices of oil development involved collecting 
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and storing the oil from seeps in the ground in round sheepskin con-
tainers and distilling it to make  qir (tar), which was sold as one of the 
region’s exports. Since the early eighteenth century the Persian Empire’s 
monarch, Nadir Shah, was reported to have issued a decree to trans-
port  qir to Ottoman Iraq for the building of warships. 50 The only sub-
stantial control exerted by the central government over the province 
was through an annual tax on the petroleum seeps in the amount of 
2,000  tuman . 51 
 Local Arabic-speaking and Persian communities and nomadic 
groups, such as those ruled by Shaykh Khaz’al and the Bakhtiyari khans 
respectively, exercised their own form of political leadership and sys-
tem of authority. 52 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the relationship between the shaykh and the reigning shah remained 
nominal: the shaykh paid annual taxes or personal “gifts” to the shah 
more as a means of maintaining his autonomy than as a show of fun-
damental political support to the monarchy. 53 The extent to which the 
Qajar state successfully collected taxes from the Bakhtiyari confeder-
ation was also uncertain. 54 Depending on the migration season, these 
nomadic groups owed taxes either to the provincial governor of Isfahan 
(spring) or to the governor of Arabistan (winter). 55 In their capacity as 
large landowners, “tribal leaders or  khans ” collected their “share of the 
produce of the land or their rents and dues,” and as “tribal leaders,” 
collected “levies from their followers.” 56 Thus, government control of 
property simply registered the ruler’s right to tax or extract a tribute 
from the shaykh and the Bakhtiyari khans. Since the rule of the Safa-
vid Empire (1501–1722), there was never a clear distinction in practice 
between the land held by the ruler as head of state, which Ann Lamb-
ton translates as  divani , and crown land, which she translates as  khasseh 
or  khaliseh . 57 
 Afsaneh Najmabadi explains that the Qajar regime (1794–1925) 
executed the consolidation of landed property; however, a de facto indi-
rect management of agricultural surplus extraction through tax farming 
( toyul-dari ) reemerged, and the land tended to remain within families 
as “essentially private.” 58 With an increasing need for income in the 
fi rst two decades of the twentieth century, the government sold “state 
land,” rather than paying out revenues from the land, and wealthy fami-
lies and merchants increasingly bought land as “private property.” 59 The 
history of private property was fi nally consolidated with the building 
of a modern legal and judiciary regime during the accession of Reza 
Shah (1925–1941). Najmabadi’s history of property for the two periods 
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largely relies on Lambton’s account, which translates  milk as private 
property. 60 What should be noted here is that modern English concepts 
of ownership—such as crown and private land in England or state prop-
erty in the United States, reduced to the singular issue of who owned the 
land—did not simply emerge in southwest Iran because they did not exist 
in the Persian language. Lambton does not explain her translation of 
the terms  khaliseh and  divani , but she does note that the distinction was 
“not so much concerned with the legal status of the land as with control 
over the administration and expenditure of the revenue.” 61 Further, the 
two categories of land were “not permanent and fl uctuated as political 
circumstances demanded.” 62 British offi cials and surveyors soon learned 
that the local practices concerning property that persisted in Iran did not 
correspond to their concept of ownership as an individual’s exclusive 
claim to land, alienable and inheritable by sale, and represented in a con-
tract. How then would  divani or  khaliseh come to mean ownership or 
“lands belonging to the State” as stipulated in the oil concession? 
 The arrival of British investors and technologists in Iran necessitated 
a peculiar kind of spatial knowledge about oil and property rights that 
marked a shift in the nature of political claims to the land. The older 
forms linked central government claims to Khuzistan’s land through 
the taxation of revenues collected by a network of semiautonomous 
shaykhdoms, “tribes,” and villages. In contrast, the foreign method pur-
sued by a British fi nancier such as D’Arcy focused on the single issue of 
“who” would control the land by possession of the guarantee or “right” 
to exploit its resources. The formulation of a written oil concession or 
contract represented this different form of creating and concentrating 
political authority. The format embodied a particular relationship to the 
land and the subsoil designated for exploitation that was not readily 
familiar to and practiced by local regional groups or governing bodies. 
 The 1901 oil concession at fi rst appeared as a legal text that seemed 
to guarantee a kind of absolute authority concerning the rule of con-
cessionary property. In practice, however, concessionary rights were in 
direct confl ict with local practices and forms of property. D’Arcy and his 
team of technologists soon realized that they could not simply impose 
the concession’s terms by invoking the absolute authority of an abstract 
concept. Their operation would have to involve the building of connec-
tions between oil, the concession terms, and an earlier history of legal 
devices and renting precedents guaranteed by the Iranian government 
to local political groups. Managed on the terms of the fi rst three articles 
of the 1901 concession, diverse property arrangements were suddenly 
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intertwined with larger battles over the control of fossil fuels. The conces-
sion stipulations served as a kind of machinery for defi ning and arrang-
ing authority over property and minerals in terms of a single individual 
owner: state or private control in the British sense. British investors and 
technologists, who bore no relation to southwest Iran, needed to fi nd a 
way to reduce land-use practices and production to the single issue of 
who owned the land and to separate this question of control from local 
activities. 
 Translating Mineral Rights 
 The political method of granting a concession to a foreign concern 
occurred at a particular historical moment when the corporation’s power 
was guaranteed by the backing of British diplomatic support and exemp-
tion from local forms of law and authority. 63 Articles 9 and 10 of the 
concession specifi cally granted the formation of a company or several 
companies in the future to take over D’Arcy’s responsibilities. In an 
attempt to guarantee the fi nancial backing of the concession, D’Arcy set 
up the Concession’s Syndicate in May 1903 with the authority to acquire 
all rights and privileges originally vested in him as concessionaire. 64 
 But the aforementioned local forms of power and authority over land 
introduced another kind of uncertainty that threatened the concession’s 
stability even in the form of a company. D’Arcy and his fellow investors 
soon learned that the Iranian government had its own form of imperial 
edict or royal decree known as a  fi rman . 65 The Iranian government had 
granted D’Arcy the exclusive right to drill for oil in certain parts of Iran in 
1901, including the region in which the territories of Shaykh Khaz‘al were 
located. But in January 1903, Mozaffer al-Din Shah granted a  fi rman to 
the shaykh using language in which the Qajar government admitted, “at 
least by implication,” that it had exceeded its powers in conferring certain 
privileges on D’Arcy. 66 The lands in question had belonged in the past to 
the shaykh, his tribesmen, and their ancestors. The rule of the  fi rman  over 
local property threatened to destabilize the authority of the 1901 con-
cession. To eliminate this threat, British authorities would have to certify 
all documents. 67 A company offi cial declared that “we shall recognize no 
one’s claim until they have produced the necessary  fi rman either in the 
original or a copy,” certifi ed by the British Legation in Tehran. 
 The British solution was to pursue “an alternative legal route” by pay-
ing the shaykh a proportion of profi ts derived from the oil obtained in 
his territories and to “deduct an equivalent sum from the amount due 
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to the Persian Government. …” 68 However, the shaykh really did not 
have the right to sell or lease the land on Abadan. The 1903  fi rman  had 
granted Abadan and the Karun River banks to “Arab Tribes” and not 
to the shaykh by name. By law, this forbade individual Arabs to sell the 
land to anyone. The Iranian government had also undertaken not to sell 
it unless it was fi rst purchased at a fair valuation from the tribes. The 
Iranian government would have to buy the land and “sell it again to the 
Oil Company.” 69 
 New and old property arrangements mixed and proliferated within 
the boundaries of the concession area. It appeared advantageous for the 
company to frame the land as uncultivated in order to acquire it free 
of charge from the Iranian government, as stipulated in Article 3 of the 
1901 concession, while simultaneously compensating the shaykh. Within 
a year, the company’s managing agents argued that the shaykh had no 
“ locus standi ” on the matter: the 1903  fi rman did not include mineral 
rights, and the shaykh had not claimed any mineral rights when the com-
pany was fi rst established. Thus, it was unlikely he would claim them 
now with the relevant  fi rman to confi rm the claim. The company’s agents 
advised that it follow “strictly on the lines of the concession,” and noth-
ing more should be paid to the shaykh in excess of the “surface value of 
the land.” 70 
 There was an ambiguity in the terms defi ning the kinds of property 
that persisted in English versus Persian terms. The concession discussed 
property as “cultivated” or “uncultivated” lands “belonging to the State.” 
In contrast, the rules of property in Iran at the time did not entail or 
imply the same concepts in English as in Persian. By the early twentieth 
century, Lambton says that land controlled or possessed by “the State” 
was known as  khaliseh . 71 One of the most signifi cant concentrations of 
 khaliseh was found in Khuzistan Province. 72 Under Qajar rule, the lands 
and waters of virtually the whole of Khuzistan were  khaliseh and entailed 
particular conditions and terms of lease. Much of  khaliseh daym (unirri-
gated, dry farming land), however, was in the de facto possession of the 
Arabic-speaking population of the province. 
 According to Reynolds, the persistence of local forms of property, 
differing from how property worked in England, was not an adequate 
explanation for confl icts over property claims with local forces. He 
explained that “Arab apathy” was really what made the land lay waste, 
but “he” (the Arab) recognized that “land has value it never had before 
as he has seen what can be achieved with irrigation.” 73 Thus, invoking 
British concessionary logic, Reynolds concluded that “if then it be Arab 
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apathy which renders the ground waste, it will be Arab avarice which will 
prevent you getting it at the price you quote.” 74 To maintain the stability 
of the concession’s terms, the British side could not factor the legitimate 
property claims of local groups into their calculations. At any moment, 
these groups might threaten to deconstruct the concessionary formula for 
securing access to the subsoil. 
 British investors, engineers, and drillers acted as spokespersons for the 
British civilizing mission, arriving in what they viewed as a technologi-
cally and socially backward land of disorder. This perspective informed 
the concessionaire’s technical decisions about how to resolve controver-
sies over property, mineral rights, and the pricing of land. The conces-
sionaire, argued Kitabji, was perhaps following too closely “the letter of 
the contract, forgetting that they were dealing with people who are unac-
quainted with laws and contracts. … People thought they had a right to 
ignore their engagements, and resorted practically to blackmail in order 
to carry out their designs.” 75 Establishing the rules of concessionary prop-
erty started with a rhetoric that rendered the local population defective in 
terms of a lack of rationality regarding laws and contracts. 
 Both British and Iranian interests aimed to secure  khaliseh under the 
absolute control of the central government. They argued that local polit-
ical communities with claims to the oil lands lacked an adequate under-
standing of the rule of (Western) laws and contracts. These communities 
were said to be characterized by avarice, which obscured their compre-
hension of the productive and technological use of land as well as its fair 
pricing. Such technoracialized attitudes toward local political forces that 
emphasized their fl aws, such as a proclivity for blackmail, informed the 
company’s technological choices and were inscribed in its conceptions of 
legality, valuation, and the hierarchical classifi cation of English law terms 
as superior to Persian terms. 
 Local claimants were defi cient in their legal understanding of “mineral 
rights.” From the moment the concession was signed, D’Arcy and his 
fellow investors knew that “land owners or even lease holders” might not 
permit drilling on their grounds. It may be necessary, Reynolds explained, 
“to enter into some agreement with them,” to offer compensation “over 
and above that laid down in the Concession.” 76 For they must know, 
he continued, that “the people with whom we will have to deal have 
but little respect for the orders of the Shah, and have no idea of the 
mineral rights of the owner of the ground being nil, to him belonging 
only the surface and its produce.” 77 The concessionaire justifi ed the rule 
of concessionary property (backed by state authority) in part through 
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a lack of understanding, exhibited by the local population, regarding 
mineral rights. 
 Article 3 of the concession appeared to guarantee that uncultivated 
land belonging to the state could be acquired “free of cost.” But with 
regard to sites designated for the oil refi nery and pipeline, “nothing could 
be satisfactorily settled without the Sheikh’s good will and coopera-
tion.” 78 Thus, the company had every desire to deal with him “on rea-
sonable business principles.” 79 For each land acquisition, the company 
was required to submit an application to the Iranian minister of mines 
and public works, who would then classify the land and determine its 
value. 80 This practice, however, would not eliminate the controversy over 
the hierarchical framing of property ownership in English terms as supe-
rior to Persian ones, which was creating uncertainty with regard to the 
valuation and pricing of the land, and local claims to it. 
 The concession’s articles did not address the relation between state con-
trol over cultivated and uncultivated land, which included subsoil miner-
als, and the older forms of property ownership that persisted among local 
communities in the oil regions. The origins of modern (concessionary) 
property in Iran were not separate from older land arrangements because 
these so-called traditional claims and productive processes were inter-
nal to its construction. 81 British investors interested in oil development 
worked toward tools and arguments with local and government actors 
that transformed property arrangements and mineral rights over the sub-
soil, originally secured through  fi rmans and  khaliseh , into the modern 
English version of state property authorized by the concession. 
 Porosity of Concessionary Property 
 In southwest Iran, it appeared to be to D’Arcy’s advantage to work with 
the central government in securing a concessionary relation through 
which all cultivated and uncultivated land “belonging to the State” was 
granted to the concessionaire (cultivated land being purchased from the 
state at the “fair current price of the Province”). In this early period, 
an emerging modern, large-scale corporation such as AIOC operated 
by “establishing oligopolies or exclusive territories of operation.” 82 
AIOC’s political method of gaining access to minerals through a con-
cession was tied to an earlier history of the colonizing corporation, 
which was automatically granted access and rights by the metropole 
alone to monopolize trade in specifi c resources. In contrast, the devel-
opment and implementation of the D’Arcy Concession would not only 
Properties of Petroleum  39
require fi nancial and technical control, granted through a legal document 
signed by the ruling state authority or government, but “an ability to 
understand the Persian environment in which it would be worked.” 83 
Only in this way would the recreation of the monopoly arrangement be 
guaranteed. 
 The Bakhtiyari khans presented themselves as the legitimate political 
authorities and owners of the lands, including the subsoil, in and around 
Masjid Suleiman. The D’Arcy Concessions Syndicate “readily accepted 
them as such,” 84 in direct violation of the terms it had agreed to in the 
1901 concession, which recognized the state as sole owner of the subsoil. 
D’Arcy’s British representatives, such as Reynolds, did nothing to con-
tradict these assumptions and undertook negotiations with the khans to 
secure drilling access. The Bakhtiyari had won a battle over property that 
was initially challenged by the syndicate. Reynolds had argued previously 
that with the aid of the British government, they must make the Bakhti-
yari understand the authority of concessionary property in alliance with 
state property, such that “even if the surface of the land is their [the Bakh-
tiyari khans’] property, that which is under the ground, is the property 
of the Crown and it is within the Concession that the Shah has granted 
D’Arcy access to this land for oil exploration.” 85 
 On November 15, 1905, an agreement was fi nally signed between 
the Concessions Syndicate and the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani, the ruling 
khans of the two dominant families within the Bakhtiyari confedera-
tion. 86 D’Arcy won the right to acquire land from the Bakhtiyari khans 
and to exercise drilling rights in their territory. In return the Bakhtiyari 
acquired a 3 percent interest in any company formed in their territory 
and agreed to guard the concessionaire’s property and personnel. 87 
 After oil was discovered in commercial quantities, an alternative 
arrangement prevailed in which the Bakhtiyari Oil Company (BOC) 
was incorporated and another company was set up known as the First 
Exploitation Company in April 1909. 88 BOC was provided with an issued 
capital of £300,000 and the “specifi c object of providing the Bakhtiyari 
Khans with their subsidies.” 89 The First Exploitation Company would sell 
its oil below cost to BOC, whose “sole function was to resell it to AIOC 
at the normal price.” 90 Following the earlier 1905 agreement, the Bakh-
tiyari families were given 3 percent of all shares in BOC, while AIOC 
received the remaining 97 percent and all of the First Exploitation Com-
pany shares. Building an alliance with the khans was crucial not only for 
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fi nancial and security purposes, but also because the Bakhtiyari provided 
4,500 of the 5,000 laborers working in the oilfi elds. 91 
 The creation of multiple companies existing only on paper with local 
political groups such as the Bakhtiyari khans demonstrated the porosity 
of the concession, a kind of ambiguity in its articles and clauses that 
could be exploited by many sides—British oil investors, the Qajar govern-
ment, and local political actors. Subsidiary companies such as the BOC 
were part of a mechanism existing only on paper with some people in an 
offi ce controlling the sites where oil would be explored and extracted. 
The power of a company was manifested precisely in these local connec-
tions, indicating that its power was not as concentrated or absolute as 
one might assume from the concession contract, and that such ties could 
easily fall apart. Both the concession and the various subsidiary com-
panies operating under its authority served as a technical machinery, a 
set of connections, for separating ownership claims that could be made 
or not. 92 
 The Qajar government refused to recognize AIOC’s arrangements with 
the khans. It also insisted on fi xing its claim to the ownership of certain 
lands as  khaliseh alone. 93 Prior to the signing of the agreement, the Qajar 
government argued that any contract concluded between D’Arcy and 
local political groups must be submitted fi rst to the government before 
being signed. 94 But as Stephanie Cronin observes, the British consul nego-
tiated with the khans and the Concessions Syndicate apparently with-
out any reference to the Iranian government or to rights the government 
might have secured in the concession. 95 
 The company could not ignore the complex ways local communities 
managed land. It invented alternative forms of property arrangement in 
its dealings with the Bakhtiyari that overlooked the articles of the con-
cession. In similar fashion, on May 6, 1909, Percy Cox, British politi-
cal resident in the Persian Gulf, promised Shaykh Khaz‘al “a guarantee 
that Britain would not allow the Iranian government to disturb the  sta-
tus quo of himself or his heirs or successors.” 96 A confl ict between the 
Bakhtiyari khans and Shaykh Khaz‘al would “not lead to very pleasant 
results” either for Khuzistan or for oil operations. 97 Bypassing the central 
government and other local claims to land revenues, the shaykh was to 
receive fi nancial compensation for access to the land, and such fi nan-
cial rights were secured along hereditary lines. On July 16, 1909, Cox 
signed an agreement with the shaykh granting one square mile of land 
to AIOC in exchange for an annual rent of £650 for the fi rst ten years, 
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an immediate British government loan of £10,000, and the withdrawal 
of the Indian Army guard with “the maintenance of security entrusted to 
local chiefs.” 98 As Cox put it, “the Company’s best interests would suffer, 
and our national interests as well, if they are to pursue their enterprise 
through the Persian government in spite of the Sheikh.” 99 
 AIOC’s actions indicate the porosity of the 1901 concession, a kind of 
ambiguity and weakness of ties, exploitable by multiple parties pursuing 
confl icting property arrangements over oil. The company realized that 
local claims to the land could not be bypassed as easily as anticipated. In 
spite of the new representation of state claims to the land and its subsoil 
outlined in the concession, the company understood that  khaliseh lands 
were highly unstable. AIOC offi cials opted to overlook and actively vio-
late the concession interests of the Qajar government by dealing secretly 
and directly with local ruling elites in alternative arrangements, neither 
within nor without the jurisdiction of Tehran. This included training and 
paying tribesmen as guards to patrol the oil extraction sites and pro-
tect their boundaries from disruptions posed by the local population. 100 
In turn, different property arrangements were invented, extended, and 
secured between AIOC and local forces with the power to disrupt con-
cessionary rule over the subsoil. Local forces such as the Bakhtiyari khans 
and Shaykh Khaz‘al pursued their own forms of political authority and 
power, causing them to suddenly appear outside state power and the 
terms of the concession. However, they were in practice both inside and 
outside, as their method of controlling the properties of oil and securing 
alternative contractual arrangements over them was the prerequisite to 
the production of oil according to the rule of concessionary property in 
the fi rst place. 
 Who Is the Real Owner? Pricing the Properties of Oil 
 “Compensation” for Bakhtiyari land was a controversial issue for AIOC. 
What was the basis for estimating the value of the land? In pricing the site 
of the main oilfi eld at Maydan-i Naftun, Charles Greenway, 101 AIOC’s 
managing director, looked to India, arguing that “the value of good 
cultivable land in India” averaged about £3–£5 per acre and that “this 
appears to me about as much as any similar land in Persia can possibly 
be worth.” 102 Reynolds suggested that the company consult a volume on 
the nature of ownership in Iran by a British adventurer and ethnographer, 
Austen Henry Layard, titled  Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and 
Babylonia, Including a Residence among the Bakhtiyari and Other Wild 
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Tribes . 103 Layard had written about his travels and discoveries in Iran in 
the late nineteenth century, including a section on the Bakhtiyari, which 
they later accepted as forming part of their own history. 104 Company 
representatives viewed the Bakhtiyari with an imperialistic bias, taking 
on Layard’s framing of them as primitive and “wild” and awaiting pro-
gress. Certainty resided in the Bakhtiyari khans’ promise to ensure secu-
rity for oil operations by drafting a letter to “Tribesmen, warning them 
against interfering with the Company’s work and of the consequences in 
so doing.” 105 On the question of land and its valuation, however, a series 
of uncertainties and interested claimants were getting involved. 
 The complexity of the ecologies of pastoral nomads and their tradi-
tional pasture rights did not factor into the British contract agreement 
with the Bakhtiyari khans concerning the purchase of their lands (the 
site of the main oilfi elds and a portion of the main pipeline) for oil devel-
opment. The power of the khans derived from two sources: on the one 
hand, from the confederation of which they were the leaders, and on the 
other, from the land. In their capacity as authorities over the land, the 
khans collected their share of the produce of the land or their rents and 
dues, while as “tribal leaders” they collected certain levies from their fol-
lowers. 106 The central Zagros Mountains were a diffi cult terrain through 
which nomads passed from their winter to summer pastures and back 
again. 107 Groups such as the Bakhtiyari khans claimed arable land in the 
 qishlaq (or  garmsir , winter quarters and site of oil regions) and some-
times in the  yaylaq (or  sardsir , spring quarters). 108 There were permanent 
agricultural villages and settlements throughout the Bakhtiyari territory 
except at high elevations and near border regions. 109 This resulted in a 
highly sophisticated ecology of mobility and settlement, which the com-
pany chose to overlook in its dealings with the group by simply treating 
them as settled, private landowners in the Western sense. 
 AIOC knew that oil operations in Bakhtiyari territory carried on 
“without any very defi nite understanding with the owners of the land 
here.” 110 The arrangement automatically assumed that the khans were 
“the sole owners of the property which we now know not entirely to be 
the case.” 111 The terms of the Bakhtiyari Oil Agreement of 1905 stated 
that “all arable or irrigated land required was to be handed over by the 
Khans at ‘the fair price of the day.’ Non-arable land was to be free.” 
The “ambiguity,” Morris Young explained, resided in the defi nition of 
 cultivated and  cultivable land. 112 But from mapping the regional and 
local ecologies of southwest Iran, the English concept of cultivated or 
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uncultivated obviously did not fi t because it presumed and was desig-
nated for land that had been settled, so to speak. 
 The entire property for the pipeline area, extending from Bakhtiyari 
territory to the site designated for oil refi ning in Abadan, totaled 1543.03 
acres. 113 In AIOC’s view, approximately 1246.03 acres were under “crop 
and new fallow,” and roughly 297 acres of “old fallow” existed that had 
not been cultivated in three to four years. 114 But a company surveyor 
from India noted that lands classed as “new fallow” were those the  ilyat 
(nomadic groups) were “in the habit of cultivating every alternate year, 
while even those lands classed by us [AIOC] as old fallow, had been cul-
tivated within quite recent years.” 115 In some cases, areas shown as “old 
fallow” in the previous year’s survey were under crop in the current year. 
On the one hand, the khans appeared to fall into the category of “propri-
etors” as spelled out in the terms of Article 3 of the 1901 concession, with 
claims to both cultivated and uncultivated lands that were not owned 
by the state. On the other hand, Article 3 excluded the khans by making 
no mention of pasture rights. Through a simple legal-fi nancial transac-
tion, it was thought, the British concessionaire might purchase the khans’ 
land at the “fair and current price of the Province” and build a pipeline 
to transport the oil. The problem was that local property arrangements 
were bound up in diverse ecologies, farming practices, and mobilities of 
settlement, which meant that lands understood in English as cultivated or 
uncultivated were not fi xed categories and took on quite fl uid meanings 
in practice. 
 The Bakhtiyari khans would not accept AIOC classifi cations or fi g-
ures on land measurements. During the 1911 negotiations over property 
arrangements within the concession area, the khans contested framing 
“non-arable lands” as “wasteland,” citing their value as grazing lands 
and seeking a fair price for them. As a response, the khans used local 
defi nitions and land surveyors to calculate land area and price in terms 
of  jarib , not acres. 
 The  jarib measurement of land respected the biannual and cyclical 
process of mobility and cultivation local to the region. The khans had 
“their own man who walked about with a stick measuring the land, 
and completed all his work within the last two weeks,” making out a 
“fi gure far above ours.” 116 The khans’ surveyor had reached a fi gure for 
an area of property fully double that supplied by Scott, the company 
surveyor. 117 
 British agents concluded that a  jarib was a piece of land measuring 25 
by 40 “shah”  zar’ , each  zar’ equaling 42 English inches. 118 A national law 
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was eventually passed in 1926 to equate Persian measurements with the 
metric system, and it was fi nally formalized in March 1935. 119 The  jarib 
was fi nally set at 1 hectare (approximately 3 acres); however, this again 
varied according to local uses and could represent an area ranging from 
400 to 1,450 square meters. The  jarib also varied according to the nature 
of farming practice. For example, a  jarib of unirrigated land was larger 
in certain areas than a  jarib of irrigated land. Lambton explains that this 
variation was due to the fact that the  jarib was not purely a “surface 
conception.” 120 In practice, it was bound up with measures of weight: 
“Since the amount of seed sown per acre of irrigated land is greater than 
the amount sown per acre of unirrigated land, the size of the  jarib varies 
in proportion.” 121 British investors wanted to impose and stabilize their 
own (Western) hierarchical system of classifi cation of Bakhtiyari land in 
terms of a fi xed and generalizable measurement in English. The problem 
was that local practices and technologies of designating an owner and 
measuring and pricing the land did not work in southwest Iran the same 
way as in the West. 
 Local forces in Khuzistan and throughout Iran practiced a sophisti-
cated form of measurement that varied with different kinds of land and 
weights of the seed. It did not follow a grid or frame as British offi -
cials assumed. This points to a particular politics of “enframing” or 
the peculiarity of absoluteness unconnected with the specifi city of activ-
ities people do. 122 This politics informed the choices of British investors 
and technologists, who bore no relation to the land, as they reduced 
practices of land use and production to a single issue of who owned 
the land and separated this question of control from local activities. 
However, as evidenced here, local activities defi ned logics of property 
measurement in Khuzistan. This was also the case in the West, as with 
the term  acre : the amount of land plowed by oxen or cattle in a day. 123 
Europeans arrived in Khuzistan, however, with a different notion of 
measure—a grid system—unrelated to the actual practices and activities 
of measuring lands that made the process of measurement and therefore 
valuation possible. 
 There was even more ambiguity concerning hill tracts. The khans con-
tended that these tracts were of value as grazing ground. There was noth-
ing in the original agreement saying that these lands were given free. 124 
James Ranking , the British consul, conceded that the word  free did not 
appear in the agreement, and the word in the Persian text translated as 
 give in English did not imply “free gift.” 125 There was no such thing as 
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 free land in the sense of “free gift” in Persian, further confi rmed by the 
Bakhtiyari practice of taxing grazing land as a source of income. 126 
 This highly complicated and varied system of measurement and valu-
ation points to why the khans would only negotiate by “rate per Jarib” 
and not English acres. The specifi city of the land and crop along with the 
work activities attached to them shaped the act of measuring and of val-
uation, rather than starting from an abstract grid or frame, which com-
pany offi cials preferred. Why? These methods of enframing worked as 
techniques of power to help render the land and its subsoil readable and 
thus controllable in abstraction precisely through the terms and authority 
of the oil concession. 
 AIOC continued to purchase more lands as operations expanded 
after World War I. Confl icts over land measurements for the purposes of 
accessing oil involved further controversies over whether a Persian  zar ’ 
was 42 English inches as stated in the 1911 agreement or 40.95 inches as 
claimed by the Iranian government. In either case, the British conceded 
that the khans did not “comprehend inch.” 127 By 1928, the aggregate land 
purchased by AIOC from the khans amounted to 6,750 acres. 128 
 At the close of property negotiations, the khans accepted Scott’s fi g-
ure of 9.5 square miles (6,131 acres). They sold the fi elds for a fraction 
of the original price, giving away over 3,000 acres of pastureland for 
free. 129 Framing the Bakhtiyari khans as sole owners, says Arash Khazeni, 
excluded the rights of pastoralists and farmers to the land, particularly 
the Lurs nomadic group. 130 The 1911 Bakhtiyari Land Agreement for-
bade the Lurs to access lands on a seasonal basis to graze their fl ocks 
and cattle, even though they had inhabited and cultivated these lands for 
generations. AIOC policy was to keep people of the district “away for at 
least one season from the boundaries of our property in order to break 
the continuity of their work” and to make “the common Lur understand 
that the land which he has tilled for generations is no longer his.” 131 Pas-
toralists resisted by crossing the designated boundaries of the oilfi elds 
regularly, setting up tents on company property and continuing to plow 
at Masjid Suleiman and Maydan-i Naftak. 
 Tracing the steps involved in transforming the oil regions into conces-
sionary property has made visible a defi ned chain of translation, although 
at all points unstable. British investors, engineers, and drillers, the Bakh-
tiyari khans, and Shaykh Khaz’al worked hard to “modify, displace, and 
translate their various and contradictory interests.” 132 Concession terms 
worked as a nice device for framing and directing actors’ interests toward 
concessionary control through the stabilization of connections between 
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an invisible, subsoil liquid, confl icting logics of property and ecology on 
the surface, English and Persian terms for types of land ownership, use, 
and measurement, and mechanisms of dispossession and violence. AIOC 
aimed to enforce the authority of the concession while simultaneously 
enrolling local forces that bypassed the power of the central government. 
Either way, depending on the strength of the ties, different groups threat-
ened to pursue alternative interests and disrupt the property arrange-
ments enabling the energy network to be built. 
 The concession’s terms were indeed porous and exploitable by mul-
tiple sides. Working out controversies over the fair valuation and mea-
surement of lands covering the concession area has revealed the ways 
concession terms failed to account for semiautonomous political groups 
who were simultaneously inside and outside of the law and authority 
of the central state and its contractual relations with British investors. 
Even living and cultivating conditions moved with the seasons, alerting 
AIOC to the realization that it was not dealing with single owners fi xed 
to a piece of land embodied in the English terms of the concession. What 
was certain in AIOC’s view, however, was that local claimants to the oil 
lands lacked an adequate understanding of proper English measurements 
and pricing. This informed AIOC’s technical decisions and techniques 
for securing access to the subsoil while blocking more equitable political 
arrangements of the energy system. 
 Reassembling the Properties of Oil 
 Reynolds found it “impossible” to obtain an “idea of the market price of 
the ground” in the lands claimed by the shaykh that marked the future 
location of a section of pipelines and the main refi nery at Abadan. 133 
Arabic-speaking nomadic groups residing on both sides of the Shatt 
al-Arab waterway (marking the border between Iran and Iraq and emp-
tying into the Persian Gulf) owed allegiance to the shaykh. His farm-
ers ( fellaheen ) cultivated his lands, which included Abadan Island, site 
of the future oil refi nery, primarily in dates. 134 As with the older forms 
of property that persisted in Bakhtiyari territory, the D’Arcy Conces-
sions Syndicate was again confronted with local forms of property that 
threatened to destabilize the authority of the fi rst three articles of the 
1901 concession. Cox recommended that the syndicate make sure the 
shaykh “has the right to sell land at all on Abadan” and that they should 
rely on diplomatic assistance to secure terms “as near fair market rate 
as possible.” 135 
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 The shaykh had agreed to lease, on behalf of his descendants and tribes, 
land for an annual rent and had agreed that all constructed property 
would revert to himself and his kin. 136 He regarded the lands as his own 
by right of inheritance and Arab by right of settlement. 137 Not only did 
AIOC agree to this, they also assured the shaykh that whatever change 
might occur in the “form of government in Persia,” the British govern-
ment was prepared to provide the same support against encroachment of 
his rights as was promised in his  fi rman . 138 AIOC acquired approximately 
650  jarib on Abadan Island, the site of the future oil refi nery, in addition 
to 10  jarib at Ahwaz, with riverfronts on the Karun River for erecting 
storehouses and other buildings. 139 
 Oil operations commenced and agreements were signed with the com-
pany’s full knowledge that the nature of “tenure and rights … over and 
in the soil enjoyed by the Sheikh and his tribes” since the granting of 
the 1903  fi rman required further investigation. 140 Rather than resort-
ing to arguments about the skills and knowledge that local proprietors 
“lacked,” Cox advised the company to recognize in confronting the Ira-
nian government that the shaykh did enjoy “mineral rights” in his terri-
tory, so that “any future exploitation of minerals would … naturally fall 
to British enterprise alone.” This was preferable to conceding that the 
Iranian government possessed such rights, which could lead to placing a 
mining concession in another region of Khuzistan “over the heads of the 
Sheikh and ourselves.” 141 Company offi cials feared that if they failed to 
make an agreement that acknowledged local groups as legitimate owners 
of mineral rights in the oil regions, they risked losing their oil concession. 
It therefore made more sense, in the early years, to bypass a weak central 
government in favor of strengthening ties with local claimants. 
 AIOC faced the problem of creating boundaries between advanta-
geous and disadvantageous forms of property rights as well as their mea-
surement and valuation. First, the company advised that the “right to 
allow boring for oil” be disassociated from the term “mineral rights.” 142 
Second, it was in the company’s interests “not to … dissect the question 
of the Sheikh’s precise rights” but to have recourse to various alterna-
tives. AIOC’s director suggested the shaykh be paid the “surface value 
of the ground” and allowed some equivalent of the 3 percent on profi ts 
derived from the sale of crude oil extracted in his territory, which would 
be based on the price paid for the oil to BOC. Due to the complex nature 
of property ownership, AIOC’s chairman admitted to the necessity of 
negotiating with local forces, but proposed that the costs incurred from 
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meeting their demands be deducted from the 16 percent share of profi ts 
owed to the Iranian government. 143 
 Property arrangements were not fi xed. They proliferated and extended 
across the concession area, threatening to destabilize the energy sys-
tem. Over the years, British and Russian intervention had weakened the 
central government in Tehran, reviving the power of local chiefs as 
well as numerous leftist and Russian-backed movements countering 
Britain’s hold over the country. 144 In the early years, it had been advanta-
geous for AIOC to strengthen semiautonomous political communities in 
southwest Iran in the event of the government’s collapse. 145 The British 
government dramatically shifted its strategy after 1921, however, engi-
neering the installation of Reza Khan and a strong centralized govern-
ment to suppress any further threats from Iran’s provinces, especially 
Khuzistan. 
 Formerly a Cossack Brigade member, Reza Khan changed his name 
to Reza Pahlavi and formalized the execution of the British-supported 
coup by ordering the constituent assembly to depose the Qajar govern-
ment in 1925. The installation of Reza Pahlavi as the shah marked a 
realignment of power and exposed AIOC’s former alliance with local 
forces and ruling elites as an increasing liability. For example, the govern-
ment’s decision in 1924 to revoke  fi rmans issued after March 10, 1903, 
put AIOC lands bought or leased from Shaykh Khaz’al in jeopardy. 146 
Suddenly, these middlemen were an increasing liability in the emerging 
alliance between the central government and AIOC. The central govern-
ment eliminated such groups through political violence and repression 
or by forcing them to sell their land, opening the door for the shah to 
deal directly with the company and collect royalties as well as land and 
petrol taxes. 
 By 1925, the new shah implemented his tribal policy to ethnically 
homogenize the state through a string of military campaigns against 
tribes particularly in Khuzistan, ousting Shaykh Khaz’al, confi scating oil 
shares controlled by the rival Bakhtiyari confederation, and forcing its 
chiefs to sell all of their land and disarm. 147 The Pahlavi shah sought to 
build a modern state with exclusive military control of southern Iran 
down to the Gulf and to maintain “direct responsibility for protecting 
the oilfi elds.” 148 An Iranian minister ordered the company to apply to 
local offi cial governors of the provinces for “ascertaining the ownership 
of the lands and for their own protection.” 149 Such agreements must be 
made with the “true owners of lands and waters with the cognition of 
the governors and the chiefs of tribes who will no doubt act according 
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to their duties.” 150 During the early years of the Pahlavi shah’s reign, the 
state confi scated considerable areas of land as a means of eliminating 
“tribal power” and that of certain large landowners. Among these were 
large areas in Khuzistan taken from Shaykh Khaz’al. The confi scated land 
was transformed into the shah’s  khaliseh . The shaykh fell from power 
around 1925 and died under suspicious circumstances while under house 
arrest. 151 The new Pahlavi monarch was reasserting the terms of the 1901 
concession by ensuring that property covering the oil regions was state 
controlled. This would help to eliminate any obstacles hindering his abil-
ity to collect oil revenues and build a modern state. 
 In this shifting of alliances, new groups with claims to concessionary 
property were plunged into the battle over the control of oil. “Arabs and 
peasants” rebelled across Khuzistan as the Finance Department ordered 
tenants to pay a tax on every date palm and owners to pay a tax per 
tree. 152 Such protests threatened to spread to other provinces.  The Times 
of London reported that the cause of the revolt “is attributed to the 
nature of property holdings in Khuzistan” connected to the shaykh. 153 
With the shaykh’s deportation to Tehran, his  ra’iyat (farmers) “seem to 
have thought that it would be well to claim their holdings as their own, 
especially as their landlord was no longer in a position to collect his 
dues.” 154 The British Foreign Offi ce confi rmed the report: “Arab fellaheen 
have been quietly disposing of the date produce for their own benefi t” 
and cultivators were refusing to pay the tax on trees in defi ance of local 
fi nance offi cials. 155 
 The new Pahlavi regime reasserted the rule of state property, above and 
below the surface, as internal to the authority of the concession through 
mechanisms of dispossession and eviction, alliance shifting, and debt. For 
example, the Bakhtiyari khans had started to borrow money against their 
oil shares, a large portion of which was already mortgaged by 1920 from 
the Imperial Bank of Persia. With a new British-backed central regime in 
Tehran, AIOC, the British Legation, and the Imperial Bank collaborated 
to use the khans’ fi nancial diffi culties as a means of “keeping their shares 
under British control.” 156 Banking and debt were twin mechanisms of 
compulsion exercised to fragment the Bakhtiyari confederation by associ-
ating one faction more closely with the British. The Bakhtiyari responded 
in multiple ways: by withdrawing protection and labor from the oilfi elds 
and embracing “private property” in land and oil shares to separate the 
senior khans, the main signatories to the Bakhtiyari oil agreements, from 
the junior khans, who were demanding their share of the dividends. 157 By 
1928, in the midst of the central government’s efforts to “clarify property 
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rights” through the enactment of a national law requiring the registra-
tion of property and title deeds, AIOC had successfully diverted all div-
idends and Bakhtiyari oil shares to British control, leaving them with 
nothing. 158 Whereas the company had previously overlooked the state’s 
concessionary authority over the subsoil in favor of alliances with local 
middlemen, the 1920s saw a transformative shift in strategy. It suddenly 
appeared advantageous for AIOC to pursue alternative alliances with a 
new British-backed monarch who worked to centralize control by elim-
inating local claimants to the oil regions through mechanisms of debt, 
dispossession, and eviction. Now working hand in hand with the com-
pany, a strong and centralized Iranian government ensured that the 1901 
concession terms regarding property and access to oil were reassembled 
as state control, whether defi ned in English or Persian. 
 Early in his rule, Reza Shah introduced new legislative, regulatory, and 
property arrangements to consolidate his control of the soil and subsoil 
of Iran. 159 The previous Qajar regime established the fi rst Department of 
Land Registration in 1922 within the Ministry of Justice, under Arthur 
Millspaugh, the government’s American Financial Adviser, for the reg-
istration of property and documents. Land Registration Acts spanning 
1921 to 1929 required that all titles be registered with a special offi ce. 160 
A uniform land tax was implemented throughout the country in January 
1926. A cadastral survey followed by a supplementary law for the reg-
istration of property in 1928–1929 fi xed the charges incurred on regis-
tration. 161 The latter law made registration of real estate compulsory and 
required the establishment of registration offi ces across the country. Fail-
ure to register within the two-year period after the establishment of the 
fi rst Department of Registration empowered the government to register 
the property in the name of the holder at the time. Notices were posted 
in the oil towns of Mohammerah and Abadan calling on all owners of 
landed property to register within one month or run the risk of losing 
their property. 162 
 For the whole of Khuzistan Province, which included the oilfi elds, pipe-
line, and refi nery, the Finance Department intimated that it would oppose 
registration of all land, “as the whole of Khuzistan is Crown property 
both in town and country.” 163 In 1934, the sale of state agricultural lands 
was resumed for the specifi c purpose of commencing modern agricultural 
development. 164 Much of the land of Khuzistan was taken over by Reza 
Shah, who, by the end of his reign in 1941, was the largest landlord in 
Iran with 2,000 villages wholly or partly owned by him. In confrontation 
with AIOC, the shah eventually shifted his strategy to consolidate his 
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control of more revenues from the oil-rich subsoil by canceling the 1901 
D’Arcy Concession in 1932 and signing a revised agreement in 1933. 165 
On the one hand, the revised terms reduced the concessionary area to 
100,000 English square miles, a territory whose boundaries were to be 
fi xed no later than December 31, 1938. On the other hand, there was 
no change as the lands available for acquisition were defi ned in terms 
of utilized and unutilized (rather than cultivated and uncultivated) but 
still as “belonging to the Government.” 166 Government policy regarding 
ownership of mineral rights was indefi nite and vague until 1939, when 
an act of the  Majlis (Iranian parliament) formally classifi ed all mineral 
resources and granted private ownership of mineral resources  except oil 
and precious metals. 167 Thus, Reza Shah’s policies of land confi scation 
and registration in Khuzistan introduced a new layer of legal interme-
diaries connecting the subsoil to the surface, claimants to the law, the 
central government, and the revised 1933 concession terms. Introducing 
procedures and paperwork for the national-legal classifi cation of the oil 
regions helped stabilize the control of the oilfi elds, pipeline, and refi nery 
in favor of concessionary control, helped eliminate intermediary claim-
ants, and helped solidify a new alliance between the British oil company 
and the Pahlavi government. Reassembling the properties of oil in this 
way ensured that any political uncertainty introduced by middlemen or 
former claimants to the land was eliminated. 
 Reassembling the properties of oil from local to concessionary prac-
tices of oil development and ownership involved a coordinated move-
ment between the oil company and the Pahlavi-controlled government to 
eliminate any instability in the oilfi elds, in part by introducing a new set 
of national laws concerning mineral rights and the registration of private 
property. This would protect the terms of the concession contract while 
blocking more equitable forms of oil production. AIOC mobilized the 
concession contract as a device to implement actions that would trans-
late oil into profi ts. In a similar fashion, the Pahlavi shah confi scated 
land, eliminated nomadic groups, and enacted national laws that could 
be placed between the oil, striking oil workers, and claimants to the oil 
regions to ensure that they would not defi ne their identities toward more 
radical and democratic forms of control over the oil. 168 
 As company operations expanded through the 1930s and especially 
through World War II, numerous complaints were fi led against the gov-
ernment’s conversion of land to  khaliseh as a mechanism for legalizing its 
sale to the oil company (after being registered at the Land Registration 
Department). Property owners in the oil regions claimed that they had 
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never accepted the valuation of the lands in the fi rst place. 169 Shaykh 
Khaz‘al’s son and descendants of the Bakhtiyari khans also attempted to 
reclaim land confi scated by the Iranian government and the company. 170 
In the aftermath of Iran’s oil nationalization crisis (1951–1953) and 
the creation of an international oil consortium in 1954, the newly estab-
lished National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) pursued a similar politics 
of coercion and resettlement, precluding the resolution of complaints by 
land claimants. 171 
 The government argued that NIOC was legally replacing the former 
British-controlled oil company in the consortium. Therefore, the lands 
under dispute were already processed and priced leaving the national 
company in formal possession of them. Following the procedure built 
into AIOC’s concession terms on property, local claimants might be 
compensated on the condition that they provided legitimate titles to 
the land. 
 Inclusive Exclusion 
 Anglo-Iranian oil’s liquid and mobile properties underground demanded 
a peculiar set of property rights as well as inevitably leading to politi-
cal struggles surrounding claims to the land targeted for extraction. The 
British political project to produce oil in southwest Iran involved the 
building of new forms of property arrangement, built into the format 
of the 1901 oil concession, that appeared to overlook the local forms of 
property and politics persisting on the ground. By scrutinizing the terms 
of the concession, I have considered its operation as a sociotechnical 
device that helped create the agency of AIOC, the Iranian state, and oth-
ers, defi ning what these actors could do and on what terms including the 
oil. The concession articles on property maintained an ambiguity that was 
exploited by multiple sides according to different interests and degrees 
of strength. The signing of the 1901 agreement, with its procedures for 
building concessionary property, left the impression that a legal contract 
had merely been signed between two contractually equivalent parties 
separate from the world outside. And yet new political actors, organiza-
tional forms, and public-private interests were participating in the polit-
ical project to establish the rule of British concessionary property, while 
other groups, such as the Burmah Oil Company, were simultaneously 
working to delay oil development in the fi rst decade of the concession’s 
existence. 
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 The company’s technological choices about defi ning, measuring, 
and pricing lands covering oil reservoirs were informed and inscribed by 
technoracialized assumptions about local society and their knowledge of 
mineral rights, (Western) private ownership, and modern energy devel-
opment. This indicates that the social and technical worlds of oil were 
not separate but intertwined from the start. The concession worked by 
introducing novel technologies of intervention and representation that 
operated with other very physical tools of control, technical and scien-
tifi c knowledge, political arrangements, and coercion. These techniques 
worked to transform the subsoil into a manageable object to which 
claims of concessionary and state ownership and monopoly control could 
be attached, proliferate, and develop new objects, interests, alliances, 
and agents. 
 Mechanisms of property dispossession and acquisition were organized 
around the lands targeted for oil extraction and exercised by the Iranian 
government, in alliance with AIOC and the British government, in the 
name of crown/state land or concessionary land, respectively. The pro-
cedure would continue with the dramatic departure of AIOC in 1954 
(renamed British Petroleum) and its replacement by NIOC in an inter-
national oil consortium. Following the multiplication of local actors with 
claims to this land is also important for understanding the different ways 
older and more recent logics of property rule confl icted and by what 
political methods the modern concept of state property was constructed 
in the Middle East to guarantee a foreign concern’s rule of concessionary 
ownership. The nature of the problems that evolved over land and prop-
erty demands that one take into account the specifi city of oil’s physical 
and subsoil properties, the complexity of local ecologies persisting on the 
surface, and practices of property valuation. These controversies made it 
necessary for AIOC to request more land to build more facilities, conduct 
oil surveys, and build boundaries managed by the concession’s terms. 
Establishing boundaries, legal procedures, and technical measurements in 
English for pricing and quantifying helped legitimize the making of state 
property and its transformation into concessionary property. 
 The concession was a technology of political management and control 
whose machinery did the work of assembling the numerous forces at play, 
human and nonhuman, in a kind of “inclusive exclusion.” 172 Depend-
ing on the stakes, various groups such as the transnational oil corpora-
tion, the Iranian and British governments, the Bakhtiyari khans, Shaykh 
Khaz’al, and other political forces had the potential to get interested or 
abandon the shifting arrangements traced here, enabling the technical 
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and political transformation of an invisible material into concessionary 
property and a large-scale energy system. 
 On the one hand, I have suggested that the terms of the British-controlled 
oil concession described a world very different from local forces at play 
in southwest Iran. On the other hand, the rule of concessionary property 
was not separate from the world it claimed to describe in its articles. By 
recovering the history of the construction of concessionary property over 
oil, I have exposed the connections that helped displace and transform 
oil by a new intermediary (e.g., a unit of land, measurement, or law) to 
render each new displacement easier and more abstract and to establish 
equivalences. 
 Infrastructural work, or the building of alliances and connections, is 
what makes the international market in oil stable and the hypothetical 
world of the concession a reality. These movements resulted in the uni-
versal authority of concessionary property as spokesperson. Thus, the 
oil concession was black-boxed over time. 173 Its execution was all that 
mattered, not the organizational techniques, local knowledge, and con-
troversies that went into making it operational in the fi rst place. 
 The work of the concession also involved the silencing of other claims 
to the lands and the reconfi guration of local forms of politics. AIOC built 
boundaries between oil operations inside concession property and the 
political claims of various groups outside. Their status, however, was nei-
ther outside nor inside because the rules of concessionary and  khaliseh 
property arrangements were the outcome of a battle fought over control 
of the subsoil with these so-called outside forces. The various procedures 
for framing, pricing, and converting property and its subsoil to  khaliseh 
were inscribed in the concession articles, national land and mineral laws, 
and property measurements. The procedures were also connected to local 
forces, mechanisms of debt, dispossession, eviction, and petroleum exper-
tise. The entanglement of diverse actors in the machinery of the oil con-
cession enabled a kind of centralization of information and domination 
at a distance from AIOC headquarters in London. The remaining histori-
cal connection to help stabilize this arrangement was the energy needs of 
the British Admiralty and the largest oil corporations, which were seek-
ing to preserve their growing monopoly control over international oil 
supplies, distribution networks, and markets. 
 The specifi c properties of oil played a central role in the creation, 
establishment, and strengthening of concessionary property in south-
west Iran, in turn shaping the larger history of modern property in Iran. 
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The terms of the concession helped create and equip a new actor in the 
twentieth century, the transnational oil corporation. Concession terms 
did the physical work of building the machinery in and through which 
more democratic forms of oil production and politics were shut down 
and other arrangements left open. They laid the necessary groundwork, 
namely, foreign control in coordination with oil corporations and cartels 
to reorganize British concessionary rule in the novel format of an inter-
national oil consortium. 

 The Concessionaire shall immediately send out to Persia and at his own cost 
one or several Experts with a view to their exploring the region in which there 
exist, as he believes, the said products, and … the latter shall immediately send 
to Persia … all the technical staff necessary … for boring and sinking wells and 
ascertaining the value of the property. (Article 8, D’Arcy Concession, 1901) 
 The Company undertakes to send, at its own expense and within a reason-
able time, to the [Iranian] Ministry of Finance whenever the representative of 
the [Iranian] Government shall request it, accurate copies of all plans, maps, 
sections and any other data whether topographical, geological or of drilling 
relating to the territory of the Concession, which are in its possession. (Article 
13, 1933 Concession) 
 The Company shall place at the disposal of the specialist experts nominated 
to this end by the [Iranian] Government, the whole of its records relative to 
scientifi c and technical data, as well as all measuring apparatus and means of 
measurement, and these specialist experts shall, further, have the right to ask for 
any information in all the offi ces of the Company and on all the territories in 
Persia. (Article 14B, 1933 Concession) 
 The global energy shift from coal to oil in the early twentieth century 
helped transform political possibilities and forms of expertise in relation 
to the control of this new fuel. 1 With the discovery of oil reserves at 
Masjid Suleiman in 1908, the new oil company, AIOC, was confronted 
immediately with another sociotechnical problem. Unlike coal, petroleum 
could not be studied in situ. Geologists could only examine the water, oil, 
gas, and rock shards that came up the borehole. 2 The high viscosity and 
sulfur content of the oil that came out of the ground here made refi ning 
it not only technically diffi cult but its yield of liquid hydrocarbons and 
motor gasoline inferior to many other crude oils, and thus unsuitable for 
civilian consumers. 3 The heavy oil could be used, however, to fuel ships, 
making AIOC the British Navy’s single largest supplier. 4 
 2 
 Petroleum Knowledge 
 Chapter 2 
 Petroleum Knowledge 
 © Massachusetts Institute of Technology All Rights Reserved 
58  Chapter 2
 The British-controlled 1901 D’Arcy Concession made little mention 
of the oil itself, where to fi nd it, and how to extract, produce, and refi ne 
it. Article 8 simply stated that the “Concessionaire” would send to Iran 
all necessary “technical staff” for “boring and sinking wells.” The con-
cession terms made no suggestion that the Iranian government possessed 
automatic rights of access to information concerning the kinds of tech-
nical activities that would take place. Articles 13 and 14 of the 1933 oil 
concession, however, suddenly obliged the “Company” to provide to the 
Iranian government “accurate copies of all plans, maps, sections and any 
other data whether topographical, geological or of drilling … in its pos-
session,” whenever requested. The terms also granted to the “specialist 
experts” of the Iranian government “the whole of its [the company’s] 
records relative to scientifi c and technical data, as well as all measuring 
apparatus and means of measurement, and … the right to ask for any 
information in all the offi ces of the Company and on all the territories 
in Persia.” What was novel about this fossil fuel that it necessitated the 
production of new forms of expertise and concession terms? 
 Most histories suggest that the diffi culties AIOC confronted in extract-
ing, producing, and refi ning oil were technical in nature. BP’s company 
historian, R. W. Ferrier, frames the history of AIOC in Iran in terms of the 
success of “the practical application of scientifi c principles” to local oil 
operations that in turn created an advantage for the company’s reserves 
and cheaper oil supplies. 5 The implication here is that scientifi c exper-
tise arrived in southwest Iran from the West and was applied to the oil 
in a pioneering fashion, with the effect of maximizing both the amount 
of oil within the concession area and the company’s ability to sell it at 
competitive prices. But the history of petroleum expertise as constructed 
in southwest Iran involved many more actors and controversies than is 
suggested by the BP corporate history or by a petroleum engineer’s story, 
framed in the technical terms demanded by his discipline. 6 
 Concession terms, corporate histories, and the petroleum sciences 
exclude the historical and political circumstances in which such knowl-
edge was constructed in the fi rst place. In practice, the construction of 
expertise around a new source of energy in the early twentieth century 
required an entire scientifi c community of petroleum consultants, geolo-
gists, engineers, and chemists collecting information about the specifi city 
of the oil’s physical and chemical properties and its interactions with the 
local environment and population with claims to where it was found. 
These properties were embedded in the emergence and organization of 
new large-scale oil corporations in the early to mid-twentieth century and 
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the reconstruction of an energy network that would serve as the basis 
for new kinds of geological, engineering, and economic knowledge. 7 To 
increase their profi t margin, oil companies such as AIOC developed large 
research-and-development divisions to fi nd applications for their unused 
petroleum byproducts, distribution and marketing divisions to promote 
their use, and political and public relations departments to help build 
societies that would consume them. They also colluded to deny expertise 
to others, in particular the coal industry. 8 
 That Anglo-Iranian oil came to possess its own abstract origin myth 
had little to do with the organizational work involved in transforming 
the world into a place where oil and its byproducts would be eagerly 
demanded. To say that the history of Anglo-Iranian oil can be understood 
better as a history of the working possibilities of technical and scientifi c 
information gathering is impossible in the framework of a conventional 
political or social history of the period. 9 These accounts do the work 
of silencing the activities of surveyors, geologists, and engineers and the 
ways other local and government actors factored into their calculations 
and decision making about the oil. However, some of the most important 
battles concerning the Iranian state’s demand for sovereignty over its oil 
resources emerged within specifi c controversies over the exact nature of 
Anglo-Iranian oil—that is, its physical, chemical, and geological composi-
tion, as well as its lifespan, production rates, and reserve estimates. When, 
in 1932, Iran decided to cancel its British-controlled oil concession, the 
above controversies, combined with additional demands for the replace-
ment of foreign workers with Iranian workers and for a greater share of 
royalties, culminated in a renegotiation of concession terms that might 
favor a national government over an oil company. Much had changed 
socially and politically since 1901. 
 Whereas the 1901 concession remained silent on the question of gath-
ering and sharing scientifi c and technological information about the oil, 
Article 14 of the 1933 concession obligated AIOC to make its scientifi c 
and technical data transparent and available at the request of the Iranian 
government. The risk for the British side was that this would set a prece-
dent for other oil-producing countries, such as Mexico, to follow suit and 
make claims in terms of national sovereignty. AIOC’s construction and 
representation of its science and technology in technical reports, journal 
articles, and international petroleum conferences greatly underplayed the 
role of interruptions posed by local political communities such as the 
Bakhtiyari khans. They also understated all the collaboration required to 
learn about the behavior of the oil, to establish the concessionary rule of 
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property, and to manage the relentless emergence of oil worker strikes in 
the 1920s, 1940s, and early 1950s. Such exclusions by petroleum experts 
of the local knowledge gathering that occurred and its historical inter-
connections with social and political groups in the oil regions, Tehran, 
London, and elsewhere have been reproduced in the scholarship on the 
topic. The implication in the scholarship is that technical controversies 
about oil are a separate issue from political and economic concerns about 
state and society. 
 In his sociotechnical history of the French oilfi eld services com-
pany, Schlumberger, Geoffrey Bowker tracks how company engineers 
and geologists transformed oilfi elds at various sites around the world 
into their laboratory as a business strategy in the early twentieth cen-
tury. 10 This chapter sets out to do the same by exposing the company’s 
business strategy through the transformation of the oil regions into a 
kind of laboratory for producing scientifi c knowledge and technologi-
cal know-how about nature and society. Rather than viewing technical 
and scientifi c information as a benevolent force of Western ingenuity or 
as an instrument of securing monopoly control, I recover the history of 
Anglo-Iranian oil’s petroleum knowledge as a site of political contesta-
tion to demonstrate the interconnectedness between the technical world 
of oil and the social world that it requires to survive. Each section traces 
the ways AIOC constructed, gathered, and managed information about 
Iran’s oil as a business strategy to exclude rivals and build boundaries 
between technical, scientifi c, and economic concerns and politics. By 
tracking the oil’s transformation from a subsoil material into a repre-
sentable object with measurable qualities and quantities, and fi nally into 
a publishable and generalizable research fi nding in London, I reveal the 
company’s truth-making strategy, which sought to exclude the possibil-
ity of national control and a more equitable distribution of profi ts from 
entering its calculations. 
 In the fi rst two sections, I map the construction and extension of the 
energy network for the production, circulation, and standardization of 
petroleum knowledge about techniques of exploration, extraction, and 
refi ning as they accumulated in southwest Iran. Only by recovering this 
local and organizational work can we make sense of the oil company’s 
strategic success in managing Anglo-Iranian oil production in relation to 
world oil production, protecting its international monopoly agreements, 
and silencing the historical and sociotechnical activities that enabled the 
geological representation of the oil in the fi rst place. AIOC engineers, 
geologists, and chemists encountered many problems in southwest Iran 
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as they gathered information about the oil, evaluated it with various cal-
culating technologies, and fi nally manufactured a certain ignorance about 
its knowability, particularly in confrontation with the Iranian govern-
ment. In the last section, I examine the relation between the work done 
in the oil regions to defi ne the properties of oil and the representation 
of that work in the public arena, in presentations to petroleum experts 
from other oil companies and at petroleum congresses. By scrutinizing 
the ways techniques of representing and standardizing oil accumulated, 
operated, and circulated in southwest Iran, Tehran, and London, I reveal 
that the powers of AIOC and the Iranian state were worked out within 
the specifi c and local history of Khuzistan’s oilfi elds, precisely through 
the management of technical and scientifi c information about oil. 
 Petroleum knowledge equipped AIOC offi cials, petroleum experts, and 
Iranian government offi cials, to varying degrees, with agency in political 
struggles over profi ts, labor, and national control. 11 As with AIOC’s busi-
ness history, the company’s in-house and offi cial scientifi c publications 
about the oil portrayed petroleum knowledge as the product of ingenuity 
arriving from abroad, only to be confronted with a passive natural envi-
ronment and technically ignorant society. Forms of information manage-
ment provided AIOC’s managers, engineers, and geologists with the tools 
to build a world in which the company’s oil could thrive in the midst of 
increasing uncertainty regarding Iran’s nationalist demands for control 
of the oil. This entailed the production of scientifi c knowledge and tech-
nological expertise about Iran’s oil, fi rst as industrial science and then 
as pure science, through a so-called process of invention (the birth of an 
idea; technological) and innovation (commercialization). 12 
 Properties of Oil and Practices of Control 
 In the fi rst two decades of the concession’s existence, AIOC geologists, 
engineers, and managers suffered numerous unintended consequences as 
a result of the extractive needs of Iran’s oil. The oil at Masjid Suleiman was 
located in Bakhtiyari 13 territory ( fi gure 2.1 ) situated within the distinct 
rock formation of a highly porous limestone. The geologist S. J. Shand 
fi rst identifi ed the reservoir rock as Asmari limestone. 14 Anglo-Iranian 
oil was particular in terms of the geophysical environment in which it 
was found but also in terms of the way it came out of the ground. Oil 
production in many fi elds, as in the United States, was sustained through 
pumping, but the naturally higher gas pressure of Iran’s oil eliminated 
the need for pumps, at least initially. 15 To extract commercial quantities, 
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the engineers needed to drill more wells at Masjid Suleiman but with-
out jeopardizing the high-pressure zones of productive wells. In general, 
some oil wells will produce for extended amounts of time by fl owing 
due to the pressure from subsurface gas or water that pushes the oil out 
naturally. Other wells must be pumped to extract the oil. High-pressure 
zones that characterized the oil regions in southwest Iran ensured that the 
oil came out on its own, at least in the short term. An equally signifi cant 
concern was the lack of skilled drillers and engineers to read the gauges 
that monitored the pressure at the bottom of the wells. 16 
 The subsoil, liquid, and mobile properties of oil marked its particu-
larity as a new source of carbon-based energy in the twentieth century. 
Addressing problems associated with the high sulfur content and viscous 
properties of Anglo-Iranian oil required the technical expertise of trained 
engineers and geologists, specialized equipment, and adequate living and 
working conditions. To overcome the cost of exploration and develop-
ment activities, AIOC’s managers aimed to extract the oil, defi ne its par-
ticular qualities, refi ne it as quickly as possible, and create a market for 
its products. 17 The fi rst problem emerged from the assumption, among 
petroleum experts, that Iran’s oil would behave like the oil at Rangoon, 
Burma. AIOC offi cials faced delays in production due to Anglo-Iranian 
oil’s naturally high pressure and sulfur content. 18 Chemists and engineers 
with prior experience working in Burma were unprepared, and it took 
many years to analyze the chemical constituents and physical properties 
of this new source of oil. 19 The persistent fear was that gas pressures 
in a particular area of a fi eld would be exhausted too rapidly, caus-
ing other production fl ows to fail prematurely. 20 Data on the physical 
characteristics of the oil reservoir, as well as its behavior and its con-
trol using various methods of production and drilling, were essential if 
the company was to succeed in predicting where the gas pressure would 
fall fi rst. 
 There were many other properties to consider. For example, Anglo-
Iranian oil came out of the well not as a simple liquid but as a frothy sub-
stance. 21 For every million gallons of oil produced, approximately 20–25 
million cubic feet of gas (equivalent to 3.56–4.45 million US barrels of 
oil) were released mainly as methane and ethane. As the gas bubbled out 
of the oil, it also released light hydrocarbons such as butane and pentane, 
which were potentially of valuable use in gasoline. In the early years, the 
gas was ignored and allowed to escape freely into the air. 
 Extracting the oil was not the only problem. In the early twentieth cen-
tury, petroleum and the accompanying natural gas was extracted from 
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the ground and distilled elsewhere, according to boiling-point tempera-
ture, into fractions such as gas, kerosene, lubricating oil, and asphalt. 22 
Anglo-Iranian oil could not be refi ned using the same methods applied 
to Burmese or Pennsylvania oil due to its high viscosity. 23 Through the 
1920s, problems created by the viscosity of Anglo-Iranian oil, particu-
larly the fuel oil for the British Admiralty’s warships, were surpassing the 
“scientifi c knowledge of the day.” 24 
 Company engineers and chemists learned about such properties based 
on their previous experience with American or Burmese oil, and they 
assumed that Iran’s oil could be extracted, distilled, and used in the same 
way and to the same extent as other oils. From an economic perspec-
tive, AIOC offi cials felt that to make enough capital to cover the cost 
of extraction, other marketable products needed to be produced using 
distillation techniques to replace kerosene such as benzene, motor spirit 
(gasoline), and fuel oil for river steamers. 25 In the early years of the 
concession’s existence, these and other “unsuspected problems” drove 
AIOC’s profi t-seeking oil managers to the verge of bankruptcy. This was 
also due to inadequate labor and equipment, as well as to the “unknown 
nature of the Persian crude.” 26 
 Additional information was therefore required not just to overcome 
the constant loss of capital but to make sense of the properties of the 
oil. To achieve this goal, the company appointed John Cadman, future 
chairman of AIOC (1927–1941), as technical adviser of a newly formed 
research organization in 1917. Through the 1920s, he implemented an 
extensive plan to develop the company’s activities in research and devel-
opment because the whole “geological problem is still obscure.” 27 This 
was due in part, the company believed, to insuffi cient contact between 
geologists working on Anglo-Iranian oil and the staff in London. Other 
problems such as escaping gas from the main oilfi elds were preventing 
the extraction of the oil. 
 For Cadman, the economics of oil and the petroleum sciences were 
seamlessly intertwined. Finding a solution to the problem of gas seep-
ages, he explained, would not only have “very important economic 
results” but would reveal a “good many scientifi c problems connected 
with the economical engineering side of the question.” 28 Cadman was a 
well-informed petroleum expert, having previously served as Professor of 
Mining and Petroleum Technology at Birmingham University, where he 
established the fi rst Department of Petroleum Technology in the British 
Empire. 29 The department would become the destination for the majority 
of Iranians selected for training under AIOC sponsorship. 30 Cadman also 
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served as consulting petroleum adviser to the Colonial Offi ce. He was a 
member of the Admiralty Commission to Iran (1913–1914), director of 
the British government’s Petroleum Executive (1917–1921), member of 
the Inter-Allied Petroleum Committee (1918), and president of the Insti-
tution of Mining Engineers. 31 This experience gave Cadman a heightened 
awareness that a host of conditions, social, economic, political, organiza-
tional, and technical, were required for the Anglo-Iranian oil industry to 
work. The fl uidity of the boundary between the technological system of 
oil and its environment was constantly being raised, as was the question 
of the extent to which “systems builders,” such as Cadman, molded their 
environments to facilitate the growth of their system. 32 
 As AIOC formulated its plans for oil research and development, Iran 
faced heightened problems of food scarcity, high prices, separatist nation-
alist movements, and a weak central government. 33 With hopes of increas-
ing its share of oil profi ts to strengthen its power over the provinces, the 
government signed the Armitage-Smith Agreement of 1920, clarifying 
some of the ambiguities of the 1901 concession regarding the calculation 
of profi ts. 34 Iranian government offi cials were demanding more produc-
tion in order to increase their share of royalties, whereas AIOC offi cials 
sought to limit production levels in relation to world oil production and 
to block politics—that is, national control—from entering calculations 
that shaped the concessionary arrangement. 
 Combined with a heightened post–World War I interest in developing 
rather than limiting Anglo-Iranian oil development (discussed in chap-
ter 1), the appointment of Cadman as AIOC’s technical adviser marked 
the beginning of the construction of a large research-and-development 
branch within the company and the building of new connections to 
research centers and science and technology institutes based in London. 
To increase profi t margins and to overcome the obstacles to extracting 
Iran’s oil, AIOC embarked on accumulating more data about the oil 
through fi eld surveys, laboratory tests, publications, international meet-
ings, and in-house company conferences. 35 The primary impulse behind 
establishing the Sunbury Research Centre in Middlesex, England, in 
1917 was to solve the problem of high viscosity characterizing AIOC’s 
fuel oil. 36 
 After World War I, as Iran underwent a series of social, economic, and 
political upheavals, resulting in the division of the country into British 
and Russian spheres of infl uence and the revived power of semiauton-
omous groups, Great Britain, as AIOC’s largest shareholder, moved to 
consolidate its control over Iran. Defi ning the properties of Anglo-Iranian 
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oil meant controlling a set of connections that would ensure the oil com-
pany’s strategic success. First, control meant overcoming the failures and 
uncertainties that emerged around the high cost of extraction, refi ning, 
and marketing. Second, it referred to protecting the secret monopoly 
arrangements of the dominant international oil companies. Their goal 
was to control world production rates and prices in the midst of domestic 
turmoil in Iran and nationalist demands for more oil production. From 
the perspective of AIOC, maintaining the stability of these connections 
required accumulating more technical information about Anglo-Iranian 
oil through the recruitment of experts with experience in Britain, Burma, 
and Sumatra. 
 International consulting geologists were important actors in the 
project to stabilize expertise about Anglo-Iranian oil. 37 After World War 
I, AIOC commenced the hiring of large numbers of geologists, geophysi-
cists, drillers, and petroleum engineers. They formed associations of spe-
cialists and published their fi ndings with the permission of the company’s 
chairman and directors. 38 This was acknowledged in a footnote in every 
publication. Findings were circulated within the company at annual or 
biannual production conferences and shareholder meetings, which Cad-
man initiated. 
 In the early years, a select few consulting fi rms in London were the 
principal advisers of these large-scale business concerns, but their special-
ists were not employees of the company. Boverton Redwood, for instance, 
was a consultant for both the Burmah Oil Company and the syndicate of 
British investors in Iran, the British Admiralty, as well as for other opera-
tions in Mexico and Nigeria. 39 At a time when few companies employed 
full-time geologists, his consulting fi rm was used by virtually every British 
oil company. 40 Redwood’s “major signifi cance” was his intermediary role 
between AIOC, the Burmah Oil Company, and the British government 
(the Admiralty and the India Offi ce), maintaining consulting connections 
with oil-producing companies and equally “intimate association(s)” with 
British government agencies. 41 He was also one of the strongest advocates 
of the use of fuel in naval vessels, which helps explain his connections to 
the British government. 42 Strongly supporting the development of British 
colonial oil industries, he had great animosity toward the rival Standard 
Oil and Shell groups. As a consequence, he helped block their efforts 
at monopoly control to protect Burmah Oil’s monopoly of the Indian 
market, while also ensuring that Anglo-Iranian oil development did not 
disrupt this market either. 43 This connection also explains his interest in 
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seeing Burmah Oil get involved as AIOC’s parent company, effectively 
bailing it out in 1905. 
 The Burmah Oil Company had “pioneered the use of geologists in 
the search for oil,” many of them supplied by Redwood’s consulting 
fi rm. 44 In 1907 the company began to employ full-time geologists, many 
of whom, such as E. H. Cunningham Craig, Basil Macrorie, and Lister 
James, were later to use the experience they gained in Burma in the ser-
vice of Anglo-Iranian. “There was a steady fl ow of personnel” between 
Burmah Oil and AIOC, especially on the technical and geological side of 
the business. 45 This enabled AIOC to “draw upon the long experience of 
its adopted parent.” 46 Much of the preliminary analysis of Anglo-Iranian 
oil after 1908 was undertaken in London at the New Oil Refi ning Process 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Burmah Oil. 47 The fi rst of what became AIOC’s reg-
ular geological staff went to Iran in 1913 and were joined by many more 
geologists in subsequent years. 48 
 AIOC’s desire for secrecy in all aspects of its oilfi eld operations was 
opposed by its desire to share information to build up scientifi c techniques. 
Geologists such as Duncan Garrow, a director at AIOC (1914–1924) 
with previous experience in Rangoon, had observed that Anglo-Iranian 
oil appeared to share similar conditions to those of Mexican oil. 49 The 
fear was that the reservoir containing Anglo-Iranian oil might “turn to 
water” as Mexican oil had done in 1920, or it might go into decline as 
with Baku’s oil in 1901. 50 Garrow consulted with A.F. Corwin of the 
Standard Oil Company for an alternative opinion. Corwin paid a visit to 
the oilfi elds of southwest Iran. He argued that while the general behavior 
of wells in the main producing zones resembled those of Mexico, there 
was still no concrete proof of a rising water unit, and yet the uncertainty 
remained. By the 1920s, importing trained staff and engineers from the 
oilfi elds of Rangoon and the Indian Public Works Department was no 
longer adequate if the company wanted to survive commercially in the 
world market. A geological survey department existed within AIOC at 
this time, but to meet the company’s expansion, Cadman established a 
formal Geological Survey Department with permanent staff. 51 Young 
geologists of European origin (primarily British) were expected to handle 
the “diffi cult conditions in oil regions for surveying abroad,” and such 
men must be equipped with good university training in surveying, map-
ping, and report writing. 52 Some twenty additional geologists arrived in 
southwest Iran, nearly all with postwar training and many with wartime 
military service. 53 Petroleum experts also arrived there with previous oil 
experience in other parts of the world and with university training. The 
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problem was that technical experience and knowledge told them little 
about the underground properties of Anglo-Iranian oil. Led by Cadman, 
who hoped to rescue the company from going into bankruptcy, these 
experts took steps to transform the oilfi elds of southwest Iran into a 
laboratory. 
 Building a Petroleum Laboratory and Constructing Publishable 
Research Findings 
 Research institutions, techniques of mapping, and other forms of tech-
noscientifi c expertise suddenly proliferated to help make Anglo-Iranian 
oil knowable. In the period between 1920 and 1940, there were many 
competing ways of discovering and then mapping oilfi elds. 54 This period 
of heightened interest and expansion in exploration was triggered by 
the rapidly increasing demand for petroleum, an acute shortage of oil 
in the United States after World War I, and international competition for 
the control of the world’s oil reserves. AIOC geologists were stationed in 
each drilling area of southwest Iran, but remained principally concerned 
with surface exploration. Drilled wells demonstrated underground fold-
ing, a kind of bend or curve in the underground sedimentary rock lay-
ers, that coincided with surface folding. 55 Geologists named these folds 
or arches “domes” and “anticlines,” forming the basis of the “anticlinal 
theory,” considered the “backbone of geology” in this period. Domes, 
anticlines, and faults comprised the most important structures in these 
oil and gas reservoirs. 56 The principal objective of exploration surveys of 
the major Fars and Bakhtiyari anticlines, characterizing the oil regions 
of Khuzistan, was to map the region using a scale of an inch to a mile. 57 
 The early 1920s marked a decisive moment for oilfi eld management 
in which geologists and engineers could observe the “performance of 
a large limestone reservoir under controllable conditions,” guaranteed 
by AIOC’s concessionary “ownership of the entire fi eld.” 58 The exten-
sive mapping and surveying of the oilfi elds of Khuzistan amounted to 
approximately 2,500 square miles, helping to “form reliable data” about 
the oil reservoirs and their geophysical structure. 59 But more data was 
needed. A company geologist informed Redwood that there was still a 
“lack of maps … on the geology and physical landscape of the region.” 60 
According to Owen, in most oil-producing countries of the time, “lit-
tle effort was made to acquire accurate subsurface data before 1918.” 61 
There were older scientifi c publications from the nineteenth century on 
oil in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana in the United States, but most 
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European and American petroleum geologists did little more than “com-
plain about the unreliability of the drillers’ well logs.” 62 Subsurface geol-
ogy was not adapted as general oilfi eld practice until 1918–1921, after 
which it “spread rapidly.” 63 
 The accumulation of more data would help render the oilfi elds test-
able, knowable in abstraction, and describable in publications. Bowker 
has observed that the domain of an oilfi eld was described using three 
kinds of maps, each of which helps to produce a new kind of space—a 
transport map, a map of geological structure, and a map of subsurface 
structure. The era of formation of the oil, the date of discovery, and the 
statistical year describe three time periods that, together with the maps, 
combine into a new kind of time. 64 In southwest Iran, for example, 
one-inch mapping of the Bakhtiyari oil regions was contoured simultane-
ously with geological mapping and with the use of American plane-table 
methods, 65 helping to transform the site into a space of measurement that 
increasingly operated as a laboratory. 
 To this end, AIOC’s new in-house geologists, H. T. Mayo and H. G. 
Busk, presented one of the company’s fi rst scientifi c publications on 
Iran’s oilfi elds at the Institute of Petroleum in London in 1918–1919. 
AIOC’s chairman and honorary president of the institute, Charles Gre-
enway, explained that until now, “little information ha[s] been given to 
the world on the subject of these remarkable oilfi elds.” But now that their 
“phenomenal richness and extent” had been demonstrated, the oilfi elds 
proved to be “one of the largest, if not the largest source of supply for the 
world’s future requirements of petroleum.” 66 It was necessary, therefore, 
that “a little more light be shed on their geological character,” following 
the research fi ndings of Busk and Mayo. 67 
 Busk and Mayo’s paper presented the current problems with Iran’s 
oilfi elds. Their fi ndings suggested that numerous stratigraphic problems 
persisted and more specifi cally, in locating the part of the limestone struc-
ture in which the oil at Masjid Suleiman accumulated. By providing a 
“generalized view of the geology, and the building of the oilfi eld region in 
historical sequence,” Busk and Mayo introduced new temporalities and 
spatial scales to the oil regions of southwest Iran, framed in the techni-
cal terms of their discipline, geology. 68 The main stratigraphic divisions 
of the oil regions and the epochs in their geological timescales were as 
follows: A. Asmari Series (Eo-Cretaceous epoch), B. Fars Series (Miocene 
epoch), and C. Bakhtiari Series (Pliocene epoch). 69 “It is always remem-
bered,” they commented, “that it was only through detailed and extensive 
survey that such a history was fi nally proved.” 70 To help guarantee the 
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truth of this peculiar kind of framing of an abstract history in terms of 
the geology of Iran’s oilfi elds, Busk and Mayo referenced earlier studies 
of the Bakhtiyari region fi rst conducted by geologists from the Burmah 
Oil Company and the Geological Survey of India, such as W. K. Loftus, 
“Pioneer of Persian Geology,” in 1849, by G. E. Pilgrim, who established 
the “main stratigraphic divisions” of the oil regions, and by Lister James, 
who with his coauthor, Busk, constructed “the fi rst detailed large-scale 
map of the Maidan-i-Naftun Field,” the largest source of commercially 
producible reserves in the entire concession area. This local work of 
experimentation, new representations, and development of a “strati-
graphic nomenclature” was helping to organize the oil regions according 
to a different spatial-temporal scale, a kind of laboratory, while getting to 
the bottom of the problem of ascertaining exactly where the oil at Masjid 
Suleiman accumulated. 
 In practice, Busk and Mayo’s research fi ndings were helping to con-
struct a systematic body of knowledge called petroleum geology with 
its own history. Bruno Latour has observed that in both industrial and 
academic science, there is a process of destroying one’s own past. 71 In 
a typical scientifi c paper, two specifi c historiographic processes occur: 
the presentation of the paper within the history of the scientist’s own 
discipline, geology in this instance, and the destruction of the historical 
context. A study of publications, company prospectuses, and other pam-
phlets challenges hackneyed depictions of oil exploration as lawless and 
random. 72 However, typical reports of prospecting missions detailed not 
only geological fi ndings and prospecting methods, but also the ethnic 
composition of territories covered and relationships between personnel 
of different ethnic backgrounds. 73 Ethnological conventions about race 
relations dominated explanations of why missions encountered success 
or failure. Local political groups, for example, kept slipping into and 
interfering with Busk and Mayo’s construction of a geological history of 
Anglo-Iranian oil: 
 The Bakhtiari country, under the jurisdiction of the hereditary Bakhtiari Khans, 
who lead one of the most powerful political factions in the Shahdom and one 
friendly to ourselves, is situated on the south-west side of Persia between the 
provinces of Farsistan and Luristan. It … merges north-west into the Pusht-i-
Kuh country … and … the Kuh Gahr country, the inhabitants of both the 
latter, living as they do upon the plunder of their neighbors, being extremely 
unfriendly to Europeans. 74 
 Busk and Mayo set out to “summarise the chief geological features of 
the oilfi elds in the Persian concession” by dividing the subject into three 
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geographic regions, beginning with “The Bakhtiyari Country.” 75 Oddly, 
the geographic description was mixed with information outside their 
domain of interest, namely, the history of power relations between a 
“powerful political faction,” known as “the Bakhtiari Khans,” and “our-
selves,” the author-geologists, and “Europeans” more generally. Thus, 
conventions about race relations informed technical explanations of how 
geological missions in this instance proceeded and encountered success 
or failure. 
 The article ended by attributing the success of the geological missions 
in southwest Iran to the geologist’s pioneering spirit in an unfamiliar 
geographic setting fi lled with political and technical uncertainties: 
 Pioneers in Persia are much to be congratulated in their enterprise, in a region 
fraught with many political and transport diffi culties, in their following up the 
fi rst test well at Maidan-i-Naftun with other wells, which have now proved an 
area which, on account of its richness and phenomenal productivity, entitles it 
to be classed amongst the great oilfi elds of the world. 76 
 AIOC’s representation of its science and technology overlooked the role 
of interruptions posed by local political communities such as the Bakhti-
yari khans and all the work and collaboration that the company pursued 
with them in order to protect oil operations. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, this was most obvious in the company’s decision to set up a 
subsidiary company in 1909, known as the Bakhtiyari Oil Company, to 
pay the khans for access to their land, to secure the concessionary rule 
of property over the subsoil, and to recruit their followers as guards to 
patrol the oil regions. 77 For many years to come, these political forces 
inhabiting the oil regions threatened to disrupt the security and stabil-
ity of oil operations. As one company geologist, Lister James, admitted, 
evidence of oil for the greater part of the concession area was still “lack-
ing,” due in part to the “political conditions of the country, and the lack 
of communication” between geological staff in different areas of the 
concession. 78 
 The political conditions of the country in the early twentieth century—
that is, the historical circumstances in which the geological fi ndings such 
as those of Busk and Mayo were obtained—were characterized by the 
weak central Qajar government discussed in the previous chapter. The 
Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) had meant that alliances with 
local semiautonomous nomadic groups, inhabiting the site of oil oper-
ations, pipeline, and refi nery, were essential for AIOC’s concessionary 
control and the geological missions discussed here to succeed. The shift 
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to a new strategy in the 1920s sought to build an alliance with a strong 
central government that would in turn help suppress any further threats 
from Iran’s provinces, especially Khuzistan. 79 By 1929, Iranian oil work-
ers threatened to mix questions of politics with questions of geology, 
demanding better wages, treatment, training, and housing. 80 Political 
conditions were indeed one of the reasons why, on the brink of a conces-
sion crisis in 1928, AIOC geologists had traversed only a minute portion 
of the concession area. 
 AIOC’s information gathering was working to exclude the local his-
torical and sociotechnical activities that enabled the birth of the science 
of geological representation in the fi rst place. Identifying AIOC’s domains 
of knowledge production and the problems that geologists and engineers 
confronted in standardizing Anglo-Iranian oil has exposed the technical 
and scientifi c work AIOC required to construct its authority and objec-
tivity. In this way, the company could distance itself from political prob-
lems with land claimants, oil workers, and national government actors. 
By 1920, scientifi c and technical research had become a key feature of 
modern industry. As I discuss below, it also made sense for the compa-
nies to share information in order to build up discovery and production 
techniques. 81 When compared to the diffi cult process of trial and error 
in gathering local knowledge about Iran’s oilfi elds, the presentation of 
AIOC’s expert fi ndings in international journals and institutes abroad 
produced the effect of technical ingenuity, the birth of an idea, commenc-
ing a process of innovation in which economic, social, and political con-
cerns would come into play only at a later stage. 82 
 The Secret Life of the Oilfi eld and the Politics of Unknowability 
 In the period between the signing of the fi rst oil concession in 1901 and 
its revision in 1933, AIOC’s organizational work involved transforming 
the oil regions into a laboratory for managing power relations between 
the British oil corporation and the national Iranian state’s claims to sov-
ereignty. These activities were an integral part of, indeed indistinguish-
able from, its in-house scientifi c work. During the 1920s and 1930s, 
the question of the life of the oilfi eld, or the amount of commercially 
producible oil available within a defi ned timeframe, was entangled with 
the “obscurity of the geological problem as a whole,” noted earlier by 
Cadman. The company’s diffi culties with understanding the behavior of 
Anglo-Iranian oil necessitated the accumulation of information in the 
form of standards, measurements, and parameters about not only its 
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geophysical structure, but also the amount and behavior of oil within 
the reservoir. Questions about the exact nature of the oil and its lifespan 
(reserve estimates and depletion rates) generated controversies involv-
ing the Iranian government; AIOC geologists, engineers, and managers; 
the British government; and research centers and technical institutes in 
London. As already noted, this set of concerns helped trigger the largest 
interwar dispute between a national government and a foreign oil com-
pany, when the Iranian government canceled the British-controlled oil 
concession in 1932. 
 Calculating the lifespan of British-controlled oilfi elds was essential not 
only to the profi t-seeking managers, but to the British Admiralty, namely 
Winston Churchill, who as First Lord made the decision in 1912–1913 to 
switch from coal to fuel oil, relying totally on the reserves of southwest 
Iran. In one of the earliest assessments of the life of the Iranian oilfi elds, 
the Admiralty Commission expressed the impossibility, in the absence of 
more conclusive evidence, of making any defi nite estimate as to the life 
of the main oilfi eld. 83 It was therefore crucial for AIOC to ensure that the 
organizational work was in place in the event of “an outbreak of lawless-
ness amongst the tribes,” as such a situation would “present certain diffi -
culties which should not be insurmountable.” 84 Political communities in 
the local oil regions created constant uncertainty, threatening to disrupt 
the technical world of oil that AIOC and now the British government 
were working hard to keep separate from politics. 
 New representations and formulas for establishing equivalences 
between the oil and future calculations proliferated, indicating the use-
fulness, from the company’s point of view, of treating the oil regions as 
a space of measurement and calculation, a laboratory. AIOC’s geologists 
and engineers employed novel kinds of framings such as lifespan, estimat-
ing fl ow, oil reservoir pressure, and gas pressure to manage and control 
the behavior of the oil. Cadman circulated a report among AIOC’s man-
agers in 1923 in which he discussed estimating the life of the fi eld. 85 This 
would require calculating when the wells would cease to fl ow under their 
own pressure and the amount of gas reserves available for the purpose 
of prolonging the life of the fi eld. Other calculations included identifying 
when producing wells would “go to gas,” and selecting the wellsites that 
would continue to produce oil by pumping after gas pressure had dissi-
pated. This organizational work of calculation and representation would 
help make Anglo-Iranian oil more manageable and controllable, and thus 
make international markets in oil secure. 
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 Techniques of classifi cation had consequences for the economic deci-
sions of an oil company and the political decisions of the British gov-
ernment and Admiralty. Cadman, as technical adviser, admitted in a 
confi dential report that oil reserve estimates considered in conjunction 
with present production and estimated future production “will not fail 
to cause some alarm.” 86 He explained that “whilst these fi gures can only 
be considered as approximate estimates, it is the best that can be done 
with data available, and if it does no more than direct attention to the 
fact that the life of the Maidan Naftun fi eld is calculable and limited.” 87 
The amount of oil underground and how long it would last under current 
production conditions were indeed calculable, even though the company 
worked hard to suggest otherwise, particularly in confrontation with the 
Iranian government. 
 While it was diffi cult to “disentangle what is speculative from what is 
positive,” Cadman was drawing attention to the “supreme importance of 
supplementing the present reserves by other sources of supply.” 88 At the 
same time, the company required more local data from which deductions 
could be made with “greater accuracy.” Numerous unknown variables 
were getting in the way of acquiring an adequate knowledge of under-
ground conditions. 89 Even when all the data—the new representations 
and formulas for establishing equivalences between the oil and future 
calculations—became available, “there will always be one unknown 
quantity” and that was the change in structure with depth. 90 The shape 
of the domes, the thickness of the reservoir rock, and its permeabil-
ity and porosity, would have to be factored in to infer the value of the 
always-unknown quantity. This general “lack of data” necessitated more 
calculative tools such as “formulae from which further conclusions may 
be arrived at.” 91 AIOC experts introduced a set of new representations 
and calculations to describe the oil. Representations would help render 
the oil (and limits to reserves) manageable and calculable in abstraction, 
according to a peculiar kind of spatial-temporal scale. The report pro-
posed multiple new terms and formulas to be worked out. 92 
 Iran’s oil was simultaneously knowable and unknowable depend-
ing on the interests involved and the recipients of the information. The 
standardization of Iran’s oil in terms of lifespan helped AIOC’s infor-
mation fl ow within controlled conditions of measurement, circulation, 
and access. AIOC was transforming Iran’s oilfi elds into its laboratory. 
The oil was undergoing a series of transformations through the work 
of a set of technical devices and measurements: its origins fl owing out 
of these transformations and not vice versa as claimed in the scientifi c 
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articles. Scientifi c articles claimed that science arrived in the oil regions 
and was applied to a passive natural element, the oil, while simultane-
ously excluding the circumstances that enabled the effect of this process 
to occur from the start. Historical circumstances were the devices and 
measurements mobilized by author-geologists as techniques of represen-
tation to extract and purify the oil from its sociotechnical environment 
and politics, but masked by the rhetoric of scientifi c discovery. In prac-
tice, the scientifi c origins of the oil were formed precisely in the organi-
zational work of getting it out, namely, in the oil’s  movement from under 
the ground to a two-dimensional representation as a numerical reserve 
estimate and outline of a geophysical structure on a map. The stability 
of this movement and its publication in an article necessitated a collec-
tive effort and negotiation involving measurements, geologists, company 
managers, local political forces, concession terms, and monopoly 
arrangements. 
 Additionally, there was never a perfect fi t between the fi gure or reserve 
estimate and the ground in that results were valid only insofar as they 
were rooted in a particular site. As Bowker has argued for the early geo-
physical work that Schlumberger scientists did, “the process of getting 
enough local measurements to do good science and enough work on the 
oil fi elds to be able to take local measurements was essentially a boot-
strapping one … a technological equivalent of the hermeneutic circle.” 93 
Geologists who arrived in southwest Iran came with a general idea of the 
subsurface geology based on older geology articles and previous experi-
ences in other parts of the world, such as the United States and Burma. 
They needed to be aware of what they were looking for and then to fi nd 
a correlation between what they found and the classic rules of general 
geology. But the uncertainty always remained. The identity and proper-
ties of Anglo-Iranian oil were not given by its intrinsic properties, because 
these properties depended on the relations with other entities, including 
information. 94 
 Cadman’s alarm about the calculability and limits of Iran’s oil 
reserves was confi rmed by AIOC’s scientifi c work, particularly that of 
Hugo de Böckh in 1924. 95 What was the cause of the productivity of 
the reservoir rock? Was it porosity, permeability, or some other prop-
erty? In de Böckh’s controversial report on the “Principal Results of My 
Journey to Persia,” the maps, analyses, and conclusions were the subject 
of debate for many years as the Iranian government pressed for more 
information about production rates in the fi elds. De Böckh had set out 
to conduct a general investigation of the geological conditions in Iran 
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and to establish the lines along which the search for oilfi elds should be 
carried out. 96 AIOC reports were never published and often circulated 
among a limited number of scientists, engineers, and higher management 
such as Cadman. De Böckh’s observations built on previous work by 
his colleagues, including unpublished articles on AIOC’s geology of Iran. 
The controversy arose from one of the main conclusions reached in the 
report, where de Böckh argued that Maydan-i Naftun possessed great 
quantities of oil, but “they are in any case limited.” 97 He warned that “a 
great effort must be made to discover reserve fi elds before the production 
drops, and the time for this is limited.” 98 
 AIOC’s in-house knowledge production was not simply a mundane 
technical activity, it was controversial because it had consequences for 
the monopoly arrangements of the major oil corporations and the dura-
bility of its concessionary arrangement with the Iranian government. The 
accumulation of scientifi c knowledge and technological expertise was 
internal to the company’s business strategy as it served as the basis for 
managing what parts were deemed private or public, universal or par-
ticular, certain (knowable) or uncertain (unknowable) depending on the 
political and economic costs. 
 For example, certain arguments could and could not be made about 
the oil, particularly in confrontation with the Iranian government but 
also within the company itself. To manage the ongoing controversy over 
the amount of oil reserves under the ground, Garrow, an AIOC director, 
instructed William Fraser, deputy chairman of AIOC, that fi gures of oil 
reserves and estimates should “never be circulated to the Board or share-
holders.” 99 Garrow justifi ed his reasoning based on a claim to unknow-
ability, that AIOC could not actually say what the total proved crude oil 
reserves of the company were because one of the giant fi elds, Haft Kel, 
was “not fully understood yet.” 100 Certain calculations about oil reserves, 
which Cadman and de Böckh acknowledged previously as calculable and 
limited, could not be made public even within the company. Calculations 
about oil reserves were dangerous because they factored into the compa-
ny’s economic interests, indicating that the oil would run out along with 
company profi ts. Access to this information risked inviting a discussion of 
how long the company could survive. Thus, the operation of these zones 
of measurement, and the distinction between what was considered an 
internal and what was considered an external matter, were always con-
testable. 101 Garrow did not consider the 22- to 24.5-year lifespan of the 
largest oilfi eld, calculated from 1929, long enough because the “expan-
sion of world’s markets may necessitate production of crude largely in 
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excess of 231 million gallons monthly after 1937.” 102 He advised that all 
favorable geophysical reports be proved or disproved to get a more accu-
rate understanding of the rate of reserve depletion at Masjid Suleiman, 
the giant fi eld with total reserves of around 27,805,725,000 gallons, by 
January 1, 1938. Garrow confessed privately to Cadman that the esti-
mated life of the Masjid Suleiman fi eld was about 20 years, assuming 350 
hundred million gallons were there. 103 
 On the other hand, the science of calculating reserve estimates was 
not so certain. Comins, a company engineer, argued that his “minimum” 
fi gures were “very conservative,” but his “probably fi gures” extremely 
speculative, particularly for “Unproved fi elds,” for which “they should 
only be regarded as basis for discussion which can be prepared from 
existing data.” 104 The “general bases” of reserve estimates were based on 
assumptions or theoretical framings that excluded certain behavioral fac-
tors of oil over other local conditions. 105 These assumptions concerned 
porosity, the oil-bearing area, and thickness of the limestone, which, 
Comins admitted, “are very liable to wide error.” 106 With the exception of 
Masjid Suleiman, reserve estimates were based on pressure data and the 
rate of drop of oil-gas levels—that is, the ratio of the volume of gas that 
came out of solution, to the volume of oil when brought to the surface. 
These estimates were “extremely speculative and should only be accepted 
as a very general guide.” 107 In the early stages of the development of a 
fi eld, companies like AIOC kept their estimates of reserves confi dential, 
and this tended to remain so through the lifetime of the fi eld. As Andrew 
Barry explains, oil companies maintained multiple reserve estimates “for 
planning purposes and fi nancial reporting requirements, both of which 
[were] likely to differ from the uncertain estimates made by company 
geologists.” 108 Thus, the life cycle of an oil reserve went through a number 
of stages during which the degree of uncertainty and controversy con-
cerning how much oil there was underground vacillated. 
 Over a decade later, the question of reserves was still masked in 
secrecy and up for debate. What was apparent, according to the tech-
nical adviser to the Petroleum Division of the British government, was 
that Masjid Suleiman “has been heavily depleted,” while the other giant 
fi eld, Haft Kel, “has had about 50% of its oil extracted.” 109 On the other 
hand, the fi elds at Gach Saran, Agha Jari, and Lali still possessed large 
reserves underground. Depending on the interests at stake and the recip-
ients of the information (e.g., company shareholders, the Iranian gov-
ernment), reserve estimates were calculable and limited, but their science 
and measurement were uncertain. As we see below, this information was 
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not to be revealed to the Iranian government because it would invite 
further questions concerning production rates, royalties, and the validity 
of the concession, as well as opening the door to more democratic forms 
of control. 
 AIOC certainly knew that if it refused to divulge certain kinds of geo-
logical and economic information to the Iranian government, it risked los-
ing its oil concession. Fraser approved a strategy to construct systematic 
ignorance about the knowability of oil reserves by relying on arguments 
and the presentation of information that suggested their calculation was 
complicated and understanding their geology was an obstacle; oil quality 
was just good to know about for the industry but bad for estimates of 
reserves that could be made public. Fraser instructed that the full details 
of de Böckh’s analysis and conclusions not be revealed to the Iranian gov-
ernment and approved the alteration and omission of certain geological 
data from the de Böckh report to the government. As the company saw 
it, the revised version (“Persia. Geological Report by Dr. H. de Bockh and 
Others. 1925”) had a “less contentious title” than the original title (“Pre-
liminary Report on the Principal Results of My Journey to Persia”). 110 
The report also omitted the introduction, the travelogue format, any geo-
logical hypotheses, and the route taken by the author-geologist. Along 
with a handful of other less contentious geological studies, the report was 
presented to the Iranian government as “the most comprehensive review 
in existence of the geology of the Company’s concession area.” 111 
 As Iran’s Majlis ratifi ed the revision of its 1901 oil concession in 
1933 (discussed in chapter 3), the new director of the petroleum depart-
ment, Nasrullah Jehangir, and the geologist for the Iranian government, 
Aghababoff, requested geological data and maps. 112 These were presented 
during their fi rst visit to the oilfi elds, but E.H. Elkington revealed pri-
vately that the company had failed to provide maps showing the under-
ground contours of the main oil areas. Elkington reported to AIOC’s 
board in London that “you will be glad to learn that in spite of one 
inquiry respecting our oil reserves we were able to avoid a reply and any 
further reference to such a subject.” 113 
 In the meantime, AIOC also made sure that no copies of the original 
de Böckh report left the company. 114 AIOC traced all seventy-two copies 
of the original report, including to whom they were distributed. The plan 
was to revise the originals found and to keep a few originals in “strict 
custody in London.” 115 But Jehangir remained unconvinced, insisting that 
the original report be published separately from the one AIOC provided 
him. He demanded more maps, plans, and a copy of de Böckh’s report 
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on “Persian Geology.” 116 In response, the company claimed that they had 
“no copy of such report.” AIOC offi cials instructed that all maps as well 
as engineering and geology reports submitted to the Iranian government 
should be devoid of analysis, controversial commentary, and under-
ground contour maps. 117 The details of whether oil wells were in use, 
mudded off, or had gone to water were also misrepresented to the Iranian 
government. 118 
 AIOC’s knowledge-brokering strategy was manifested in the circula-
tion of papers, measurements, and scientifi c work. The strategy involved 
gathering maximum knowledge about reserves to make economic cal-
culations, while simultaneously constructing systematic ignorance about 
it to the Iranian government and perhaps even to other oil companies. 
Cadman was fully aware that oil had a limit and that it was calculable. 
These calculations would factor into the company’s economic interests. 
By the late 1940s, a policy of scaling down production at the main oilfi elds 
was put forward to extend what remained of their lifespan. 119 AIOC’s 
production department admitted that there had been “no improvement 
in our methods of producing limestone reservoirs,” and “very little of a 
fundamental nature” had been learned about mechanisms of recovery 
from limestone in the past fi fteen years. 120 AIOC’s organizational work 
did not exemplify the “practical application of scientifi c principles to 
local oil operations.” Rather, organizational work transformed the oil-
fi elds of Iran into a laboratory of calculation and measurement, equip-
ping managers with the tools to build a world in which the oil would 
thrive inside oil operations, and the politics of national control would be 
kept out. 
 Political decisions were internal to AIOC’s business strategy, under-
stood here in terms of its organizational work. They involved the ele-
ment of secrecy and with it the introduction of black boxes, not only 
to prevent geologists and engineers from taking away the information 
they produced, but to block the Iranian government’s access to oil infor-
mation and thus the political possibility of national control and higher 
profi ts. This work of secrecy would help separate the act of measure-
ment from the act of interpretation. 121 Technical information—reserve 
estimate numbers and new representations of the oil—could be made 
available to the Iranian government, but the details of their construction 
and the considerations that went into them could not be made public 
because they would invite the government to interpret problems unfavor-
ably. Thus, the oil company did not want its opponent, the Iranian gov-
ernment, to know how it obtained a particular piece of information or 
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made a particular decision because this would put it in a better position 
to ask questions. 122 AIOC built black boxes “as exclusion zones” into 
which they could “stuff information handling and organizational tech-
niques, local knowledge, and technical innovations.” 123 Local knowledge 
and organizational techniques in this box were masked by the rhetoric 
of scientifi c discovery that the company deployed in its research fi ndings. 
Only by recovering the local and organizational work—the politics of 
unknowability and the manufacturing of technical ignorance that went 
into estimating oil reserves and publishing the geological properties of 
the oil—can we make sense of the oil corporation’s strategic success. 
 AIOC in the Public Arena 
 AIOC coordinated local forms of petroleum knowledge, gathered in the 
“private arena” of southwest Iran, with formal and public associations of 
petroleum knowledge abroad. The fi rst World Petroleum Congress was 
held in London in 1933 a few months after the signing of the revised 
1901 oil concession in Tehran. The Council of the Institution of Petro-
leum Technologists initiated the meeting to provide “a platform for the 
discussion of standardization” among the leading geologists, engineers, 
and petroleum chemists, “particularly those of European countries.” 124 
Representatives of “all countries specially interested in the subject of 
petroleum” were invited, with funding support coming from the major 
oil companies based in the United Kingdom. 
 Oil companies acted individually and in secret, but also coordinated 
through private and public associations. The congress appointed Cad-
man, chairman of AIOC, and J. B. August Kessler, manager of the Royal 
Dutch Shell Petroleum Company, as honorary vice presidents of the meet-
ing. Along with British government representatives, fi ve international 
bodies and the delegations of twenty-eight countries were represented at 
the congress. 
 The start of the 1933 congress marked the move from standardization 
within the oil company to the control of that standardization through 
the industrial research laboratory and an International Standards Asso-
ciation. The congress passed two resolutions on standardization. First, 
a committee of twenty-eight from the International Standards Associa-
tion would serve as the coordinating body with respect to all activities 
connected with the standardization of tests of petroleum products. Sec-
ond, the Congress would be held triennially with the “hope of ultimately 
developing a World Empire of Petroleum Technology.” 125 As Bowker has 
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observed, this movement marked “the recognition of the independent 
value of industrial research as standardizing the natural world in the 
image of the new social world.” 126 
 The point here is that organizational work preceded the construction 
of industrial science and operated locally, indicating that the kind of sci-
ence produced in the industrial setting of oil operations was inherently 
political and helped constitute the political agency of the oil corporation. 
AIOC’s fi rst move toward standardization involved the partial transfor-
mation of the oil regions into a laboratory for enacting measurements 
and representations of the geophysical structure of the subsoil, calculat-
ing reserve estimates, and describing the qualities of the oil. This work 
facilitated the control of the information fl ow in the oilfi elds of south-
west Iran, or what could be made public and private depending on the 
economic and political costs. The second move toward standardization 
involved the setting up of industrial research laboratories in the United 
Kingdom, and eventually in Abadan, Iran, in 1935, to test and assess the 
qualities of Anglo-Iranian oil. The last move was the recognition of the 
independent value of petroleum science research presented by Cadman at 
the fi rst World Petroleum Congress. As Bowker says, “rather than look 
for ways in which science is grafted onto industry,” we must “look for 
ways in which science is a natural extension of industrial processes.” 127 
Thus, achieving the dual goal of enrolling the International Standards 
Association as spokesperson for coordinating standardized tests for 
petroleum products along with the pursuit of a “World Empire of Petro-
leum Technology” was a simple extension of the organizational process 
that fi rst occurred in the oilfi elds of southwest Iran. 
 Cadman presented his article “Science in the Petroleum Industry” at 
the congress and located the origins of petroleum expertise in the history 
of the rise of industrial science. He highlighted the petroleum industry’s 
debts to its “founding fathers” in science, Michael Faraday and James 
Dewar. 128 He then noted two landmarks in the history of petroleum: the 
last plenary meeting of the International Petroleum Commission held in 
Bucharest in 1912, followed by the founding of the Institute of Petroleum 
Technologies in 1913. Cadman’s chronological history of the oil industry 
continued by noting the technical achievements that came with the inven-
tion of a higher-effi ciency internal combustion engine, the diesel engine, 
and the multitude of petroleum products leading to the growth of new 
industries such as in petrochemicals. 
 Through a series of narrative movements, Cadman transformed the 
history of petroleum expertise as an industrial science into the rise of 
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pure science and scientifi c investigation applied to modern industry. This 
transformation was afforded by the development of geophysical meth-
ods to determine the nature of underground structures. Cadman recalled 
early diffi culties in determining the exact form of underground oil struc-
tures in abstraction. But he neglected to recall the local conditions and 
problems with measuring and controlling Anglo-Iranian oil and all the 
political forces involved, which had shaped his understanding of the tech-
nical diffi culties. Two historiographic processes occurred at once: the pre-
sentation of the paper within the new discipline of petroleum science, and 
the destruction of the historical context. 
 In his historical account, Cadman neglected to include the local his-
torical and sociotechnical activities that had enabled the birth of petro-
leum science from the start. Such activities included managing oil worker 
strikes (discussed in chapter 4), protecting the terms of the oil concession, 
negotiating with political groups for access to the oil, and protecting the 
company’s involvement in international cartel arrangements to limit Mid-
dle Eastern oil production. Working through and eliminating any uncer-
tainty attached to these controversies was indeed necessary for AIOC’s 
representational and organizational work to occur in the fi rst place. 
 The secrecy of the company’s technical and scientifi c work in south-
west Iran was made more evident as Cadman proceeded to demonstrate 
a “working sectional model of an oil fi eld” for his audience ( fi gures 2.1 
and  2.2 ). The model demonstrated wells producing from the oil reservoir 
and ultimately going to gas and water, according to their position on the 
structure. Standing at the podium at the front of a lecture theater at the 
Royal Institution, 129 Cadman made the independent authority of indus-
trial science as pure science visible through the representational work 
of a model and the various ways it could be applied to resolve technical 
obstacles. And again, this performance simultaneously excluded the local 
activities in which such “technical achievements” had been worked out. 
 Cadman then shifted from a discussion of inventions or the birth of 
industrial-scientifi c ideas to one of innovation. “Unit operation” 130 exem-
plifi ed “applied science” at its best, enabling one organization to con-
trol the oilfi eld as a single unit with advantages “not confi ned to the 
purely commercial” but derived from the “avoidance of competition,” 
also known as the monopoly arrangement. 131 Such an operation, Cad-
man explained, enabled the collection and correlation of data to a “high 
degree of accuracy” on “uniform and consistent lines,” regarding the 
analysis of reservoir conditions and the calculation of reserves to ensure 
economical methods of maximum recovery. To ensure the authority of 
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 Figure 2.2 
 Working sectional model of an oilfi eld, presented by John Cadman, chairman of AIOC. 
 Source : John Cadman, “Science in the Petroleum Industry,”  World Petroleum Congress 
Proceedings 1 (1933): 563–570, esp. 564–565. 
 Figure 2.1 
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industrial science, Cadman’s lecture excluded the identifi cation of all the 
political activities of managing information and concessionary disputes, 
repressing oil workers, revising geological reports, and the uncertainties 
attached to the calculation and measurement of reserves. In practice, 
these entities, tools, and arguments were necessary for making the pre-
sentation of the working model of oilfi eld operations possible. 
 In his conclusion, Cadman noted that it would be “very diffi cult for 
the petroleum industry as a whole” to follow his company’s practices. 132 
Nevertheless this is precisely what his participation in the public arena, 
as AIOC’s spokesperson, demonstrated. Petroleum science was an exten-
sion of the sociotechnical processes and organizational work that occurred 
in the oil regions of southwest Iran, enabling the global oil industry 
in markets and production to be predictable and stable. Most of the 
presentations at the meeting consisted of articles published by AIOC’s 
geologists, engineers, and chemists. The various byproducts of oil—natural 
gas, gasoline, kerosene—each possessed its own abstract origin myth 
that had nothing to do with the organizational work involved in trans-
forming the world into a place in which such products could thrive and 
be consumed. 
 The World Petroleum Congress in London served as the occasion for 
the extension of the laboratory fi rst built in the oilfi elds of southwest 
Iran to the oilfi eld model presented to an audience of political and inter-
national petroleum experts. Cadman concluded that the congress above 
all demonstrated the need for “encouraging the application of scientifi c 
principles and methods to every branch of industrial activity.” 133 The 
“old empirical methods” were giving way to “ordered thought and inves-
tigation,” and “there is today a clear[er] appreciation of benefi ts to be 
derived from the union of theory and practice than ever before.” 134 On 
the ground, however, organizational work operated by controlling social 
and natural time and space and made industrial science possible. 135 
 Distinctions between AIOC and other oil companies in public/private 
arenas were blurry. After all, AIOC was a cartel or joint organization 
with interests in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), Royal Dutch Shell, 
and all the other major Anglo-American oil companies controlling global 
oil marketing and production. “Petroleum technologists” served either 
as experts from private companies or arrived from universities and state 
institutions. These experts emerged in professional associations at insti-
tutes, World Petroleum Congresses, and academic and in-house produc-
tion conferences. This practice and expertise was internal to the system 
of exchanges of information of oil companies that acted individually but 
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coordinated with each other through associations on pricing, production, 
and labor. 136 AIOC’s domains of knowledge production constituted the 
machinery of the transnational oil corporation and its historical identity. 
Cadman’s universalist claims 137 to petroleum knowledge as industrial sci-
ence in the public arena (to the exclusion of the local organizational work 
of producing that knowledge) enabled the company to step outside of 
local constraints in southwest Iran, and to ensure that relations between 
politics and international markets in oil remained predictable. 
 Extrascientifi c Origins of Petroleum Knowledge 
 One of the most important differences between the 1901 and 1933 con-
cession contracts concerned the rights of access and terms of exchange of 
technoscientifi c information between the oil company and the national 
government. In this period, concession terms and the construction of 
petroleum knowledge actively concealed their extrascientifi c origins in 
the need to maintain the effectiveness of British imperial and corporate 
power over a new source of energy. Through an investigation of the com-
pany’s local activities of assembling petroleum knowledge, this chapter 
has illuminated the working out of a transnational oil corporation’s 
power in southwest Iran. New technologies were responses to problems 
caused by earlier projects, explained in geology articles and conference 
proceedings as unexpected complications, failed theories and uncertain 
assumptions, and the need for more data. But following the activities of 
petroleum experts has revealed their attempts to learn from the failures 
of oil production and refi ning, and to reformulate goals from the start. 138 
What this means is that technical expertise did not work, as the BP com-
pany history argues, by bringing science and technology from abroad to 
develop a natural resource in a faraway land of inhabitants defi cient in 
technological knowledge. Rather, petroleum knowledge was formed in 
the organizational work of the battle that preceded and made possible 
the effect of Anglo-Iranian oil as standardized and separated technically 
from political questions of national control. Technological zones of mea-
surement and qualifi cation, and the staging and circulation of this knowl-
edge in global terms, generated spaces of immense political and economic 
importance. 
 Following the activities of AIOC’s managers, geologists, engineers, and 
chemists exposes the various domains of petroleum expertise through 
the multiplication of journals, congresses, and in-house company meet-
ings about Anglo-Iranian oil. Each site served as an occasion for the 
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production of technical expertise about oil as well as the erasure, silenc-
ing, and destruction of the historical circumstances in which the fi nding 
was made possible. The fi nal result of this political project was to present 
industrial science as “pure science” through a so-called process of inven-
tion and innovation. 
 AIOC’s experts devised management methods that were an integral 
part of the history and politics of Iran in the early twentieth century. The 
production of scientifi c knowledge and technological expertise and the 
ways this knowledge circulated and was monopolized are key elements 
for understanding the battles over which the Iranian state’s demand for 
sovereignty over its resources emerged. Tracking the construction of tech-
noscience around oil is also necessary for understanding the relations 
between the British ruling elite of AIOC and its employees, as well as the 
history of Khuzistan, particularly the oil regions inhabited by political 
groups threatening the powers of the ruling monarch and that of the 
company. 
 Standardizing and managing technical information in public-private 
arenas was a vital aspect of AIOC’s business strategy in the midst of 
a global energy shift from coal to oil. It involved dealing with the ten-
sions between local and total knowledge, between scientifi c and business 
knowledge, and between necessary secrecy and publication. Contrary to 
what scientifi c articles and technical and business histories of oil lead us 
to think, the universal history of oil was not superior to and separate from 
the local, rather it was embedded in local activities and the particularities 
of producing oil. AIOC needed to take the properties of Anglo-Iranian oil 
seriously to make decisions about further exploration and oil policy, how 
long to keep its concession, how much labor it needed, how much this 
would all cost, and how to manage the information to control the nation-
alist demands of the Iranian government. Rather than seeing nature and 
knowledge on one side and interests, stakes, politics, and power forces on 
the other, divides between social and technical were the outcome of the 
political process examined here and not the start. 

 [The Company shall pay] … the said Government [Imperial Government of 
Persia] the sum of £20,000 sterling in cash and an additional sum of £20,000 
sterling in paid-up shares of the fi rst company founded by virtue of the forego-
ing Article. It shall also pay the said Government annually a sum equal 
to 16 per cent of the annual net profi ts of any company or companies that 
may be formed in accordance with the said Article. (Article 10, D’Arcy 
Concession, 1901) 
 In the event of there arising between the parties to the present Concession any 
dispute or difference in respect of its interpretation or the rights or respon-
sibilities of one or the other of the parties … such dispute or difference shall 
be submitted to two arbitrators at Teheran … and to an Umpire who shall be 
appointed by the arbitrators before they proceed to arbitrate. The decision of 
the arbitrators or … that of the umpire, shall be fi nal. (Article 17, D’Arcy 
Concession, 1901) 
 On November 28, 1932, the Iranian government canceled its 1901 D’Arcy 
Concession with the backing of the ruling monarch, Reza Shah. 1 The 
Iranian parliament (Majlis) immediately endorsed the decree four days 
later. AIOC opposed the cancellation as illegal, according to the terms of 
the 1901 concession, referring to Article 17, concerning the resolution of 
disputes using arbitration. However, canceling the oil concession was a 
decisive step taken by the Iranian government because normal forms of 
control for profi ts, stipulated in the royalty clause of Article 10, seemed 
to have broken down and were not working in its favor. AIOC would 
have to rebuild and restabilize those apparatuses controlling profi ts, pro-
duction, and labor, to ensure its continued control of oil operations and 
to eliminate any threat to the terms of its 1901 oil concession. 
 Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Iranian government pushed for 
higher production rates, royalties, better treatment of its workers, and 
more technical information about its oilfi elds, framing these demands 
in increasingly nationalist terms about sovereignty. The Iranian prime 
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minister, Abbas Mehdi Hedayat, fi rst announced to the Majlis in 1928 
that the British concessionaires might consider some revision of their 1901 
concession. In the following years, an outpouring of concerns emerged in 
national newspapers that portrayed the 1901 concession as perpetrated 
by ignorant government offi cials of the former Qajar regime, who had 
been bribed to do so by foreign fi nanciers. 2 While John Cadman, chair-
man of AIOC at the time, was displeased with the “orchestrated press 
campaign,” 3 ordinary Iranians expressed support in local newspapers for 
their government’s decision to negotiate a revision of the 1901 oil conces-
sion. 4 By ignoring the concession terms that stipulated workers must be 
“Persian,” AIOC was depriving Iranians of employment and thousands 
of foreign workers were collecting their pay to the detriment of the law-
ful rights of Iranian nationals. 5 Finally, the company was carrying away 
the oil, refi ning it, and selling it back to Iranians at exorbitant prices. In 
this period, AIOC had already built large refi nery facilities in the United 
Kingdom and one in France. After World War I, it completed the acquisi-
tion of both shipping and tanker fl eets, enabling it to transport oil and its 
byproducts “at its own cost and in its own time.” 6 Thus, Iranian public 
opinion urged that in the absence of a resolution, the government can-
cel the 1901 D’Arcy Concession, in particular because the company was 
actively taking steps to set up operations outside Iran. 
 The increasingly nationalist demands of the Iranians confl icted with 
the secret monopoly arrangements set up by the international oil cor-
porations, including AIOC, to place limits on world oil supplies to keep 
profi ts high. During the interwar period, nationalist demands in Iran, 
Mexico, and Venezuela clashed with the national interests of foreign 
(Anglo-American) governments, which either held a direct stake in or 
were home to the largest international oil companies. For example, as the 
largest shareholder in AIOC, Great Britain’s investment in the oilfi elds 
was much greater than all Iranian investment in trade and industry. 7 Such 
connections extended further with regard to the employment of domestic 
labor in oil operations. As a private British company, AIOC employed 
more workers in the oilfi elds than all other Iranian-controlled industries 
combined. 
 The shah’s cancellation triggered the most controversial confrontation 
between AIOC and the Iranian government in the interwar period. Its 
resolution would set a precedent for managing future confl icts, particu-
larly Iran’s oil nationalization crisis in 1951 (discussed in chapter 5). As 
with the question of concessionary property discussed in the fi rst chap-
ter, this chapter follows the oil by starting from the stipulations of the 
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concession concerning profi ts and labor, then examining the ensuing dis-
putes. I investigate its activities as a sociotechnical device and map the 
political agency and machinery it offers. Each section probes the tech-
nical properties of oil—that is, the organizational work and calculating 
technologies that went into stabilizing the controversy advantageously, 
or canceling and replacing the 1901 concession with a new one in 1933. 
 Canceling the concession did not mark the fi rst time the Iranian gov-
ernment had complained to AIOC about royalty payments and other 
fi nancial issues. The origins of the interwar concessionary crisis reside in 
earlier fi nancial disputes that emerged after World War I regarding the 
defi nition and calculation of the phrase “16 per cent of the annual net 
profi ts” inscribed in Article 10 of the royalty provision clause. Article 
3 of the 1901 concession stipulated that the Iranian government would 
acquire profi ts from “all companies” formed or working for the conces-
sion. 8 In this period, AIOC formed numerous subsidiary companies such 
as the British Tanker Company, national British oil refi neries, and the 
British Petroleum Company. 9 However, the Iranian government claimed 
it was not receiving any profi ts from these companies. 
 In 1928, the Iranian government was demanding a percentage of the 
profi ts from these subsidiary companies and an increase in the propor-
tion of higher-level positions occupied by Iranian workers. 10 An attempt 
had previously been made to work out the dispute in the Armitage-Smith 
Agreement of 1920, meant to establish a way to calculate 16 percent 
of annual net profi ts. But the Iranian government overlooked the agree-
ment in 1928, and the Majlis never ratifi ed it. Thus, the interpretation of 
ambiguous terms, “16 per cent of the annual net profi ts,” in the royalty 
clause of the 1901 concession was at the heart of the controversy over the 
years. Were revenues to be based on royalty per ton, a percentage of prof-
its, dividends on shares, or oil in kind, and would there be shareholding? 
How should “profi ts” be defi ned? 11 
 The interwar concession crisis was the fi rst of its kind between a for-
eign oil corporation and a national government. Its resolution would set 
a precedent in international law as two national governments, British and 
Iranian, and a private British company would present very different views 
of international law and sovereignty in arguing their respective positions. 
The dispute also involved the sudden breakdown of operations that were 
necessary for AIOC to maintain a particular oil economy in Iran and a 
social world constructed through the framework of the oil concession. 
Opening up the 1901 concession’s articles concerning the formulation of 
profi ts, labor, and the legal terms for arbitrating disputes over economic 
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resources exposes the concession’s role as not just a text but a politi-
cal weapon, enrolling multiple actors, procedures, and machineries. By 
enrolling such remarkable actors, AIOC hoped to eliminate the instabil-
ity generated by this crisis and restore its concessionary authority, ensur-
ing that relations between politics and oil markets remained intact. 
 Scramble for Oil: Entangling Anglo-Iranian Oil in the Anatomy of 
International Oil Markets 
 In the years preceding the concession crisis, AIOC and the Iranian govern-
ment wanted to enter into (re)negotiations for a revised concession but 
with different interests at stake. At a meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 
1928, Teymourtash, the Iranian minister of court, based his government’s 
demands for more royalties on the £1.4 million royalty payment received 
in 1927 and with prospects for further increases from their sharehold-
ing. 12 But Cadman argued that the royalty for 1927 was exceptional, 
“which they may not see again for a long time in view of over-production 
today and more to come.” 13 He was right. The royalty plummeted to 
£502,080 in 1928 based on 5,357,800 tons of oil produced compared to 
the 4,831,800 tons in 1927. 14 
 AIOC claimed its negotiating position was not only based on their 
interpretation of the concession but on “hard facts”—that is, their “per-
fect liberty to divorce from [AIOC] all outside assets, and to all oil not 
on f.o.b. Persia-basis” to companies that were “complete outsiders.” 15 
Subsidiary companies of AIOC that collected profi ts from operations in 
other parts of the world were not considered internal to AIOC oper-
ations in Iran. “F.o.b. Persia-basis” referred to oil that was purchased 
and shipped from the port in Abadan. Oil that left other ports and was 
sold to “outsider” companies, even if they were subsidiaries of AIOC or 
partners, such as the Burmah Oil Company, did not constitute legitimate 
profi ts from operations in Iran and thus would not factor into additional 
royalties paid to the Iranian government. The company claimed that it 
was already suffering under the disadvantages of the British government 
participating in distribution and shipping. Accepting the Iranian govern-
ment as a shareholder would result in a series of drawbacks—that is, 
a precedent would be set in which the company would have to accept 
Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Albania, and other countries as share-
holders. Participation granted to the Iranian government in the event of 
an increase in the net share of profi ts must not undermine the British 
government’s preponderance (a 51 percent stake in AIOC), “a thing they 
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would never allow.” “Hard facts” referred to a set of distinctions the 
company reserved the right to invoke in determining which of its activi-
ties to include in oil operations and which to exclude. 
 The Iranian government took issue with the company’s position. 
Royalty fi gures had dropped even further to £300,000 in 1932, and the 
government had refused to accept the royalty payment for 1931. The 
reasons it stated for its decision to cancel the concession were the fol-
lowing: 16 (1) the government had not been allowed to check company 
accounts; (2) no royalty had been paid by the company during World 
War I and the interpretation of “16 per cent of the annual net profi ts” 
was unfairly arrived at; (3) the company had refused to pay income tax to 
the government; (4) the cost of oil in Iran was excessive; (5) the company 
had engaged in reckless expenditures in other parts of the world to the 
disadvantage of the Iranian oil industry; and (6) the 1901 concession had 
been obtained through coercion. 
 AIOC had its own set of concerns. First, the period remaining in the 
sixty-year concession contract, thirty-two years, was inadequate for 
sound economic development and for the quantity of oil reserves avail-
able for extraction. Second, political concerns and criticism from the 
Iranian press and public were growing: “There is a steadily growing 
political feeling with respect to the national signifi cance of its (Iran’s) 
oil production.” Such political agitation had “developed to unwise and 
sometimes expropriatory oil legislation (e.g. Romania, Argentina, Mex-
ico, Colombia).” Third, the company was increasingly perceived as exhib-
iting monopolistic tendencies, controlling over 500,000 square miles of 
territory. Finally, the company’s marketing policy needed to be adjusted 
“to a view of the future in which production from Iraq, and possibly from 
other centres of production, may play an increasingly important role.” It 
was also essential to “realize the menace in terms of Persian resentment 
should such developments take place to the detriment of Persian pro-
duction and consequently (as concession terms now stand) of Persian oil 
revenue.” 17 
 Iranian government offi cials were demanding more production in 
order to increase their share of the royalties, whereas AIOC offi cials 
sought to limit production levels in relation to world oil production to 
protect their own profi ts. These connections entangled Anglo-Iranian 
oil with international oil markets and the need to adjust the compa-
ny’s “marketing policy” in relation to future production from Iraq. The 
structure of foreign ownership over Middle East oil was getting worked 
out in these connections, which were simultaneously entangled in the 
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Anglo-Iranian royalty controversy. But over the course of preliminary 
concession revision negotiations with the Iranian government in 1928, 
AIOC managers did not mention these concerns upfront. In reality, while 
there was a major peak in oil discoveries in the 1920s relative to earlier 
and subsequent discovery rates, it was not in Iran. Oil supplies from the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, Mexico, and Romania were 
fl ooding the world market, threatening competition. 18 Prices were col-
lapsing worldwide on the brink of the Great Depression, and this induced 
a price war among the major oil companies. 19 Like the other leading 
oil companies, AIOC had two options: compete to win new markets for 
investment or set up joint ventures with other companies and divide mar-
kets among them. In response, AIOC actively pursued a parallel policy 
on world oil production, prices, and synthetic fuel technology. In August 
1928, during the same period as his meeting with Iranian government 
offi cials in Switzerland, Cadman traveled to Achnacarry, Scotland, and 
agreed with the heads of the major international oil companies such as 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch / Shell, Gulf Oil, and Standard 
Oil of Indiana to enter into a “Pool Association” or “As-Is” agreement. 20 
This monopoly arrangement was designed to manage the glut of oil sup-
plies by establishing a uniform selling price so that participants would 
not have to worry about price competition. The group agreed to control 
world oil production as well, enabling the companies to increase their 
output above volumes indicated by their market quotas, but only so long 
as the extra production was sold to the other pool members. 
 The “As-Is” agreement additionally formed part of a much larger 
“hydrocarbon cartel” concerning not just oil but the chemical and coal 
industries. 21 The goal was to control the chemical industry and block 
the coal industry from accessing the patented use of a hydrogenation 
technology known as the Bergius process that could be used to convert 
coal into oil and develop synthetic fuels. The agreement ensured that 
chemical fi rms were blocked from using the new technologies to make 
chemicals, synthetic rubbers, and fuels from the conversion of coal into 
synthetic oil. Such arrangements would help maintain a particular econ-
omy of oil through the construction of an artifi cial system of scarcity. 22 
This system had been in place for a while, but with recent discoveries in 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and east Texas, companies like AIOC would have to 
work much harder to limit oil production. As the Iranian government 
began to push for higher production rates and profi ts during concession 
revision negotiations, the major oil companies were relying on a system 
based on the exclusive control of oil production and limits to the quantity 
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of oil produced—only an antimarket arrangement could guarantee their 
profi ts. 23 
 Tracing the wider set of connections between Iran’s dispute over roy-
alties, stipulated in Article 10, and the coordinated activities of inter-
national oil companies reveals that AIOC made signifi cant gains from 
the gradual elimination of foreign competition to its own interests and 
British imperial interests in the Middle East, public and private. As dis-
cussed in chapter 1, this interconnected history between a public and pri-
vate British entity extended back to 1914, when the British government 
rescued AIOC by purchasing 51 percent of the shares in the company. 
The British government rescue enabled AIOC to be a leading member 
of an emerging oil cartel, Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), and to 
share in the project to hinder the development of both Mesopotamian 
and Iranian oil, threatening both the European and Asian markets. 24 The 
registered offi ce of TPC was offi cially transferred to AIOC’s premises in 
1921. H.E. Nichols, an offi cial in AIOC, was made managing director of 
the consortium until his replacement in 1929 by Cadman, now chair of 
AIOC, as head of a newly renamed TPC consortium, the Iraqi Petroleum 
Company (IPC). 25 
 In a period of world oil glut, Cadman’s activities at multiple negoti-
ating tables helped build a set of connections between the royalty clause 
of the 1901 D’Arcy Oil Concession and the “As-Is” agreement to con-
trol global oil markets and keep profi ts high. But this was not the end 
of his journey because he also needed to control global oil markets in 
relation to Middle East oil production as a whole, and in light of recent 
discoveries in Iraq, for example. 26 With British investors having delayed 
oil development for nearly a decade to protect oil markets in Asia, oil was 
“discovered” in large quantities in the Kirkuk area in October 1927. 27 
With these details in mind and within the same timeframe as his other 
negotiations, Cadman participated in the secret signing of the “Red Line 
Agreement” on July 1, 1928, in Ostend, Belgium. AIOC, Royal Dutch 
/ Shell, and the major French and American oil companies each took a 
23.75 percent stake in TPC or IPC, as it was known in the subsequent 
year, and participants agreed not to engage in any oil operations in the 
major oil-producing fi elds of the Middle East that were contained within 
the Red Line. This excluded Iran and Kuwait, which were already under 
British control. 28 No Middle East oil would be produced except in coop-
eration with the members of TPC/IPC. At the insistence of American 
oil interests, AIOC had relinquished its position as the dominant share-
holder in TPC/IPC for 23.75 percent in the Red Line Agreement. 29 Final 
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arrangements were concluded between the oil companies, but as with 
AIOC operating in Iran, no company wanted to produce oil in a period 
of world oil glut. 30 
 AIOC’s calculations during concession revision negotiations were 
complicated because they were bound up with demands by the Iranians 
for more control over profi ts and oil production rates that might favor 
Iraqi production over their own, as well as the company’s obligations to 
control Middle East oil production in alliance with the international oil 
companies. As chairman of AIOC with a share in IPC, Cadman needed 
to coordinate his view of both AIOC and IPC’s control over production 
as a single entity unrelated to human-made political borders. But it was 
precisely these borders, or the threat of national control, that might dis-
rupt the stability of the company in limiting Middle East oil production 
at a time of world oil glut. Questions of national control, a world oil 
glut, and protecting the terms of contractual agreements concerning oil 
production and pricing were some of the intertwined concerns inform-
ing AIOC’s negotiations for two months in Switzerland, Scotland, and 
Belgium in 1928. 
 Opening up Iran’s royalty clause dispute has therefore revealed a 
powerful connection with many new actors and organizational forms 
involved such as Iraqi oil, the largest transnational oil corporations, and 
AIOC’s entanglement with the British government in “antimarket” con-
sortium arrangements and subsidiary companies. Anglo-Iranian oil was 
entangled in multiple contractual arrangements, putting AIOC in a pow-
erful bargaining position. 
 For several reasons, the Iranian government’s cancellation of the 1901 
concession was not just about the interpretation of “16% of the annual 
net profi ts” stipulated in Article 10. First, the royalty clause worked in 
practice as a kind of apparatus that, when initially opened up, was entan-
gled with numerous subsidiary companies, founded by AIOC to impose 
limits on the calculation of net profi ts, the basis for calculating the Ira-
nian government’s annual royalty. Second, as we see in more detail below, 
this apparatus also helped impose limits on Iran’s oil production even 
though the government was demanding an increase. Third, placing limits 
on an increase in royalties was made possible through a series of larger 
arrangements that connected AIOC to both the British government and 
the largest foreign oil companies in a kind of monopoly arrangement 
over the production and marketing of oil from the Middle East. 
 In the years preceding the crisis, the articles of the concession were 
doing much more than a paper contract between two parties would have 
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done. AIOC needed to operate the concession as a kind of technology of 
control, not just a text, by defi ning and associating entities to forge alli-
ances that would remain stable through this and future controversies. 31 
During concession revision negotiations, company managers neglected 
to mention that AIOC was working very hard to preserve the rule of 
the royalty clause in order to limit Iran’s oil production and preserve 
monopoly arrangements over Middle East oil production as a whole. The 
concession thus served as a kind of managing technology that could be 
placed between AIOC’s allies and all other entities that sought to defi ne 
their identities otherwise, especially, as we witness below, the Iranian oil 
workers and a national government demanding fair treatment, more pro-
duction, and a higher percentage of royalties. 
 Sovereign Entanglements in International Law 
 With early concession revision negotiations having failed, Anglo-Iranian 
oil mixed with nationalist politics, new organizational forms, and novel 
actors, creating a situation of immense uncertainty. AIOC protested the 
Iranian government’s cancellation of the concession in 1932, claiming 
that it was illegal and that the Iranian government should withdraw the 
decree immediately. However, the Majlis ratifi ed the cancellation decree 
on December 20, 1932. 32 Company offi cials framed the reports of damage 
to AIOC property in the oilfi elds as an “Anglophobic campaign” inspired 
by the Iranian government. The British Foreign Offi ce fi nally responded 
by informing AIOC that the dispute had been transformed into an “inter-
governmental question.” 33 The British government advised AIOC against 
pursuing further negotiations until the concession was reinstated. 34 
 On behalf of the British government, the British Foreign Offi ce reached 
an agreement with AIOC that the company should seek a solution ini-
tially through its own efforts but simultaneously object to the restoration 
of the concession “in order to permit resumption of negotiations upon a 
satisfactory basis.” 35 Negotiations had to proceed on the assumption that 
the 1901 concession would remain in place until change was agreed on. 
This would block the emergence of an “unfortunate precedent” in which 
other countries holding British concessions would be encouraged to “act 
in a similar fashion” if international law was breached. 36 In the mean-
time, the Foreign Offi ce commenced examination of the juridical aspects 
of the dispute, concluding that the cancellation was an unlawful act, 
because Article 17 of the 1901 concession provided for arbitration. The 
dispute potentially involved a “confi scatory act of sovereignty committed 
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against a foreign company.” The latter point constituted a breach of inter-
national law and enabled the government of the injured party to make 
the matter the subject of a diplomatic claim. Framing the dispute in terms 
of international law and the cancellation as a hostile “act of sovereignty” 
gave the British government the right to get involved in Iran’s conces-
sion dispute, on behalf of its “injured party,” AIOC. Iran had played no 
role in the formulation of international law, but its participation in the 
international system translated into acceptance of the existing rules of 
international law, including the law of state responsibility with regard to 
foreign investment. 
 Through the 1920s, two key articles of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations had been formulated to enable the Council of the League of 
Nations to do whatever appeared possible in circumstances where dis-
putes arose between governments (Article 11). When a dispute threatened 
to lead to a “rupture,” the dispute could be submitted to the Council for 
settlement (Article 15). 37 According to the report by legal advisors to the 
Foreign Offi ce, Britain would derive certain advantages from an appeal 
to Geneva: the action would placate League opinion and strengthen Brit-
ain’s position should the Council rule in its favor. The Council’s “moral 
pressure” would persuade Iran to accept its proposals for settlement, 
although force might become necessary “should such pressure founder 
upon the rocks of Persian nationalism.” In the event of the use of force, 
the League decision would justify any British action against Iran and 
enable Britain to solicit help from other members. Britain preferred a 
pacifi c solution, however, as many in the Foreign Offi ce feared that pro-
ceedings at the League would help Iran gain the sympathy of several 
South American countries that “resented concessions held by great pow-
ers in their territories.” In fact, much of the legal doctrine concerning 
state responsibility under international law with regard to foreign invest-
ment was generated by disputes between American and European inves-
tors, on one side, and Latin American states, on the other, insisting that 
investment be ruled entirely by local, national law. 38 
 With the dispute now framed as “intergovernmental” and concerning 
the question of sovereignty in relation to a foreign entity, an oil com-
pany, the British government sent a note of protest to the Iranian gov-
ernment declaring that it would not hesitate to adopt necessary measures 
to protect British interests and that no damage should be infl icted on 
the company’s property. 39 The British government, in its view, had no 
choice but to report the Iranian government’s cancellation to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) at The Hague. 40 The PCIJ was 
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created in 1920–1922 as one of the four principal organs of the League 
of Nations. 41 In its replies, the Iranian government denied responsibility 
for any damage to AIOC interests. 
 The Iranian government sought to frame the relation between inter-
national law and state sovereignty advantageously by keeping the British 
government out. It claimed that the intervention of the British govern-
ment was hindering the settlement of the concession dispute and that 
the Permanent Court possessed no jurisdiction in this question, refer-
ring to Article 36. 42 The Iranian government also threatened to notify the 
Council of unnecessary pressure exerted by the British government. At 
this moment, the British government made the decision to prevent Iran 
from “forestalling a British appeal to Geneva,” because it was “vital” for 
Britain to appear before the League as the “plaintiff rather than as the 
defendant” to allow for a “full consideration of the case.” 43 
 On December 19, 1932, the dispute was formally transformed and 
framed in terms of international law when the British appeal to the 
Council was made under Article 15, concerning a “rupture” in relations 
between two governments, defi ned as a situation that caused Britain to 
contemplate movement of either ships or troops. 44 The British govern-
ment was presenting its case before the Council, not in its capacity as 
“shareholders in the company,” but as the “Government of a State that 
has thought it necessary to take up the case of one of its nationals whose 
interests have been injured by acts contrary to international law commit-
ted by another State.” 45 The British government urged the Council to take 
the appropriate steps to “ensure the maintenance of the  status quo and to 
prevent the interests of the company from being prejudiced” while pro-
ceedings were pending before it. The British government made its legal 
case in the “British Memorandum.” The document reviewed past con-
fl icts over the interpretation of “16% of the annual net profi ts,” which 
the British government argued were understandable given the “ambiguity 
in the text” of the 1901 concession and the “expanding complexity of 
fi nancial and accounting arrangements of the company.” 46 The Iranian 
government’s refusal to retract its cancellation decree justifi ed the British 
government’s right to intervene on an international stage to “protect the 
rights of a British national when injured by acts contrary to international 
law, committed by another State, and ensure … respect for rules of inter-
national law.” 47 AIOC was not simply a private British oil company oper-
ating abroad, it was a foreign national whose interests had been violated 
by an act of sovereignty. 
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 In a September 19, 1932, resolution to the League, however, the 
Iranian government reserved the right to require that proceedings at the 
Permanent Court be suspended in respect of any dispute submitted to 
the Council of the League of Nations. 48 Article 36 of the Statute of the 
Court obligated members of the League of Nations to settle disputes con-
cerning treaties, conventions, and questions of international law within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. As a signatory member to the League, how-
ever, Iran had passed a resolution in 1932 reserving the right to require 
that proceedings in the Court be suspended “in respect of any dispute” 
submitted to the League. 49 This was also the case in 1951, when the 
British government submitted the oil nationalization dispute to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, which replaced the Permanent Court after 
1946 (see chapters 5 and 6). 
 In its memorandum to the Council, the Iranian government reviewed 
past disputes over the calculation and payment of royalties. It argued that 
the British concessionaire was continually extending its activities outside 
Iran while confi ning itself to “restricted exploitation” within the country. 
This was “a line of action unacceptable” because the conceding party 
received a sum varying according to the extent of exploitation. 50 Further, 
AIOC was infringing on the terms of Article 12 indirectly by constructing 
refi neries and other works outside Iran and infringing directly by employ-
ing Indian workers in Iran, despite government protests. 51 
 Transforming the dispute into national legal terms, the Iranian 
government argued that AIOC had consistently refused an arbitrator in 
concession disputes. Therefore, British intervention removed from the 
jurisdiction of municipal courts a dispute that “naturally belonged to 
them” and constituted an infringement of “Persia’s jurisdictional inde-
pendence.” 52 Respect for jurisdictional independence was the reasoning 
behind the Iranian government’s appeal to the League (Appendix VI). 
Article 15 of the Covenant required a “dispute likely to lead to rupture,” 
but the Iranian government argued that such a dispute could only exist 
when a government has “by means of diplomatic protection taken up 
the cause of its nationals.” This presupposed “a violation of general or 
conventional international law and the previous exhaustion of munic-
ipal remedies.” Hence the procedure of cancellation based on nonful-
fi llment of a contract was not a violation of international law, and if it 
was unfounded, “diplomatic protection could only come after municipal 
courts had been given an opportunity of dealing with the matter.” The 
remedies of Iranian municipal law had not been exhausted by the Brit-
ish government as the prerequisite to diplomatic intervention. For this 
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reason, the British government did not have the right to make a diplo-
matic claim in this case. 53 
 An entire legal order was being invoked here, for the fi rst time, with 
the resort to the League. This would lay the groundwork for the national-
ization crisis case in 1951—a landmark in international law. Transform-
ing the dispute in terms of international law by bringing it to the League 
of Nations and the Permanent Court was, for the British government 
and AIOC, about connecting the petroleum order to the machinery 
of international law. 54 The world of Anglo-Iranian oil was constituted 
“inside” the infrastructure of oil operations, its measurements, regulations, 
contracts, and now international law, or so company lawyers and Brit-
ish government offi cials claimed. Legal knowledge about Anglo-Iranian 
oil derived from the transformation, translation, and movement of a 
material object, Anglo-Iranian oil, from the oilfi elds of Iran, into mul-
tiple forms of representation that included the text of Articles 10 and 
17 on royalties and arbitration, respectively, to court proceedings at 
The Hague. This chain of meetings, papers, legal arguments, and rulings 
constituted the machinery of the oil industry. The enterprise maintained 
the traceability of legal knowledge about Anglo-Iranian oil “inside” oil 
operations, moving from the center at the League and the Permanent 
Court to the periphery, or its original context in the oilfi elds where 
AIOC had fi rst set up its laboratory (discussed in chapter 2) to exclude 
the local. 
 This analysis has not sought to provide a wider “legal context” to the 
Anglo-Iranian concession dispute. Rather, international law occurred as a 
set of connections that, at fi rst glance, provided a guarantee to AIOC and 
the British government of a certain traceability and certainty of control 
over the oil, from global arenas to the local oil regions and back. The site 
of the League, an international institution in Geneva, and the various 
proceedings, statements, and decisions about the terms of the oil conces-
sion and its relation to international law and the question of sovereignty 
enabled AIOC to temporarily step outside local constraints of the oil-
fi elds and national institutions in Tehran. The preliminary groundwork 
was now laid for the return of Anglo-Iranian oil to international law in a 
more dramatic confrontation marked by the Iranian government’s deci-
sion to nationalize its oil industry. The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute served 
as one of the critical occasions on which new legal doctrines concerning 
domestic jurisdiction, state responsibility regarding the protection of for-
eign investment, and international arbitration were devised for structur-
ing relations between the contracts of an expanded community of newly 
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sovereign states and foreign corporations in the economic exploitation of 
their natural resources. 55 
 Following the construction of international law around Anglo-Iranian 
oil highlights how the British government and company offi cials, as well 
as Iranian delegates and their representatives at the Council, helped build 
an extension to the energy network, in the form of legal texts within 
which the so-called facts about oil would survive. Thus, the British 
government was not just using law as an instrument of policy, as Beck 
has argued. 56 Rather, the law worked by arranging the social world—
that is, attaching to people, events, oil operations, and papers as they 
shaped decisions about building the oil industry and the rights of a state 
to claim political sovereignty over a natural resource. 57 International 
law made domination and action from a distance possible. It did so by 
reinforcing the faithfulness of the actors shaping the crisis to achieve a 
resolution that granted AIOC and the British government the author-
ity to speak on behalf of the many silent actors (e.g., oil workers) in 
the oilfi elds. 58 
 Different actors were attaching themselves to the law in advantageous 
ways to eliminate rivals and secure control of Iran’s oil. At the Third 
Meeting in January 1933, Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, made 
a statement in response to the “Persia Memorandum” reiterating the Brit-
ish government’s position on the suitability of the case for jurisdiction of 
international law. 59 He again argued that the cancellation had adversely 
affected the company and could develop into a “still more serious sit-
uation leading to a rupture between the two countries,” both of which 
desired to maintain friendly relations. 60 The “real reason” for the can-
cellation decree, Simon argued, was that the Iranian government hoped 
by this means to “dictate to the company a new concession while the 
company is in the adverse and unfair situation of having its concession 
cancelled.” 61 This was an “indefensible use by the Persian government 
of its sovereign power. 62 International law would have to reconfi gure 
itself according to a new set of standards for managing the uncertainty 
attached to a new social reality in which (postcolonial) states claimed 
domestic jurisdiction and sovereign rights to take over foreign investment 
entities, such as an oil industry, operating within their borders. 
 The concession dispute was not just an econotechnical issue. Rather, 
it was bound up with political questions of sovereignty and social ques-
tions of labor that transformed the terms of international law. Having 
challenged the economic arguments about royalty payments and other 
dues stated in the Persian Memorandum, Simon shifted to the question of 
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labor. 63 In response to Iran’s allegation that AIOC had failed to observe 
a stipulation in the concession concerning “the employment of work-
men who are Persian subjects,” Simon responded with a statement about 
“the facts”: 
 I think the company has some right to feel a little aggrieved that such a sugges-
tion should be made against it. … It is not a ground on which anybody has ever 
sought to cancel a concession, and has nothing to do with the case. The actual 
facts are these. The skilled labour employed by the company in Persia includes 
118 categories of employees, managers, engineers, etc. When the company 
began operations, few artisans in any of these categories were available among 
the Persian population, and during the Great War rapid development led to the 
importing from India of skilled labour not available in Persia. Since then the 
number of non-Persian employees has been consistently diminished, and 90% 
of the company’s non-European employees in Persia are now Persian subjects. 
In order to fi t Persian subjects for employment, the company has spent over 
£100,000 on education in recent years. Apart from artisan-training centers, it 
has built schools in the Persian province of Khuzistan, where none existed, and 
for six years it has provided free university education in England for two Per-
sian students annually. Further, the Persian Government has benefi ted directly 
and indirectly by the expenditure … by the company. On the medical services 
alone in South Persia, the company has spent over £550,000 since 1924, tens 
of thousands of non-employees receive free medical treatment every year … but 
I am entitled to say on behalf of my fellow countrymen, that the reproach that 
they have not in this matter shown a suffi cient regard for the very proper needs 
of the population of Persia in the neighbourhood concerned has not the smallest 
scrap of foundation. 64 
 The British government was arguing, on behalf of AIOC, that the com-
pany had been operating as a benevolent, civilizing social force in the 
oil regions of Khuzistan Province and was making full use of its Iranian 
labor. As Simon remarked, this was the fi rst time anybody had made 
use of a social argument concerning the adequate employment and treat-
ment of labor, as opposed to economic arguments, as a basis on which 
to cancel a concession. But he quickly brushed the labor point aside as 
ultimately having “nothing to do with the case.” The Anglo-Iranian oil 
dispute introduced social arguments about the treatment of labor that 
embodied a new social reality of postcolonial nation-states in which 
claims to bringing Western civilization to a technically (and racially) defi -
cient population, as a justifi cation for the operations of foreign fi rms, 
were no longer acceptable. International law would have to be reformed 
and redeemed from its colonial past by developing a novel language of 
paternalistic development for managing disputes between foreign corpo-
rations and newly sovereign, non-Western governments. 
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 The colonial legacy of international law provided AIOC with the 
tools with which to discredit the agency of oil workers, who were at 
the same time credited with legitimacy to act as arguments presented by 
the Iranian government. International legal arguments put forward by 
both sides provided the tools with which to determine who could act and 
on what terms, such as Iranian oil workers, whose presence threatened 
to destabilize and redefi ne the structure of relations between foreign cor-
porations and non-Western governments concerning the exploitation of 
natural resources. 
 The Arabian-American Oil Company, Aramco, as Robert Vitalis has 
shown, developed a similar set of moral and civilizing arguments in subse-
quent years to justify its operations in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, large fi rms 
in fi elds such as mining and oil deployed “paternalism” in their efforts 
to defeat union building in the American Southwest and the oilfi elds. 65 
Even “while racism’s ethics governed the hierarchical distribution of ben-
efi ts,” Vitalis explains, “a fi rm’s benefi cence ostensibly demonstrated how 
so-called outsiders and third parties, including the local state,” in this 
instance Iran, “were second best (or worse) options for securing a decent 
life.” As with AIOC, fi rms brought this model with them when they began 
producing oil beyond US borders. Thus, Simon’s rebuttal was intended 
to emphasize not only AIOC’s benefi cence toward the people of “South 
Persia,” building schools and training centers “where none existed,” but 
also how the Iranian government represented a worse option for securing 
a decent life for its population. 
 In response to Simon’s rebuttal, Iran’s minister of fi nance, Davar, 
argued that the contract had been made between the Iranian government 
and a private company, not between states. 66 Furthermore, despite the 
Iranian government’s protests, the company still employed thousands of 
foreigners who were not skilled workmen but “mere laborers.” 67 AIOC 
could go ahead and “withdraw its benefactions” in supporting two 
Iranians annually for study in England because the government was 
itself supporting the study of hundreds of Iranians abroad, particularly 
in France. 68 Such symbols of benefi cence were mere tokens and not prac-
tices intended to meet the criteria of the concession. 
 The Council never expressed an opinion on the legality of the can-
cellation, the role of jurisdiction for the case itself (whether constituting 
diplomatic protection or a question for Iranian municipal law), or the 
legality of claims made by either side concerning the role of the com-
pany in its treatment and employment of Iranian labor and its social 
impact on Khuzistan as a whole. At the Sixth Meeting of the League 
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in February 1933, M. Benes, Foreign Secretary of State for Czechoslo-
vakia, appointed by the Council as rapporteur to work with both par-
ties to reach a “friendly and equitable solution,” 69 reported that the 
court proceeding involved “important questions of law.” He also stated 
that a provisional agreement had been reached in which both parties 
agreed to the suspension of further proceedings before the Council until 
May 1933. The two parties agreed that the legal standpoint of each 
as stated before the Council remained “entirely reserved.” 70 In private 
negotiations for a fi nal settlement to the confl ict, AIOC concluded that 
operations must continue as they did before the cancellation decree of 
November 27, 1932. 71 The British government announced its satisfac-
tion with the Council’s provision and that a settlement could now be 
negotiated on “equal terms.” 72 On April 29, 1933, the Iranian delegate to 
the League, Anoushiravan Sepahbody, announced that a new concession 
had been signed and the Majlis announced its ratifi cation to the Council 
in June. 73 
 In international legal terms, the 1932–1933 concession dispute was the 
fi rst case of its kind, laying the groundwork for a future milestone case 
in international law, Iran’s oil nationalization crisis in 1951–1953. The 
relationship between international law and sovereignty was transformed 
by this fi rst encounter with Anglo-Iranian oil as it triggered the refor-
mulation of a number of doctrines for organizing relations between the 
transnational corporation and host governments, including “the doctrine 
of diplomatic protection and state responsibility for injury to aliens.” 74 
Whereas the British government invoked the law to secure its authority 
and legitimacy as spokesperson for AIOC’s operations, the Iranian gov-
ernment hoped to transform it. In practice, international law worked as 
a series of memorandums, meetings, decrees, arbiters, and legal texts that 
extended the energy network from southwest Iran to Geneva, The Hague, 
and London, helping to elaborate positions of strength and weakness. 
The British government, on behalf of AIOC, wanted to utilize the law 
to help bolster its position of strength, claiming that Iran had commit-
ted a “confi scatory act of sovereignty,” whereas the Iranian government 
rejected this association in favor of national and municipal laws to bol-
ster its own position with regard to sovereignty over a natural resource. 
Many of the controversies regarding the impact of “new states” (formed 
out of the Mandate System of the League of Nations) on the rules of 
international law emerged in disputes generated by the “doctrine of state 
responsibility as related to the protection of foreign investment,” as in the 
case of AIOC in Iran. 75 Thus, the law was not simply a way of extending 
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existing power relations and of maintaining the Iranian government in 
a position of weakness. It was transformed by its encounter with oil, 
generating new doctrines and linkages that attached international law to 
questions of national sovereignty over a natural resource and the right of 
a government to intervene on behalf of a private, international oil corpo-
ration framed as its national. 
 The proceedings at the League occupied an important place in British 
thinking in that the League’s sanctioning of an agreement according to 
universal standards of international law would make it more diffi cult for 
Iran to rescind it. 76 Private discussions to resolve the dispute were not 
only about the economic question of royalties but also included technical 
questions of oil production and social questions about the replacement of 
British labor with Iranian labor at higher skill levels. The Council made 
no formal decision except to encourage that a resolution be reached 
strictly between the company and the Iranian government. Transporting 
the dispute to the League was not just an instrument of British policy. 
It was a necessary step for the (re)stabilization of the British-controlled 
energy network in the midst of uncertainty. As such, the groundwork 
was now laid for managing future controversies involving the national-
ization of the British-controlled oil industry. 77 The uncertainty resided 
in the dispute’s susceptibility to a technolegal rearrangement of the 
so-called real facts about oil by diverse actors, including Iranian govern-
ment offi cials, oil workers, legal doctrines, and the oil, connecting into 
other logics and confl icts such as national sovereignty and revolutionary 
movements. 
 Calculating Iran’s Oil Royalties 
 AIOC needed to stabilize the authority of its 1901 concession in Iran 
by devising various legal formulations and calculating technologies for 
resolving the concession dispute advantageously. The concession crisis 
unfolded during the course of two years, commencing offi cially with the 
Iranian government’s cancellation decree of November 27, 1932, fol-
lowed by the British government’s appeal to the Council of the League 
of Nations on December 19, 1932. With the suspension of international 
legal proceedings and the resumption of negotiations in February 1933, 
company management were called on to prepare the “necessary data” for 
the review of the London board of directors, which would be involved 
in negotiating the terms of the revised concession. 78 Company opinion 
noted the instability of any scenario. For example, all sorts of objections 
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might be raised as to a defi nition of the “reasonable cost of the pro-
duction, refi ning, transporting, and marketing” and might “involve us in 
admitting a right for the Government to control such costs and may lead 
to all kinds of diffi culties for the future.” 79 
 The company’s fi rst step in avoiding the uncertainty attached to any 
future compromise with the Iranian government was to defi ne a new 
set of parameters for the calculation of oil production rates and profi ts. 
AIOC offi cials proposed a revised basis for calculating royalty payments 
that would satisfy a series of conditions: (1) a substantial minimum 
annual payment to the Iranian government; (2) an annual payment that 
under normal working conditions would prevent violent conditions; (3) a 
scale of payment in a reasonable ratio to the company’s total profi ts; (4) 
a scale of payment to remove the incentive for the Iranian government to 
press for increasing tonnage; and (5) a method of payment that carried 
no shareholding, but gave the Iranian government some share in the prof-
its of the company without depriving it of a minimum in lean years or in 
the event of a declining Iranian tonnage. 
 AIOC’s “accountancy experts” formulated a set of alternatives for cal-
culating royalties with the goal that “the fi eld of suspicion or dispute 
would be confi ned to narrow limits and, consequently, the cause for any 
desire to examine accounts would disappear.” 80 The Iranian government, 
for its part, was demanding minimum annual production levels of six 
million tons of oil. 81 From AIOC’s standpoint, such production levels 
were not possible in a period of global economic depression, but also in 
relation to the new monopoly arrangements set up between the inter-
national oil companies. To make matters worse, 90 percent of Iranian oil 
production was refi ned within Iran. 
 AIOC formulated that all royalty schemes should be based on a set of 
variables, namely, a combination of a tonnage royalty and a royalty tied 
to the profi ts of the company, derived from all sources (e.g., company 
and subsidiary company operations in Iran and abroad). 82 The Iranian 
government’s demand for higher production levels led company accoun-
tants to reason that a tonnage royalty would “necessarily increase with 
increasing production and provide the urge to the Iranian government 
to press for increasing tonnage.” A “means” therefore had been found to 
apply the “Profi t Royalty” in such a way that it “exerts a counteracting 
infl uence on the increasing tonnage Royalty.” The profi t royalty on any 
“fi xed profi t decreases as the tonnage increases.” Further, the profi t roy-
alty, though dependent on profi ts from all sources, was purposely linked 
to Iran’s oil production on the assumption that it would be “sound in 
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principle” to express the total royalty payable to the Iranian government 
in terms of its production. 
 Working out the question of royalties as stipulated in the concession 
was about securing a particular arrangement of information and poli-
tics. The Iranian government had been demanding access to accounts for 
many years. AIOC offi cials feared that the introduction of “profi ts” in 
any shape might risk an examination of the accounts and thus jeopardize 
the British concessionary control of oil. A peculiar ordering of informa-
tion was constructed to block the threat of instability seen in the Iranian 
government’s demand to view accounts and receive a larger share of roy-
alties, whether calculated on the basis of increased tonnage, revenues, or 
a combination of the two. 
 AIOC accountants built a series of proportions and limiting variables 
into the royalty formula to manage the Iranian government’s demands for 
more oil production and eliminate attempts by the Iranian government 
to deconstruct the formula in order to strengthen its bargaining power 
and its labor according to an alternative formulation of the energy sys-
tem. The company calculated that by setting an annual payment (which 
within the most likely combinations of tonnage and profi t varied slightly) 
and by guaranteeing a minimum royalty that was less than 25 percent of 
company profi ts, the incentive for the Iranian government to push for 
increasing tonnage would be “very largely removed.” 83 
 Company experts elaborated on their formulation: “It will be seen for 
instance, it is as much to the advantage of the Persian Government to see 
the Company remain on a steady tonnage and strive for increased profi ts 
as it is for them to keep profi ts steady and increase tonnage.” For exam-
ple, the fi rst “scheme,” as the company called it, proposed an arrange-
ment in which the royalty payable with profi ts of £5 million would be: 
£1.15 million on three million tons production; £1.1 million on four mil-
lion tons production; £1.15 million on fi ve million tons production; and 
£1.25 on six million tons production. 84 Thus, according to the scheme, 
increased production would not necessarily lead to an increase in roy-
alties payable to the Iranian government. AIOC’s draft clause for calcu-
lating royalties proposed the development of a formula for each of two 
possible “schemes”: 85 
 
K RP S AP L
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 where  R = tonnage royalty in pounds sterling (£) per ton,  P = produc-
tion in tons,  A = gross profi t (£) of the company,  S = amount (£) paid as 
“Profi t Royalty” for every Sh.1/- total gross profi t (all sources) per ton of 
production from Iran,  L = limit in shillings per ton of profi t below which 
no “Profi t Royalty” is payable, and  K = total payment (tonnage royalty 
plus profi t royalty). 
 In both schemes, whereas tonnage royalty ( RP ) increased with 
production, the profi t royalty  ( )20AS P SL−  or  
20AS
P
( )  decreased with 
production. The purpose of the “limiting factor”  L in scheme 1 was to 
“cause the profi t payment to cut out entirely if production increases out 
of proportion to profi t.” Most importantly, in each case, if total payment 
was to be uninfl uenced by production,  K must remain constant for all 
production amounts, meaning that the rate of change of  K with production 





= = − ( )0 20 2 or  R AS
P
= ( )20 2  —the
condition to be satisfi ed if total payment was to remain constant irre-
spective of production.  R and  S would vary with production and profi t 
according to the two formulas. These values were tabulated over a wide 
range of production and profi t levels. For any condition of production 
and profi t selected, the values of  R and  S tabulated against this produced 
a total royalty payment equal to the desired 20 percent of the profi ts (see 
 fi gure 3.1 ). 
 Each proposed scheme corresponded to a particular arrangement, 
with the ultimate aim of narrowing the fi eld of dispute by removing 
the possibility that the government would demand access to company 
accounts and an increase in production and profi ts. By excluding what 
AIOC considered disproportionately high profi ts (deriving from min-
imum and maximum levels of oil production) as well as coordinating 
the profi t and production variables in a dependent relationship, AIOC 
offi cials designed formulas to help stabilize their hypothetical world. It 
needed to be stressed, however, that the scale of royalty had been “arbi-
trarily fi xed” in the illustrations, which could be “adjusted to suit [the] 
monetary consideration it is intended to concede,” and “production is, in 
any case, within the control of the Company.” 86 
 The calculations built into formulas implied an arrangement whereby 
numbers played only a secondary role. The variables mobilized by 
each formula were different but similar in that certain critical vari-
ables, particularly the volume of production, were consistently the same. 
The volume-of-production variable was present on multiple occasions 
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regarding profi ts, the company’s recruitment policy, and production rates 
(discussed in chapter 6), and could be seen as determined by the actors 
themselves among a hierarchy of variables. Variables built into formu-
las were also strategic—volume of production became a variable that 
allowed actors on the British side to control outcomes and behaviors. 
Political possibilities were opened up by formulas in order to organize 
certain predictable relations between many critical variables and one 
strategic variable, volume of production. This enabled AIOC to coor-
dinate simultaneously with other fi rms in monopoly arrangements and 
to organize relations. Thus, the importance of the strategic character of 
formulas turned around one strategic variable and the subordination of 
other parameters to this one, making the market in oil manageable and 
predictable. 
 With the help of formulas, AIOC managers and accountants worked 
to manufacture a kind of ignorance about the nature of royalty calcula-
tions and to deny access to their accounts. Such concerns were already 
entangled with other kinds of calculation that rendered the various sites 
and actors in the energy network highly unstable. For both sides, the 
success or failure of any future compromise would depend on securing 
control of Iran’s oil production. Cadman, chairman of AIOC at the time, 
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 Figure 3.1 
 Source: Graph of Proposed AIOC Schemes for the Calculation of Royalty Rates to the 
Iranian Government at Varying Levels of Profi t. Based on fi gures from “Scheme 1. Draft 
Clause,” “Scheme 2. Draft Clause,” and “Investigation of the Problem in General Terms,” 
n.d., 70223, BP Archive, Coventry, UK. 
Calculating Technologies in Crisis  109
of the production variable because it would translate into a signifi cant 
loss in company profi ts that also depended on coordinating with other 
oil companies in limiting the production of Middle East oil as a whole. 
He instead proposed a minimum annual payment of £750,000. 87 In the 
end, the ruling Iranian monarch, Reza Pahlavi, accepted most of AIOC’s 
proposals and signed the revised oil concession in 1933. Why? Brought 
to power with the funds and backing of the British government, fi rst as 
minister of war under the Qajar regime in 1921 and then as shah (king) 
of Iran in 1925, the self-proclaimed Pahlavi monarch was in a position 
of weakness. Without the necessary funds to build a modern state, the 
shah risked public criticism and larger political threats coming from the 
Soviet Union. 
 Article 10 of the 1933 concession agreement stated that royalties were 
to be calculated on the basis of physical volumes of oil and the fi nancial 
distribution that the company made to its shareholders, not on profi ts 
alone. 88 Starting in January 1933, the royalty was set at 4 shillings per 
ton of oil consumed in Iran or exported, plus a sum equal to 20 percent 
of the dividends paid to the company’s ordinary shareholders in excess of 
£671,250. These terms guaranteed an annual royalty to the Iranian gov-
ernment of at least £750,000, just as Cadman had proposed to the shah. 
This reformulation was applied retroactively to recalculate royalties for 
the years 1931 and 1932. 
 Central to their strategy of manipulating scales and formulas for 
establishing the basis of royalty payments was AIOC’s control of the 
oil production variable. The strategy also involved putting limits on the 
working possibilities in the calculation of royalties (e.g., controlling cer-
tain strategic variables such as minimum and maximum tonnage and roy-
alty payments). This, company offi cials hoped, would build boundaries, 
blocking access to accounting information and producing the effect of 
technoeconomic concerns as separate from political questions of sover-
eignty and national control. 
 Reza Shah accepted the terms of the revised concession’s royalty clause 
into which was built the peculiar formulation outlined above. On numer-
ous occasions, Iranian government offi cials had attempted to deconstruct 
the formula by demanding more production, but they were bargaining 
from a position of weakness and uncertainty. Semiautonomous groups 
throughout the country threatened the central government authority, 
as did striking oil workers and national public opinion angered by the 
British exploitative presence. 89 The temporary resolution of the confl ict in 
the format of a revised concession formula was the product of this battle 
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among actors in differing positions of strength and access to calculative 
equipment. The differences among the strategies of the different actors 
had nothing to do with their nature and everything to do with the skills, 
tools, and means available within the network to mobilize other actors 
and allies and exert power over them. 90 
 Thus, the oil disputes traced here do not just concern the ties between 
the oil company and the government. Rather, they occurred among a 
series of nonhuman and human actors in the energy network. The Ira-
nian government accepted the formula’s terms because its powers were 
not stable. The state lacked the necessary tools to control the pipelines, 
the wells, the refi nery, oil workers, and semiautonomous groups, and to 
determine the political outcome at least for a while. Later in 1951, the 
government’s dramatic move to pass the nationalization law would again 
reopen the formula to scrutiny but within the larger context of reassem-
bling the state in the framework of reformist nationalism. 
 In practice, the company was controlling elements of the royalty 
formulas and concessionary articles to establish political control over 
various forces and to eliminate controversy. All these different actors—
Iranian government offi cials, AIOC managers, local political groups, 
the oil—were connected to the formula and needed to be enrolled, 
interdefi ned, and stabilized in a particular way to make the operation 
of the formula possible. 91 As an element internal to the concession, the 
scheme of formulas for calculating royalties was operating as a kind of 
device with defi ning terms and variables that needed to be controlled, 
but that would always have multiple logics confl icting and tying into 
other logics. 
 The royalty formula played a central role in shaping the outcome of 
the most important interwar dispute between an oil company and a sov-
ereign government. To say that the history of Iran’s concession dispute 
might be understood better as a history of the working possibilities of 
the royalty formula is impossible in the framework of a conventional 
political or social history of the crisis. These conventional analyses over-
look the technicality of the royalty dispute and situate it within the larger 
context of the Iranian monarch’s campaign against foreign infl uence. 92 
As Thomas Hughes has shown for the building of the electrical indus-
try, Edison and his colleagues invoked two formulas, Ohm’s and Joule’s 
laws, to make electricity consumption competitive with gas. The techni-
cal specifi city of two formulas with their variables and interdefi ned rela-
tions helped Edison work the problem out by identifying the need for a 
high-resistance and durable fi lament. 93 Likewise, the construction of the 
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royalty formula was shaping the building of a transnational oil company 
by equipping it with a peculiar kind of agency that could determine who 
could act and on what terms. This would have political consequences for 
the powers of the Iranian state and its oil workers. 
 (In)Calculability of the Oil Worker 
 (II) …  the Company shall recruit its artisans as well as its technical and com-
mercial staff from among Persian nationals to the extent that it shall fi nd in 
Persia persons who possess the requisite competence and experience. It is 
likewise understood that unskilled staff shall be composed exclusively of Persian 
nationals. (III) The parties declare themselves in agreement to study and prepare 
a general plan of yearly and progressive reduction of the non-Persian employees 
with a view to replacing them in the shortest possible time and progressively by 
Persian nationals. 94 
 Another formula appeared during the course of the 1932–1933 conces-
sionary dispute, one even more interesting because it was unexpected 
and unusual. It was a proposal for measuring and controlling the degree 
of Persianization of AIOC’s employees as stipulated in Article 16 of the 
1933 oil concession quoted above. Besides the question of royalties and 
rates of oil production, Persianization or the gradual replacement of Brit-
ish workers (particularly managers and technicians) with Iranian ones 
at higher skill levels was the major point of dispute during the conces-
sion crisis of the 1930s and continued to be contentious through the 
1940s. 95 AIOC’s attempts at stabilizing its labor regime with the use of 
a formula for managing the rate of Persianization were entangled with 
the reassembly of the Iranian state. Connected to this issue was increas-
ing pressure from oil workers and public opinion for the government to 
nationalize its British-controlled oil industry. The company’s Iranian oil 
workers had fi rst disrupted oil operations by going on strike in 1929 to 
demand better treatment, including higher wages and living standards. 
In 1931, they expressed their support for the government’s cancellation 
and revision of the concession, particularly as it addressed the question 
of Persianization. 96 
 Article 16 of the 1933 revised concession concerning “Personnel in 
Persia” redefi ned the working possibilities and limits of the oil worker in 
technical terms that appeared to overlook any racial differences. In prac-
tice, technical terms worked by delineating the unsuitability of local labor 
at higher skill levels and managerial positions precisely in terms of race. 
Prior to the signing of the fi nal agreement in 1933, a series of drafts of 
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Article 16 were exchanged between the company and the Iranian govern-
ment in which the latter demanded the following formulation: Manual 
workers, laborers, artisans, foremen, overseers, mechanics, typewriting 
clerks, accountants, and all other junior employees “must be of Persian 
nationality.” AIOC must undertake to “replace all non-Persian” employ-
ees in these categories before January 1, 1934. 97 Regarding categories of 
employees that included engineers and other members of “higher tech-
nical personnel,” the company must implement a plan for the “progres-
sive annual reduction of non-Persian employees in order to substitute … 
Persians within a period of 10 years.” After this period and according to 
the proposed formula, the nationality of only one-fi fth of the employees 
in the said categories would be “non-Persian.” 
 AIOC dealt with the controversy by transforming a labor issue into 
an econotechnical problem. The company proposed that it would recruit 
artisans and its technical and commercial staff in Iran from among Ira-
nian subjects “to the extent that it shall fi nd Persian subjects who possess 
the requisite competence and experience.” 98 All unskilled staff must be 
of Iranian nationality. Yet, both parties also agreed that it was in their 
“mutual interest” to maintain the highest possible “measure of techni-
cal effi ciency and of economic conduct” in oil operations. Therefore, the 
calculability of the Iranian oil worker was possible where economic or 
technical arguments about effi ciency needed to be made. 
 No deadline for Persianization or execution of the General Plan was 
actually stipulated in the revised concession, but Iranian negotiators had 
proposed a deadline for 1934. In a private discussion on the company’s 
General Plan, “not for communication to Government,” the company 
hoped to “build up a better and more intelligent type of skilled [Iranian] 
workman and one who can be trusted with more responsibility, partic-
ularly in plant operations.” 99 Such a plan, it was argued, would enable 
the company to “reduce ultimately the British and Indian supervisory 
personnel.” The scheme was “not therefore primarily one of Persianiza-
tion but rather a scheme for the more economical operation of plant and 
processes by the provision of a better type of workman with the essential 
initial training,” and for the “provision of a more economical shift labor 
in the higher grades.” 
 The direct participation of Iranian elites in plant operations and man-
agerial positions might be possible, but this would have to be managed. 
At all levels, except the lowest grades, AIOC’s training would require 
instruction in the English language. 100 Requiring spoken English in all 
skilled positions in the worker hierarchy would help secure an island of 
Calculating Technologies in Crisis  113
economic enclaves separate from so-called society on the outside. The 
strategy worked by excluding and creating proximities and alliances, not 
just among the elite but between workers and with their managers. In 
response, Iranian apprentices, trained to fi ll graded posts, went on strike 
on multiple occasions, demanding that courses be taught in Farsi instead 
of English. 101 Thus, AIOC used language profi ciency as a tool for creating 
categories of difference among workers. It was a strategy for managing 
and integrating the Iranian workforce, in particular by relying on tech-
nologies of difference built into the use of English and Farsi at particular 
places and levels in the worker hierarchy. 
 The technical capacity of the oil worker in terms of achieving the 
“requisite competence and experience” was simultaneously calculable 
and incalculable. In another private report, the company revealed its plan 
to control the replacement and reduction process by proposing to offer 
positions as artisans, technical specialists, and commercial staff to Ira-
nian nationals “possessing the requisite competence and experience—this 
will, of course, never happen.” 102 The General Plan would be “reviewed” 
again in 1943. The company was making its arguments in technical terms 
to guarantee that Persianization would never happen, claiming that an 
Iranian oil worker capable of replacing a British or Indian worker of a 
higher grade was impossible because of the economic costs to the com-
pany. To build an oil labor regime in terms of racial-technical difference, 
Elkington, an AIOC operations manager, advised that the company make 
use of its calculative equipment, a formula 
 implying [that] a defi nite accomplishment [should] be accepted, indicating 
lines upon which the Company will do its best to fulfi ll its obligations. … In 
other words, we give practical evidence of our good faith … and at the same 
time arrange the affair so that we can turn round at any time and in justice say 
that the results have not been up to expectations for such and such reasons—
reserving to ourselves the right to retain this prerogative always. The formula 
therefore to which I refer should take the shape of this implication. … Produc-
tion plan alone is far too ephemeral, but a production plan plus a formula has 
the semblance of some substance. Our reluctance to imply that we can make 
a defi nite numerical reduction in our foreign employees each year … is due to 
uncertainties brought about by fl uctuations in the programme of work and 
throughput. 103 
 Just as the mechanism of the royalty formula provided a means of man-
aging Iran’s interwar concession crisis, the company’s strategy for deal-
ing with the labor issue and avoiding the increasing threat of national 
control of oil was to build another formula. Certain variables would be 
connected to imply a reduction in the number of foreigners employed in 
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relation to annual expenditure and production. The “great advantage” 
was that in reality, “any reduction at all can as a rule only take place” if 
the competent Iranians were available. 104 
 Elkington explained his ideas regarding the mechanism of the formula 
to create the effect of a reduction in foreign employees: 
 Is it not possible then to relate the number of foreigners whom we are required 
to employ to the annual expenditure, i.e. the budget, and to the annual pro-
duction. Thus we can say that a total Capital and Revenue expenditure of £1 
million requires the employment of 400 foreigners today, and using this as 
a yardstick create a formula which would imply a reduction in the number 
of foreigners employed per million pounds—also we can relate the numbers 
employed to production and work out a formula which would be in conformity 
with past results, that is to say the formula applied to the past would give us 
the position we are in today. In other words, can Mylles [the accountant] work 
out a relationship between the number of foreign employees, annual expendi-
ture, and production over the past number of years. If so, instead of implying a 
reduction in accordance with fi gures above, which are quite arbitrary and make 
no allowance for fl ux in program, throughput, or expenditure, we might be able 
to imply a basic reduction on an agreed datum level which would be infl uenced 
arithmetically by the variations in the expenditure and production. 105 
 Elkington continued, 
 For example, let the expenditure be £5 million per annum and the number of 
foreign employees 2000. Then under present circumstances an expenditure 
of £1 million implies the employment of 400 foreigners. Let us then take 
expenditure of £1 million as the datum level and say we reduce the number of 
foreigners relevant to this at rate of 20 per annum. Then after one year, number 
required per million pounds is 380 and for £5 million, 1900, but should expen-
diture rise to £6 million after 2 years then the number of foreigners permissible 
under the formula would be 2160 or [400-(20x2)] x 6. This is one curve 
and your next curve should be production in millions of tons relative 
to foreign employees, and might then be possible by a combination of two 
curves to obtain a satisfactory relation between the three factors. The great 
advantage of this is whilst we do our best to reduce, and possibly succeed, our 
basic fi gure, our totals always bear an automatic relation to the programme. 
However, any reduction at all can as a rule only take place if competent Iranians 
available. 
 In practice, the company eliminated a political issue by making an expla-
nation in economic and technical terms to legitimize and guarantee its 
long-term control over a racially and hierarchically organized labor 
regime. The technical device of the formula, 
 
# # Foreigners Rate of Reduction of Foreigners  of Years− ×( )[ ]
× =Expenditure  of Foreigners (permissible under the form# ula)
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 constructed an argument about the competency of the Iranian oil worker, 
producing the effect of a replacement of non-Iranian labor with Iranian 
labor in terms of three variables (number of foreigners required, produc-
tion in tons, and expenditures). The limits built into the defi nition of the 
Iranian oil worker relied on various technologies of difference employed 
by the company as a device to keep technical and economic issues separate 
from political questions of national control and social concerns about the 
racial organization of living and working conditions (i.e., keeping British 
and Indian employees as supervisory personnel). 106 The oil worker was 
internal to oil operations for economic arguments about effi ciency, pro-
duction, and costs but external when considered for the replacement of 
British and Indian labor at higher grades or the improvement of housing 
conditions and treatment in the workplace. 
 This formula was a remarkable power grab, as it transformed a polit-
ical issue into a purely technical-economic calculation, ensuring AIOC’s 
total control over its recruitment policy. On the other hand, petrofor-
mulas organized heterogeneous actors, such as oil workers, who were 
increasingly involved in the reassembly of the state, creating a kind of 
uncertainty. The Iranian government, public opinion, and oil workers 
themselves sought, in different ways, to reconnect the so-called tech-
nical argument about training Iranians at higher levels to the political 
question of national control of the oil industry. Thus, labor strikes and 
the reassembly of the state toward national control were entangled in 
the terms of Article 16 and threatened to deconstruct the company’s 
formulations. 
 Through the 1940s, both AIOC and the Iranian government responded 
to labor dissent by forming new institutions and disciplinary regimes to 
protect oil operations. But the formation and resurgence of new politi-
cal parties calling for national control of the oil, such as the reformist 
National Front Party and the communist, Tudeh Party, threatened the 
Pahlavi shah’s power. The national government and the oil company had 
a shared interest in blocking the possibility of a more militant alliance 
between oil workers, the Communist Party, and national control. Only by 
redirecting labor dissent into the more manageable framework of reform-
ist nationalism might the company and government ensure profi ts for 
large-scale military and industrialization projects domestically while also 
protecting the international monopoly arrangements of the largest trans-
national oil corporations. 
 Article 16 (III) of the 1933 concession confi rmed that the two parties 
had agreed to “study and prepare a general plan of yearly and progressive 
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reduction of the non-Persian employees” with the aim of replacing them 
“in the shortest possible time and progressively with Persian nationals.” 
The two parties signed the fi nal agreement over the terms of this General 
Plan in 1936. 107 The terms of the plan (Part I (a), specifi cally) guaran-
teed a rate of reduction in foreign employees on the condition that the 
“highest degree of effi ciency and economy is maintained.” The Iranians 
had agreed to a peculiar formula, which was built into this statement and 
graphed ( fi gure 3.1 ). 108 
 No subsequent progress was made in the struggle to replace foreign 
employees with Iranian labor. New negotiations commenced in 1947 as 
the Iranian parliament responded to the lack of progress by passing the 
Single Article Law. 109 The law built on Article 16 of the 1933 conces-
sion, calling for increased worker benefi ts in health, housing, and edu-
cation. The Iranian government pursued further negotiations from 1947 
to 1951, when the reformist Mosaddiq government passed a law calling 
for nationalization of the British-controlled oil industry. In the meantime, 
more oil worker strikes erupted. 
 As its policy, AIOC rejected any possibility of a redefi nition of terms 
and variables by rival actors. In 1948, the Iranian government continued 
to argue that employing more Iranians would help the company avoid 
the costs of expatriation and transportation for non-Iranian employ-
ees. 110 It proposed a formula (thus attempting to deconstruct the British 
formula) to reduce the number of non-Iranian employees at an increasing 
rate annually—that is, 150 for the fi rst year, 200 for the second year, and 
50 more for each subsequent year. Razmarra, the Iranian prime minister 
at the time, made a fi nal attempt to deconstruct the British formulation 
for Persianization 111 by presenting his government’s formula as a con-
dition for securing Iranian parliamentary approval for the terms of the 
1949 Supplemental Agreement, renegotiating Iran’s oil royalties. 112 AIOC 
offi cials rejected the proposal. 
 The two parties disagreed on whether achieving a formula for Persian-
ization should serve as a condition for the resolution of negotiations on 
the General Plan or whether the formula might be put aside. AIOC offi -
cials had hoped that an agreement might be reached based on the plan’s 
other provisions, thus avoiding the resolution of the formula problem 
altogether. 113 Company strategy sought to avoid the resolution of Clause 
16 (III), or to avoid transforming the political question of labor into num-
bers, as this risked inviting a discussion of pay scales. 
 In 1950, the company fi nally declared the impossibility of reach-
ing a resolution with the ruling Iranian government as the controversy 
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had spilled into national politics. The reassembly of the Iranian state 
toward the nationalization of its oil industry was fi nally defeated in an 
Anglo-American engineered coup d’état, which successfully replaced 
Mosaddegh’s reformist-national government with a pro-West Pahlavi 
regime in 1953 (discussed in chapter 6). The coup was, in part, a dra-
matic attempt to block the national government and oil workers from 
deconstructing AIOC’s labor formula, which linked the number of for-
eign employees in a dependent relationship to levels of oil production and 
expenditures. Formulas organized around oil and labor served as calcu-
lative equipment, helping AIOC build a world in which more democratic 
forms of oil production and politics were, for the moment, blocked. 
 Politics of Formulas and Formulation 
 The 1901 oil concession’s articles on royalties, labor, and arbitration 
did not occur collectively as a legal contract between two contractually 
equivalent parties. When put to work in the course of the 1932–1933 
concession crisis, the concession exhibited a fl exibility enabling the var-
ious actors involved to frame the same issues in different ways (legally, 
technically, numerically, or mathematically) and according to multiple 
interests. The practical work of information exchange, calculation, inter-
national standardization, and decision making was connected to politics 
and was precisely what enabled both the oil industry and the national 
state to be conceived and built at this moment of crisis. 114 
 Following the activities of the technical dimensions of mathematical 
formulas and legal formulation in this history has made visible their con-
nections to the political management of oil workers, national control of 
the oil industry, and the stability of international oil markets. A social 
history of Iran’s oil workers cannot account for the actual equipment—
the technical work of formulas—and their political activity in defi ning 
what conceptions of worker competency were necessary to protect Brit-
ish control of oil operations and ultimately block nationalization. 115 As 
discussed in the next chapter, the more dangerous alliance of militant 
workers with national control threatened to disrupt the company’s labor 
regime and its undemocratic forms of oil production by opening them up 
to alternative political arrangements of the energy system. 
 In the history presented here, the concession dispute unraveled at a 
critical moment in the interwar period when a new set of calculating 
technologies and devices were needed to limit the production and distri-
bution of energy. These techniques and controls, such as the concession 
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device and monopoly arrangements, shaped the transnational oil corpo-
ration and the oil-producing state. Thus, the concession contract worked 
alongside formulas, laws, and concerns attached to it by contributing 
to the production of the reality it sought to describe. 116 The oil com-
pany worked in southwest Iran to build a social world it could manage 
through the institution of the concession, but the various articles and 
formulas built into this device were also built into the oil environment. 
Their entanglement with physical and social forces did not appear to 
factor into the articles, but actually worked in reality by producing a situ-
ation of uncertainty. Such uncertainty provided opportunities for Iranian 
government offi cials, AIOC negotiators, national public opinion, and oil 
workers to frame issues advantageously. 
 Standard accounts of Iran’s interwar concession crisis place the con-
troversy in the geopolitical and economic context of the Great Depression 
and the worldwide drop in oil demand, the 1928 cartel agreements for 
limiting global oil production, and looming disputes with independent 
producer governments in Mexico and Venezuela. This chapter has argued 
somewhat differently that Iran’s concession crisis was not a mere “con-
text” to be evaluated as a backdrop or dress rehearsal for nationaliza-
tion. Rather, the crisis occurred as a set of traceable connections between 
the local and the global (e.g., formulas, laws, and cartel arrangements), 
constituting the political machinery for managing disputes that would 
increasingly involve the question of national control. The resistance to 
such an explanation in the scholarship about oil in favor of the standard 
account may have to do with their apparent incommensurability, and the 
mixing of the social and technical worlds such an alternative account 
entails. 117 The nature of politics at work concentrated legal and account-
ing knowledge at new sites to guarantee a corporation’s claim to exper-
tise and authority embodied in the concession. Politics was also working 
to resolve the world into what seemed human calculation and company 
expertise inside oil operations and a passive nature and society outside. 118 
But the world of oil operations and its borders was produced out of a set 
of political projects and entanglements traced here. 
 There are many different ways in which taking seriously the technical 
aspects of the interwar concession crisis alters one’s understanding of 
the kind of social world the oil industry sought to build. For example, 
the company sought to transform a southwest corner of Iran into its 
laboratory and extend it through a chain of concession terms, monopoly 
arrangements, legal arguments, paperwork, lawyers, and accountants to 
centers such as the League of Nations. The traceability of Anglo-Iranian 
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oil and the delineation of its properties in technical, legal, and mathe-
matical terms ensured the stabilization of “facts” about oil operations. 
AIOC pursued this goal through a series of battles to keep associations 
and alliances among many different entities enrolled in the process of oil 
production, transport, refi ning, and marketing stable as it would help to 
eliminate further disruption. 119 
 One of the company’s central tactics to avoid controversy resided 
in its attempts to separate “technical questions” from “political” ones, or 
oil operations and monopoly arrangements from local political struggles, 
violence, and labor controversies. AIOC used this manufactured divide 
as a weapon, in part by enrolling the calculative equipment and services 
of a most unusual actor—a formula. A careful tracking of the techni-
cal problems that emerged in the crisis, however, has led to politics and 
the proliferation of agencies, organizational forms, and calculations con-
stantly in play. Iran’s political claims to sovereignty over oil produced 
excesses that could not be factored into the company’s formulations and 
overfl owed into national politics, rendering the sociotechnical world of 
Anglo-Iranian oil highly unpredictable. 

 The workmen employed in the service of the Company shall be subjects of His 
Imperial Majesty the Shah, except the technical staff such as the managers, 
engineers, borers and foremen. (Article 12, D’Arcy Concession, 1901) 
 (II) …  the Company shall recruit its artisans as well as its technical and com-
mercial staff from among Persian nationals to the extent that it shall fi nd in 
Persia persons who possess the requisite competence and experience. It is 
likewise understood that unskilled staff shall be composed exclusively of Persian 
nationals. (III) The parties declare themselves in agreement to study and prepare 
a general plan of yearly and progressive reduction of the non-Persian employees 
with a view to replacing them in the shortest possible time and progressively by 
Persian nationals. (Article 16, 1933 Concession) 
 Between the 1920s and 1950s, oil workers helped transform the oilfi elds, 
pipeline, and refi nery of southwest Iran into sites of intense political strug-
gle. The struggle triggered one of the most dramatic political events of the 
mid-twentieth century, the Iranian government’s decision to nationalize 
the oil industry in 1951. The interwar dispute between AIOC and the 
Iranian government over the terms of Iran’s 1901 oil concession included 
the unresolved issue of “Persianization,” the gradual replacement of for-
eign employees with Iranian workers at higher skill levels. This particular 
controversy, along with a series of oil worker strikes promoting national 
control of the oil, raised the question of the kind of worker the oil indus-
try required to survive. 
 The Iranian government’s call for Persianization of the British-controlled 
oil industry was, in part, a response to the fi rst organized industrial 
action by Iranian oil workers in 1929. Indian labor went on strike in 
1922, and more strikes, often allying Iranian, Indian, and Arab oil work-
ers, followed in 1945–1946 and 1949–1951. 1 This chapter considers the 
kinds of social technologies that targeted striking oil workers to help 
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stabilize a labor regime peculiar to the transnational oil corporation of the 
twentieth century. 
 Striking oil workers generated a kind of vulnerability, which threat-
ened to disrupt the energy system at any moment. But studies on the 
development of Iran’s labor movement exclude the legal, economic, and 
organizational content of labor controversies from the politics. 2 They 
suggest that social forces, interests, and resources are somehow separate 
from the technicalities of the battle. Worker disruption of oil infrastruc-
ture, such as pipelines and refi nery processes, had political consequences 
for the powers of the transnational oil corporation and the national state. 
Disruptions to the fl ow of oil and thus the fl ow of profi ts to AIOC, and 
income to the Iranian government, shaped the emergence of certain kinds 
of political arrangements that favored British control. 
 This chapter follows oil workers as they built connections between 
politics and the control and distribution of oil. It considers the kinds of 
social technologies and practical work involved in organizing oil workers 
in the locations of housing and work. The chapter argues that AIOC’s 
organizational techniques of intervention and control constituted a polit-
ical project that worked by enrolling diverse actors to build divides in 
terms of racial-technical difference in the oilfi elds. Labor disputes marked 
decisive moments when the company attempted to devise and implement 
a scheme to address the question of employing more Iranian labor at 
higher skill levels (discussed in chapter 3). The controversies that attached 
to this recruitment scheme were the outcome of a peculiar process of 
bifurcation in which the company attempted to exclude the local from 
oil operations by transforming political questions of labor into technical 
and economic issues. 
 AIOC’s formative years of constructing an oil labor regime in Khu-
zistan, Iran, coincided with the fi rst episodes of industrial labor action 
in the 1920s. As one of their management techniques, mining and oil 
fi rms in the fi rst half of the twentieth century resorted to paternalism in 
their efforts to defeat union building and worker dissent in the mines of 
America’s Southwest and in the oilfi elds of the Middle East. 3 Paternal-
ism involved the provision of benefi ts and the construction of housing 
and recreational facilities for a small segment of employees as a means 
of securing loyalty and thus stability in oil operations. Similar to the 
other global oil fi rms of the twentieth century, AIOC relied on a peculiar 
combination of racial and technical ordering and coercion as a strategy 
to battle union formation and stabilize oil operations. 4 These practices 
were not new to the transnational oil corporation and had their origins 
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in other industries located in other parts of the world. Robert Vitalis 
has tied the portrayal of the Arabian-American Oil Company, Aramco, 
as a benevolent force to a larger American corporate history of mining 
in the Southwest of the United States. AIOC’s company managers and 
technologists had a different colonial past, however, connected to the oil 
operations of Burma and colonial administrative apparatuses of India. 5 
Dominant Iranian political groups, such as the communist Tudeh Party, 
played an equally signifi cant role by portraying themselves as the national 
spokespersons for the oil workers to redirect oil worker dissent toward 
alternative political possibilities. 
 This chapter traces shifting conceptions of the oil worker through 
AIOC’s mobilization of benevolent and paternalistic practices, in response 
to the most pivotal oil worker strikes. By doing this, it pinpoints the criti-
cal moments in which the company decided to respond (or not) to the oil 
workers’ demands by building divides between technical and economic 
issues (inside oil operations) and political issues of labor (outside oil 
operations). Technologies of racialization and other kinds of difference 
were often introduced and legitimized in technological terms—according 
to skill and wage structures to justify the use of the workforce—and then 
limited by delineating the suitability of certain jobs over others according 
to race. Article 12 of the 1901 concession, quoted above, designated all 
“workmen” as Iranian subjects, “except the technical staff such as the 
managers, engineers, borers and foremen.” The division of labor in terms 
of race was marked in terms of a technical difference between unskilled 
(Iranian) and skilled (British) labor. As the scale and demands of strik-
ing Iranian workers intensifi ed, AIOC managers and accountants devised 
inventive ways of delineating the unsuitability of skilled jobs according to 
race by explaining that the Iranians did not possess the requisite training 
and experience. The last section considers the extent to which technolo-
gies of constructing a segregated labor regime fl owed into national pol-
itics, especially during ongoing battles over how to make Anglo-Iranian 
oil governable, and in coordination with other oil corporations to man-
age labor internationally. The chapter ends with a consideration of how 
a careful examination of the social and calculating technologies involved 
in building an oil labor regime with a specifi c kind of worker alters our 
understanding of the history of nationalism, the role of the subaltern, 
and the so-called emergence of a labor movement in the formation of a 
national state. 
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 Points of Vulnerability within the Energy System 
 Oilfi elds, pipelines, and refi neries became the sites of powerful political 
battles throughout the Middle East in the twentieth century. However, 
as Timothy Mitchell explains, organizing the control and distribution of 
oil did not offer oil workers the same power as the triple alliance of 
coal, railway, and dockworkers did in building more democratic forms 
of energy production. 6 Because oil comes out of the ground under its own 
pressure, it requires a smaller workforce than coal. 7 Oil’s unique physical 
and chemical properties demand that each category of work—drilling, 
pipeline construction, well maintenance, transportation, and refi ning—
utilizes specifi c kinds of skilled and unskilled laborers such as drillers, 
pipeline fi tters, engineers, geologists, and chemists. The layout and design 
of oil infrastructure, namely, that it has an enclave character and requires 
oil wells, a pipeline, and a refi nery to transform the oil into marketable 
products, result in distinct methods of monitoring and surveillance of 
workers. The oil workers’ capacity to form unions and “engage in strike 
activity” is drastically reduced, especially when considering that other 
sources of oil can be relied on and tankers can be rerouted to replace 
a sudden loss of oil elsewhere. 8 Thus, one reason oil companies have 
succeeded in making enormous profi ts has been “their ability to contain 
labor militancy.” 9 Where labor militancy has occurred, it has generally 
been concentrated in refi nery operations where there are large concen-
trations of skilled workers who occupy strategic positions to disrupt the 
economies of both oil-exporting and oil-consuming countries. Over time, 
pumping stations and pipelines replaced railways as the main means of 
transporting a liquid form of energy, rather than a solid, from the site 
of production to refi neries and tankers for shipping abroad. This meant 
the infrastructure of oil operations was vulnerable but not as easy to 
incapacitate through strike actions as were railways that carried coal, for 
example. 
 These points of vulnerability on the technical side of oil operations 
extended to, and were reinforced by, the segregated layout of residential 
areas according to race. As operations expanded after World War I, AIOC 
built an almost completely segregated populace through housing accom-
modations and the use of buses, clubs, and cinemas. It was comparable 
to the racial system built into Aramco’s organization of Saudi Arabia’s 
oil labor regime. 10 Worker skills were divided along racial lines and these 
were translated into the organization of housing, transport, leisure, and 
work. By 1922, Indian workers were living separately in “tents and mud 
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huts in the barrack-like ‘coolie lines’ located to the southwest” of the 
refi nery ( fi gure 4.1 ). 11 Iranian recruits lived in separate quarters, either in 
sun-baked mud houses in the old village, or in structures made of sticks 
or bamboo and covered with palm leaves. 12 
 Mark Crinson has shown that AIOC’s development of housing and 
facilities in Abadan “heavily favoured the small European section of its 
population and indeed its policy towards Abadan as a whole was largely 
to treat the town as a place divided by race.” 13 After the discovery of 
oil in 1908 and the formation of AIOC in 1909, all building resources 
and facilities were imported from abroad and an area was laid out for 
the construction of bungalows for European staff. 14 AIOC built its fi rst 
“pucka bungalow constructed in the local style” with a mat and “chan-
dle roof.” A chandle roof is constructed of poles placed close together 
and overlaid with mats made from date palm leaves covered with earth. 
The bungalow form was symptomatic of sociospatial divisions of labor 
within colonial urban development, particularly in colonial India. 15 The 
 Figure 4.1 
 Right , “Coolie Lines.” Map of Abadan refi nery in 1910.  Source : Mark Crinson, “Abadan: 
Planning and Architecture under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company”  Planning Perspectives 
12, no. 3 (1997): 341–359, esp. 343. Reproduced with the permission of the BP Archive. 
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“bungalow area,” known as “Braim,” was built exclusively by company 
engineers for European employees in 1912. It also consisted of buildings 
and a pattern of roads including “specialist bachelor barracks” known 
as “Slidevalve” and “Sunshine,” built in 1923. The buildings had thick 
walls, shutters, and arcaded verandas to block out the heat, which could 
reach 125 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer. Communal buildings such 
as the “Gymkhana Club” as well as many gardens were constructed in 
the vicinity. AIOC’s transformation of Braim into a “green oasis” for the 
European workers was a major undertaking. Its construction involved 
the transportation of materials and extensive labor for irrigation and 
planting as well as the employment of professional gardeners with work 
experience at Kew and in New Dehli. 
 The Abadan refi nery itself was located between Braim and the town 
of Abadan. Located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway at the end of the 
130-mile-long pipeline, it would soon become the largest refi nery in the 
world, pooling the liquid and transporting it through plants for all stages 
of refi ning before pumping it onto tankers to be transported abroad. 16 
Over the years, the refi nery was transformed into the site of an expanding 
zone of tank farms, distillation units, and cracking plants. 17 It marked a 
kind of border separating the spaciously laid out bungalow area “in the 
west in favour of the prevailing winds” from the town that became the 
source of disorder, epidemic, and disease. The “logic of location” was to 
situate the managerial and technical elite and the labor power close to the 
refi nery, “if at opposite sides of it.” 18 The technical order of the refi nery 
and its residential areas seemed at fi rst to exclude the apparent disorder 
of “Abadan town,” but it also appeared to include it. 19 The source of dis-
order and disease in the town and the potential for racial mixing that it 
symbolized were necessary for the colonial order of the refi nery to exist. 
The cramped town of Abadan rioters and other “natives” threatened to 
disrupt the clean and spacious layout of the European-inhabited bunga-
low area from the outside, but in practice and as the potential source of 
labor, it was  internal to oil operations. 
 The machinery of the energy system, as constructed in southwest 
Iran, was constituted by the particular properties of Anglo-Iranian oil, 
which demanded specialized forms of knowledge, equipment, and labor, 
skilled and unskilled. The problem was that, from the start, the com-
pany chose to organize and manage oil operations by fi xing the skill set 
of the managerial and technical elite and the labor power to race, in 
locations of housing and work. As discussed below, this ordering along 
racial-technical lines produced situations of immense uncertainty and 
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vulnerability, particularly during moments of labor unrest, because they 
put into question the kind of worker AIOC required to expand opera-
tions and keep profi ts high. 
 Benefi cence and Violence 
 As of January 1921, 4,942 Indian workers out of a total of 20,000 work-
ers were employed in AIOC’s oil operations and of these, 3,816 were 
concentrated at the Abadan refi nery in the Persian Gulf. 20 Indian workers 
were recruited either through an agency from India or transferred from 
the Rangoon Refi nery in Burma, through the mediation of the Burmah 
Oil Company. 21 AIOC had commenced its policy of recruiting Indian 
labor for the expansion of operations during World War I. 22 The British 
government helped the company by intervening to suspend the Indian 
Emigration Act of 1883, which placed restrictions on the migration of 
Indian labor to certain destinations. The suspension was considered a 
“war measure in respect of recruitment of skilled labour required by the 
Company.” 23 Company offi cials believed it essential to have the “great-
est possible freedom to recruit labour from India.” 24 But the specifi city 
of Indian laborers’ technical knowledge—they were mainly employed as 
artisans and clerks but also in construction work at the refi nery—gave 
them a kind of power to disrupt oil operations at any moment. In the 
period between World War I and the early 1920s, Indian workers at the 
Abadan refi nery disrupted refi ning processes by going on strike on mul-
tiple occasions over pay rates for different classifi cations of labor. 25 In 
each instance, they built connections between their technical knowledge 
of oil refi ning and their economic and social demands about wages and 
housing. 
 In 1922, the immediate threat came from the “coolie lines” to the 
southwest of the refi nery. The complaints of maltreatment and the mis-
erable conditions of Indian workers employed in AIOC operations were 
expressed in Indian newspapers such as the  Bombay Chronicle. 26 In terms 
of pay, the position of the worker went from bad to worse. 27 In a letter 
from the General Committee of the (Indian) Workmen to AIOC’s joint 
works manager at Abadan, the workers declared their intent to go on 
strike. They expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the company pol-
icy of discriminating between “workman and a cooly.” Several demands 
were listed concerning improvements in wages as well as housing and 
working conditions. 
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 Led by the General Workers Committee, approximately 2,000 Indian 
workers went on strike for eleven days in March 1922. In response to 
the articles published in Indian newspapers as well as the demands sub-
mitted by the workers, AIOC challenged the notion that the accommoda-
tions provided for Indian workers were poor. On the contrary, company 
offi cials argued, the newest “clerks’ quarters” were in excellent condi-
tion. 28 They consisted of a “large airy bed-room with bathrooms attached 
for each clerk and a dining room for every two clerks.” 29 An alleyway 
separated the living rooms from the latrines and cookhouses, but “peri-
odical congestion” was evident, the offi cial admitted. The constructed 
quarters were not quite fi nished, and cookhouses and latrines, which 
were “nearing completion,” were “unexpectedly demolished by a heavy 
storm of rain.” 30 
 The situation of the 1922 strike at the Abadan refi nery improved with 
the arrival of Shaykh Khaz‘al from Kuwait. The shaykh had an inter-
est in securing the stability of AIOC operations. As a claimant to prop-
erty in the oil regions (discussed in chapter 1), he was receiving rents 
through a secret fi nancial deal with the company that granted access to 
the lands where the refi nery and part of the pipeline were built, as well 
as the provision of security to ensure that local nomadic groups did not 
disrupt company operations. 31 The shaykh posed a threat to the Iranian 
government, as his power over Khuzistan Province persisted outside the 
control of the central state. 32 According to the British political resident 
in the Gulf, the shaykh had “practically scotched [put an abrupt end to] 
the strike of Arab and Persian labour.” 33 There were 1,500 Chittagonian 
laborers (Sunni Muslims originating in the northeast region of India 
known as Bengal) who had continued to work under the guarantee of a 
pay increase of around 15 percent, but they were wavering. 34 “It was very 
important,” the British political resident explained, “to keep these men 
loyal because if they struck all the benches where oil is refi ned would have 
had to close and the entire refi nery would have been at a standstill.” 35 In 
the view of AIOC and the British government, the Abadan refi nery con-
stituted one of the most vulnerable points in the energy system where 
large concentrations of skilled workers could easily disrupt international 
oil markets. 
 To avoid addressing the social and economic demands of the Indian 
workers, the company made distinctions between economic issues and 
politics by putting the blame on a specifi c group of “agitators.” The Brit-
ish political resident alleged that the motivations behind the strike were 
not solely economic but “largely political,” and that it was engineered by 
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“the Sikh element.” 36 As a result, AIOC repatriated approximately 2,000 
male workers to India, while the remaining Indians, Arabs, and Iranians 
resumed work and new laborers were recruited. 37 In this early crisis of 
industrial action, the British government, operating on behalf of AIOC, 
felt the company was completely “justifi ed in using force if necessary to 
compel men to leave as they have no right to insist on staying.” 38 The 
company argued that the Indian strikers had no “reasonable grounds for 
going on strike and for intimidating others and local labour into join-
ing.” 39 In terms of pay, there were no legitimate grievances because the 
“company’s scale is very liberal and is … higher than that given by other 
fi rms.” 40 The company portrayed itself as the most liberal and benefi -
cent of the international oil fi rms. However, it simultaneously resorted to 
forms of coercion such as deportation and violence to eliminate dissent 
and place the blame on the political agitations of a particular group of 
workers. 41 
 Kaveh Bayat has highlighted the strikes and grievances expressed by 
Indian and some Arab workers in the 1920s to argue that the Iranian 
workers were “not yet ready to take an active part in these actions or 
to organize their own.” 42 But it is equally important to follow the more 
complex forms of coercion at play—for example, the technical proce-
dures and terms, calculative equipment, infrastructures, and coordination 
among diverse actors that helped render fl ows of oil and people govern-
able. 43 Whether the Iranian workers were ready or not, strikes were crit-
ical moments in which assemblages of workers, company offi cials, and 
the British and Iranian governments struggled to frame controversies in 
advantageous ways to block opponents. 
 Indian workers performed specifi c tasks at the refi nery without which 
the set of interconnected mechanisms involved in producing, transport-
ing, and refi ning oil was rendered vulnerable, especially at these moments 
of political uncertainty. The company feared that Indian workers would 
encourage local laborers to join and open up new political possibilities in 
oil production that threatened to weaken British control. To counter this, 
AIOC worked hard to dismiss grievances with respect to pay by compar-
ing its wage scale to that of other fi rms and workers in Iran. In these early 
years, the success of Persianization was explicitly linked to the reduction 
of Indian labor in a way that took into account Iranian contract labor not 
directly employed by the company. 44 The Indian worker was, at the same 
time, necessary to company operations, which allowed AIOC offi cials to 
make technical and economic arguments about a lack of Iranian labor 
with the requisite effi ciency and experience. 45 Company interests were 
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“obliged to rely on India not only for unskilled but for skilled labour as 
none is obtainable in Persia.” 46 On the other hand, political possibilities 
were narrowed as striking workers could always be deported through the 
exercise of force, as in 1922. 47 
 The 1922 strike by Indian workers marked an early moment when the 
company did not have to address worker demands by setting up institu-
tions or mechanisms for the management of labor. It could easily resort to 
violence and deportation, an option not available to them with regard to 
Iranian workers. Most importantly, the foreign Indian worker equipped 
AIOC offi cials with the “evidence” it needed to develop a working defi -
nition of the Iranian oil worker in technical and economic terms as too 
ineffi cient and inexperienced to replace foreign labor, Indian or British. 
In what followed, however, the oil labor regime did not stabilize so easily. 
Additional equipment and forms of expertise were necessary to man-
age AIOC’s expanding oil operations because it was becoming increas-
ingly diffi cult to deal with ongoing labor crises and the looming threat 
of national control using the techniques of coercion framed as corporate 
benefi cence. 
 The 1929 Strike and the Question of National Control 
 The strike by Indian laborers in 1922 coincided with the Iranian govern-
ment’s pressure on AIOC headquarters to decrease the amount of Indian 
labor. In response, AIOC managers argued that the company was hin-
dered from executing such demands at Abadan on account of “the very 
large percentage of Indians employed who resisted every effort to intro-
duce local labour to their own exclusion.” 48 Resistance among Indian 
workers was acceptable in the company’s working defi nition of the oil 
worker as long as it reinforced the company’s arguments about imposing 
limits on the possibility of employing more Iranian laborers at higher 
skill levels. 
 Abadan in the late 1920s was an overcrowded “township” with 
60,000 residents, a large number of whom were living in “squalid and 
unsanitary dwellings with no public services like clean drinking water.” 49 
In 1928, the company employed 16,382 workers, but as Bayat argues, 
the presence of the company in southwest Iran was “constraining Iranian 
sovereignty and other issues like the appalling condition of Iranian work-
ers.” Although the town was nominally under local municipal control, 
Abadan was practically a company town. 50 
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 The company’s initial plans for constructing housing and work facil-
ities at the site of oil operations were internal to the British imperial 
project to bring a peculiar kind of order to its colonies around the world. 
AIOC assigned James Mollison Wilson as the architect in charge of devel-
oping town-planning schemes and designing large numbers of buildings 
in Abadan. 51 Wilson received commissions from AIOC starting in 1927, 
but his career experience and training included work in the mandated 
territory of Iraq, fi rst organizing the Public Works Department and then 
serving as Director of Public Works from 1920 to 1926. He had previ-
ously worked in New Dehli from 1913 to 1916 as an assistant to Sir 
Edwin Landseer Lutyens, the British imperial architect of the company’s 
future headquarters in London. 52 Led by Wilson, the work of design-
ing individual buildings and planning large residential areas, especially 
in Abadan but also in other company areas in Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, 
mushroomed in the 1930s. 
 By 1929, the degree of planning for the organization of working and 
living conditions, as well as the political groups involved, had changed. 
The Iranian Communist Party, known as the Tudeh, launched a campaign 
in early 1928 to reorganize the “Iranian working class.” 53 Moscow’s deci-
sion to “Bolshevize” the international communist movement in the 1920s 
encouraged communist groups such as the Tudeh to take a more radical 
line of action in their respective countries. The party sent trained agents 
to the Khuzistan oilfi elds to take advantage of the growing anti-British 
sentiment among oil workers, communist sympathizers residing in the 
area, and other “nationalists,” who together contributed to the forma-
tion of what Bayat has called “the semblances of a trade union.” 54 Work-
ingmen’s clubs were social clubs that served as an important vehicle of 
worker organization and education. 55 The miserable conditions faced by 
the oil workers, the discrimination between Iranian and foreign workers, 
the poor living conditions and low wages, and the offi cial campaign to 
force AIOC to revise its 1901 D’Arcy Oil Concession were among the 
many grievances voiced at these social gatherings. Meanwhile, the new 
British-backed ruler of Iran, Reza Shah, was working with the company 
to centralize and consolidate his power over semiautonomous politi-
cal groups in the provinces, such as the Bakhtiyari khans and Shaykh 
Khaz‘al, to secure the stability of oil operations and keep oil profi ts 
fl owing to the state. 56 
 The Iranian oil workers fi nally went on strike May 1–6, 1929, disrupt-
ing operations at multiple points of vulnerability, including the main oil-
fi elds, pipeline, and refi nery. 57 AIOC’s general manager, E. H. O. Elkington, 
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hoped to avoid diffi culties by securing the “fullest support” of the Iranian 
minister of court, Abdulhusayn Teymourtash, for the governor-general 
of Khuzistan. The governor-general must be “empowered to deport such 
agitators as he may deem fi t, irrespective of their nationality, in the inter-
ests of law and order.” 58 The governor-general responded swiftly to the 
minister’s call to “strong action” by arresting forty-fi ve “ringleaders.” 59 
On May 6, strikers attempted to prevent laborers from returning to work 
in the refi nery. The disruption was “quelled by a detachment of soldiers” 
summoned from a neighboring town, Mohammerah, after it became evi-
dent that the Iranian police force was inadequate in size to cope with the 
situation. 60 In total, “two to three thousand workmen” were reported to 
have demonstrated, causing shops and bazaars to close, but other studies 
suggest up to 9,000 workers protested at the most vulnerable point in the 
energy system, the Abadan refi nery. 61 No oil processes were successfully 
shut down, however, and the arrest of oil workers led to an escalation of 
violence, more arrests, and the dispersal of “mobs” by the military. The 
company made arrangements to have “reserve men in the works … in 
case of emergency.” 62 
 The strike was disruptive and yet ineffective. The Iranian government 
responded in a novel way by collaborating with the company to end the 
strike while making Reza Shah’s upcoming visit to oil operations coincide 
with the announcement of an increase in wages. The strike ended on May 
7 with the resumption of work. “Mainly owing to the loyalty of Indian 
and Persian labour,” AIOC successfully maintained all refi ning processes 
throughout the period of disturbance. 63 The strike was disruptive, how-
ever, and forced the Iranian government to suspend all geological surveys 
conducted by the company. An oil operations manager confi ded to AIOC’s 
chairman, John Cadman, that the company suffered a “great loss” by not 
being able to “employ its Geological staff, as also the valuable time which 
was being lost securing evidence for future development.” 64 The technical 
infrastructure of oil operations, whose upkeep demanded constant geo-
logical exploration and knowledge gathering to support future expansion 
(discussed in chapter 2), was vulnerable to striking oil workers and easily 
disrupted at moments like this. 
 AIOC responded to the striking oil workers by disseminating informa-
tion in certain newspapers accusing the oil workers of conspiring to strike 
and burn the refi nery under the instigation of communist infl uences. 65 
Reacting to a meeting between AIOC and the Iranian government on the 
status of workers in the oil regions, Ali Dashti, editor of  Shafagh-i Sorkh , 
dismissed attempts by the company to paint an alternative picture of the 
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oil workers. In reality, the demands of the Iranian oil workers were about 
securing better wages. 
 The Iranian government conducted an investigation into the causes of 
the strike and concluded that “Bolshevik” instigation was an inadequate 
explanation. 66 Economic grievances and concerns about racial discrimi-
nation provided a more feasible motivation. Indian workers had gone on 
strike to demand higher wages prior to the arrival of Bolshevik infl uence 
in the Persian Gulf region, and they were receiving higher wages than 
Iranian laborers with a higher literacy and skill level. In fact, the govern-
ment’s investigation claimed that the company fi red Iranian workers who 
were close to learning technical skills and specialization. Iranian workers 
suffered from a lack of housing and lower wages compared to foreign 
workers. It was this kind of racial segregation, concluded the govern-
ment, that was the cause of dissatisfaction, and ultimately led Iranians to 
organize themselves like the Indian workforce. 
 The investigative report claimed that the British company fabricated a 
link to the Bolsheviks to frame the strike as a political issue and dismiss 
the employees’ economic demands, despite the success of the communists 
in organizing the workers to assert such demands in the fi rst place. The 
workers who had intended to protest their meager wages were arrested at 
the instigation of the company. This was a tactic that the Iranian govern-
ment took to quell the strike. The group consisted of thousands of people 
from which “hundreds” attempted to break away and occupy company 
installations. 67 But the editor of  Habl al-Matin , a Calcutta newspaper, 
explained that while communist infl uence was shaping troubles in Khu-
zistan, the Iranian oil workers had legitimate economic demands. They 
were not receiving the same treatment as the “Indians and the Iraqis.” 68 
The Calcutta paper called on the workers to establish a union to protect 
their rights. It declared that to survive, the company would have to sepa-
rate itself from political concerns and preserve its identity as a “commer-
cial institution only.” 69 
 On a national scale, the 1929 strike opened up alternative political 
possibilities connected to questions of political sovereignty and national 
control of the oil. For the fi rst time in the company’s history, industrial 
action triggered a reorganization of AIOC’s labor management in order 
to “increase contact” between laborers and company managers. 70 Like-
wise, AIOC’s efforts to quell oil workers marked a period of heightened 
involvement in labor issues by the new British-backed ruler, Reza Shah. 
Various government ministries worked with the company to repress 
the strike and impose martial law, while simultaneously subduing the 
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workers by announcing a wage increase. Indian workers were useful as 
a company strategy for replacing agitating Iranian oil workers in various 
technical tasks, but this was a short-term solution. Oil worker dissent 
along with the call for Persianization in the 1930s triggered new efforts 
by the company to provide all Iranian employees with access to educa-
tion, transportation, health benefi ts, leisure facilities, and even their own 
traffi c police. 
 The increasing gains made by populist politics in both Iran and Iraq 
forced AIOC to expand housing facilities to accommodate Iranian labor-
ers and their families, but also to institute more layers of segregation, 
monitoring, and surveillance. Physical spaces were designed according 
to what Ehsani has called the “authoritarian spatial design of a com-
pany town,” to impose “time-discipline” and a “hierarchy, distinguish-
ing laborers, supervisors, managers, engineers, white collar staff, and the 
unemployed.” 71 Oil towns became the “fi rst modern industrial towns” in 
Iran designed in a hierarchical and segregated form that would later serve 
as a model for state-owned industrial urbanization projects. 72 
 Social technologies of racial and technical difference, mapped here, 
were built into the very design of housing and work sites. Guaranteed 
by the authority of the oil concession, the company dismissed the eco-
nomic demands of its workers by maintaining a boundary between tech-
nical operations and questions of labor, violence, and increasing calls 
for national control of the oil industry. This was best exemplifi ed in the 
company’s attempts to construct a labor formula to manage the rate of 
Persianization during the 1932–1933 concession revision negotiations, 
discussed in the previous chapter. Calculating formulas for managing the 
rate of Persianization were entangled with the company’s development 
of housing, work, and training facilities. These technologies equipped 
workers with forms of agency, informing their decisions to hold strikes 
and make demands in increasingly nationalist terms. The construction of 
these social and calculating technologies exemplifi es one of the peculiar 
ways the oil corporation operated and its political agency was consti-
tuted by delineating the kind of Iranian oil worker, preferably unskilled, 
that was necessary for oil operations to succeed. 
 Newly involved political groups such as Iran’s communist Tudeh Party 
acted on behalf of the oil workers by attaching themselves to their cause 
as local and national spokespersons. Iranian public opinion, government 
agencies, and political groups aligned themselves with the oil workers 
as proponents of national control, but with different interests at stake. 
Benevolence and violence on the part of AIOC managers were no longer 
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as effective interventions as they had been in response to the strike in 
1922 by Indian workers. Shifts in strategy included new efforts by the 
company to provide Iranian employees with access to social services and 
more training, as well as better coordination with the Iranian govern-
ment in quelling strikes to keep the threat of union formation, communist 
infl uence, and more militant politics out. New responses were worked out 
precisely at moments of crisis, when technical concerns about developing 
and expanding oil operations were increasingly intertwined with politi-
cal questions of sovereignty and national control, producing important 
albeit inadequate concessions to the oil workers’ demands. 
 New “Conception of the Rights of the Persian” after World War II 
 The oil worker was now calculable and manageable in new ways that 
had not been possible before. The resolution of the labor crisis in 1929 
and the concession crisis in 1932–1933 triggered the introduction of 
new institutions of labor and disciplinary regimes to block workers from 
the threat of nationalism and militant forms of politics. 73 The events in 
1929 and 1932–1933 marked a political moment in which the exercise 
of direct force by a colonial power on a subject population justifi ed in 
terms of racial differentiation and “civilization” was no longer possible. 
Populist politics were gaining ground across the Middle East and espe-
cially in the oilfi elds of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. If a foreign oil cor-
poration wanted to operate locally in these countries, it would have to 
develop new forms of social control to manage militant forms of worker 
dissent, while also accommodating domestic laborers and their families 
by providing them with social services and access to training at higher 
skill levels. 
 After the Second World War, this emerging politics of national sover-
eignty could not be overlooked. AIOC mobilized paternalism—that is, 
the provision of benefi ts, housing, and recreational facilities for a small 
segment of employees—as a means of securing loyalty and managing the 
increasing threat of nationalism. These practices were legitimized, on 
the one hand, in terms of economic costs, and on the other, in terms of 
the modernization and moral uplift the company believed would come 
from new living quarters and leisure activities. The strategy necessarily 
included the impossibility of relinquishing British control over oil. This 
had consequences for political possibilities tied to national control of the 
industry. As Vitalis says, fi rms began disguising the “supremacist origins 
and resonances of their labor regimes” after World War II and through 
136  Chapter 4
the Cold War. It was not a question of racism but of “skill levels” that 
the international oil fi rm would begin to insist on in expanded public 
relations campaigns, which AIOC commenced as far back as the 1930s 
in Iran. 74 Overcoming the vulnerability of the energy system at particular 
nodes in southwest Iran, such as with the oil wells, at the refi nery, and 
in segregated living spaces, required new kinds of arguments justifi ed in 
terms of skill levels rather than race. 
 By the end of the Second World War, there were 65,641 AIOC employ-
ees in Abadan alone, of whom 2,357 were British. 75 The company was 
expanding exponentially, drawing labor directly and through subcon-
tractors from southwest Iran, the Persian Gulf, and India. 76 Company 
resources continued to be channeled in favor of the construction of 
housing and other facilities for its senior European staff. Housing for 
non-European junior staff and wage-earning laborers, especially the con-
tract laborers the company increasingly relied on, however, was “left as a 
matter for the market or the municipality.” 77 They simply lived in “shanty 
towns on the edges of the Company and municipal areas.” AIOC did not 
regard the large numbers of contract laborers arriving in the 1940s as its 
responsibility. 
 AIOC’s deployment of paternalism, which favored only a small group 
of elite workers, did not solve the problem of “a very great and wide-
spread spirit of Nationalism,” according to Wilson, the company archi-
tect. 78 He pointed to disparities in housing as contributing the “most 
to the dangerous divide between Iranian and British employees.” 79 As 
a solution, Wilson proposed to create a new residential area known as 
Bawarda “as a kind of manifesto of racial mixing, an experiment in 
non-segregation.” 80 Situated on the other side of the bazaar from the 
refi nery, the town was designed by Wilson as a “showcase vision of com-
pany paternalism.” 81 Iranians living in Bawarda would soon abandon the 
traditional “purdah system,” the practice of veiling and secluding women 
within the home, and future homes would be designed in the European 
style, encouraging the Iranian employee to “desire British conventions of 
domestic life.” 82 Wilson’s project for harmonious racial mixing failed in 
the face of “potential violence.” 83 Racial mixing was likely to breed vio-
lence. The “very spaciousness of the plots in Bawarda and its generous … 
road provision could only be provocative to the Iranians in ‘the town.’” 
In subsequent years, Wilson built offi ces, bungalows, and “dormitory 
estates.” New industrial estates were laid out all over Abadan Island 
and maintained their connections through the introduction of company 
buses, which transported workers to the refi nery. 84 These new clusters 
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of small towns rather than large townships would help reduce political 
activism, it was thought, by establishing a distance between them and the 
“social disorder” of Abadan town. In effect, the racial-technical construc-
tion of housing and work within oil operations was helping the company 
exclude the local while maintaining a distance from politics. 
 In the spring of 1945, a representative of the British Ministry of Labor 
and National Service, A. Hudson Davies, accompanied by the Inspector 
of Labor Supply, J. B. English, traveled to the oil regions for three months 
to examine ways of addressing labor problems in AIOC’s operations. The 
demands and costs of World War II, according to the report, had exacer-
bated the isolation of company management in Iran from “direct knowl-
edge of industrial experience” in the country. 85 The oil company was a 
“highly technical industry in a backward, foreign, and remote country.” 86 
This meant that skilled British employees constituted “the backbone” of 
the company. The need for British employees might decline in the future, 
but there were such “defi ciencies in quality, skill, and training of the 
native staff and labour that an increase of output” could only be achieved 
by increasing the number of British employees. 87 For the oil industry to 
survive, the report argued, the ratio of British to Iranian workers must 
favor the British employee of a higher skill level. Framed in technical 
and economic terms, this was not due to a lack of domestic labor, but to 
the Iranian worker’s inherent inability to acquire the qualities, skills, and 
training necessary for increased economic productivity. 
 Compared to the oilfi elds, the refi nery at Abadan was suffering the 
most, both in terms of skilled labor and in terms of adequate housing. 
“So short is housing that only a man with more than seven years of 
service can be joined permanently by his wife.” 88 The lack of housing 
to accommodate spouses and families was affecting the attitude of the 
workers. Over half of new recruits were housed for the fi rst few years in 
“emergency housing of a relatively poor standard,” and this was encour-
aging the spread of discontent. Davies advised the company to pursue an 
“accelerated house building programme” in Abadan. The program would 
address labor problems, though it would not go far enough to solve the 
housing shortage. That all British staff were in specialist or supervisory 
posts could not be altered in proportion to the relatively low percent-
age of Iranians (7 percent) in these senior posts. The British inspectors 
explained away the problem in technical terms, arguing that it stemmed 
from a serious shortage of “natives capable and trained in supervision 
and of clerks.” 89 The Abadan Technical Institute was built in 1938 to 
give Iranian apprentices basic technical skills, but by 1945, only 1,700 
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Iranians had received training. 90 The training covered a fi ve-year appren-
ticeship and included short, intensive training courses in craftsmanship 
and semiskilled occupations for adult workers together with special 
courses for the upgrading of certain employees, night classes in languages 
and other subjects, a four-year course for junior foremen, and courses 
in clerical work and commerce. More advanced course topics included 
mechanical and petroleum engineering, and during World War II, the 
institute introduced a bachelor of science degree in petroleum technol-
ogy. 91 However, Michael Dobe explains that, as a strategy, the company 
“sought to minimize the number of Iranians sent for university training 
and maximize the number sent for trade training” in the United Kingdom 
as it would block the threat of returning superior-skilled Iranians from 
stirring up trouble among the workers. 92 
 Technical obstacles of inadequate training were adding to the burden 
placed on British employees, who had to continue to “organize, super-
vise, and teach.” 93 The “concessional obligation” to reduce the “British 
component” and employ more Iranians had fallen into the background 
during the war, but there were additional “limitations in all directions” 
that “forbid a quick reduction” of the British-to-“native” worker ratio. 
Davies warned that while trade unions had been illegal in Iran, a new 
labor law was before the Majlis to make them legal. If the law passed, 
it would be wise for the company to consider the possibility of “fore-
stalling pressure from the Persians” by taking the initiative to set up “its 
own plan for consultative machinery with the native staff and labour.” 94 
After World War II, AIOC and the British government were fi nding it 
increasingly diffi cult to maintain a boundary between social concerns 
about labor, nationalist politics, and technical operations. To maintain 
its precarious control over the energy system, AIOC would have to 
resort to other kinds of explanations such as the threat of communism 
and would have to make additional plans to implement paternalistic 
welfare work. 
 Iran’s 1936 labor law did not discuss the right to strike or form trade 
unions, but after the 1941 Allied invasion of Iran, intended to protect oil 
and supply routes from the Nazis, unions became strong and in 1942, the 
communists established a Central Council of Trade Unions in Iran which 
in 1944 became the United Central Council of the Unifi ed Trade Unions 
of Iranian workers (CCUTU). 95 In 1946, the CCUTU was affi liated with 
the World Federation of Trade Unions and membership included 90,000 
workers in the oilfi elds of Khuzistan. In this period, there were twenty-fi ve 
major stoppages and fi ve separate regional general strikes of which the 
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two main centers were Tehran and the oilfi elds. The oil workers’ main 
form of unrest was to strike. 
 On May Day 1946, over 50,000 workers demonstrated in Tehran. On 
the morning of May 5, Tudeh offi cials in the oilfi elds called on 350 AIOC 
workers employed in distillation and bitumen plants at the Abadan refi n-
ery to walk out without warning. 96 There were major strikes in the refi n-
ery and in six distinct production centers during the 1945–1946 period 
including a three-day general strike in July 1946, specifi cally over pay 
and working conditions. 97 The May strike was organized in sympathy 
with a strike that had occurred six days earlier in the company’s locomo-
tive shops in which fi fty men were involved. 98 The effect of the walkout 
on production and refi ning in 1946 was signifi cant, revealing the vulner-
ability of the technical side of the energy system at certain key points in 
the process. 99 On the fi rst day of the strike, instant crude oil dispatches 
from the main oilfi elds, amounting to some ten million gallons per day, 
were shut off. As a result, oil production was shut down at Gach Saran, 
since the percentage of incoming oil to the Abadan refi nery was too high 
for the maintenance of products. Due to picketing activity, the loading of 
tankers was also suspended. 
 An oil worker writing during the strike action of 1946 and appointed 
head of branch affairs for the CCUTU, claims that the British government 
had larger interests than breaking the strike because it was exerting a lot 
of effort in time and money to neutralize and break the Tudeh organiza-
tion. 100 AIOC was allying itself with certain Arab “tribes” in the province 
to infi ltrate the workers’ union affi liated with the Tudeh-backed United 
Council. More skilled and trustworthy oil workers “of the fi rst rank” 
needed to be recruited in leadership roles and each node in the energy 
network needed to come under a central Abadan administration. 101 A 
set of social and economic demands and future goals were listed in the 
report, including the election by workers of a representative for each oil 
region to address worker complaints, an increase in wages, and the prior 
approval by worker representatives of any form of punishment, such as 
deportation, pursued by the company. 
 In its report to the British government, the company took a different 
view from the Iranian oil workers by building connections between the 
causes of the strike and the rise of “Tudeh infi ltration” in Abadan at 
the end of November 1945. 102 Leaders included drivers, fi tters, and plant 
attendants. Strikers resumed work on May 6 at Abadan, but another 
group of workers at Agha Jari, one of the main production sites pro-
ducing four million tons of oil per year, struck on May 13 to protest 
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poor housing conditions and general amenities. 103 The Tudeh Party was 
attaching itself to the cause of the oil workers by acting as their national 
spokesperson. 104 AIOC rejected their demands, and Iranian military 
forces were dispatched to maintain order. In response to the 1946 strike, 
company management had instructions to “expedite as far as possible” 
the construction of housing and expansion of medical and other welfare 
facilities, to review wages in relation to the cost of living, and to encour-
age representation among workers, which might be developed into union 
organization. 105 The company knew that it must be prepared to deal with 
Tudeh leaders so long as they remained in control of the situation at 
Abadan. 
 A delegation of British members of parliament paid a visit to the oil-
fi elds in June 1946 to investigate the causes of the militant Iranian labor 
movement within AIOC’s oil operations. The delegation advised that the 
“conception of rights of the Persian, defi ned twenty to thirty years ago by 
the Company,” must undergo “a complete and fundamental change.” 106 
The British secretary of state for foreign affairs, Earnest Bevin, had 
warned that around the world, “the sense of equality is rapidly develop-
ing.” 107 The way to tackle the problem, advised the report, was through 
a concerted effort by the company to develop its social program and 
to engage in “greater consultation with their workpeople.” 108 The back-
ground of anti–trade union organization by companies such as AIOC had 
“inevitably brought the present situation to a head.” 109 The company’s 
management was composed of men inexperienced in negotiations with 
unions. This needed to change for management to be better equipped 
to deal directly with the internal representatives of oil workers rather 
than members of Iran’s Communist Party. Such a strategy would work to 
“separate the political aims of the Tudeh Party from the economic desires 
of employees.” 110 
 Iran’s pending national labor legislation was making it diffi cult for the 
company to avoid addressing social and welfare activities, with the most 
important consequence being the recognition of an oil workers’ union. 
Iran’s Council of Ministers had passed the national labor law back on 
May 18, 1946. 111 The labor law made it possible to enroll new institu-
tions and standards of work to help manage oil worker dissent in terms 
of reformist nationalism. In particular, the law called for the establish-
ment of a National Ministry of Labor and Department General of Labor 
charged with executing the various regulations in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 112 Provisions of the law stipulated 
that work must not exceed forty-eight hours per week. 113 The main labor 
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offi ce was opened in Abadan, with subsidiary labor offi ces scheduled 
for opening in each of the oilfi elds. The Iranian government welcomed a 
labor representative from the United Kingdom to help formulate proce-
dures for union activity under the new law. 114 
 A committee was subsequently formed to meet in the same period as 
the British delegation’s visit, consisting of representatives of AIOC and 
the Abadan Workers’ Union. Under pressure from the Iranian Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Justice, and the prime minis-
ter, the company agreed to provide full pay for the period during which 
workers were absent at the oil-producing region at Agha Jari. 115 This was 
further induced by the technical calculation that production losses had 
already amounted to some 30,000 tons of oil, losses limited by the efforts 
of British workers to operate wells and production plants throughout the 
strike. 116 While the industrial actions posed a signifi cant threat, the tech-
nical knowledge of British workers enabled a fl exibility that prevented 
the total disruption of operations, particularly at certain points of vulner-
ability such as wells and production plants. 
 Having spent two weeks in the oilfi elds, the British parliamentary del-
egation concluded that a labor crisis was “inevitable.” 117 The British del-
egates met with leaders of the Abadan Workers’ Union, who reported on 
the intolerable living and working conditions. 118 The delegates observed 
the status of housing conditions in Abadan: 
 On one hand we are able to see splendidly built modern houses with 
air-conditioning, ice-boxes, etc., passing through a variety of stages right down 
to small individually built shacks in some cases the only roof being empty 
paper cement bags and old pieces of matting which some of the Persian labor 
had tried to create shelter from. Never in the whole of my experience indeed in 
any other country which I have had the privilege of visiting, did I see so close 
together such extremes in Housing Accommodation. 119 
 The oil regions of southwest Iran did not appear to have changed much 
since the fi rst “coolie lines” were built outside the Abadan refi nery in 
the early 1920s. The delegates concluded that “the place looks like a 
penal settlement in the desert” and “houses we visited little better than 
pig-styes.” 120 AIOC faced mounting trouble due to the strike actions, 
reported the delegates. Its “previous policy had been one of paternalism,” 
and they had depended on their “undoubted good relations with their 
staff” to solve labor problems as they arose. 121 The disappearance of a 
“means of discussion” for handling workplace issues and disputes needed 
to be redressed as an “essential feature of future policy.” 122 Neverthe-
less, the limitations remained. It was “of course, humanly impossible,” 
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the British delegates confessed, “to expect even a Persian to advance his 
knowledge technically in the interests of British Oil Production and at 
the same time expect any individual Persian, or Persians, not to acquire 
knowledge which creates within them a desire for a much better exis-
tence.” 123 On the one hand, arguments about Iranian oil workers were 
factored into calculations when making arguments about protecting the 
British-to-“native” ratio due to a “defi ciency” in technical skills for ade-
quate economic output. On the other hand, arguments about the acqui-
sition of technical knowledge were impossible to factor in because they 
would create within that same Iranian worker “a desire” for more equi-
table forms of treatment, causing the ratio to fall apart. 
 According to one former AIOC worker with forty-six years of experi-
ence fi xing drinking-water problems in Abadan, the company’s aim had 
always been to subordinate the Iranian laborers. H. Gholami-Ghanavati 
has recalled the specifi c ways the hierarchical and racial system of labor 
was organized after the Allied invasion of 1941. 124 He started working 
for AIOC at the age of fourteen as an unskilled laborer, although he man-
aged to study English at the company night school for seven years. He 
remembers that when he was fi rst hired, he worked under the supervi-
sion of the English and Indian employees: “They were never interested in 
teaching us technical skills.” 125 For example, “when they wanted to repair 
equipment or pumps they either sent us to work on something else or 
covered up what they were doing, so that we would not learn the partic-
ular skill involved.” Gholami-Ghanavati explains that on other occasions 
unskilled laborers were expected to lubricate machines and equipment, 
and in doing so, secretly learned the mechanisms involved in their oper-
ation. When Gholami-Ghanavati realized that he had acquired as much 
technical skill as many of the Indian workers, he applied for work at 
the higher skill level, “but the English were severely against this.” Their 
refusal was “natural,” according to Gholami-Ghanavati, because their 
aim had never been to promote the Iranian laborers. 
 The defense of the new rights of the Iranian oil workers was at stake. 
The Tudeh Party, the Iranian government, and AIOC battled to attach 
themselves to the interests of the oil workers and serve as their national 
spokesperson. The Tudeh leaders contributed to disruptions in the oil-
fi elds by picketing all petrol-distributing stations in Tehran and prevent-
ing any vehicle from refueling on certain days in June. The company 
feared that a cessation of “oil distribution would entail break down 
of public transport, electric light supply and closing all bakeries.” 126 
Cutting off Abadan’s supplies of oil would have “disastrous economic 
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consequences in the UK and throughout the Empire.” 127 The British For-
eign Offi ce viewed the labor unrest less as refl ecting “genuine concern 
for the welfare of Persian workmen than as a political campaign against 
British interests.” Acknowledging the strength of the connection between 
the legitimate demands of militant oil workers and the Iranian Commu-
nist Party was impossible if the British side wanted to maintain control 
of oil operations and keep profi ts high. On the other hand, using argu-
ments about workers in political terms was possible when it threatened 
the stability of oil operations, framed here as a political campaign against 
British interests. 
 Both the British and Iranian governments viewed the creation of new 
labor offi ces in the oilfi elds and refi nery area as the best mechanism for 
managing the crisis and avoiding the more militant alliance of oil work-
ers with the Iranian communist movement. The goal was to “wean AIOC 
employees from the Tudeh by persuading them to submit complaints to 
the Government Labour Offi ce.” 128 Through the establishment of new 
labor institutions and laws, the Iranian government sought to position 
itself as the oil workers’ spokesperson. 129 By doing so, the Iranian gov-
ernment could collaborate simultaneously with the British government 
and the oil company to redirect labor militancy into the more manage-
able frame of national labor reform. This was a strategy to secure the 
loyalty of a small segment of employees and to create enough stability to 
prevent the more militant alliance of communism, the control of oil, and 
nationalism from coming together. 130 
 The Iranian government, acting as national spokesperson and police-
man, made offi cial statements to the press that minimum wages, includ-
ing Friday pay, were under negotiation. Pending the outcome of the 
Work Commission’s inquiry, the government deemed any future strikes 
illegal. 131 The 1946 strike that started on May Day fi nally ended on July 
17. It drew some concessions from AIOC, but ultimately led to the mass 
arrest of strike leaders and the shutting down of the oil workers’ union 
and the Tudeh Party in Khuzistan. 132 Laborers gradually returned to 
work, but there was still a “hostile feeling between Iranian labor and the 
British.” Halliday argues that “this action in which workers won most 
of their demands … demonstrated how a small but strategically placed 
working class can play a major role in an economy like Iran.” 133 Although 
the government imposed martial law and stationed troops at the oilfi elds 
and refi nery, 134 the strike was decisive in terms of the disruption of par-
ticular tasks and operations involved in the energy system, and also in 
terms of the scale of violence and involvement of concerned groups. The 
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Iranian prime minister, Ahmad Qavam al-Saltaneh, eventually stepped in 
and encouraged AIOC to compensate the oil workers in national-legal 
terms. 135 The politics of a highly technical operation that the company 
had hoped to preserve as an isolated economic enclave was overfl owing 
into national debates and laws. 
 There appeared here to be a tension in defi ning the limits and possi-
bilities affecting the competencies of the oil worker, which was triggering 
battles over who would win as national spokesperson for the oil workers. 
There was no question that the design and operation of AIOC’s oil labor 
regime were working to the disadvantage of local and non-European 
labor. At the same time, the British delegates expressed anxiety that the 
necessary and rapid improvement in housing, work, and training would 
instill in the Iranian worker a desire to acquire much more, namely, 
national control of the oil industry. 
 The company defended its housing policy, arguing that it was “geared 
to produce a good general quality of housing rather than a rapid pro-
duction of quantity.” 136 The Iranian government was collaborating with 
the company by imposing martial law and authorizing troops to sup-
press the strikes, while also redirecting the militancy of the oil workers 
into the more manageable frame of reformist nationalism. The company 
continued to view itself as a benevolent social force. This was justifi ed 
by comparing its housing projects to the housing available in the rest of 
Khuzistan Province, beyond the borders of oil operations. At the same 
time, there was a heightened awareness that the company must address 
the economic and social demands of the oil workers, but that it lacked 
experience negotiating with union organizations to do this. 
 By 1951, only 18.5 percent of the labor force was accommodated 
in AIOC quarters. 137 AIOC housing was allocated largely by seniority 
rather than longevity of service or basic rate of pay. 138 Over the course 
of two decades, AIOC had done little to improve the living and working 
conditions of its non-European employees, but instead was pressured by 
the British government to respond with more institutions and layers of 
monitoring to weaken unions and reduce the threat of future disruptions. 
Iran’s government worked hand in hand with the company’s efforts to 
defeat the communist Tudeh Party and rechannel workers’ interests into 
the more manageable outlet of reformist nationalism, as noted earlier. 
The impact of the 1946 general strike coincided with the rapid construc-
tion and expansion of government institutions, laws, and political parties 
with a stake in representing the oil workers as their national spokesper-
son. Suddenly, the mobilization of benevolence, economic and technical 
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arguments about worker competency, and various forms of monitoring, 
surveillance, and coercion were inadequate. These techniques and con-
trols fl owed into national and international debates about the rights of 
the maltreated workers and who had the right to control the oil of a 
sovereign country. 
 Coordinating Labor Nationally and Internationally 
 Labor crises opened up new political possibilities involving the national-
ization of the British-controlled oil industry that might include the con-
fi scation of company property, oil infrastructure, and the replacement 
of all foreign labor with Iranian labor. Labor crises also threatened to 
disrupt the coordination of international monopoly arrangements among 
the largest oil corporations over the control of production, profi ts, and 
now labor. In 1947, the Iranian government set up a judicial committee 
that ruled that the General Plan of 1936 concerning Persianization was 
invalid because its provisions were contrary to Article 16 of the 1933 
concession (discussed in chapter 3). 139 Iranian government ministers did 
not endorse the General Plan for Persianization. An alternative had been 
discussed between AIOC offi cials and the Iranian ministers for salaries 
and working conditions, in the “widest sense of all staff and labor,” to 
be the joint responsibility of the government and company. The Iranian 
government was unconvinced by AIOC’s efforts to improve living and 
working conditions for the laborers. 140 There was strong pressure com-
ing from the Iranian government for the company to seek a formula 
whereby Iranian staff would receive regular and automatic promotion to 
senior and management posts or to serve on committees, which would be 
directed toward the same ends and on which there would be government 
representation. 141 
 AIOC was refusing to do numerical reductions and continued to 
insist on a formulaic reduction in relation to the “scale of operations,” 
discussed in the previous chapter. The government was also demanding 
fi nancial assistance for the construction of additional schools in Khu-
zistan, maternity facilities in Abadan, and the immediate reduction of 
Indian personnel. 142 Husayn Pirnia, director of the Petroleum Depart-
ment, insisted that the Iranian government’s interpretation of the phrase 
“annual and progressive reductions” in the text of the 1933 concession 
could only be satisfi ed by the execution of an annual numerical reduc-
tion. Pirnia also declined to recognize a joint proposal for the implemen-
tation of Article 16. 
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 In a telling interview conducted in 1948 by AIOC, Pirnia expressed 
the prime minister’s grave disappointment with the company’s attitude 
toward the discussion of a general plan and its failure to reduce its for-
eign personnel. 143 The company’s willingness to help was “more theo-
retical than practical” and showed an utter disregard for the repeated 
explanations offered by the Iranian government and public opinion. The 
Iranian public was “riveted on the attitude of the Company towards 
the country,” as evidenced by numerous speeches in the Majlis. 144 An 
announcement would soon be made to the press that general ongoing 
discussions surrounding the question of Persianization had broken down. 
Pirnia warned that the government was prepared for AIOC to restrict 
its operations in Iran in order to keep within its obligations, rather 
than expanding operations and going beyond the “limit, which the 
Government could acquiesce in.” 145 
 Acting as national spokesperson for the oil workers, the Iranian gov-
ernment decided to enlist the help of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO), originally created by Article 23 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations in 1918, and transfer the dispute to a new international site in 
Geneva in November 1948, just as the British side had done at the League 
of Nations in 1932–1933. 146 After a three-week stay in the oil regions 
of southwest Iran, the ILO published a report that was presented at a 
subsequent ILO meeting in November 1950. The delegates continued to 
legitimize oil operations by defi ning Iranian oil workers in the industry in 
economic and technical terms. The report argued that there remained a 
“shortage of workers with the required skills” and qualifi cations, which 
the “oil industry needs.” 147 The report also relied on arguments about 
inadequate modernization such that the “minds” of local labor seemed 
“fi rmly set in traditional ways,” and that this constituted “one of the 
big problems of the industry.” 148 Increasing the rate at which Iranian 
nationals were recruited for employment in the higher categories of wage 
earners and members of supervisory staff would therefore be diffi cult. 
As international spokesperson for workers worldwide, the ILO mission 
confi rmed what the AIOC had always argued, namely that positions were 
open to all who “acquire the necessary qualifi cations and experience.” 
To the dismay of the Iranian government, the report presented a posi-
tive view of the company’s treatment of its laborers, while admitting the 
urgency of constructing better housing facilities. 
 Shifting the labor controversy to the international arena failed to 
strengthen the Iranian government’s bargaining position and that of 
its oil workers. AIOC won the battle by receiving a positive assessment 
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from the ILO mission, which was urged by the British government not to 
“worsen” relations between the Iranian government and the company by 
emphasizing labor problems. 149 The controversy had been transformed 
into an international labor issue, but in favor of corporate interests, 
which continued to operate through a hierarchical and racially organized 
regime of labor. The ILO advised that it remained in the interests of both 
sides to pursue a cooperative strategy. The time had come to “elevate a 
Persian of proved merit and temperament for work … to be the third 
link in the vitally important advisory chain.” 150 Mostafah Fateh, AIOC’s 
most senior Iranian employee, was appointed to the post of managing 
employee relations. 151 The industrial labor regime must be controlled, 
an offi cial explained to the US government’s labor attaché in Tehran, but 
still appear to produce a “collective relationship between employers and 
workers in Persia.” 152 
 The stability of relations between politics and international oil mar-
kets was at stake. Achieving this stability necessitated the coordination 
of labor organization nationally, between AIOC and the Iranian gov-
ernment, and internationally. In a meeting held at the company head-
quarters, Britannic House, in London, representatives of the largest oil 
companies gathered to reconsider the whole question of standards of 
employment for oil companies operating in the Middle East. 153 Represen-
tatives of AIOC, the Kuwait Oil Company Limited (KOC), the Middle 
East Pipeline Company (MEPL), the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company 
(TAPLINE), Standard Oil of New Jersey, Shell Petroleum Company 
Limited, IPC, and United Overseas Petroleum Company agreed that 
“tremendous sums of money” would be poured into the Middle East 
in upcoming years. 154 This spending would have consequences for labor 
matters such as salaries, wages, and other terms of employment. 
 AIOC representatives discussed the increased pressure to provide 
accommodations for families of British staff. In response to suggestions 
by other company representatives, Elkington insisted that concessions 
could never be implemented for British staff in Iran without extending 
them to indigenous employees. AIOC fi rmly held the view that family 
allowances were the responsibility of the state and not of the employer. It 
therefore discouraged KOC and MEPL from granting family and separa-
tion allowances, as it would be impossible to resist the pressure to extend 
this practice to Iran, “with embarrassing results.” 155 Also, AIOC’s Euro-
pean employees worked a forty-two hour week, while local labor worked 
a forty-eight hour week, but new companies were well advised to adopt 
the longer week for all shifts. With regard to “local labor problems,” 
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Elkington argued that industrial relations offi cers were a useful remedy 
along with more extensive contact between management and local labor. 
Industrial relations offi cers from one’s home country could be helpful 
in advising on labor legislation toward a “practical and workable form 
suited to the conditions of a country.” 156 This was the case in formulating 
the labor law in Iran. In response to inquiries from David Rockefeller Sr., 
Elkington went on to discuss the improved standards of technical and 
other education as implemented in Iran. 
 AIOC’s expertise in managing oil workers and addressing the question 
of Persianization in Iran was circulated among the major oil companies 
to determine the best strategies for managing labor and welfare in the 
Middle East as a whole. AIOC offi cials urged that steps be taken to “pre-
sent a united front” by developing a system of wage policy and grading 
labor, “which will be common to all companies.” 157 The coordination 
of production, prices, and now labor formed part of a system of infor-
mation exchanges among companies that acted individually but coordi-
nated through associations. Transnational oil companies operating in the 
Middle East were highly conscious of the need to develop standardized 
strategies for avoiding labor dissent and inhibiting strong labor organi-
zation. They achieved this not only by collaborating with national host 
governments, but also with other companies internationally. AIOC offi -
cials treated the subsoil as one geological unit in order to maintain larger 
production and pricing arrangements with the largest transnational oil 
companies. In the same fashion, the oil workers on the surface needed 
to be managed through a unifi ed labor policy among the largest inter-
national oil companies, defying the goals of national politics. Only this 
kind of coordination and information exchange could successfully pro-
tect international production, pricing, and patent arrangements among 
the world’s largest oil producers. 
 Defusing the Oil Worker’s Power 
 The Majlis fi nally approved the nationalization of the oil industry on the 
recommendation of a parliamentary committee on March 20, 1951. The 
parliament appointed Muhammad Mosaddiq as prime minister on April 
28, replacing the shah’s choice, Husayn Ala. 158 This monumental decision 
coincided with the most decisive confrontation between oil workers and 
the Iranian government, in March and April 1951, when the local Iranian 
governor attacked the strikers and arrested their leaders. 159 The reformist 
government, represented by the Iranian provincial governor, attempted to 
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manage the oil workers’ power by arguing that mass action against the 
company would provoke British military intervention and undermine the 
oil nationalization campaign. 
 There were a series of work stoppages in the oilfi elds between 1949 
and 1951. 160 The communist movement was revived in 1949, but the 
government banned the Tudeh Party and the CCUTU after an attempt 
on the shah’s life in February 1949. 161 At the end of 1949, approximately 
33,000 of the 38,000 employees at Abadan and 15,000 of 17,000 work-
ers in the oilfi elds were involved in construction, maintenance, transpor-
tation, loading, and pipeline work. A large proportion of the workers 
were unskilled and the upper level of the managerial and engineering 
staff remained, for the most part, British. By 1951, an additional 15,000 
Iranians worked as contract laborers for the oil company. 162 The status 
of the Iranian oil workers had not changed signifi cantly since the 1920s. 
To survive, the Anglo-Iranian oil industry appeared to require unskilled 
Iranian oil workers, described in the terms of Article 12 of the 1901 oil 
concession, ensuring that all skilled technical staff would remain under 
British control for the foreseeable future. 
 Oil workers at the Bandar Mashur oilfi eld went on strike on March 
24, 1951, to protest new-scale allowances. 163 As a result of loading stop-
pages at Bandar Mashur, oil production from Agha Jari was halted. Extra 
troops from the Iranian military were also drafted into the area and the 
Ministry of Labor issued a circular promising negotiations with AIOC’s 
general management on bathhouses and other amenities. 164 Workmen 
in the garage and workshops at Agha Jari had also struck in solidarity 
with Bandar Mashur, and by midday, three-quarters of the laborers had 
ceased work. 
 The strike at Agha Jari quickly spread to the main workshops, 
the welding operations, and the main stores, followed by the electrical 
departments. 165 Workers submitted complaints about the inadequacy of 
water, housing, and other amenities, but managers agreed to meet with 
worker representatives only after the men returned to work. AIOC offi -
cials were well aware of the urgency of providing permanent housing 
and amenities in the oilfi elds, but they were also concerned about the 
possibility of the strike spreading nationally as a result of “Tudeh encour-
agement.” 166 On the other hand, working in alliance with the Iranian 
government to repress the more militant forms of labor protests provided 
the company with a degree of security. As a means of restoring order, the 
government ignored the workers’ complaints and declared martial law in 
the strike areas. 
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 Demonstrations by apprentices outside the Abadan Technical Institute 
commenced the following day, March 26. 167 Workers at Masjid Sulei-
man struck on March 28 when those employed in the garage, work-
shops, stores, and electrical and other departments did not report for 
work and gathered outside the main company gates. 168 Work stoppages 
at Naft Safi d and Lali followed, with workers demanding the restoration 
of certain allowances, as well as improved promotion rates and a min-
imum wage. 169 In March, the oil workers immediately formed a strike 
committee representing the different striking areas and presented a series 
of grievances concerning pay and amenities. 170 The Iranian government 
declared martial law on March 27, and AIOC imposed a curfew on the 
oil workers at Agha Jari. By the start of April, bungalow servants had left 
their places of employment, and there was a falling off in attendance of 
“Production Labor.” British staff were forced to take over and operate 
the “Production Unit” and “Flow Tank.” 
 In the meantime, the Iranian government sent a “Commission of 
Three” to investigate oil workers’ claims and meet with six striker rep-
resentatives along with AIOC management. The director of labor also 
arrived to distribute notices describing the legal machinery embodied in 
the 1946 labor law, through which disputes must be solved collectively 
rather than by strike action, which the company had declared illegal. 171 
Reza Dinashi of the garage workshops at Masjid Suleiman dispatched a 
telegram to the Majlis stating that “since the question of nationalization 
of the Southern oilfi elds had been deliberated, the Co. had increased its 
pressure on the workers, hence the reason for their strike.” 172 The strike 
ended at Agha Jari on April 11 with the announcement that the com-
pany would offset strike pay against leave entitlement—that is, in place 
of receiving payments to help meet their basic needs while on strike, the 
workers could make use of their legal right to take leave or be away 
from work. According to company estimates, 95 percent of the workers 
returned to work the following day. As in 1946, the 1951 strike occurred 
as an assemblage of diverse actors, organizational forms, and coercion in 
relation to the fl ow of oil, but the central issue was now national control 
of an entire oil industry. 
 The 1946 strike was different, however, in that it was almost entirely 
“industrial in its origin,” while the 1951 strike action, according to com-
pany offi cials, was “clearly political.” 173 AIOC managers were alarmed 
by the degree of support offered to the oil workers by the Iranian gov-
ernment, the Majlis, and public opinion. The Tudeh appeared to be 
exploiting the situation for “its own ends,” and offi cials admitted the 
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need to “eradicat[e] the Tudeh element.” 174 AIOC managers hoped that 
the Iranian government would “capitulate completely” with regard to 
increased pay, amenities, and workers’ strike pay. British managers were 
also alarmed about oil production, recalling that it took nearly a month 
to restore refi nery operations after its last shutdown during the 1946 
general strike. 175 Tudeh agitators and labor were making the political ori-
gins of the strike quite clear. According to Elkington, “in the same [that] 
way you will recall how whole cities were brought out on strike in India 
during the Congress struggle for home rule,” many Iranians possessed 
“no illusion whatever in regard to Nationalization,” but wished a greater 
share in the profi ts and administration of the oil industry, which occupied 
a dominant place in the country’s economy. 176 
 The British government urgently needed to decide future oil policy 
based on a very real loss of production at Abadan due to the strike. 177 The 
main issue was whether the company should move to rely on refi neries 
outside of Iran (e.g., UK refi neries at Llandarcy or Grangemouth or even 
Trinidad). The problem was that the quality of the oil would change, 
altering the kinds of products that could be produced. 178 The shutting 
down of a refi nery constituted a major point of vulnerability where labor 
movements could organize and apply pressure. 179 Podobnik explains that 
refi ners have a more strategic position versus drillers and oilfi eld laborers 
in that refi ning requires the application of heat, pressure, and chemical 
agents to unprocessed oil to extract impurities and produce standard-
ized categories of fuel. 180 To the extent that labor militancy has emerged 
in the oil sectors of specifi c countries, it has “focused on these refi nery 
operations.” This was the case in southwest Iran, where the oil was not 
as easily replaceable as company experts had hoped, and adjustments 
in refi ning operations abroad would have to be implemented to accom-
modate the loss of Iran’s oil and its replacement with a comparable, 
salable product. 
 The 1951 strike succeeded in creating a situation of immense politi-
cal uncertainty in the national arena. Ayatollah Abolghassem Kashani, a 
prominent religious leader, member of the Majlis, and member of Mosad-
diq’s National Front coalition, suddenly emerged as another national 
spokesperson, issuing a communiqué urging strikers to return to work on 
April 17. Kashani argued that the strike action provided a pretext for dis-
turbances to the “enemies of the country.” The workers pressed on. The 
representative for the Abadan strikers issued a second list of demands to 
AIOC’s Industrial Relations Department arguing that the minimum wage 
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needed to be fi xed as soon as possible. Until strike pay was paid, the 
workers were not prepared to “cease the strike, our last legal weapon.” 181 
 The strikers were making their demands in nationalist terms pro-
claiming the defeat of the British oil company by the Iranian nationalist 
movement. 182 The Tudeh Party was viewed as a legitimate spokesperson 
for the oil workers and demanded that the Iranian government declare 
the cancellation of the 1933 concession. The proclamation declared 
that the oil concessions of 1901 and 1933, “which had been exchanged 
between the internal and international traitors for dividing our resources 
of wealth,” were “nothing but scraps of paper.” The oil workers were 
exhibiting new kinds of power, building connections between economic 
and social demands as well as national demands about control over the 
oil industry. In a message to workers at the Abadan refi nery, the strikers 
at Bandar Mashur denounced the legitimacy of the commission sent by 
the government to address their demands. The message expressed “the 
Iranian nation’s” desire that the Majlis announce the cancellation of the 
British-controlled oil company and its nationalization. 183 
 As with the strikes that preceded it, the 1951 strike constituted a 
shift in methods of managing concerns as well as in the degree of vio-
lence exercised to reinforce a particular organization of labor. A violent 
confrontation had emerged between the Mosaddiq government and the 
oil workers, leading to the arrest of the strike leaders. Both British and 
Iranian employees were killed in the violence. The government impris-
oned strike leaders and extended martial law through the course of the 
strike. 184 Whereas AIOC sought to maintain secrecy about the impact 
of the strike by withholding all data on the loss of production, 185 the 
Tudeh Party, like the Communist Party of Iraq, sought to expose and 
disrupt the most vulnerable points in the technical structures of oil pro-
duction. 186 Coordinated decisions by the company and the Iranian gov-
ernment to direct the oil workers into a manageable union framework, 
and ultimately reformist nationalism, were most evident as they battled 
to repress striking oil workers. 
 As in Mexico in 1937, a reformist government in Iran had attempted 
to “defuse the oil workers’ power by nationalizing the country’s oil indus-
try … on terms more favorable to the foreign oil company than those 
demanded by the union and the communist party.” 187 As the following 
chapters reveal, the international oil companies, including AIOC, would 
ultimately refuse to accommodate the national organization of Iran’s oil 
industry. In 1953, a CIA-organized coup successfully reestablished for-
eign control. Each controversy over the control of oil in Iran was shaped 
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by the very real threat of “Persian nationalism” and its connections to 
the motives of the Iranian government in relation to national control of 
the industry. 
 Reconfi guring the History of (Oil) Nationalism 
 To survive, AIOC required new defi nitions of the oil worker in technical, 
economic, and legal terms into which was built a peculiar limitation. 
The limitation expressed the impossibility of employing a skilled Iranian 
worker demanding a better life and more equitable forms of oil distribu-
tion and profi ts. As the company continued to make promises to redress 
the plight of the Iranian oil worker, it also promoted a process of exclu-
sion along racial-technical lines. However, this process became less effec-
tive after World War II as nationalist and populist politics spread across 
oil infrastructures around the world. The excesses of AIOC’s efforts to 
police the boundary between unskilled and skilled Iranian oil workers 
had the unintended consequence of transforming the political possibility 
of nationalization of the entire industry into a reality. 
 A sociotechnical approach to a history of oil workers demands closer 
attention to the machineries of building an oil labor regime, which were 
simultaneously sites of politics. By following the ways the building of 
a racial-technical oil labor regime leads to politics, we see that the his-
tory of nationalism, or the nationalization of the oil industry, was about 
the opening up and narrowing down of different political arrangements 
involving Anglo-Iranian oil and its infrastructure. 
 Following Geoffrey Bowker’s study of a French oilfi eld services com-
pany, this process of racial-technical exclusion was not so much due to 
the workings of a company state within a state as it was “a series of fi la-
ments (roads, pipelines, oil wells) operating within a different social time 
than the old state, and with minimal spatial interference.” 188 This process 
of inclusive exclusion helped constitute the energy system’s form. New 
kinds of defi nitions of the oil worker were possible that were impossible 
before, particularly at oil operation sites in which the locals from Abadan 
town and the whole of Khuzistan Province did not have access. Instead 
of unskilled Iranian labor, the company now needed skilled Iranian labor 
to justify its recruitment policy at a controlled rate that would not dis-
rupt its Iranian-to-British worker ratio. As with oil workers around the 
world, to arrive at the enclave of the oilfi elds, unskilled Iranians would 
ultimately have to go abroad to acquire adequate (Western) training and 
technical knowledge. 189 
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 AIOC mobilized paternalistic practices in response to a series of labor 
crises over the legitimacy of British control of oil operations. The sophis-
tication of the social technologies traced here, and of the calculating tech-
nologies traced in the previous chapter, reveals the inventiveness of AIOC 
and other oil companies that transformed political questions of labor 
into technoeconomic issues and cooperated in the management of labor 
in the Middle East and Latin America. In a corner of southwest Iran, 
political possibilities were worked out in the course of each strike, with 
consequences for the organizational design of an industry that did not 
respect borders marking the national state as distinct from a foreign oil 
corporation. These local events were directly related to the ways in which 
the fl ow of petroleum energy was organized at various points in produc-
tion, distribution, and refi ning. Each of the strikes constituted a battle 
over the connectivity of issues that AIOC fought hard to keep separate 
from political concerns. By 1951, the mechanism of the strike remained 
the only legal weapon to achieve economic demands and defy the com-
pany strategy of inhibiting independent union organization. Through 
each strike action, the oil workers revealed new powers as they built 
connections between their economic demands, technical knowledge, and 
efforts to win national control of the oil industry. 
 The company and the Iranian government also sought to maintain 
a border between oil operations and the question of violence and secu-
rity. The strategy entailed policing a peculiar regime of labor organized 
according to racial difference but justifi ed in terms of the technical (in)
competencies of the workers. The strikes were power struggles in which 
workers mixed the technical and the social in order to make their impact 
on the various points of vulnerability in the energy system decisive, par-
ticularly at the Abadan refi nery. Disputes over the question of Persian-
ization, which lingered throughout the nationalization crisis, served as 
the occasion for the production of expert knowledge. This technoscience 
would then shape which aspects of the labor question acquired politi-
cal signifi cance and which aspects remained strictly technical. Such an 
approach, it was thought, would stabilize the energy system by eliminat-
ing any controversy over the defi nition of the oil worker. 
 Rather than viewing the politics of oil nationalism in terms of 
large-scale political events, institutional (racial and paternalistic) ideol-
ogies, and actors rescued as historical agents in the making of their own 
history, 190 this chapter has located the most important political battles 
in the fi elds of technicality pertaining to the working defi nition of the 
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Iranian oil worker. The oil workers helped generate vulnerabilities in 
which the powers of subaltern dissent as well as the control of energy 
were taken up simultaneously, distributed, and transformed toward mil-
itant nationalism. The excesses of violence and failures of the company 
to suppress labor unrest through the intervention of alternative organiza-
tional machineries exposed the kind of labor regime that AIOC, soon to 
be BP, needed to survive and the very shape of the national state. This was 
most evident in the ways a few dominant spokespersons—the Commu-
nist Party and a reformist nationalist government—would claim to speak 
on behalf of the many silent workers in the oilfi elds. 

 Any differences between the parties of any nature whatever and in particular 
any differences arising out of the interpretation of this Agreement and of the 
rights and obligations therein contained as well as any differences of opinion 
which may arise relative to questions for the settlement of which, by the terms 
of this Agreement, the agreement of both parties is necessary, shall be settled by 
arbitration. 
 If one of the parties does not appoint its arbitrator or does not advise the other 
party of its appointment, within sixty days of having received notifi cation of 
the request for arbitration, the other party shall have the right to request the 
President of the Permanent Court of International Justice … to nominate a sole 
arbitrator … the difference shall be settled by this sole arbitrator. (Articles 22(A) 
and (D) of the 1933 Concession) 
 Before the date of the 31st December 1993 [date of expiry] this Concession can 
only come to an end in the case the Company should surrender the Concession 
(Article 25) or in the case that the Arbitration Court should declare the Conces-
sion annulled as a consequence of default of the Company in the performance 
of the present Agreement. (Article 26 of the 1933 Concession) 
 The post–World War II petroleum order witnessed a series of govern-
ments, including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, taking steps to 
nationalize their foreign-controlled oil industries. On March 8, 1951, 
Iran’s parliamentary oil committee approved a resolution recommending 
nationalization of the oil industry and requested that the Majlis allow the 
committee two months to study how to put nationalization into effect. 
The parliament’s resolution did not mark the cause of the dispute, how-
ever, but was merely the outcome of multiple controversies concerning 
the authority and terms of the oil concession, in its various forms, prolif-
erating over the course of fi ve decades. 
 The origins and transformation of Iran’s oil nationalization dispute 
emerged from many sites between 1948 and 1952, when the validity of the 
oil concession, the calculation and control of profi ts, and the replacement 
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of British managerial and technical staff with Iranian labor were scruti-
nized. These disputes reopened as controversies susceptible to alternative 
arrangements with political ramifi cations larger than ever. This chapter 
explores the conditions and factors contributing to the success and fail-
ure of oil industry nationalization. This battle was fought locally in the 
oilfi elds of Khuzistan, nationally in Tehran, and on an international scale 
between the leading and up-and-coming oil producers of the world and 
the major oil corporations, attempting to protect the terms of their con-
cessionary relations with them. 
 The extensive scholarship on the oil nationalization crisis ignores 
the machinery of nationalizing an oil industry. Starting with the act of 
nationalization, much focus is placed on the diplomacy of the Tehran-
London-Washington connection, which is disrupted by the Anglo-
American engineered coup that overthrew the Mosaddiq government in 
1953 and reinstalled Mohammad Reza as shah and General Zahedi as 
premier. 1 This dominant narrative of failed oil diplomacy ending in a 
coup d’état overlooks the specifi city of technical battles and the organi-
zational varieties that emerged in the working out of a highly successful 
consortium arrangement among the major oil companies. 2 Other stud-
ies treat governmental and nongovernmental entities, such as AIOC or 
the British and Iranian governments, as separate groups and thus take 
their organizational forms for granted. 3 This is insuffi cient because the 
focus is placed on the impact of powerful private and commercial inter-
ests on offi cial government policy or the reverse. 4 In all of these studies, 
questions of diplomacy, law, public and private interests, the coup d’état, 
and the working out of the dispute in the oilfi elds are treated as sepa-
rate events and entities with their own set of historical actors. In what 
follows, I leave these relations open and follow how diverse actors are 
enrolled in disputes over nationalization. Certain organizational forms, 
such as a national oil industry independent of foreign control, are closed 
off while others, such as the consortium arrangement reestablishing for-
eign control, are left open. I show how an understanding of the most 
important events and actors in this crisis changes by working through 
Iran’s oil nationalization dispute in terms of its technical dimensions or 
the machinery of the process. 
 In response to the Iranian government’s ratifi cation of a series of 
nationalization laws, 5 the British government and AIOC mobilized eco-
nomic and legal arguments and organizational entities to defend their 
right to control the oil. For example, AIOC built connections between 
fl ows of Anglo-Iranian oil and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at 
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The Hague (the PCIJ, prior to 1946) in order to block Iran’s attempt at 
nationalization and restore the terms of the 1933 concession, not due to 
expire until 1993. Additionally, and in coordination with the American 
and British governments and oil fi rms, AIOC pursued fi nancial restric-
tions through the use of economic sanctions, and technical blockages 
through the use of the oil boycott, to preserve a politics of oil production 
according to international monopoly arrangements. With what kinds of 
arguments, procedures, and calculative equipment was this connectivity 
achieved? 
 As in the concessionary dispute of 1932–1933, the nationalization law 
rejected the oil concession as an illegal document. The act of national-
ization marked the breakdown of normal apparatuses of control that 
AIOC managers had set in place for the calculation and control of profi ts 
and oil operations. The decision to nationalize the oil industry was an 
open issue that generated multiple technical proposals and diplomatic 
missions. The mechanism of international law was enlisted to manage 
the dispute in terms of a kind of intractability, diversion, and delay, which 
was also a political weapon. I investigate the political consequences for 
the role of the Iranian state as a sovereign entity, and the role of the oil 
corporation battling against nationalizing oil producers in the Middle 
East. The successes and failures of each kind of technical arrangement are 
tracked to demonstrate the ways intractability was constructed to impede 
the fl ow of oil, and thus the fl ow of income to the Iranian government, 
helping to stabilize a peculiar global oil economy based on an artifi cial 
scarcity of supply. 
 Strategies of intractability worked in concert with other kinds of 
technologies and interests. For example, in the fi rst section I examine 
the politics of profi t sharing such as the 50–50 arrangement, which was 
constructed to manage the mid-twentieth-century oil order against the 
threat of militant nationalism and communism, as well as to protect the 
profi ts of the increasingly powerful American oil companies. This strat-
egy involved an unusual mixing of oil contracts and currency fl ows, US 
tax law, and Iranian popular opinion. I then follow the dispute, again, to 
the international legal arena where an extended mechanism of tempo-
rization framed national sovereignty in legal terms rather than political 
ones in order to block the implementation of any real nationalization. 
Next, I follow how Western technical consultants and government offi -
cials arranged Iran’s oil nationalization in terms of reformist national-
ism and the power to determine markets. The strategy worked, not by 
ensuring the fl ow of oil, as they so often claimed, but by imposing limits 
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through an insistence on the economic facts about oil. Oil consultants 
argued that the only way oil could fl ow was within the apparatus of 
the international oil industry, as separate from political questions of 
national sovereignty. 
 Nationalizing Iran’s oilfi elds involved reworking the power of AIOC 
and the national state locally in southwest Iran through the elimination 
of British technical staff. The peculiar way oil operations were managed 
along racial-technical lines worked in tandem with sanctions and a boy-
cott to help the British and American allies constrain more democratic 
forms of oil production. I place collectives of legal, diplomatic, and eco-
nomic machinery of the nationalization crisis at the center of the analysis. 
By doing so, I identify the political role long-distance machinery played in 
the maintenance of a particular oil economy in the Middle East. 
 Technologies of Profi t Sharing and the Threat of Militant Nationalism 
 The Majlis took one of its fi rst steps toward nationalization in 1947 
when it declined to ratify a draft for a future agreement granting an oil 
concession to the Soviet Union for the development of Iran’s northern 
oilfi elds. Qavam-al-Saltaneh, the prime minister, had promised Stalin an 
oil concession in return for the withdrawal of Soviet troops during the 
Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. 6 The same law that declared the draft null and 
void carried a provision that when the rights of the Iranian people and 
the economic wealth of the country had been infringed on, whether in 
the matter of subsoil resources or otherwise and especially in regard to 
AIOC’s oil concession, the Iranian government must take action toward 
the reestablishment of these rights and inform the Majlis of the results 
obtained. 7 
 Prior to the call for nationalization of its oil industry, the Iranian gov-
ernment made a series of attempts to renegotiate the terms of the 1933 
concession with AIOC. Iranian offi cials initiated formal discussions with 
AIOC in the autumn of 1948, presenting the company with a memoran-
dum that put forward twenty-fi ve points for discussion, concerning the 
calculation of profi ts and treatment of Iranian labor. 8 Iran was demand-
ing the same profi t-sharing terms as Venezuela, which received 50 percent 
of the profi ts of Creole Oil (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) 
under its concession. Iran had received £7 million in royalties in 1947, 
but following the Venezuela model, should have received royalties of 
approximately £22 million. Other sticking points included Iran’s demand 
that it be exempted from British taxation on its share of AIOC’s annual 
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profi ts, that it acquire a share of profi ts from the sale of Anglo-Iranian 
oil overseas, and that it inspect AIOC’s books to ascertain whether the 
Iranian government was receiving its fair share of royalties. Finally, 
the Iranian government pointed out that the company had ignored its 
demands to improve the working conditions of the Iranian workforce 
and train Iranian staff to replace foreign employees in skilled jobs. 
 In contrast to demands made in earlier disputes, the Iranian govern-
ment was now proposing an equal sharing of income based on the profi ts 
obtained by AIOC from all of its activities, whether inside or outside of 
Iran. Negotiations continued through 1949 with AIOC showing indif-
ference to the points raised. On January 20, 1949, the Majlis submitted 
a bill calling for the cancellation of AIOC’s concession, which triggered 
new negotiations. When these discussions also failed, William Fraser, 
who took over from Cadman as chairman of AIOC in 1941, 9 traveled 
to Tehran and presented Mohammad Sa’ed, the prime minister, with his 
fi nal offer: a draft of a “supplemental oil agreement,” framed as a sup-
plement to the 1933 concession. 10 The offer proposed a mix of payments 
to Iran, which included royalties, taxes, and Iran’s 20 percent share in 
dividends and reserves. 
 AIOC was eager to make a deal prior to an anticipated devaluation of 
sterling by the British government. The deal would ensure that Iran would 
not be in a position to make demands later. Company offi cials expressed 
concern for the general economic state of Britain, but also that of Iran in 
light of the sterling’s planned devaluation. 11 It is important to note here 
that Iranian oil operations supplied Great Britain with twenty-two mil-
lion tons of oil products and seven million tons of oil per year. 12 It also 
generated £100 million annually in foreign exchange, which Heiss says 
“the British sorely needed.” 13 In terms of profi ts and income tax alone, 
AIOC, not counting its numerous subsidiaries, paid approximately £15 
million to the British Treasury in 1948. 14 The oil currency issue was also 
connected to Iran’s domestic plans for economic development. Abolhas-
san Ebtehaj, head of the National Bank (Bank  Melli ), had requested £10 
million from AIOC to stabilize the exchange rate between Iranian rial, 
sterling, and dollars. This occurred in addition to a separate request from 
the British ambassador for £10 million worth of goods for the purpose of 
increasing their fl ow and raising additional revenue for Iran’s Seven Year 
Plan to implement large-scale projects of modernization and industrial-
ization throughout the country. 
 The Supplemental Agreement was signed on July 17, 1949, award-
ing Iran 32–37.5 percent of total net profi ts. When the agreement was 
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presented to the Majlis in the form of a bill on July 23, however, the 
opposition, headed by Hossein Maki, deferred the decision to the next 
Majlis session. The Bank of England devalued the British pound on Sep-
tember 18, 1949, causing the pound to fall against the dollar by 30.5 
percent. 15 The Iranians continued to complain that the British govern-
ment was, through various tax laws and regulations, making far higher 
revenues from its oil than the Iranian government as owner of the natural 
resource. 16 For example, in 1945, Britain made in taxation almost triple 
the amount that Iran received in taxation and royalties on the sale of its 
oil and products. 17 
 Mosaddiq and his allies in the National Front ( Jebhe Melli ), the polit-
ical opposition party founded by Mosaddiq, considered the oil bill on 
the Supplemental Agreement a symbol of Iran’s subjugation to foreign 
interests. 18 Members of the Majlis had turned against the bill after the 
fi nance minister, Abbas Golshayan, presented a fi fty-page report commis-
sioned by Gilbert Gidel, a professor of international law at the University 
of Paris, that “documented the accounting tricks by which Anglo-Iranian 
was cheating Iran out of huge sums of money.” 19 Anxious to see their 
oil agreement approved, British offi cials encouraged the shah to replace 
Ali Mansur, the prime minister, whom they viewed as too weak to 
push the oil bill through, for a more authoritarian fi gure. On June 26, 
1950, the shah appointed Ali Razmara, a military general, to replace 
Mansur. 20 The following day, Razmara asked the Majlis for a vote of 
confi dence and, against the wishes of the National Front minority, was 
endorsed as prime minister. 21 
 Razmara promised AIOC offi cials and Sir Francis Shepherd, the 
British ambassador to Iran, that he would help get the Supplemental 
Agreement passed but only if a number of points, not unlike the pre-
vious twenty-fi ve-point proposal, were improved. 22 As before, Razmara 
failed to receive a positive response from Britain on any of the issues. 
He then turned to Henry Grady, the US ambassador, for help. Grady, in 
turn, notifi ed Dean Acheson, US secretary of state, who advised Ernest 
Bevin, the British foreign secretary, that Britain’s failure to take positive 
action against AIOC’s “intransigence” was inappropriate to the current 
situation in Iran and world conditions. As Vitalis has highlighted, US 
offi cials blamed the British for clinging to their “outmoded imperialist 
ways and blocking reforms that might check communism’s advance.” 23 
The American government viewed nationalization as an act of commu-
nism that threatened the security of their national interests at home and 
international oil markets abroad. 
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 In a top-secret summary of US views on the nationalization question, 
American offi cials speculated that a general 50–50 profi t-sharing for-
mula would have a “useful stabilizing effect in the Middle East.” 24 In this 
arrangement, the Iranian government would have a contract with the oil 
company, which would retain control of operations, have its capital costs 
reimbursed, receive 50 percent of the profi ts, and continue to “determine 
markets.” British and American interests, in the format of the transna-
tional oil corporation, would never give up their power to “determine 
markets.” Losing this power meant increasing the risk of nationalization 
in terms of a loss of control of oil production, as well as the chances of 
Iran controlling pricing and marketing. 
 “Determining the oil markets” gave Britain and the United States the 
power to manage the global fl ow of Iranian oil and impose limits to 
artifi cially keep prices high. Under the Truman administration’s Point IV 
Program, the United States placed a priority on providing all possible sup-
port to the Iranian government and the shah in the form of economic and 
technical assistance as well as military equipment and training. It favored 
50–50 profi t sharing as an alternative for managing the economic order of 
moderate nationalism in the Middle East. Moreover, profi t sharing would 
avoid the more dangerous alliance of militant nationalism, communism, 
and national control of oil operations. In September 1950, the US State 
Department held a series of discussions with British offi cials within the 
wider constellation of Anglo-American oil interests in the Middle East. 25 
According to Richard Funkhouser, the State Department’s oil economist, 
the 50–50 profi t-sharing arrangement between Venezuela and the Creole 
Oil Company was well known in Tehran. Iran and other Middle East oil 
producers could not be prevented from demanding the same terms. For 
forty years, AIOC had operated with production costs under 10 cents per 
barrel and a sale price between $1 and $3. This long-term arrangement 
had guaranteed much higher profi ts to the company than to the Iranian 
government. Funkhouser advised George McGhee, assistant secretary of 
state for Near Eastern affairs, to encourage the British Foreign Offi ce to 
accept Razmara’s demands before Aramco fi nalized its agreement with 
Saudi Arabia on a 50–50 basis. 
 The conventional arrangement for the control and sale of oil prior 
to the 1940s had been for a host country to receive a fi xed royalty rate 
from the concession companies per ton of oil produced. 26 The govern-
ment of Venezuela, however, successfully challenged these terms in 1943 
and 1947, resulting in an approximately equal or 50–50 division of prof-
its with the transnational oil companies. 27 In 1943, the Hydrocarbon 
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Law was enacted in Venezuela. Under its provisions, royalty rates and 
exploration, development, and surface taxes were increased signifi cantly. 
The Venezuelan government expected that these increases together with a 
general income tax would equalize its income with the profi ts earned by 
the oil companies. It later became evident that this was not achieved and 
in the next several years, the government levied further compulsory pay-
ments on oil company profi ts to bring about the equalization. In 1948, 
it became evident, again, that high production and prices were bringing 
profi ts to the oil companies that exceeded the income accruing to the 
government. As a result, an amendment was added in November 1948 to 
Venezuela’s “Income Tax Law” in the form of an “Additional Tax,” appli-
cable only to mining and petroleum companies. This tax was imposed at 
the rate of 50 percent on the amount by which a company’s net income 
exceeded all royalties and other taxes accruing to the government. This 
tax ensured that the government’s revenues would at least equal the 
net profi ts of each oil company. However, if royalties and normal taxes 
received by the government exceeded company earnings, no downward 
adjustments in the government’s share were provided for. By the end of 
1948, Venezuela had achieved its objective of an approximately equal 
sharing of oil company profi ts. 
 The US oil fi rms assented more easily to such an arrangement because 
the additional rents to Venezuela were in the form of “taxes” that 
allowed the oil companies to deduct the payments from those owed to the 
US Treasury. American oil corporations, with the encouragement of the 
State Department and US Treasury, were exploiting an enormous loop-
hole in US tax law. The loophole allowed them to evade antitrust laws 
by fi ling the amount paid as a higher royalty to the Saudi government as 
a foreign income tax that could be deducted from the company’s regular 
taxes to the US government. 28 The American oil corporation’s preference 
for this new technology of profi t sharing, the 50–50 arrangement, was 
due to favorable tax laws and pressure from US government agencies 
to rely on the US taxpayer to subsidize the higher royalty paid to Saudi 
Arabia. As negotiations began in 1950, AIOC refused to agree to similar 
revisions when pressed by Tehran, where a Venezuelan delegation was 
visiting. 29 British law did not grant fi rms the same capacity to rely on the 
British taxpayer to offset tax payments. 30 
 Negotiating generous dealings with host governments in lieu of nation-
alization, Heiss explains, motivated US oil giants to negotiate 50–50 
profi t-sharing deals with Venezuela in 1948 and Saudi Arabia in 1950. 31 
US oil offi cials believed that AIOC should follow this sort of strategy in 
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Iran. In a September 1950 meeting with offi cials from the State Depart-
ment, US oil executives warned that dealing generously with the Iranians 
would indeed be “a sound commercial proposition.” Failure might lead 
to disaster not only for AIOC (and the British government), but to all 
the Anglo-American oil majors. 32 However, Heiss’s analysis overlooks the 
specifi c ways in which the mechanism of 50–50 profi t sharing worked as 
a new technology of management to protect oil profi ts and manage polit-
ical outcomes. The United States was using 50–50 as a way of blocking 
the coming together of militant nationalism with national control of oil, 
which would destabilize relations between politics and international oil 
markets. 
 The dispute over royalties and profi t sharing marked the beginning 
of the drive in the Iranian parliament toward nationalization of AIOC’s 
holdings. It also marked a shift toward accommodation on the part of 
Aramco’s owners in Saudi Arabia, who signed their own 50–50 agree-
ment in December 1950. While the fi rst 50–50 agreement was signed in 
Saudi Arabia, the fi rst 50–50 negotiations in the Middle East actually 
took place in Iran in connection with calls for the revision of the 1933 
concession. But there was a “world of difference,” psychologically, in 
AIOC’s offer to increase  royalties up to 50 percent and Aramco’s 50–50 
 profi t sharing , even if the division of revenue was roughly the same. 33 
 McGhee’s US mission to London in 1950 to encourage the British For-
eign Offi ce to accept Razmara’s offer proved unsuccessful after the Brit-
ish blocked a $25 million credit request from Iran that the Export-Import 
Bank had authorized the same year. 34 Sterling and dollar fl ows, 50–50 
arrangements, US tax law, American and British missions, and the 
demands of the Iranian public and parliament to take control of the oil 
industry were now entangled in Iran’s oil nationalization dispute with 
AIOC. The participation of American offi cials and profi t-sharing technol-
ogies were also bound up in larger connections that sought to stabilize 
national oil economies, manage the threat of militant nationalism, and 
protect the profi ts of the largest American oil companies. 
 In these early moments of national and potentially international crisis, 
the Majlis, led by Mosaddiq and his National Front allies, served as a 
political obstacle against the shah and British interests. In October 1950, 
Mosaddiq argued the legality of the concession, claiming the 1933 conces-
sion was null and void because it was enacted during a dictatorship when 
Majlis deputies were not the real representatives of the people. The Sup-
plemental Agreement was framed as the affi rmation of a basically invalid 
concession, representing Iran’s continued subjugation to unjust terms. 
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The deputies unanimously passed a resolution on November 25, 1950, 
opposing the agreement for offering Iran inadequate rights. 35 Gholam 
Hussein Forouhar, the fi nance minister of Iran, was forced to withdraw 
the bill on the Supplemental Agreement and resigned after the December 
30 announcement of Aramco’s signing of a 50–50 agreement with Saudi 
Arabia. The Majlis instructed its oil committee to formulate a new policy 
that the government could pursue in securing Iran’s oil rights. 36 
 A different kind of moment marked this mid-twentieth-century 
political order in which new technologies of profi t sharing were open 
to oil-producing countries. The nature of Anglo-American interests was 
also shifting, with oil majors taking a decisive role in building a partic-
ular relationship among oil currency fl ows, military, fi nancial, and tech-
nical aid, and the battle against communism. Negotiations surrounding 
the Supplemental Agreement were very much a rehearsal for the calls to 
nationalize Iran’s oil industry looming in the background and in light 
of experiences in Venezuela and then Saudi Arabia. Unwilling to follow 
the American lead by pursuing 50–50 profi t sharing, AIOC hoped to 
maintain the arrangement it had worked hard to stabilize over the years, 
insisting on the concessionary relation as a basis for accumulating profi ts 
and controlling Iranian oil in world distribution and marketing arrange-
ments. The uncertainty remained, however, as Iranian public opinion, 
reformist nationalists, and striking oil workers threatening more militant 
forms of nationalism were increasingly unwilling to turn back to more 
undemocratic forms of oil production. 
 Return to International Law and National Sovereignty 
 An alliance of oil workers, religious political groups, the reformist-
nationalist National Front, and the now clandestine, communist Tudeh 
Party came together in support of nationalization ( fi gure 5.1 ). This collec-
tive of confl icting political groups and oil workers as well as national pub-
lic opinion and the law framed the oil issue as one about Iran’s national 
sovereignty and, therefore, its legitimate claim to a natural resource. In a 
speech to the Majlis, Mosaddiq justifi ed why AIOC had not fulfi lled the 
terms of the concession in good faith. He referred to Article 16(III) of the 
1933 concession calling for the progressive replacement of non-Iranian 
employees by Iranian nationals in “the shortest possible time”; Article 
14(B) with regard to the duty of the company to place at the disposal of 
the Iranian government “the whole of its records relative to scientifi c and 
technical data”; and Article 10(V), the gold clause, which was intended 
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to protect the Iranian government against losses that might result from 
fl uctuations in the value of the British pound sterling. 37 Majlis deputies 
submitted a total of sixty-seven proposals ranging from a reversion to the 
D’Arcy Concession of 1901 to a 50–50 arrangement with Iranian con-
trol. But, as Elm explains, it was the proposal drafted by Mosaddiq and 
his National Front allies in January 11, 1951, calling for nationalization 
of Iran’s oil industry, “that set the future course of the Majlis and the gov-
ernment.” 38 Soon thereafter, Ayatollah Kashani, the prominent religious 
leader and member of the Majlis, joined in backing the National Front’s 
calls for nationalization. AIOC then attempted to reopen negotiations on 
a 50–50 arrangement, but these attempts were blocked on February 19, 
1951, when Mosaddiq presented the Special Oil Committee of the Majlis 
with a formal resolution for nationalization. 39 
 On March 15, 1951, the Majlis passed the “Single Article” bill, nation-
alizing the Iranian oil industry. In April, a more detailed bill of nine arti-
cles was prepared and passed by both the Majlis and the Senate, and then 
approved by the shah on May 1 and 2, 1951. 40 By approving both the 
Single Article and the Law of Nine Articles, the Iranians transformed the 
question of oil nationalization into a legal-national issue to increase their 
bargaining power. The passage of the articles included the formation of 
a Mixed Parliamentary Board consisting of eleven members who worked 
on implementation of the nationalization law. 41 The nationalization law 
and its law of implementation had three effects in legal terms: 42 (1) they 
canceled the 1933 oil concession; (2) they expropriated all the property 
of AIOC in Iran insofar as such property related to the oil industry; (3) 
they vested the expropriated oil industry in the new political actor, the 
National Iranian Oil Company. 
 Following the passage of Iran’s nationalization laws, AIOC responded 
in legal terms by requesting arbitration according to the provisions of 
Articles 22 and 26 of the 1933 concession, quoted above. 43 In the midst of 
an imminent crisis in Tehran and in the southwest oilfi elds where workers 
were preparing to go on strike, the British Foreign Offi ce decided that it 
was vitally concerned with AIOC’s policies in Iran and proceeded to take 
an active part in efforts to prevent the oil industry’s nationalization. 44 
Before the Iranian government had a chance to reply to the company’s 
request for arbitration, Shepherd, the British ambassador, presented the 
Iranian government with an aide-mémoire, which set forth “in strong 
language” the British government’s view on the legal position of the com-
pany. 45 If Iran rejected the company’s request for arbitration, it specif-
ically reserved the right to transform the dispute into an international 
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issue, just as it had done in 1932–1933, by taking the case to the ICJ at 
The Hague. The aide-mémoire also reiterated the suggestion that the dis-
pute be solved by negotiation. 
 For the second time in its history, the British-controlled oil company 
was threatening to transform a concession dispute into international 
legal terms as a means of protecting its concession rights and rendering 
Iran’s oil nationalization illegitimate. On May 15, the British government 
took more drastic steps, announcing that paratroopers were being held 
in readiness in the United Kingdom to protect its nationals and prevent 
the “illegal seizure of the property of AIOC.” 46 In response, Iran’s min-
ister of fi nance, M. Ali Varashteh, wrote to the AIOC representative in 
Tehran that his government rejected AIOC’s request for arbitration. The 
nationalization of the Iranian oil industry was not referable to arbitration 
 Figure 5.1 
 Scene of Tehran supporters hauling down AIOC sign on June 24, 1951. The company cap-
tions the photo as “An angry mob, incited and supported by the Islamic groups and the 
National Front, tore down the signs above the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s store yard, 
Information Centre and Central Offi ce and paraded them upside down in lorries around 
the town.”  Source : INP P 277 Special 53961, 1951, 78148, BP Archive. Reproduced with 
the permission of the BP Archive. 
Assembling Intractability  169
and “no international authority was competent to deal with the matter” 
because it was entirely within the domain of the Iranian government. 47 
However, AIOC representatives were invited to meet with the Majlis’s 
Special Oil Committee to arrange the implementation of the nationaliza-
tion laws. 
 In a speech to the foreign press, Mosaddiq spelled out Iran’s reasons 
for refusing to arbitrate by framing the dispute in terms of national sover-
eignty. First, the sovereign right of the Iranian nation entitled it to nation-
alize its oil industry, but AIOC was arguing that the Iranian nation had 
annulled its contractual agreement. 48 Second, Mosaddiq argued that the 
1933 concession was signed under duress, rendering it invalid. Third, the 
Iranian Majlis had not acted in a way that gave AIOC reason to refer 
the matter for arbitration. He agreed that if the question had been raised 
regarding the validity of the agreement, the need for arbitration would 
arise, but “neither the Majlis nor the Iranian government has raised any 
point regarding the agreement.” 49 Therefore, the oil company could not 
invoke the arbitration clause. The only remedy for a situation in which a 
government exercised its sovereign rights, causing loss to a private cor-
poration, was to claim compensation from that government. The law, 
Mosaddiq explained, already provided for such compensation, but again, 
the 1933 concession was not the subject of the Iranian government’s dis-
cussion and any reference to it was misplaced. 50 
 AIOC responded that as a consequence of the Iranian government’s 
refusal to rely on arbitration, the company was applying to the presi-
dent of the ICJ to appoint a sole arbitrator in accordance with Article 
22, paragraph D of the 1933 concession. The following day, the British 
embassy in Tehran notifi ed the Iranian government that the British gov-
ernment, as a separate party from AIOC, had brought the oil dispute 
before the ICJ. The Iranian government had declared the concession null 
and void, yet AIOC continued to draw on its articles for leverage. The 
Iranian government and AIOC battled to frame the dispute in legal terms, 
one group on the basis of its sovereign rights and the other on the basis 
of its oil concession. Now the British government stepped in, on behalf 
of a private corporate interest in which it had a controlling stake, to 
transform the dispute into international legal terms by taking the case 
to the ICJ. An entire legal-metrological order was being invoked for the 
second time. 
 Eric Beckett, legal advisor to the British Foreign Offi ce, submit-
ted the “Application” instituting proceedings at the ICJ. The Appli-
cation requested that the Court declare the execution of the Iranian 
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nationalization laws a violation of international law insofar as it claimed 
the unilateral annulment of the terms of the 1933 concession. By rejecting 
the company’s request for arbitration, the Iranian government denied the 
company the exclusive legal remedy provided for in the agreement, which 
constituted a denial of justice contrary to international law. 51 The British 
government made a series of claims to the ICJ to justify the authority of 
the concession and ensure its stability. 52 If the Iranian government per-
sisted in rejecting this legal remedy, it would be responsible for “a denial 
of justice against a British national.” 53 In its conduct, the Iranian gov-
ernment had “treated a British national in a manner not in accordance 
with … international law and have in consequence, committed an inter-
national wrong against the Government of the United Kingdom.” 54 
 As with the proceedings at the League of Nations in 1932–1933, the 
British government made a case on behalf of a private company, framed 
as a British national that had not been treated in accordance with the 
principles of international law. As Ford explains, there were two basic 
questions that would determine the legal validity of the Iranian national-
ization laws from the perspective of the British government: the actions 
taken in the course of their execution, and the international responsi-
bility for such actions. 55 The fi rst question concerned the propriety and 
implications of Britain’s exercise of diplomatic protection. The second 
question concerned the international law governing the right of a state to 
expropriate the private property of aliens, such as a foreign fi rm, located 
within its borders. 
 Contrary to Mosaddiq’s view, the British government argued that the 
ICJ had the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because it fell under the 
terms submitted with the League of Nations in September of 1932, when 
the Iranian government “accepted jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in conformity with Article 36 (2) of the Statute of 
that Court.” 56 Thus, according to the British, Iran was bound to accept 
“on the basis of reciprocity vis à vis any other government” the juris-
diction of the ICJ. 57 The legal question of whether a state had commit-
ted a breach of international obligation could not be decided exclusively 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. The Application referred 
to various treaties and other agreements accepted by Iran, which indi-
rectly obliged it to accord to “British nationals the same treatment as 
that accorded to nationals of the most favoured nation.” 58 The British 
government concluded that Iran had breached both “the rules of cus-
tomary international law” and “the treaty obligations accepted by that 
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Government” in accordance with the terms of the declaration it signed at 
the League of Nations. 59 
 By asking the ICJ to acknowledge its Application, the British govern-
ment was requesting that it oblige the Iranian government to submit its 
dispute with AIOC to arbitration, or alternatively, to declare that the 
Iranian Oil Nationalization Act of May 1951 was contrary to inter-
national law. The British government also reserved the right to request 
that the Court indicate provisional measures that might be taken to pro-
tect the British government and “their national,” AIOC, allowing it to 
enjoy the rights to which it was entitled under the concession. 
 How could the British government make its case for diplomatic pro-
tection on behalf of a private corporation based within its territories by 
framing it as a “British national”? According to Ford, “it is an elemen-
tary principle of international law that a state has the right to protect 
its nationals when they have been injured by the internationally illegal 
conduct of another state.” 60 Further, if the state, as with the British in 
this instance, “takes up the case of its injured national,” through diplo-
matic channels or by pursuing international judicial proceedings, “the 
fact that the dispute originated in an injury to a private person or interest 
is irrelevant, since the state is asserting its own right.” 61 The injury to the 
national was an injury to the state, and internationally, the state is the sole 
claimant. Furthermore, “a state can interpose on behalf of a corporation 
incorporated under its own laws, the nationality of the corporation being 
derived from the place of incorporation.” 62 Thus, in the present case, “it’s 
clear that AIOC is a British national on whose behalf the British govern-
ment would be entitled to interpose,” if the Court establishes that AIOC 
“suffered injury as a result of the illegal conduct of another state.” 63 The 
intervention of the British government on behalf of AIOC generated new 
controversies in international law about the juridical character of the 
concession agreement and whether the parties to the agreement, one a 
sovereign state and the other a private entity, were equal subjects under 
international law. 64 
 The Iranian minister of foreign affairs informed the ICJ that his gov-
ernment did not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the 
matters in the dispute. 65 The Iranian government announced that while it 
would agree to discuss its oil requirements (not AIOC’s) with the British 
government, it refused to consider the British government a party to the 
oil dispute, which was a domestic matter between itself and a private 
company. The Iranian government and AIOC still needed each other. 
Iran needed the company’s expertise and facilities to keep oil and profi ts 
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fl owing within a national framing and the company needed Iran to stabi-
lize its concessionary rule, allowing for “some form of nationalization.” 66 
AIOC’s chief representative in Tehran, Richard Seddon, argued that while 
the British government could not accept the Iranian government’s right to 
repudiate contracts, the company was prepared to consider a settlement 
“which would involve some form of nationalization, provided … it were 
satisfactory in other respects.” 67 In a meeting with Varashteh, the fi nance 
minister, the Iranian government expressed its desire to draw on the com-
pany’s experience to implement the nationalization laws, and thus invited 
AIOC to submit proposals on this. AIOC headquarters responded with 
an announcement of the names of four directors who would go to Iran to 
hold the planned discussions. 68 
 The Iranian delegation rejected AIOC’s proposals on the grounds that 
they were inconsistent with the laws of oil nationalization. 69 AIOC’s pro-
posals offered a £10 million advance against any sum that would be due 
to the Iranian government as a result of an eventual agreement and based 
on the understanding that Iran would not interfere with the company’s 
operations while discussions continued. The company also proposed that 
the Iranian assets of the company be vested in a “National Oil Com-
pany,” while the use of such assets be granted to another company estab-
lished by AIOC, which would have a number of Iranian directors on its 
board. Such concessions, Ford suggests, were very small “with no real 
changes.” 70 Negotiations ended the following day, and the British gov-
ernment returned to the ICJ to submit its “Request for Interim Measures 
of Protection.” 71 Proposals and counterproposals multiplied as AIOC, 
the British government, and the Iranian government battled to frame the 
dispute in advantageous ways to either block or enable nationalization 
of the oil industry. While the boundaries between AIOC and the British 
government were blurred, differences in their interests and approaches to 
the dispute would soon emerge. 
 With the AIOC offer rejected, the British government submitted its 
request for interim measures of protection on the grounds that if the ICJ 
were to decide in favor of the claims made by the British government, 
the decision could not be executed because the “gravest damage” would 
already have been done to AIOC operations in Iran. 72 According to the 
British government, the ICJ must indicate interim measures of protec-
tion to “prevent any step that might be taken to aggravate or extend 
the dispute.” 73 The Iranian government was using “the infl ammation of 
national feeling” through broadcasts and propaganda to unjustly vilify 
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the company, illustrated in the death of three British personnel during the 
strike at Abadan in April 1951. 
 The interim measures of protection, argued the British government, 
must oblige the Iranian government to permit AIOC to continue with 
oil operations as before. 74 Such provisional measures were another kind 
of technical procedure the British government used to intervene in the 
dispute. It was a technique used to impede the fl ow of oil (Iran wanted 
to increase production) and frame the issues in favor of the British bar-
gaining position, which would delay the Iranian government in executing 
nationalization by pursuing more meetings and legal proceedings at the 
ICJ. This process of temporization did not work alone. Rather, it was 
connected in part to impeding the fl ow of oil income accrued by the Ira-
nian government by allowing time for other kinds of technical and fi nan-
cial blockages, such as economic sanctions and an oil boycott, discussed 
below, to take effect. 
 In subsequent Oral Proceedings, Sir Frank Soskice argued on behalf of 
the British government that the ICJ should accept the request for interim 
measures prior to the determination of its jurisdiction in the case. 75 The 
British government was itself invoking an entire legal-metrological order, 
thus extending the dispute’s scope globally, rather than keeping it a mat-
ter to be resolved by the Iranian government, domestically, with a private 
company. Effectively erasing the political question of nationalizing an oil 
industry, Soskice concluded that the Iranian government should permit 
the company to execute the terms of the concession before any further 
damage occurred.  76 
 Kazemi, the Iranian foreign minister, replied to the British govern-
ment’s request for interim measures with a message consisting of a series 
of grievances challenging ICJ jurisdiction and the validity of the 1933 
concession. 77 The message stated that the Iranian government hoped the 
ICJ would declare the case as “not within its jurisdiction because of the 
legal incompetence of the complaint and because of the fact that the exer-
cise of sovereignty is not subject to complaint.” 78 The claim to national 
sovereignty over a natural resource was a political tool that the Iranian 
government relied on to generate a disruption in international law, which 
needed to account for the emergence of the transnational corporation 
as a new kind of “nonstate” actor. International lawyers writing in the 
1950s would refer to the AIOC case and other arbitrations arising out 
of disputes between Middle Eastern states and international oil corpora-
tions to devise a novel legal doctrine, combining domestic, private, inter-
national, and public law for the regulation of these “new realities.” 79 
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 The ICJ fi nally ruled in early July that “pending its fi nal decision in 
the proceedings instituted on May 26, 1951 (the Application),” a series 
of provisional measures would apply “on the basis of reciprocal obser-
vance.” 80 The ICJ indicated measures proposed in the British govern-
ment’s “Request.” Two judges, Winiarski and Badawi Pasha, submitted 
dissenting opinions to the ICJ’s order. They argued that the question of 
interim measures and the question of jurisdiction were necessarily linked: 
the ICJ had the power to indicate interim measures “only if it holds, 
should it be only provisionally, that it is competent to hear the case on 
its merits.” 81 While in municipal law, “there is always some tribunal 
which has jurisdiction,” international law required the “consent of the 
parties, which confers jurisdiction on the Court.” 82 Thus, “the Court has 
jurisdiction only in so far as that jurisdiction has been accepted by the 
parties.” 83 Without this, there is no jurisdiction for indicating measures 
of protection. Such measures, they insisted, were in fact “exceptional in 
character in international law and to an even greater extent in munici-
pal law.” 84 The measures might be “easily considered a scarcely tolerable 
interference in the affairs of a sovereign State.” 85 Because Iran did not 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court should be compelled to with-
hold its jurisdiction and under such circumstances, “interim measures of 
protection should not have been indicated.” 86 The dissenting opinions 
by Winiarski and Pasha, ruling in favor of Iran’s national sovereignty, 
did not hold, however, and the British foreign secretary accepted the 
ICJ’s decision. 
 The Iranian government took immediate steps to return the dispute 
to a domestic-legal venue by sending a telegram to another international 
regulatory body, the United Nations Security Council. Addressed to the 
secretary general of the United Nations, the Iranian government gave 
notice of abrogating its declaration of September 19, 1932, recognizing 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and one of the bases on which the 
British government maintained that the Iranian government must respect 
the Court’s authority. 87 The Iranian government regarded the ICJ’s order 
as unenforceable and would not carry out the provisional measures indi-
cated by the Court because the ICJ had acted without jurisdiction, con-
trary to the provisions of the Statute of the Court and in violation of the 
United Nations Charter. It was not until July 22, 1952, over a year after 
the British government’s Application, that the ICJ would make a fi nal rul-
ing regarding its jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian nationalization dispute 
(discussed in chapter 6). 
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 As I argued in chapter 3, transposing the dispute into the framework 
of international law and moving it to various sites in the international 
arena worked by associating the oil with international law, and keeping 
certain interests and associations tied together on behalf of the British 
government and AIOC. 88 Made possible by a proliferation of legal pro-
cedures, “internationalization” was a mechanism by which the British 
stabilized the control and distribution of Iranian oil. The mechanism 
transported the oil from local to international settings and back and won 
allies in a series of trials of strength, helping to eliminate any controversy. 
The technical and procedural work of law entailed the translation of 
actors’ goals to the advantage of both AIOC and the British government’s 
bargaining positions. 89 It also enabled the Iranian side to push for a refor-
mulation of the law in terms of national sovereignty over oil, something 
never argued before in international legal terms. More meetings and tech-
nical argumentation took place on the domestic front in Iran as various 
political forces sought to resolve the dispute. The collective work of this 
legal disputation and machinery oscillated on the one hand between the 
authority of international law and on the other, of national sovereignty. 
The outcome was to help render Iran’s oil nationalization intractable just 
as other technologies of intractability, in the format of economic sanc-
tions and an oil boycott, got underway. 
 Financial Restrictions and Technical Blockages 
 Anglo-Iranian oil stopped fl owing on June 1, 1951, and the Abadan refi n-
ery was shut down on July 31, 1951. The stoppage occurred as the British 
government was submitting its complaint to the ICJ at The Hague. In late 
summer and early fall, the British government and AIOC imposed the 
machinery of economic sanctions and an oil boycott to control and limit 
the distribution of Anglo-Iranian oil, working hand in hand with other 
technologies of intractability at sites around the world. These kinds of 
fi nancial and technical blockages, according to the British government, 
were a useful technique of control that would help eliminate the possibil-
ity of nationalization by preventing Iran from operating its oilfi elds and 
having access to its fi nancial reserves. Even if other foreign technicians 
were brought in, the lack of tankers would eliminate any outlet for oil 
exports from Iran. There would be mass unemployment in oil-producing 
areas, and Iran would face “economic chaos.” 90 
 The British government fi rst discussed the consequences of economic 
sanctions against Iran in a secret document drafted by the Treasury. 91 
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Through the summer of 1951, it instituted a series of economic mea-
sures designed to punish Iran for abrogating the AIOC concession. These 
included freezing Iran’s sterling balances in London, withdrawing Iran’s 
previous right to freely convert sterling into dollars, and halting exports 
to Iran of scarce commodities such as sugar and steel. 92 In the meantime, 
the government supported AIOC in taking measures in the form of an oil 
boycott. This involved AIOC’s refusal to pay Iran any royalties, including 
advances or receipts with respect to the oil. The boycott prohibited AIOC 
tankers from loading oil at Abadan and ensured that any other company 
loading oil there was unable to dispose of it. Finally, AIOC withdrew the 
services of all British technicians working in oil operations. 
 The sudden cessation of refi ned products from Abadan, formerly 
contributing twenty million tons per annum of products, was a serious 
matter, but Anglo-Iranian oil did not possess special characteristics that 
made it indispensable. Refi neries operating on these supplies could easily 
switch to utilize other sources of oil. 93 There was a continuous increase 
in consumer demand for petroleum products, however, such as bitumen 
and aviation fuel, with Abadan accounting for 45 percent of the total 
requirements of the latter product in the Eastern Hemisphere. Thus, the 
lack of refi nery capacity to match this demand was creating a problem. 
Furthermore, Iranian oil was supplied for sterling. This meant that the 
replacement of Iranian products would necessarily involve “calling on 
dollar sources,” intensifying existing problems with the British imbalance 
of trade in dollar areas. 94 
 On the one hand, imposing economic sanctions on the Mosaddiq gov-
ernment would help the British government conserve dollars and preserve 
supplies of goods that could be sold for dollars, since the currency was 
now needed to pay for oil imports. 95 AIOC made the decision to impose 
an oil boycott for much the same reason and to show Iran that the com-
pany would not allow its property to be confi scated illegally and with-
out adequate compensation. On the other hand, sanctions and a boycott 
would negatively impact the United Kingdom as well. As Britain’s largest 
overseas investment, the critical issue in view of the need to protect its 
balance of payments and save dollars was to keep the refi ned oil from 
Abadan under British control. 96 The Treasury estimated in May 1951 
that the loss of Iranian products would cost $504 million to replace. 
Refi ned products would be lost from closing down the world’s largest 
refi nery at Abadan, which would be impossible to replace except after a 
long interval. There might even be restrictions on the consumption of pet-
rol products in the sterling area. The risks would be higher if the Iranians 
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succeeded in maintaining oilfi eld and refi nery operations as well as the 
distribution and payment for oil overseas by hiring foreign experts and 
tanker companies, the majority of whom would have to be American. It 
was unlikely, however, that enough foreign tankers would be available to 
carry the oil away. 97 From the start of the boycott, AIOC and the British 
government “worked hand in glove to ensure its success.” 98 Their coop-
eration, argues Heiss, marked their policy on the boycott but did not 
necessarily carry over into other areas of the dispute. 
 The British government and oil company were also relying on the par-
ticipation of another set of actors, whose cooperation was essential for 
the oil boycott to work—the American oil majors. US oil companies had 
no real reason to purchase Iranian oil because the world oil industry 
was experiencing a “buyer’s market.” 99 Despite increased consumption 
in the decade after the Second World War, production grew signifi cantly 
as did a number of giant oilfi elds in the Middle East and the discovery of 
new fi elds. This fueled a scramble among the oil majors for concession 
agreements with producer countries. In light of AIOC’s monopoly con-
trol in Iran, the US majors made arrangements with Kuwait (50 percent 
AIOC controlled) and Saudi Arabia. Buying oil from Iran in the absence 
of a dramatic increase in total worldwide demand would force produc-
tion cutbacks in these countries and ultimately decrease the royalties 
they received from their oil operations. This could potentially hurt the 
US majors’ concessions by triggering nationalization efforts elsewhere. 
Purchasing Iranian oil at substantial discounts might also upset the price 
structure of the Middle East petroleum industry, something the US com-
panies strongly opposed. Having “no real need to buy Iranian oil and 
every apparent reason not to,” the US majors helped impose limits on 
Iran’s fl ow of oil and thus income to the Iranian government by support-
ing AIOC’s boycott. The Truman administration took the same stance 
as these so-called private concerns, warning smaller companies prone to 
independent purchases of Iranian oil that offi cial US policy supported the 
boycott. Independent purchasers would be on their own if AIOC prose-
cuted them for attempting to break the boycott. 100 According to Walden, 
US antitrust law says that “group boycotts” or “concerted refusals by 
traders to deal with other traders” have long been put in the “forbidden 
category.” 101 US antitrust law deemed oil boycotts illegal. 
 Deploying the boycott arrangement posed risks in compensating for 
the loss of Iran’s oil supply. In a memorandum, Walter Levy, an American 
oil consultant, warned that execution of the program would require strict 
coordination through US government regulation to avoid shortages in the 
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United States and would require a highly regimented petroleum industry, 
“a sort of partial war mobilization.” In reality, a number of “specifi c sup-
ply crises” would result from a loss of oil from Abadan. 102 For example, 
the failure of aviation gasoline would result in the shutdown of commer-
cial air operations between Europe and Asia. Practically all areas east of 
the Suez would run out of oil by August 1951. Major bunkering stations 
in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean area would also run out of supplies. Oil 
production and refi ning capacity would therefore have to be stepped up 
around the world. Lastly, normal trading and world oil prices would be 
totally disrupted as a result of the replacement of crude oil deliveries with 
the costlier shipping of refi ned products from abroad. 
 American oil companies and the US government aimed, like their allies 
in Britain, to minimize the damage they experienced as a result of the 
collapse of the Iranian oil industry while keeping world price levels high 
and production quotas limited. In July 1951, the US Petroleum Admin-
istration for Defense (PAD) organized representatives of nineteen of the 
nation’s oil companies into the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee. 103 
The agency, headed by Stewart P. Coleman, a director at the Standard 
Oil Company of New Jersey and Aramco, was originally responsible for 
managing America’s oil supplies during the Korean War. Known as “Plan 
of Action No. 1,” the aim was to enroll the oil companies in the effort to 
replace 660,000 barrels of oil per day formerly supplied by Iran. This was 
equal to one-third of total Middle East production and a quarter of all 
refi ned products outside the Western Hemisphere. The loss of this oil was 
compensated by the parties of Plan of Action No. 1, who took steps to 
reorganize the world energy system by increasing production and refi ning 
in other countries, realigning imports and exports, and allocating mar-
kets. 104 The American oil companies involved were conveniently granted 
immunity from antitrust prosecution under the Defense Production Act 
of 1950. Ostensibly, the American oil companies signed the agreement 
to “prevent, eliminate, or alleviate shortages in oil supplies” of “friendly 
foreign nations” that might “threaten the defense interests or programs 
of the United States.” 105 In reality, private and public American interests 
were coordinating to determine markets and replace the potential loss of 
Anglo-Iranian oil with other, American-controlled sources. 
 American oil majors supported AIOC’s oil boycott not to secure a 
steady supply but to place limits on the fl ow of Iranian oil. The coor-
dination of a different kind of cartel arrangement mixing the so-called 
public and private interests of the American and British governments and 
oil companies worked hand in hand to block Iranian oil nationalization 
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and fuel a war effort. This framing device in terms of protecting the oil 
supplies of friendly foreign nations served as another kind of antimarket 
arrangement, coordinated with the economic boycott, to avoid supply 
dislocations in other concession areas and keep profi ts high. 
 Technical blockages and fi nancial restrictions enabled the British gov-
ernment to reach a negotiating position with Iran with the aim of ensur-
ing both that the government’s oil supply needs were guaranteed and 
that AIOC maintained control of operations. The sanctions might have 
little effect if the Iranians “called our bluff by obtaining assurances of 
help from the Americans.” 106 British government and oil company inter-
ests were internal to each other and aimed to use economic sanctions 
as a technique of intervention to frame interests advantageously and 
impede the fl ow of income to the Iranian government. Sanctions would 
strengthen the British negotiating position and help block the political 
possibility of oil nationalization. The success or failure of combined 
sanctions and a boycott would not only depend on cooperation between 
so-called public and private interests in the United Kingdom, but also on 
an alliance with American oil companies to ensure that Iran did not access 
alternative sources of expertise and technology for the distribution and 
sale of its oil. 
 The intertwining of public and private interests was crucial to the 
boycott’s success, in spite of the antimarket and extralegal mecha-
nisms involved. 107 If the US majors had broken these connections, the 
boycott would have failed. The relation between governments and 
transnational corporations is often understood in terms of an external 
relationship between two separate entities, but the clarity of the apparent 
divide between private and public was not so obvious as to delineate 
one actor as more powerful or as determining the role of the other. The 
Anglo-Iranian nationalization dispute involved assembling a set of tech-
nologies of intractability to help impose fi nancial restrictions, technical 
blockages, and mechanisms of temporization to arrange oil nationaliza-
tion advantageously by strengthening the British and increasingly Amer-
ican bargaining positions. 
 Economic Facts of Oil 
 The opportunity for the American government to play a mediating role in 
the crisis fi rst came when Mosaddiq sent a message to Truman express-
ing his government’s wish to maintain the fl ow of oil as before and to 
keep AIOC’s foreign experts in the service of the oil industry, leaving the 
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company’s organization intact. 108 As the British request for interim mea-
sures at the ICJ was granted, Truman replied to Mosaddiq, offering to 
send Averell Harriman to Tehran on a diplomatic mission to mediate the 
dispute. Iran’s Joint Parliamentary Oil Committee and cabinet approved 
the offer on July 11, 1951. 109 The impact of the Anglo-American eco-
nomic boycott on Iran’s dollar and sterling balances, ICJ court orders, 
and now an American diplomatic mission were coming together to orga-
nize the intractability of the dispute. 
 Iranian members of parliament had concluded that nationalization 
was the best resolution to the crisis for redirecting the demands of Iran’s 
diverse political groups into the more manageable frame of reformist 
nationalism. But how could nationalization work without the participa-
tion of the British oil company? For advice, Iranian offi cials participated 
in a series of consultations with American oil business consultant, Walter 
Levy. 110 Levy previously served as head of the Petroleum Branch of the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), set up by the American 
government as part of the Marshall Plan to help subsidize the conversion 
of Europe from a dependence on coal to oil. He accumulated years of 
experience as an oil consultant for both the US government and the major 
American oil companies such as the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company. 111 
Levy was eventually put “on loan” by the ECA to the State Department 
for Averell Harriman’s diplomatic mission to Iran. The aim was to break 
the impasse between AIOC and the Iranian government by educating the 
latter about the “economic facts” of oil. 
 Presenting himself as an independent oil expert, Levy framed his role 
to both British and Iranian offi cials as presenting “the technical aspects 
of the problem,” whereas “the political side was being handled entirely by 
Harriman.” 112 Harriman felt it essential to “maintain a neutral position” 
so as to avoid the impression that he endorsed any particular plan. 113 
Using technical and economic arguments, Levy and Harriman aimed to 
persuade the Iranians that they could not expect a fi nancial return greater 
than that of other countries under comparable conditions. 114 They argued 
that oil operations in Iran must be run on an effi cient basis. This could 
only be accomplished through a “foreign owned operating company” 
with freedom in daily management though acting under principles estab-
lished by a government or national oil company. Oil diplomacy involved 
persuading the Iranian government to establish a peculiar connection 
between the “principles” of a nationally controlled oil company, only in 
name, while protecting daily management of operations under foreign 
control. 
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 Iranian negotiators warned Levy that any arrangement that tried to 
nullify nationalization or render it ineffective was “doomed to failure 
because it will hurt national pride and be rejected by public opinion in 
Iran.” 115 The practicable solution was to form a national oil company 
that would take over British and foreign technicians as well as a signif-
icant number of existing executives. The new company would make a 
long-term “Agency Agreement” for at least fi fteen to twenty years with 
AIOC, ensuring the sale of as large a quantity of oil as possible. The 
proceeds of a portion of production would then be allocated toward the 
payment of the compensation agreed on for expropriation. 116 
 During the course of the Harriman mission, Levy participated in secret 
talks with Kazem Hassibi, an engineer and undersecretary at the Ministry 
of Finance, and Allahyar Saleh, chairman of the National Oil Commis-
sion. 117 Levy framed his role in the dispute as concerning the “commercial 
and economic problems of the world oil industry,” even though Saleh 
insisted that the problem was also political. 118 Saleh complained that the 
income his government accrued from the most profi table operation of 
the company was utterly inadequate. The company was “corrupting the 
political life of the country, controlling the radio, newspapers, and other 
communication facilities, and has paid no attention to the welfare of its 
workers.” 119 The nationalization laws, Hassibi explained, would solve 
problems by enabling the government to obtain the necessary income 
from oil operations and the foreign exchange necessary to fi nance the 
country’s import program. To do this, the country must export eight to 
ten million tons of oil in the fi rst year. 
 Levy responded by framing his argument to suggest that oil sales could 
only be made within the framework of the international oil industry. He 
explained that Iran possessed large underground oil reserves producing, 
at the time, about 6 percent of the world’s oil production and less than 
5 percent of the world’s refi ning output. This production was shipped 
and exported to many countries in the Indian Ocean area, where cus-
tomers distributed it to various fi nal consumers in importing countries. 
“To achieve this translation,” Levy argued, “from a ‘valueless’ oil in the 
grounds of Iran to a commercial product in the consuming country” 
required the construction of a highly complex organization. 120 Coupled 
with production, transport, and distribution, the organization must also 
establish the “fi nancial machinery” necessary to provide for the fi nancing 
from production to the fi nal distribution points. 121 This complex organi-
zation of oil infrastructure was already in place. 
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 Levy laid out the arrangement of the world oil industry as a 
commercial-technical unit with the capacity to develop oilfi elds in 
producing countries for the establishment and maintenance of which 
“millions and millions of dollars are needed.” 122 Only a long-distance 
machinery could procure the necessary technical expertise to provide 
transportation and distribution facilities to support worldwide oper-
ations. Oil companies ensured the smooth running of this machinery 
through their control of oil production, refi ning, and transportation “by 
sea and by land and by their network of distribution facilities which is 
spread over nearly every country of the world.” 123 AIOC had spent the 
past fi fty years building the petroleum energy system in collaboration 
with the largest Anglo-American oil corporations, helping to constitute 
the political agency of this actor in the twentieth century. According 
to Levy’s expertise, this long-distance machinery was the only possible 
arrangement, a kind of obligatory passage point, 124 in which oil sales 
could occur on a large-scale. If the Iranian government wanted to sell its 
oil in international oil markets, it needed to know how to do this, fol-
lowing the model outlined by Levy, and to recognize that its alliance with 
Anglo-American oil interests around these econotechnical facts would 
benefi t them, even with nationalization achieved only in principle. 
 Nearly all previous customers for Anglo-Iranian oil were subsidiar-
ies of the Iranian oil company, companies closely associated either with 
AIOC or with other major British and American oil companies: “these 
facts they [the Iranian government] must face,” explained Levy. 125 The 
Iranians would not be able to sell eight to ten million tons of oil, even 
at discounted prices. The major oil companies were, after all, “the only 
producers in the Eastern Hemisphere,” and refi neries depended, in the 
majority of cases, on such companies for their sea transportation. 126 For 
the “oil industry to survive,” explained Levy, a means must be found 
to achieve “confi dence and cooperation between the Iranian oil industry 
and the rest of the world,” something impossible unless that arrangement 
involved the oil majors’ energy network. 127 If this particular arrangement 
of the energy system did not happen, outlets for Iranian oil in world mar-
kets were bound to “shrink and disappear.” 128 The long-distance arrange-
ment formed part of the manufactured reality of the international oil 
cartel that transnational oil corporations had spent four decades building 
using concession terms, oil infrastructure, international law, and the pro-
duction of expert knowledge about oil. 
 Framing his arguments in terms of a highly technical mapping of the 
global oil industry, Levy needed to convince the Iranians that their oil was 
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not irreplaceable and would not seriously disrupt the world oil industry 
requirements. Iranian offi cials must be persuaded not only that oil sales 
were the only thing that could save their country’s economy, but also that 
those sales could only be made within the framework of the international 
oil industry. 129 In sum, Levy’s arguments worked to diminish the Iranian 
government’s position of strength. 
 During the course of the Harriman mission, Levy continued to insist 
that Iran must not “sit on its oil, even temporarily.” 130 The trend in the 
world, argued Levy, was defi nitely toward the development of new and 
additional sources of power, such as atomic energy, and these sources 
would “replace oil and other sources” currently in use. 131 As part of 
the Marshall Plan’s reconstruction, Europe would soon have an annual 
refi nery output of sixty to seventy million tons, which it would obtain 
from “increased production in Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar,” 
to replace oil from Iran (fi gure  5.2 ). The seven major oil companies had 
huge sums of capital to weather production and marketing problems, 
owned most of the non-American refi ning capacity, and of 1,319 T2 
tankers, only 44 were not owned or chartered by the large oil companies 
and their subsidiaries. 
 Levy was attempting to persuade the Iranians that building an alter-
native arrangement to oil production, transport, refi ning, distribution, 
and marketing was impossible. Iran must not pursue its current course 
of action “implying no satisfactory settlement with AIOC,” because the 
oil companies “would never agree to help Iran in any way,” as such help 
would “unsettle the oil industry over the entire world.” 132 By the end of 
the discussions, Hassibi conceded that his government needed a “method 
of convincing [Iranian] public opinion” that Iran’s nationalization laws 
were being fully executed and that the oil industry was under govern-
ment management. 133 The connection between foreign infl uence and 
oil must disappear. Then, “public opinion could be convinced to enter 
a more permanent arrangement and one in which management control 
could be turned over to foreign technicians.” 134 The Iranian government 
appeared to agree with Levy that for nationalization to work, the gov-
ernment must persuade the Iranian public that continued foreign control 
framed as nationalization was a successful outcome. This arrangement 
could not be achieved, however, without the participation of the United 
States. As long as the appearance of nationalization was achieved, Has-
sibi conceded, other arrangements involving the largest oil corporations 
were possible. 
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 Figure 5.2 
 Map of Middle Eastern oil in 1951.  Source : William Roger Louis,  The British Empire in 
the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperial-
ism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 690. 
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 At Harriman’s meeting with Iran’s Joint Oil Committee, Levy reiter-
ated the three major problems facing the Iranian oil industry. 135 A basis 
for friendly negotiations with AIOC must be pursued to solve the oil 
question, Harriman warned, “before arrangements are made by the 
world’s oil industry to replace Iran’s oil in world oil trade.” 136 That Iran 
might choose to drop out of the international energy system was an unac-
ceptable outcome and created instability. To avoid this outcome, Harri-
man acknowledged Iran’s sovereign right to act on its own, but insisted 
that the government could not expect to “dictate oil operations outside 
the limits of its own frontiers.” 137 
 As a response to the American mission’s efforts, the Iranian govern-
ment, led by Mosaddiq, submitted a “defi nite formula” as its fi nal view 
on the talks. In a report to the Majlis, the terms revealed the govern-
ment’s willingness to participate in negotiations with the British govern-
ment on behalf of AIOC so long as the latter recognized Iran’s “principle 
of nationalization.” 138 Nationalization in “principle” indicated a novel 
framing that the Iranian government was persuaded to rely on in order 
to achieve the effect of nationalization without disturbing international 
oil markets and Iranian public opinion. 
 Conferences moved to London and Levy consulted secretly with 
both American oil company offi cials and British government offi cials. 139 
They discussed the nature of the Aramco agreement in Saudi Arabia 
and the IPC plan, recently negotiated in Iraq. Levy noted that it would 
be “very diffi cult” for Iran to maintain a pricing arrangement under a 
profi t-sharing plan like the one arranged in Saudi Arabia in which oil 
was priced at $1.43 per barrel because Iranian oil was being sold to other 
subsidiaries at the much higher price of $1.75 per barrel. Furthermore, 
while refi nery profi ts from Ras Tanura were not included in the Saudi 
Arabian agreement, refi nery profi ts from Abadan would have to be fac-
tored into any arrangement with Iran. The reason was that only 25 per-
cent of Saudi Arabian oil production was refi ned locally, while over 80 
percent of Anglo-Iranian oil was refi ned in Abadan. In another meeting 
at the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which included the US ambassador 
to London, Levy argued that the possibility of a future meeting between 
Mosaddiq and the British delegation was “doomed to fail,” if AIOC rep-
resentatives were included. 140 He also confessed the extreme importance 
of avoiding acute oil shortages, “during the course of negotiations in Teh-
ran, particularly in India and Pakistan.” 141 Such an event would “make 
the Iranians feel that the world was still greatly dependent on them for 
oil supplies,” and translate into strengthened resistance to any agreement 
186  Chapter 5
with the British. 142 Finding a resolution to the oil nationalization contro-
versy in Iran needed to occur in relation to pricing arrangements in Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia, and oil supplies in India and Pakistan. Only through a 
coordinated effort among oil experts, government offi cials, and company 
managers would the economic facts of oil survive. 
 Levy concluded the meeting by outlining his ideas on the kind of 
British position—a type of consortium arrangement—that might be 
formulated and proposed to the Iranians. He emphasized the Iranians’ 
animosity toward AIOC such that it necessitated the creation of an oper-
ating company with additional representatives to introduce a “new char-
acter” to the operation. 143 A 50–50 proposal must be “eminently fair and 
straight forward without any devious arrangements or unrealistic pricing 
involved,” and Harriman had authorized Levy to support such an idea. 144 
The idea was to obtain an arrangement that would be similar “in prin-
ciple” to arrangements in Saudi Arabia and Iraq but “which might differ 
considerably in detail.” 145 Exposing his preferences, Levy revealed that 
the “basic motive behind the idea was to protect British interests.” 146 It 
was clear, Victor Butler, of the British Ministry of Fuel and Power, and 
Levy agreed, that the “current context” did not allow for a single com-
pany operating alone in a particular country, and that “there seemed to 
be a much more stable situation where several different interests were 
engaged.” 147 Coinciding with the implementation of the Marshall Plan 
to fuel the reconstruction of postwar Europe with cheap oil from the 
Middle East, the consolidation of consortium arrangements emerged as 
a new device to help restrict oil development in the Middle East, man-
age the rise of resource nationalism, and combat any real attempts at 
nationalization. 148 
 The two world wars had helped restrict the supply and movement of 
oil, but between the wars a new set of devices were needed to limit the 
production and distribution of energy. 149 During the interwar period, a 
series of devices were developed to accomplish the task: the consortium 
arrangement to restrict the development of new oil discoveries in the 
Middle East, government quotas and price controls in the United States, 
and cartel arrangements to govern the worldwide distribution and mar-
keting of oil. 150 As discussed here, these techniques and controls shaped 
the development of the transnational oil corporation, which emerged as 
a long-distance machinery for maintaining limits to the supply of oil in a 
period of abundance. 
 Though claiming independence and neutrality as a private oil con-
sultant on purely technical and economic matters, Levy was mixing 
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econotechnical matters with politics. He was effectively coaching Brit-
ish and Iranian offi cials in a trial of strength that would close off the 
working possibilities for nationalization and open up alternative politi-
cal arrangements for a kind of consortium arrangement, more amenable 
to the “current context,” but by no means one in which strictly British 
control returned to Iran. 151 In practice, the “current context” was a set 
of connections and long-distance machinery that oil company managers, 
consultants, scientists, engineers, lawyers, government offi cials, and oil 
workers had battled to construct (and often deconstruct) over the course 
of half a century, starting in the oilfi elds of southwest Iran. 
 From the American perspective, the Harriman mission, conducted in 
its technical detail by Walter Levy, was another weapon to weaken the 
Iranian position, block nationalization of the oil industry, and thwart 
any return to British control. Harriman admitted to British offi cials that 
American oil companies were watching his activities, encouraging sus-
picions on the British side that Levy was undermining “Anglo-Persian” 
interests through the pursuit of a consortium arrangement. 152 Through 
a series of diplomatic trials of strength, the success of securing the con-
sortium arrangement to restore foreign control over Iran’s oil worked 
precisely by making arguments about the economic facts of oil a reality. 
Building a world in which such facts could survive meant pursuing eco-
nomic sanctions, imposing an oil boycott, and persuading the Iranian 
government about the impossibility of producing, refi ning, distributing, 
and selling oil outside the global arrangements of the seven major oil 
companies. 
 Like its American counterpart, the British government expressed a 
willingness to enter negotiations in response to Mosaddiq’s proposal 
for an “Iranian formula.” Harriman had also played a role, persuading 
Mosaddiq to accept a British delegation led by a senior minister of the 
Labour government. 153 This paved the way for a new diplomatic mission 
to Tehran, known as the Stokes Mission, in which Richard Stokes, Lord 
Privy Seal, led a British delegation to put forward another set of propos-
als allegedly in line with the “principle of nationalization” stated in the 
Iranian law of March 20, 1951. 154 This occurred as a British destroyer 
joined a British cruiser in the Shatt al-Arab, the Abadan oil refi nery was 
shut down, and the leading American oil companies cooperated in the 
establishment of the Foreign Supply Committee to readjust to the loss of 
Anglo-Iranian oil. 
 These diplomatic battles were disputes over framing the issues and 
building connections in relation to the fl ow of oil: Mosaddiq fought to 
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make a national and political claim to a natural resource in terms of 
state sovereignty, while Levy insisted that national politics could not be 
factored in because their outcome would be disastrous to the functioning 
of the technical and economic mechanisms of oil operations, which no 
other actors could manage except the seven major oil companies. Stokes 
withdrew his eight-point proposal on August 21, claiming the Iranian 
government was reading intentions into it that were not there. 155 The 
proposal was no different from the proposals fi rst submitted by AIOC to 
the Iranian government, which involved the vesting of Iranian assets in 
a national oil company while the use of the assets would be granted to 
an operating company established by AIOC. Harriman made one fi nal 
attempt to resolve the dispute, asserting that the British proposals were 
within the Iranian formula. 156 He argued that British proposals would 
achieve Iranian national aspirations, including Iranian control over its 
oil industry  within Iran and would provide income to enable extensive 
development of the country’s economic potential. 
 The Stokes and Harriman missions, in addition to Levy’s efforts at 
persuasion, proved futile after Mosaddiq immediately rejected the notion 
of an operating company or agency to operate the oil. 157 Many stud-
ies attribute the failure of these diplomatic missions, in part, to Mosad-
diq’s highly irrational temperament. 158 Less emphasis has been placed 
on the British desperation to achieve a “nationalization arrangement” 
that retained as much British control of Iranian oil as possible by relying 
on technical, legal, and economic argumentation to redirect the Iranian 
government and public opinion toward a new consortium arrangement. 
Stokes was fully aware that Iranian oil was the cheapest to produce in 
the world and that there was no reason to follow the American 50–50 
formula if they could retain their access to oil by offering a more gener-
ous share of profi ts. 159 British offi cials from different ministries disagreed 
with Stokes’s assessment, as did the Americans. The Iranian delegation 
submitted a further reply, which essentially argued that it was unwilling 
to sell any of its oil production to AIOC. 160 As the crisis escalated with the 
ordered evacuation of all British staff members, the diplomatic missions 
offi cially ceased in September 1951. Mosaddiq prepared to make direct 
sales to potential customers of Iranian oil. 
 Thanking Levy for his efforts, Harriman blamed “the lack of tech-
nical knowledge on the part of the Iranian government representatives 
about the oil situation”—this was, he believed, “one of the greatest 
obstacles” confronting the diplomatic mission. 161 Multiple possibilities 
for controlling Iran’s oil had seemed feasible, but in the end American 
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and British interests would pursue alternative ones, including the use of 
force. 162 This would ensure, on the one hand, that a precedent was not 
set in which every foreign government felt it could unilaterally repudi-
ate contracts with British fi rms and seize British assets in their countries 
upon the payment of compensation. On the other hand, it would ensure 
that the new 50–50 profi t-sharing principle pursued by the Americans as 
a mechanism for managing contracts in a new international order would 
not be disrupted in favor of the more dangerous alliance of national con-
trol with Soviet-inspired communism. 
 The Mosaddiq government rejected the proliferation of diplomatic 
terms proposed for a resolution of the crisis as disconnected from the 
political question of national sovereignty over a natural resource. It 
refused these terms not because of a lack of technical knowledge, but 
because the control of Iran’s oil supply was a powerful political weapon 
that could be used to redirect the energies of a militant labor movement 
into the more manageable framework of reformist nationalism and win 
more profi ts. Although the diplomatic missions failed to resolve the dis-
pute, their technical work succeeded in rendering oil nationalization 
intractable, effectively impeding the fl ow of oil and thus oil income to the 
Iranian government. 
 Nationalizing Labor(atory) 
 The work of the various technologies of intractability opened up the defi -
nition of what it meant to nationalize an oil industry and the kinds of 
arrangements that would be necessary to secure older agreements and 
build new ones to the advantage of the major transnational oil compa-
nies. As diverse and competing interests put these technologies to work 
in the international and domestic political arenas, Iran’s Special Commis-
sion on Oil, set up on June 20, 1951, and headed by Amir-Alai, the min-
ister of economy, set out to build a different kind of arrangement from 
before, executing the nationalization laws by traveling to southwest Iran 
to take over AIOC operations. 
 Iranian offi cials arrived at the oilfi elds to fi nd that the oil labor regime, 
fi xing Iranians at the lowest level of the skill and wage hierarchy, was 
completely intact. Eric Drake, AIOC’s general manager in Iran and Iraq, 
led the members of the commission around the oilfi elds, including the 
workers’ housing sections at Chadorabad, Halabiabad, and Hasseerabad 
( fi gures 5.3 and  5.4 ). Amir-Alai explains in his memoir that the standard 
of living particularly at these three locales was so strikingly poor that 
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AIOC offi cials indicated the workers were not employees of the com-
pany. The workers confi rmed their employment at AIOC by revealing 
their company identifi cation cards. 163 
 How would it be possible to nationalize the oil industry, if the social 
world of oil had been built in such a way as to deny this very possibility—
the replacement of foreign engineers, technicians, and managers with Ira-
nian ones? A report drawn up by the British Treasury on the impact of 
the withdrawal of British staff on operations in Iran mapped how the 
organization of labor would ensure the impossibility of continuing oil 
operations in the absence of British workers. 164 The technical coordina-
tion of the oilfi elds and refi neries, the report explained, was made possi-
ble by British staff with a high degree of skill in technical management 
and long experience operating the various units in or involving the fi elds, 
 Figure 5.3 
 Photo of the oil delegations with a “background of primitive dwellings at  Chadurabad . In 
the forefront are veiled women who have to bring water from miles away.” Accompanying 
the visitors on the tour was Eric Drake, general manager of AIOC [tall with dark felt hat], 
“who merely shrugged his shoulders when asked for an explanation of these conditions.” 
 Source : INP P 277 Special 54043, 78148, BP Archive. Reproduced with the permission of 
the BP Archive. 
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the pipelines, and the refi neries. Relying on a familiar formula, the report 
argued that the Iranians still did not have “the capability or experience 
which would enable them to play a real part at this level.” 165 The work of 
British staff was “largely associated with starting up and shutting down” 
oil operations. 
 Compared to a total of seventy British staff employed directly in pro-
duction, there were only nine Iranians employed in production opera-
tions with experience approximately equivalent to that of “Junior British 
Staff.” Production was dependent on specifi c tasks in mechanical engi-
neering, maintenance, and workshops. These services would halt with 
the withdrawal of foreign staff. In all fi elds, production depended on 
the operation of machinery and plants, which took the form of power 
 Figure 5.4 
 On June 26, 1951, the Tehran delegation, which carried out the nationalization, paid a 
visit to some of the slum dwellings of the company’s workers, “where people live in primi-
tive conditions in huts of matting or paper with little of the amenities of civilized life.” The 
company captions the photo with the following: “At Kagazabad, Hussein Makki, leader 
of the Persian Oil Committee, leads a Persian worker by the hand out of one of the tents 
made of paper waste and tree branches, followed by other members of the delegation.” 
 Source : INP P 287 Special 54045, 78148, BP Archive. Reproduced with the permission of 
the BP Archive. 
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stations driving electric-driven pumps, or steam- or gas-turbine-driven 
pumps and automatic control equipment. 
 The plants required “skilled operation, and although there are a small 
number of Persians with suffi cient skill,” the report explained, their num-
bers were too small to fi ll all the positions at “full production.” 166 The 
amount of production drawn from each well and zone of the four main 
oilfi elds (Masjid Suleiman, Haft Kel, Lali, and Naft Safi d) was controlled 
by senior British technical management staff “who have no Persian coun-
terparts.” Improper control of individual producing wells, the report 
warned, would rapidly result in water being produced in the oil, which 
would have a “disastrous effect in the Refi nery.” 167 A steady stream of 
tankers transporting the products from Abadan was also necessary for a 
steady operation. 
 The important feature in the disruption of operations caused by Iran’s 
oil nationalization was therefore not the removal of Indian workers, but 
the removal of British staff, who were responsible for management as 
well as “technical direction and planning.” 168 If the British left, the report 
concluded, “at least an equal number of Iranians must be found to replace 
them, and this is impossible.” 169 The peculiar oil labor regime built over 
the past forty years had succeeded in transforming the oilfi eld into its lab-
oratory, arranging an energy system divided into specifi c tasks delineated 
along racial lines. Could AIOC’s laboratory be nationalized? The design 
appeared to ensure that the industry could not run without British man-
agement and technical expertise. The British admitted privately, however, 
that oil operations in southwest Iran could not be worked without the 
“assistance of Persian workers.” 170 
 As AIOC shut down its Iranian operations and withdrew its per-
sonnel, Iranian offi cials blocked ships from leaving the port unless 
their captains signed new receipts acknowledging NIOC as the true 
owner of the oil. This convinced AIOC to halt its loadings from Ira-
nian ports, which, along with the departure of AIOC personnel from 
Abadan in October 1951, solidifi ed the boycott. 171 After the withdrawal 
of British staff, the Iranians were confi dent that they could easily rehire 
non-British technicians to operate the industry and quickly train their 
own nationals to replace them. 172 This was, however, not the case. As 
a result of the boycott, the United States, Sweden, Belgium, The Neth-
erlands, Pakistan, and Germany all refused to make their technicians 
available toward the Iranian goal of nationalizing the British-controlled 
oil industry. 
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 The technologies of difference embedded in the hierarchical segrega-
tion of labor maintained their work over every aspect of operations from 
pipelines and pumping stations to water treatment and automatic control 
equipment. 173 These operations worked in tandem with the boycott to 
impose restrictions and close the possibility of alternative, more demo-
cratic forms of oil production. The control that the international petro-
leum industry exerted over the world’s tanker fl eet did not help matters. 
AIOC controlled 30.5 percent of the world’s tankers and US petroleum 
companies controlled 42.5 percent, constituting a total of three-quarters 
of the total tanker capacity of 1,500 T-2 equivalents. 174 Iran con-
trolled none. Although it signed contracts for oil sales, Iran’s national-
ist government failed to make good on these because the oil could not 
be delivered. 
 The peculiar technoracial organization of labor in the oilfi elds was 
further strengthened by the traditional cartel arrangement among the 
world’s largest oil companies—Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), 
Standard Oil of New York (Mobil), Standard Oil of California (Socal), 
the Texas Company (Texaco), the Gulf Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, 
and AIOC. These companies coordinated production restrictions and 
price fi xing in their international operations and complied with AIOC’s 
boycott of Iran’s oil. This collective of public-private interests worked 
hand in hand with the racial-technical organization of Iran’s oil industry. 
The power of international oil companies (i.e. the company we know 
today as BP), the authority of the Iranian government, and the process of 
nationalizing an oil industry were worked out within a battlefi eld of tech-
nicality and political contestation, concentrated along global distribution 
networks and in a small region of southwest Iran. 
 Collectives of Intractability 
 Arranging the intractability of Iran’s oil nationalization dispute was 
a strategy that the British used to impose delays and avoid reaching a 
constructive solution. Delay was a useful strategy not because it worked 
alone, but because it worked in connection with other forces, such as the 
fl ow of income to the Iranian government. Controlling or impeding this 
fl ow of funds was part of what was at stake due to its interconnectiv-
ity with the fl ow of oil, which the British and eventually the Americans 
aimed to slow down. These blockages and constrictions needed time to 
take effect, which is why the temporizing diversions to new sites like 
The Hague were so important. The British company and government 
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collaborated to ensure AIOC’s control of oil operations and simultane-
ously weaken Iran’s bargaining position so as to place Anglo-American 
interests at an advantage. And yet the proliferation of organizational 
forms and technologies of intractability that emerged to manage the dis-
pute left the outcome unstable. 
 The Harriman and Stokes missions failed to bring an end to the trans-
formation of the dispute into an international legal and fi nancial issue 
managed by the work of the International Court of Justice, economic 
sanctions, and an oil boycott. These were political weapons the British 
government and AIOC deployed to build alliances and enroll support-
ers (e.g., the American government, Walter Levy, and the seven major 
oil companies) against the Iranian government and oil workers battling 
for nationalized control over oil operations along the lines of successful 
attempts in Bolivia, Mexico, and the Soviet Union. The British govern-
ment had just nationalized its coal industry fi ve years prior to Mosaddiq’s 
call for nationalization. 175 Anglo-American interests sought to build a new 
international order that entertained the wording of nationalization, but 
only as a means of preserving old and new contractual relations between 
national governments and foreign fi rms. If the terms of nationalization 
were not built into the world according to an appropriate translation 
of Anglo-American interests, the achievement of real national control—
that is, the expropriation of foreign fi rms without compensation—
would set dangerous precedents in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq 
and Egypt. 
 The nationalization crisis was worked out in terms of the different 
political possibilities and collectives of intractability that opened up and 
closed down in the process. By considering the technical, legal, and dip-
lomatic machineries involved in the distribution and control of oil, this 
discussion has opened up the black box of oil nationalization and the 
techniques of political rearrangement at play. Technologies of intractabil-
ity were deployed to organize actors and translate issues in ways that sep-
arated political questions of nationalization from econotechnical issues 
of protecting the international oil network. 
 As in 1932–1933, the law worked as a political weapon and a socio-
technical device to redirect the crisis by invoking an entire international 
legal order. The fundamental issue at stake was who would control the oil 
industry, the British or the Iranians. British government offi cials, encour-
aged by the Americans, realized that AIOC, renamed British Petroleum 
in 1954, could not return to Iran as a controlling company. An alterna-
tive emerged, in the shape of a consortium, alongside the construction 
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of 50–50 profi t-sharing arrangements in neighboring countries. The pro-
posed international consortium put forward the facade of nationalization 
but entailed the mixing of Anglo-American oil companies and govern-
ment interests to determine markets by limiting the fl ow of oil supplies 
and retaining control along the lines of older concession agreements. 
With the failure to enroll the Mosaddiq government, other increasingly 
violent political alternatives remained. 

 The post–World War II petroleum order marked a period of oil abun-
dance and an emergent machinery of global economic governance set up 
to manage this abundance in the name of “Third World development.” 
The problem for the Americans and British was not about restoring the 
supply of Anglo-Iranian oil after nationalization, but about constricting 
the fl ow of oil and income to the Iranian government using strategies 
of delay and intractability. Intractability allowed time to put in place 
a new set of political arrangements that appeared necessary to restore 
foreign control and profi ts from Iran’s nominally nationalized oilfi elds. 
Iran’s nationalization did not mark the end of the oil dispute, or the exe-
cution of the nationalization process through the complete confi scation 
of company property, the automatic takeover of the British company, 
and the evacuation of its foreign employees. Instead, over the course of 
three years, controversies emerged to redirect the nationalization crisis in 
legal and fi nancial terms to ensure that nationalization did not happen 
in practice. As AIOC and the Iranian government battled to resolve the 
crisis, Anglo-Iranian oil stopped fl owing in June 1951, with the offi cial 
halt of operations at the Abadan refi nery taking place on July 31, 1951. 
In the following summer months, international legal proceedings, eco-
nomic sanctions, and an oil boycott were the machinery developed to 
limit the distribution of Anglo-Iranian oil (discussed in chapter 5). British 
employees were evacuated in October and alternative arrangements were 
put in place to make up for the loss of Iran’s oil by relying on oil supplies 
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The rearrangement involved a 
signifi cant degree of coordination between the major Anglo-American 
oil corporations and their host governments. While the British no longer 
maintained absolute control over Iran’s oil, it did still have the power 
to infl uence the global market, of which Iran’s newly nationalized oil 
was part. Foreign control of oil was no longer acceptable in a world of 
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nation-states claiming sovereign control over their resources. With AIOC 
unable to return to Iran on its own, Iranian, British, and American gov-
ernment offi cials and oil executives needed to devise novel techniques 
to transform the formerly British concessionary arrangement into an oil 
consortium, an association of the largest foreign oil companies. 
 Alongside the emergence of the transnational oil corporation as a new 
political actor of the mid-twentieth century, this period witnessed the rise 
of a series of international regimes of legal and economic governance and 
security such as the United Nations (UN) as a successor to the League of 
Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known today as the 
World Bank). Ostensibly set up as “neutral” organizations to aid in post-
war reconstruction and so-called Third World development, each orga-
nization served as a kind of disciplinary regime, playing a direct role in 
managing the Anglo-Iranian oil nationalization dispute by proposing a 
set of economic and legal arrangements for a resolution in 1952. The 
effect was to further delay Iran’s reformist nationalist government from 
implementing any concrete nationalization while allowing for more time 
to put in place a set of mechanisms for keeping less democratic forms 
of politics inside oil operations and others, such as striking oil workers 
demanding nationalization of their country’s oil, out. 
 This chapter follows Iranian, British, and American government 
offi cials and oil executives as they fought over the design of a newly 
nationalized oil industry and the consequences for global oil markets. 
The procedural work of restoring foreign control of the nationalized oil-
fi elds involved renaming the company as the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany while reconfi guring the concession arrangement. It also involved the 
reengineering of connections between fl ows of oil, mechanisms of fi nan-
cial governance, laws, methods of accounting, and the mechanism of the 
consortium arrangement at multiple sites in Iran and abroad. The success 
of the new consortium in blocking national control and rearranging older 
forms of monopoly control gets underplayed in the scholarship on the 
topic. 1 Instead, the consortium negotiations are analyzed as a separate 
organizational issue from the nationalization crisis, March 1951, and the 
coup d’état, August 1953. 2 
 As the crisis unfolded between 1951 and 1954, British and Iranian 
lawyers debated whether a contract had been signed between a private 
entity and a government, two governments, or both. Following the trans-
portation of the dispute from the ICJ to a site of international security 
at the UN and back again, I reveal the ways the two sides clashed over 
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the framing of issues. The central issue concerned the question of polit-
ical sovereignty over a natural resource and the right to nationalize a 
foreign-controlled oil industry, only for the British side to witness, for 
the fi rst time in its history, the failure of the association of oil with the 
authority of AIOC’s concession and the successful upholding of the sov-
ereign political rights of the Iranian nation. As in the past, the British side 
hoped to enlist international law to mark the difference between order/
civilization and disorder/ignorance, and to create delays until an advan-
tageous solution—the preservation of concessionary authority—was 
achieved. When this particular truth-making strategy failed, the British 
side imposed further delays at yet another site, the World Bank. Back in 
Tehran, the work of violence and a CIA-engineered coup d’état trans-
formed the proposed format of the international consortium arrange-
ment from possibility into reality. The task of the rest of the chapter is to 
highlight the work of two unusual and unexpected actors in this history, 
US national security and another formula known as the Aggregate Pro-
grammed Quantity or APQ—two post–World War II devices designed to 
place limits on oil supplies and keep profi ts high as a means of reconfi g-
uring the older concessionary arrangement in a new consortium. Work-
ing hand in hand with Iran’s parliament to restore foreign control of a 
nominally nationalized Iranian oil company, these tools and techniques 
formed the last set of connections available to fi nalize the consortium 
deal within an appropriate reformist-nationalist framing. 
 Law by Association: The “Double Character” of the Concession 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Iran refused to abide by the ICJ’s 
interim provisional measures, intended to preserve AIOC’s oil opera-
tions until a fi nal ruling was made on the Court’s jurisdiction in Iran’s 
oil nationalization case. Instead, the Iranian government took steps to 
transport the dispute back to a domestic legal arena by giving notice to 
the UN Security Council that it was abrogating the declaration of 1932 
recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. As the crisis escalated 
at multiple sites in Iran and abroad, the British government responded 
with its decision to translate an international legal issue into an inter-
national security issue. The failure of the Harriman and Stokes diplo-
matic missions had fi rst triggered AIOC’s decision to evacuate all British 
staff members by August 1951. The Iranian government also served 
notice to all British staff to sign individual employment contracts with 
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or leave the country. 3 Iranian 
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troops seized the Abadan refi nery in late September, refusing admittance 
to all but ten British technicians. This triggered the British government’s 
decision to return the dispute to another international regulatory venue 
by asking the UN Security Council to intervene. 4 
 The British government, claiming to work on behalf of its “injured 
national,” AIOC, of which it claimed over a 50 percent stake, was heavily 
involved in the work of translation, black-boxing one legal network and 
reopening another in multiple international arenas. 5 With the oil nation-
alization case still pending at the ICJ, two important legal questions 
remained unresolved: What were the rules of international law, fi rst with 
regard to the right of a state to nationalize industries within the country, 
and second with regard to the right of foreign states to intervene diplo-
matically on behalf of their nationals? Three legal issues were entangled 
in these questions: the claim to national sovereignty, the act of expropri-
ation, and the cancellation of the oil concession. 6 
 The British government’s request to the UN Security Council argued 
that the Iranian order expelling British staff was a violation of the ICJ’s 
order calling on both parties to comply with interim provisional mea-
sures. 7 Iran’s position was that the Security Council, like the ICJ, was 
incompetent to consider the British complaint because Article 2, para-
graph 7 of the UN Charter forbade the UN to intervene in matters 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any member nation.” 8 
Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British government’s legal representative, argued 
that the ICJ’s call for interim measures showed clearly that the dispute 
was at least “prima facie justiciable and not a matter solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Iran.” 9 The Iranian government was creating an 
“infl ammatory situation,” which was a potential threat to “peace and 
security.” Jebb argued that the Security Council should adopt the Brit-
ish government’s draft resolution calling on Iran to revoke its expulsion 
order and comply with the provisional measures indicated by the ICJ. 
This would ensure that “the role of law in international affairs is upheld, 
to say nothing of the prevalence of reason.” 10 Jebb continued that “on 
behalf of intelligent against unintelligent … the resolution will create a 
landmark in the vast process of peaceful adjustment between ancient East 
and the industrialized West,” which constituted the “major problem of 
our generation.” 11 Doctrines of international law could be put to work to 
manage and maintain relations between those countries anchored in the 
past (the ancient East), constituting a threat to peace and security, and 
those in the present (the industrialized West). 
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 International law and security were an expression of civilization that 
enabled British legal experts to step outside local constraints, “it was 
thought, and thus acquire a universal vision and understanding.” 12 The 
transformation of the oil controversy in international legal and security 
terms was the difference between order and disorder in the dispute. If 
the dispute remained a domestic issue for municipal courts, it would be 
uncivilized and disordered, even though Iran’s arguments refl ected “cer-
tain incontrovertible and classic principles regarding sovereignty and 
domestic jurisdiction.” 13 The British government sought to exclude the 
local by framing its interests in terms of a peculiar battle, defi ning the 
universal struggle of an entire generation on behalf of the rule of law, 
reason, intelligence, and the industrialized West. This universality of the 
principles of international law and security “fi xed its difference from 
what was exceptional and local”—the Iranian government, oil workers, 
and public opinion—most obviously in their failure to follow “principles 
true in every country.” 14 
 As Anghie explains, attempts by countries such as Iran to regain con-
trol over their natural resources “generated a number of complex debates 
about several doctrines of international law.” 15 As in the 1933 concession 
crisis, the British sought to invoke this emergent international legal and 
security order to reestablish the authority of AIOC’s oil concession over 
any other possible arrangement. But this discussion does not aim to open 
up the details of court proceedings in order to get at the technolegal 
content of the dispute. Rather, it tracks how new mid-twentieth-century 
mechanisms of economic and legal governance, set up to deal with a new 
social reality of an expanded international community of nation-states, 
worked as a technique of political power that equipped the British with 
the power to associate Iran’s oil with foreign control and block national 
control of oil production. In this period, “developing states” such as Iran 
asserted their right to control and exploit their own resources by rely-
ing on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 16 
Such efforts were connected to other emerging issues including the right 
to nationalize, the right to economic development, and the right to 
self-determination. The problem was that these states had played no role 
in the formulation of international law, which originated in Europe and 
became “universally applicable” in the nineteenth century “as a conse-
quence of colonial expansion.” 17 
 First, in legal terms, every state has the undisputed right to vest prop-
erties and industries “which it owns in a national board or company.” 
This constitutes an exercise of national sovereignty. As Cheng explains, 
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however, “this right has a corollary duty,” the obligation to protect 
within its territory the rights of other states, and in particular, “the rights 
which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.” 18 In 
the exercise of its sovereign powers, therefore, a state is left by “inter-
national law with a great deal of discretion, which is the fi eld of the 
State’s domestic jurisdiction.” But, to the extent that a state has duties 
under “international—customary or treaty—law, the matter ceases to 
be one which is exclusively within its prerogative.” 19 While the Iranian 
government had the legal right to nationalize its oil resources within the 
fi eld of its domestic juridical order, so too was it limited in these rights 
by having to abide by certain duties under international law. If the Brit-
ish government believed that Iran had failed to protect the rights of its 
national, a private oil company, the fi eld of domestic jurisdiction in the 
exercise of Iran’s sovereign rights was suddenly open for intervention and 
redirection in international law. 
 Second, a state has the sovereign right of expropriating private prop-
erty within its territory, but is, at the same time, subject to international 
duties when the expropriation proceedings affect the property of aliens. 20 
Cheng explains that in legal terms, a state may, in “certain exceptional 
circumstances, under the right of self-preservation,” legitimately cancel a 
concession, “provided that compensation be paid to the concessionaire.” 21 
On the other hand, the case of cancellation does not entitle the “grantor 
Government unilaterally and arbitrarily to cancel the concession.” 22 Such 
an instance must be deferred to an “impartial or disinterested tribunal.” 
According to Article 26 of the 1933 concession, Iran was not granted 
the right to simply cancel the concession. Instead, both parties to the 
concession agreement needed to agree to an arbiter, as stated in Article 
22, and if they failed to do so, must resort to international law to appoint 
one. At the same time, the Iranian state, in “exceptional circumstances,” 
appeared to have the right of cancellation provided that compensation 
was paid to the British concessionaire. 
 Prior to the reconvening of the Security Council on October 15, 1951, 
the British government made such a case, fi ling a memorial with the ICJ, 
asking it to declare that Iran’s annulment of the concession and refusal 
to arbitrate was a denial of justice, and thus a violation of international 
law. 23 The memorial makes the case, as Cheng suggests above, that state 
sovereignty is not absolute but may be limited by international customary 
law and by obligations of a treaty or contractual character. 24 According 
to the British position, a state is not entitled to nationalize a concession 
if, by an international “contractual obligation towards the government 
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of the State of which the concessionaire is a national,” or by a provi-
sion in the concession, “it has expressly divested itself of the right to do 
so.” 25 In the legal view of the British memorial, the act of expropriation 
directed exclusively against foreigners constituted a “discriminatory” 
move exposing nationalization as a “disguise for confi scation.” 26 Even if 
the Iranian government was entitled to terminate the concession of 1933 
unilaterally, this right did not extend to Article 22 calling for arbitration. 
Thus, the British government sought to restore the certainty built into the 
concession’s terms by referring to its articles on arbitration and insisting 
that the Iranian government’s motives were hostile, having nothing to 
do with the political question of the right to national sovereignty over a 
natural resource. 
 The crux of the British argument, which would serve as the basis on 
which the ICJ would rest its fi nal judgment, was that the 1933 concession 
had a “double character.” “On the one hand it was a contract between 
two parties,” one a state and the other, “not a State but a national” of the 
United Kingdom. 27 On the other hand, the concession implied an agree-
ment between the government of the United Kingdom and the Iranian 
government. In 1901, a “prima facie international obligation” (a conces-
sion framed in international diplomacy terms) was established upon a 
state, Iran, to observe the terms of the concession granted to a “foreigner,” 
William Knox D’Arcy, such that the obligation was extended toward 
the United Kingdom, of which the foreigner was a national. Thus, the 
“international responsibility” of the “grantor state,” Iran, was engaged. 
This international obligation embodied a “contractual character,” and 
therefore, according to the British government, “may be described as an 
implied treaty or convention between the two States concerned.” The con-
cession also had the character of an Iranian law, but this did not prevent it 
from having the character of a contract or treaty too. 28 These legal points 
would serve as the basis for transforming the law by “internationalizing” 
concession contracts to enable foreign corporations such as AIOC to take 
on a “quasi-sovereign status” and deal with non-Western states such as 
Iran on an international playing fi eld rather than a local-national one. 29 
Anghie further clarifi es that “whether a quasi-treaty between a sovereign 
and a quasi-sovereign entity, or a contract between two private parties, 
what is common to both characterizations is the real reduction of the 
powers of the sovereign Third World state with respect to the Western 
corporation.” 30 As discussed in previous chapters, the concession’s terms 
also maintained an ambiguity that could be exploited by multiple sides 
with confl icting interests. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
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ambiguity led to situations of immense uncertainty and opened the door 
for pursuing alternative political arrangements of the energy system. 
 The British government’s case rested on two grounds. First, there was 
an international dispute between the two governments arising from the 
fact that the British government, in exercise of its right of diplomatic 
protection of its nationals, had taken up the case of AIOC when Iran 
purported to cancel the D’Arcy Concession of 1901. Both governments 
accepted the new concession in the settlement of 1933 as solving the 
international dispute, the British side argued. The memorial explained 
that “when there has been an international dispute between two Govern-
ments … there arises under international law an obligation binding the 
two governments to observe the terms of the settlement.” 31 This obliga-
tion arose even though the resolution was in the form of a concessionary 
contract between a state and a private company. 
 The second contention was that the 1933 dispute, presented by the 
two governments before the Council of the League of Nations, was 
removed from the Council’s agenda when, “but not until,” the conces-
sion had entered into force on its ratifi cation by the Majlis and approval 
by the shah. 32 According to the British truth-making strategy, both dis-
puting governments and the Council had agreed on the withdrawal of 
the fi rst concession dispute from the League in 1933. In other words, 
the act was the “equivalent of a resolution of the League accepted 
by the two parties,” declaring that the dispute should be settled by enforc-
ing and observing the 1933 concession. It is important to note here that 
the Council’s actual ruling never expressed an opinion on the legality 
of the cancellation, the role of jurisdiction for the case itself, whether 
constituting diplomatic protection or a question for Iranian municipal 
law, or the legality of claims concerning the role of the company in its 
treatment of Iranian labor and its social impact on Khuzistan. While the 
ruling acknowledged “the important questions of law” concerning the 
case, the Council had simply approved a provisional agreement with 
both parties agreeing to the suspension of further proceedings. The legal 
standpoint of each party, as stated before the Council, remained “entirely 
reserved.” 33 
 The British memorial made its case for the “double character” of the 
concession by framing its role in terms of a historical entanglement in 
both the signing of the 1901 concession contract and its revision in the 
1933 concession. The British position relied on particular truth-making 
strategies to frame the history of the oil concession in legal terms that 
secured the British government’s backing of AIOC in 1901, 1933, and 
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now 1951. This strategy relied on an assemblage of contracts, legal argu-
ments, memorandums, provisional measures, meetings and delays, diplo-
macy in Tehran and London, international boycotts, and institutions of 
international law and security. 34 Working through the technolegal details 
of the dispute, over the course of two decades, has exposed the trans-
formative work of the law in action—that is, the building and exten-
sion of British contractual control from oil operations in southwest Iran 
to international sites abroad and back. International law and security 
worked as technologies of intervention and control, helping the British 
side strengthen its bargaining position by transforming the political ques-
tion of national control into a battlefi eld of legal technicality. 
 Contrary to the British position, the Iranian government did not want 
to associate international law with the fl ow of income from oil prof-
its. Allahyar Saleh presented the legal basis of Iran’s case to the Security 
Council, but this time on the grounds of a nationalist truth-making strat-
egy that sought to include the political question of national control of 
the oil. First, he argued that the Council did not have competence to deal 
with the dispute because the oil resources of Iran, “like its soil, its rivers 
and mountains, are the property of the people of Iran.” 35 This ownership 
and authority constituted inalienable rights that rested on Iran’s national 
sovereignty and equality among the other sovereign states of the commu-
nity of nations and of the UN. He argued that the provision in the “Law 
Regulating Nationalization” on compensation to AIOC, 36 and the offer 
to employ British staff, together demonstrated Iran’s exercise of its sover-
eign rights, which was not “injurious to others.” 37 
 Saleh associated the law with universal principles of sovereign rights. 
He argued that it was a settled principle of international law that in 
matters of domestic concern to which the dispute related, the exercise 
of sovereign rights “can neither be abridged nor interfered with by any 
foreign sovereign or international body.” 38 Referring to Articles 1 and 
2 of the UN Charter, he argued that their terms provided the basis for 
Iran’s position that the Council was incompetent to intervene in the oil 
dispute. 39 Invoking articles from the UN Charter as a legal defense repre-
sented an early attempt among “developing states” to use the UN General 
Assembly “to create a different type of international law,” one that would 
work favorably in their interests when dealing with the West, particularly 
Western corporations. 40 The Iranian government had previously argued 
at the League of Nations that the 1933 concession was a “private agree-
ment between the AIOC and the Iranian government,” which could not 
limit Iran’s sovereign rights to dispose of its resources as it saw fi t. The 
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British government had acted in violation of international law by seek-
ing to “usurp Iran’s sovereign rights in matters of domestic concern, by 
interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, by placing its armed forces” near 
Iran, and by its “abusive use” of the ICJ. The sovereignty of states, argued 
Saleh, rested within the principles and laws established in Iran. 41 Saleh 
rebutted the British argument that the Security Council was competent, 
but his country was at a disadvantage in terms of strength—its military 
and economy were weaker than those of the British government, whose 
warships had gathered in the vicinity of Iran. 
 How the Law Was Transformed by Oil 
 After a series of delays on both sides, the Iranian government made its 
“Preliminary Objection” to the British government’s mémoire of October 
10, 1951, addressing the competence of the ICJ, on February 4, 1952. 42 
The “Iranian Declaration” limited the jurisdiction of the ICJ to disputes 
arising “after the ratifi cation of the said Declaration” and similarly with 
regard to treaties or conventions. 43 The said “Declaration” confi ned itself 
to the Iranian government’s undertaking to “respect in regard to British 
nationals the rules of general international law, the violation of which,” 
it argued, was not invoked by the British government and therefore did 
not provide grounds for the institution of proceedings before the Court. 44 
The Iranian government attempted to deconstruct the legal formulation 
put forward by the British by arguing that the concession did not possess 
the character of a treaty or convention because it was not made between 
two states, nor was it registered with the League of Nations as such. 
Thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction. 
 On July 22, 1952, over a year after the British government’s “Applica-
tion,” the ICJ ruled that the Court had no jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian 
oil nationalization dispute. 45 Anghie, who is quoting Ian Brownlie, 
explains that before the Second World War, the notion that concession 
contracts might operate on the fi eld of international law was “heretical.” 46 
Furthermore, in 1952, the ICJ had “declared in effect that an agreement 
between a state and a corporation was simply a concessionary agreement 
and could not be elevated to international law.” On the one hand, the 
truth-making strategies pursued by the British government and AIOC 
had provided a technical means for successfully delaying a resolution of 
the crisis until connections to other circuits and agencies—such as the 
fl ow of oil and income to the Iranian government—could be stabilized in 
an advantageous way. On the other hand, this strategy of temporization 
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and its connections to impeding fl ows of Iranian oil and revenues had 
failed to win the backing of international law. 47 The Court argued that 
Iran obviously had “special reasons” for drafting the “Iranian Declara-
tion” in a restrictive manner and excluding earlier circumstances. At the 
time, Iran denounced all treaties with other states relating to the regime 
of capitulations, uncertain as to the legal impact of these unilateral acts. 
It was unlikely that Iran would have willingly agreed to submit to an 
international court disputes relating to all of its treaties. Earlier treaties 
did not apply and thus the United Kingdom could not rely on them. 48 
 The Court ruled that the 1933 concession had not resulted in an agree-
ment between two governments, which may be regarded in terms of its 
“double character.” The concession did not possess a double character 
because the United Kingdom was “not a party to the contract,” which 
did not constitute a link between two governments or regulate relations 
between them. Under the contract, Iran could not claim any rights from 
the United Kingdom that it may claim from AIOC, nor could it perform 
any obligations toward the United Kingdom that it was bound to per-
form to AIOC. This “juridical situation,” argued the ICJ, “is not altered 
by the fact that the concessionary contract was negotiated through the 
League of Nations.” 49 At the League, the United Kingdom had exercised 
its “right of diplomatic protection in favour of one of its nationals,” and 
this had nothing to do with the contractual relation between Iran and 
AIOC. 50 Thus, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. 
 The ICJ’s judgment appeared to transport the dispute back to the 
domestic arena in Iran, suggesting that Iran’s unilateral nationalization 
of AIOC was legal. However, the ICJ ruling did not induce the British 
to relax the boycott of Iran’s oil at all. 51 As Heiss explains, the British 
considered the court ruling to serve “simply as a recognition that it could 
not decide the dispute, not a ruling that AIOC claims were invalid.” 52 
The British government’s decision to resort to the rules of international 
law and security was intended to mark the difference between order and 
violence in the dispute, bringing the truth and order of the principle of 
law to the disorder of striking workers in the oilfi elds and a nation lack-
ing in technolegal knowledge to take over an industry. Following the 
circuitry built between the control of oil in southwest Iran and techni-
cal arguments concerning international law and security has revealed the 
British strategy to temporize and delay in order to achieve an advan-
tageous resolution. But this strategy of diversion failed to achieve the 
desired domination from London and the strengthening of the British 
bargaining position. Instead, international law ruled in favor of Iranian 
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sovereignty in what would become known as a landmark case called 
“the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (United Kingdom v. Iran),” which 
set the precedent for future disputes between national governments and 
foreign fi rms over the control of natural resources. 
 The law was transformed by its encounter with Anglo-Iranian oil hav-
ing to make adjustments, for the fi rst time, to deal with a national govern-
ment intervening in a foreign-controlled industry to take control of it in 
the name of political sovereignty over its natural resources. International 
law regarding contracts claimed a universality that was, in practice, “spe-
cifi cally devised to deal with a type of agreement to which only Third 
World states were parties”—that is, “economic development agreements” 
such as the concession contract. In an emerging mid-twentieth-century 
context of resource nationalism, it was no longer possible for Western 
powers to resort to international law in order to preserve a distinction 
between the order of laws and contracts and the question of political sov-
ereignty over a nation’s resources. The law would have to be transformed. 
To survive, the British could not acknowledge the truth of international 
law, namely that the ICJ had made any decision regarding the legality or 
validity of AIOC’s concessionary role in Iran’s oil operations. Competing 
formulations of the law and concession terms did succeed, however, as a 
temporizing strategy, but they did not work alone, nor were they entirely 
successful in attaching themselves to other kinds of circuits to impede the 
fl ow of oil and income accrued to the Iranian government. The next step 
in avoiding any further disruption to the British monopoly over Iran’s oil 
was to enroll another set of circuitry between oil and a new institution of 
global economic governance, the World Bank. 
 “Masterly Inactivity” at the World Bank 
 As it battled to stabilize the authority of AIOC’s concession, the British 
side had shown extreme inventiveness in transforming and transport-
ing the dispute to multiple sites in the international arena. According to 
Louis, “British policy pursued the hallowed course of ‘Masterly Inactiv-
ity,’” which meant putting forward “no constructive solution” to the oil 
dispute. 53 There were good reasons for this, he notes, “as any alternative 
to AIOC would mean the breaking of the British monopoly.” One such 
occasion for protecting British monopoly interests was the enrollment of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, also 
known as the World Bank) in the fi rst half of 1952. With Anglo-Iranian 
negotiations deadlocked and no sign of economic assistance, 54 Robert 
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Garner, the vice president of the World Bank, took the opportunity to 
offer his bank’s services in order to break the stalemate during Mosad-
diq’s visit to the United Nations. 55 The World Bank had been established 
in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference to aid postwar reconstruction 
and Third World economic development. 56 As successor to the Mandate 
System of the League of Nations, it represented one of a series of inter-
national regulatory organizations, such as the United Nations and the 
International Court of Justice, which developed during the mid-twentieth 
century to formulate “new techniques with which to bridge the differ-
ence” between “the developed” and “the developing” countries. 57 One of 
the fi rst instances in which the bank’s powers were built was by proposing 
a series of technical arrangements for a resolution of the Anglo-Iranian 
oil dispute. 
 World Bankers of the 1950s, such as Garner, had professional iden-
tities as “economic professionals,” deploying their technical expertise 
to manage crises such as the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute in terms of an 
“artifi cial dichotomy,” a kind of economic purifi cation, between so-called 
“political” problems and “economic” ones. 58 The bankers sought to limit 
national politics erupting in Iran (and Egypt) because they threatened to 
undermine future prospects for economic development and participation 
in the world economy. With no single raw material as important to the 
global economy of the 1950s as oil, the World Bankers saw an oppor-
tunity to use the bank’s international identity to achieve a solution and 
boost the world economy. This strategy was most important in light of 
the British government’s failure to enroll international law and security 
in the resumption of AIOC’s oil operations. 
 The World Bank sought to act as a mediator in the dispute because the 
crisis was having a negative effect on the world economy and especially 
on the British and Iranian governments, which were deprived of their 
oil profi ts. 59 As Staples explains, the World Bankers believed that if they 
solved the economic problems of the dispute and resumed Iranian oil 
operations, the so-called political aspects of the crisis would become less 
urgent, each side would become more fl exible, and outstanding issues 
would ultimately be settled. If the situation worsened, however, Iran 
would suffer from economic recession; this could undermine the govern-
ment and provoke a civil war among Iran’s political groups. The British 
would also suffer from losing signifi cant AIOC tax revenues and the most 
important source of the Royal Navy’s fuel oil. Finally, “the West” might 
lose Iran to communist takeover. The bankers decided to act. 
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 To ease the fi nancial diffi culties on both sides of the dispute and cre-
ate a suitable environment for achieving a long-term settlement, Garner 
outlined a plan to Mosaddiq. The bank would provide the funds needed 
to resume oil operations and would then act as a trustee of the oilfi elds 
and the Abadan refi nery, operating the properties and marketing the oil 
through established AIOC distribution channels. 60 Proceeds from the 
sale of oil, deducting the bank’s operating costs, were to be held in a 
trust pending a fi nal compensation settlement between Iran and AIOC. 
Mosaddiq encouraged Garner to make this same proposal to the British, 
who believed that the bank’s scheme offered possibilities. 61 In his reply 
to Garner, which was circulated to AIOC managers, Mosaddiq said that 
any intervention on the part of the bank to exploit the oil resources of 
Iran should be regarded as a delegation of authority from the Iranian 
government. The bank must act on behalf of the Iranian government. 62 
The controversy over the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian oil was now 
bound up in multiple legal and economic institutions of international 
governance. To survive, the Iranian side needed to strengthen its bargain-
ing power on a global stage by attempting to set the terms by which a 
resolution would happen. 
 On the British side, “masterly inactivity” also meant “keeping the 
Americans in play” while retaining British control. 63 In a confi dential 
meeting between AIOC manager Neville Gass, Garner, and US State 
Department offi cials, the latter expressed a preference for avoiding the 
threat of militant nationalism by abandoning interim arrangements and 
pursuing a longer-term settlement. State Department offi cials suggested 
a plan for Iranian management control. 64 They argued that although 
sums of money received under the proposed new agreement would not 
be suffi cient to “keep communism at bay” in Iran, the conclusion of an 
agreement, whether in the short or long term, would enable Mosaddiq 
to redirect his attention from “action against the British to action against 
the [communist] Tudeh Party,” a group they assumed “would oppose vio-
lently any settlement.” 
 With tentative approval from both sides, the World Bank staff drafted 
a formal proposal intended to save the Iranian oil industry and appease 
Iranian nationalism. British, Iranians, and Americans all looked to the 
bank as the “best chance” for bringing a constructive end to the crisis. 65 
To restore the fl ow of oil quickly and protect the legal rights of all parties, 
the World Bankers believed that they must exercise exclusive managerial 
control, including full discretion to hire and fi re personnel. 66 Staples sug-
gests that the bank’s staff “mistakenly believed the Iranians would accept 
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the reintroduction of British workers,” as long as they were responsible 
to the World Bank and “therefore, implicitly apolitical.” 67 
 The bankers worked hard to avoid the entanglement of political ques-
tions with economic and technical ones by separating the issues, a kind 
of purifi cation that framed the controversy advantageously to avoid a 
disruption of international oil markets. In contrast, the Iranians, led by 
Mosaddiq, insisted that any settlement, interim or fi nal, was a matter of 
national sovereignty and prestige. Therefore, a fi nal settlement “could not 
be reduced to technicalities.” 68 The bank’s focus on economic issues as 
largely mirroring the position of AIOC “failed to grasp the dimensions of 
Iranian nationalism.” 69 
 In the end, Mosaddiq broke off talks with the bank because of its 
insistence on discounted oil sales to Great Britain. 70 The negotiations 
also stalled due to Mosaddiq’s insistence that “‘fair compensation’ would 
be based on the current value of the oil installations.” 71 AIOC’s under-
standing of “fair compensation” was “based not on current value but 
on projected profi ts … into 1993.” America’s rejection of Mosaddiq’s 
formula for compensation “became part and parcel of the destabilization 
strategy” that led to the coup in August 1953. The crisis escalated. Three 
days prior to the bank’s mission to the oilfi elds, a riot broke out in Teh-
ran protesting the intervention of the World Bank in the crisis. Iranian 
public opinion was against transforming the dispute into an international 
legal, security, and now fi nancial issue. Mosaddiq viewed the bank as 
a tool of the British, unless Garner recognized Iran’s full control of its 
oil industry and the bank itself as acting solely on behalf of the Iranian 
government. Any suggestion otherwise would violate the spirit of Iran’s 
nationalization decree. 72 Attempting to ease Iranian offi cials’ concerns, 
Garner insisted that the bank was acting as a “friendly, neutral facilita-
tor,” framing its strategy on the basis of a sound economic and business 
rationale. 
 The impasse between the World Bank’s economic approach and Ira-
nian nationalism continued as Garner worked with oil consultant, Wal-
ter Levy to make another attempt to reach an interim settlement. Levy 
spelled out a highly detailed interim arrangement that split the profi ts 
from oil production and refi nery operations on a 50–50 basis, with the 
World Bank serving as interim manager over oil operations and market-
ing. 73 The arrangement still contained the stipulation that a necessary 
number of foreign technicians must be employed. But the “real question,” 
advised Levy, “is always whether the repercussions of any arrangement 
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… are likely to affect our national interest in a worse manner than if we 
would have no settlement at all.” 74 
 Garner traveled to Iran in February 1952 to make a second attempt 
at an arrangement. With the assistance of Torkild Rieber, Hector 
Prud’homme, and the bank’s legal and economic team, Garner submit-
ted a memorandum of agreement that Staples says “concealed some very 
diffi cult problems,” and perhaps was “deliberately designed to do so.” 75 
The arrangement gave Iran veto power over all marketing arrangements, 
and the two sides agreed to a two-way split of profi ts, with AIOC’s share 
going into an account on which the company could draw after the dis-
puted points in the crisis has been settled. The issue of British technicians 
and the pricing of Iranian oil remained unresolved. The bank refused to 
accept Iran’s conditions that it was operating solely on behalf of Iran. 
In a fi nal and desperate plea, Garner fi rst asked the British government 
to withdraw its case from the ICJ, which he believed would appease 
Mosaddiq’s government and enable the readmittance of British techni-
cians. Second, Garner invited Hossein Maki, Mosaddiq’s oil adviser, to 
visit the United States and consult with American oilmen at the bank’s 
expense. 76 The World Bankers hoped this would “enlighten Iranians 
about the facts of the situation,” making them realize that “technical, 
rather than political, criteria determined the bank’s insistence on read-
mitting British nationals.” The failure of the World Banker’s attempt to 
mediate the oil dispute did not merely signify the bank’s attachment to 
an international “apolitical identity.” On the contrary, it was the outcome 
of a series of arrangements and strategies that, for decades, deliberately 
aimed to transform political issues into economic and technical ones to 
build connections that would keep international oil markets stable. 
 The World Bank’s strategy of mediating the dispute worked as another 
technology of intervention and control, not unlike the oil boycott and 
international proceedings at the ICJ and UN. It had failed to achieve a 
real resolution to the nationalization controversy, but it succeeded as a 
temporizing strategy to undermine Iran’s sovereignty by ensuring that 
nationalization did not happen according to the formulations proposed 
by the Mosaddiq government. 77 Examining the technical details of the 
bankers’ work has revealed their connections to other interests and agen-
cies. These included the British and American governments, oil industry 
experts, and a new international fi nancial order concerned with man-
aging the political threat of Iran’s oil nationalization and avoiding its 
spread to other countries with national claims to their resources such as 
the Suez Canal in Egypt. 78 
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 Regime Change 
 The history of Iran’s attempt to nationalize its British-controlled oil 
industry involved the failure of a series of technolegal and fi nancial 
arrangements at multiple sites at The Hague, the UN Security Council, 
and the World Bank. The arrangements appeared to operate as potential 
solutions but worked in practice as political weapons by helping to sep-
arate economic and technical concerns from political ones, leaving open 
the possibility for other more undemocratic political arrangements of the 
energy system. The Mosaddiq government refused all of the formulations 
for a compromise put forward. A permanent settlement needed to be 
devised to keep AIOC’s interests alive, but without placing the manage-
ment of operations solely within the hands of either AIOC or a subsidiary. 
 British and AIOC offi cials considered more violent political outcomes 
that might bring about the downfall of Mosaddiq. 79 The Mosaddiq gov-
ernment was unlikely to agree to AIOC or a subsidiary of AIOC returning 
to operate in Iran for the foreseeable future, if at all. As British offi cials 
began to redirect their energies toward bringing AIOC in line with gov-
ernment policy, William Fraser, chairman of AIOC, refused to discuss any 
new scheme with American offi cials until it was clear “under what condi-
tions Mossadeq falls,” who would be his successor, and what line his suc-
cessor would take. 80 Fraser preferred a fi nal settlement, but he doubted 
whether this was a practical solution, in the event of the overthrow of the 
Mosaddiq government. Instead, some sort of interim arrangement must 
be set up as a short-term solution with a new Iranian government. 
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, American oil expert Walter Levy 
fi rst developed the idea for the consortium arrangement in early discus-
sions with Iranian government offi cials in 1951, but according to Louis, 
“the actual architect” of the reorganization of the Iranian oil industry on 
the British side was Peter Ramsbotham, then at the oil desk of the Brit-
ish Foreign Offi ce. 81 Ramsbotham argued that whatever the “concession” 
amounted to before in Iran must be “replaced.” He envisioned a “con-
tractual arrangement” in which a new company would negotiate a 50–50 
profi t-sharing agreement with the Iranian government. AIOC would 
receive compensation for losses, possibly through arbitration. Ramsboth-
am’s proposed arrangement involved a new managing company operat-
ing as a “façade that would enable the Iranians to save face.” The new 
agreement would also include a guarantee to prevent the Iranians from 
interfering “in the company’s day to day operations.” A British company 
could not operate as the sole company in Iran because this would be “too 
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transparent a restoration of British monopoly.” 82 British government offi -
cials including Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, did not like Rams-
botham’s novel suggestion of bringing in American companies. Interests 
were shifting, however, and even Fraser was coming to agree in principle 
to a management company in which the major American oil companies 
might participate. 83 
 Another political crisis ignited when the shah agreed to dismiss 
Mosaddiq and replace him with Qavam briefl y in July 1952, coinciding 
with the ICJ ruling that it had no jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian oil dis-
pute. Mosaddiq returned to power after only a few days in July 1952. 84 
The Americans feared that the economic collapse of the Mosaddiq regime 
might open the door for communist rule. Thus, economic assistance was 
necessary to counter what they viewed as Tudeh exploitation of the chaos 
and poverty. The British, on the other hand, acknowledged the threat 
posed by the Tudeh, but did not believe Mosaddiq could be appeased, 
nor would economic assistance impact the political situation. The crisis 
of July 1952, however, aligned the British more closely with the American 
view that if an oil agreement was to be reached, AIOC could not return 
alone. 85 
 Policy lines ultimately shifted toward Anglo-American unity in the 
dispute. Unbeknownst to AIOC offi cials, whom Louis says “played no 
part in either the origins of the intervention or its execution,” the British 
government had put plans in place to overthrow Mosaddiq since 1951. 86 
They regarded three possible candidates for the replacement of Mosad-
diq: Sayyed Sia and Qavam al-Saltaneh, former premier during the Azer-
baijan crisis of 1946, and Fazlollah Zahedi, the army general. 87 British 
support for Qavam stemmed from their belief that he would collaborate 
in the conclusion of an agreement “satisfactory to the AIOC.” 88 In the 
company view, Fraser argued that there was no rush for AIOC to return 
to Iran straightaway, as the Kuwait oilfi elds had already more than recov-
ered losses from Abadan. 89 
 With Mosaddiq restored to power, British and American government 
offi cials embarked on a series of “joint proposals” to the Iranian govern-
ment as a solution to the oil dispute. 90 Offi cials at the British Ministry 
of Fuel and Power believed that future discussions between AIOC and 
the Iranians must proceed on an “entirely new basis.” 91 The result was 
the Truman-Churchill proposal of September 1952 whereby the amount 
of compensation to AIOC would be arbitrated. 92 AIOC would negotiate 
with the Iranian government for the resumption of oil production and 
the United States would grant $10 million in budgetary aid. Mosaddiq 
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responded with a demand for £50 million as an advance against the 
oil. This, argues Louis, was another turning point because the Ameri-
cans now moved closer to the British assumption that it was “impossi-
ble to do business with Mosaddegh.” Thus, British policy now shifted 
from “inactivity” to engineering the overthrow of a foreign, national 
government. 
 The Mosaddiq government expelled the British diplomatic mission in 
October 1952, and all diplomatic ties between the British government 
and Iran were broken. This marked a critical period when British and 
American interests collaborated in covert operations to overthrow the 
Mosaddiq government. MI6 relinquished control of its intelligence net-
work to the CIA, which marked a decisive shift from the period prior to 
October 1952, when the plan to remove the Mosaddiq government was 
solely “British in inspiration.” 93 
 The details of “Operation Ajax,” as it was known in American cir-
cles, to overthrow Mosaddiq in August 1953, have been well assessed 
in the scholarship. 94 The British and Americans aimed to engineer the 
installation of a pro-Anglo-American government in order to reach an 
advantageous resolution of not only the oil question, but also the Cold 
War battle against communist interests. 95 This entailed the building of a 
series of alliances and the enrollment of concerned groups to ensure that 
the Iranian government would actively participate in the takeover of its 
oil industry by participating in an international oil consortium framed as 
national control. With no constructive solution in sight, Anglo-American 
governments and corporate oil interests turned to a more fundamental 
political arrangement—regime change—through which Iranians would 
help execute the foreign takeover of the oil industry. 
 The 1953 coup and the reengineering of Iran’s national government 
effectively closed off the political possibility of more democratic forms 
of oil production as originally demanded by oil workers, backed by the 
communist party and national public opinion. The coup did not mark the 
start or the end of the nationalization dispute over oil. Rather, it was one 
connection among a series of connections, confl icting interests, and alli-
ances that continued to transform Iran into a “clinic” for the stabilization 
of private-public Anglo-American oil interests and a recasting of their 
interests as necessary for securing “strategic concerns” of the Cold War 
battle against Soviet expansion. 96 It was politically impossible for AIOC 
to return as the sole owner and operator of Iran’s oil operations. This 
shift in interests drastically weakened the company’s bargaining position 
and left open the possibility for American oil companies to redirect goals 
216  Chapter 6
and alliances in other directions, namely, the assembling of an Iranian oil 
consortium. 
 US National Security Apparatus 
 The working out of American interests in the resolution of an Iranian oil 
consortium commenced much earlier than the events of the 1953 coup. 
The American government had repeatedly claimed that if a solution to 
the nationalization crisis was not found, Iran’s economy would collapse 
from a lack of oil revenues, producing political instability and inviting 
communist control over the oil. 97 On the heels of Iran’s nationalization 
act in May 1951, US government offi cials fi rst consulted with American 
oil executives running operations in the Middle East about the possi-
bility of involving their operations in Iran. 98 What impact would this 
have on their concession areas, and what could be done to protect their 
position in different areas? Howard Page, representing Standard Oil of 
New Jersey, responded by arguing that it was inadvisable for American 
oil companies to work in Iran. American participation was sure to invite 
objections from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) regarding antitrust legislation. 
 American oil companies suddenly had a direct interest in controlling 
the amount of oil Iran was producing by participating in the joint venture 
of a consortium and avoiding the threat of competition. After World War 
II, massive newly proved oil reserves in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were 
controlled by the noncartel American oil companies, Gulf Oil, and Stan-
dard Oil of California (Socal), and this control threatened to introduce 
competition into world markets. In consequence, the activities of the post-
war oil cartel shifted from controlling market distribution to controlling 
the supply end of the petroleum system. 99 Anglo-American oil companies 
embarked on joint production and long-term supply arrangements in the 
Middle East, as a means of maintaining high oil prices and profi ts. First, 
the strategy was for companies to expand the number of interlocking, 
jointly owned production companies to unify their control of concessions 
and of oil output from Middle East sources. 100 Second, they established 
a system of long-term mutual supply contracts, under which they sold 
or reciprocally exchanged (i.e., bartered) enormous volumes (upward of 
a billion barrels) of oil and products among themselves at substantial 
mutual savings, while at the same time, quantitatively and geographi-
cally balancing surpluses and defi cits. If supply could be controlled at the 
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source, the elaborate market arrangements at the retail level throughout 
the entire world would be unnecessary. 
 The problem was that certain government agencies in the United States 
had an entirely different set of interests at stake concerning the antitrust 
activities of the largest American oil corporations and the interests of US 
national security in protecting the free fl ow of oil. Back in November 
1951, the FTC wrote and circulated within government circles the  Report 
on the International Petroleum Cartel , a study with damaging evidence 
that threatened to disrupt the stability of the energy system. 101 Oil com-
panies’ records indicated that their operations had retarded the develop-
ment of oil in certain Middle East countries and purposely drilled dry 
holes to comply with the legal technicalities of their contracts. The report 
evidenced that during the 1920s and 1930s, the largest Anglo-American 
oil companies had endeavored, through company agreements, to control 
and divide the world oil markets. 102 According to State Department offi -
cials, publication of the report would seriously undermine the position of 
oil companies as well as the Anglo-American position in the Middle East. 
Opponents of the oil companies, advocates of nationalization, and the 
communists would have a “substantial amount of material in the report 
indicating that the oil companies had acted contrary to the best interests 
of the countries concerned.” Also, the report was “highly embarrassing to 
the British” as it highlighted cartel activities through British operations in 
Iraq and IPC, in which AIOC was a shareholder. 
 Whereas the Federal Trade Commission identifi ed itself as an “inde-
pendent agency” with the authority to question the monopolistic activ-
ities of American corporations on behalf of the American consumer, the 
State Department recommended, in March 1952, that a request be put to 
the National Security Council (NSC) for a judgment on whether publi-
cation of the report would be “contrary to the national interest.” 103 The 
State Department was attempting to put a gag order on the FTC. A battle 
over Anglo-Iranian oil was forming among American government agen-
cies framed in legal, commercial, or foreign policy terms, depending on 
the interests at stake. These were the kinds of procedures and connections 
through which the resolution of Iran’s oil nationalization controversy 
shaped the building of a different kind of international petroleum order 
focused solely on placing limits to world oil supplies. 
 The release of the FTC study was held up at the request of the State 
Department due to the “sensitive negotiations which were going on in 
an effort to straighten out the Iranian situation.” 104 In a letter to the 
chair of the FTC, Dean Acheson, the secretary of state, made his case 
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in terms of America’s national foreign policy interests. He warned that 
the publication of the report would affect the “foreign policy aims of 
the United States in the Middle East” and could “seriously impair their 
attainment.” 105 Mixing economic and political concerns, Acheson argued 
that the report would inevitably be “interpreted by the peoples of the 
region as a statement that, were it not for such agreements, they would 
be getting a higher return from their oil resources.” 106 This would moti-
vate movements such as the one in Iran for renegotiation of the present 
concession agreement and could give encouragement to groups push-
ing for nationalization. “Since the issues are not only economic but also 
political,” explained Acheson, “the net effect will probably be to cause a 
decrease in the political stability of the region.” 107 
 State Department offi cials were connecting economic and technical 
issues of control and distribution to questions of national security, polit-
ical stability in the Middle East, and the threat of militant nationalism. 
Publication of the report would “prejudice prospects for a settlement of 
the Iranian oil controversy” by “damaging, perhaps, irreparably, the sta-
tus of the US as mediator between the UK and Iran.” 108 Exposing details 
of the report would therefore contribute to economic deterioration in 
Iran, and increase opportunities for communist subversion to organize 
workers and gain control of the oil. Politics was factored into arguments 
about economic and technical concerns when it favored US interests and 
protected those of the oil companies. 
 The State Department connected the dispute over the FTC report to 
a peaceful resolution of the Iranian oil crisis, by framing its release as a 
problem of national security. The Department of Justice challenged this 
framing by transforming the problem into a legal-national issue. On July 
17, 1952, the Department of Justice announced that a Federal Grand 
Jury would conduct an investigation into international oil cartel activities 
involving the fi ve largest American oil majors, AIOC, and Royal Dutch 
Shell. Seeking to maintain a separation between the legal question of anti-
trust activities abroad and the political question of American national 
security in the Middle East, President Truman advised the FTC chair-
man, James Mead to declassify and release the report, “if the deletions 
and revisions suggested by you are made.” 109 Furthermore, British offi -
cials pursued a similar line, insisting to the US attorney general that the 
Department of Justice could not expect to obtain the records of AIOC’s 
overseas activities on the grounds of British national interest. 110 National 
Security Resolution 138 ruled that publication of the FTC report would 
have a “catastrophic effect” on American and British oil companies in 
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Venezuela and the Middle East, owing to the loss of oil sources to the 
“free world.” 111 National security considerations required that nothing 
interfere with the free fl ow of petroleum and petroleum products from 
Venezuela and the Middle East. The Court conveniently annulled the sub-
poena for AIOC’s records. 112 
 NSC 138 helped protect the cartel arrangements of the largest 
Anglo-American oil companies by building a connection between the res-
olution of the Iranian oil dispute and the national security of the United 
States. 113 The US government was shifting from its role as mediator 
between the British government, AIOC, and the Iranian government to 
the leading spokesperson. The device of national security also helped Tru-
man make the fi nal gesture, opening the door for American oil companies 
to consider participation in controlling Iran’s oil: he ordered the US attor-
ney general, James McGranery, to transform the antitrust case from a 
criminal proceeding into a civil action suit. 114 This would help delay pro-
ceedings against the international cartel by four to eight years. 115 Working 
in the interests of the American oil corporation, national security oper-
ated as an apparatus to enforce delays and construct layers of secrecy by 
blocking the public disclosure of evidence concerning the operations of 
American oil companies abroad with “national security implications”—
that is, the loss of oil sources to the so-called free world. 116 
 An attorney-at-law who worked in the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice recollected that by 1953 “the Iranian crisis caused 
decision making to be transferred from the Justice Department to the State 
Department and the National Security Council.” 117 The NSC ultimately 
issued policy directives that, “for all practical purposes, gutted the oil car-
tel case.” National security directives precluded the Justice Department 
from challenging the legality of joint production, joint refi ning, joint stor-
age, and joint transportation ventures among the seven largest oil compa-
nies. These are the very joint arrangements that were the most signifi cant 
features of the postwar supply cartel. Left open for prosecution were the 
older market cartel arrangements, which by then had become “relatively 
incidental to the basic joint venture, supply-control system.” 118 
 Government regulatory regimes and national security were some 
of the techniques that transformed postwar energy abundance into a 
system of limited supplies. 119 The system of limited supplies emerged 
through connections between US national security, American oil com-
panies, and mechanisms for managing the nationalization of Iran’s oil. 
The connections put in place a new consortium arrangement, which was 
constructed long before the American-led coup events of August 1953. 
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The US president and offi cials at the NSC and State Department worked 
hard to keep certain actors and interests in (i.e. the American oil com-
panies), and other rivals out (i.e., Department of Justice, FTC, militant 
nationalism, and communism). The history of these sociotechnical and 
national-legal assemblages exposes the co-construction of the power of 
government and nongovernment (corporate) entities with certain mutual 
interests at stake. These interests were represented as issues confi ned to 
the public-government domain of “national security,” foreign policy, and 
the fi ght against communism and militant nationalism. 
 Concession to Consortium: American Oil Majors Play “Dress Up” 
 The American oil companies and government needed to work together to 
achieve a solution in Iran sanctioned by US national law. Offi cials in the 
Truman administration advised the incoming Eisenhower administration 
to continue with this policy of achieving a coordinated solution. The new 
president must respect commitments on immunity from antitrust laws 
made by the outgoing Truman administration to employees of the US 
oil companies. 120 Eisenhower secured the approach by separating certain 
issues from others in discussions with the NSC. He argued that from 
a national security point of view, US oil companies must participate in 
an international consortium to purchase Iranian oil. 121 The NSC must 
ensure that “the problems of the cartel suit and the new consortium be 
kept wholly separate and distinct.” 122 
 Government offi cials, oil executives, and national laws came together 
as a matter of “patriotic duty” to achieve a solution to the Iranian oil 
problem. John Scott of the Socony-Vacuum Company and Harold Linder, 
assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, together agreed to “put 
AIOC and the other majors in the same frame of mind.” 123 State Depart-
ment offi cials invited oil company representatives to discuss participa-
tion in managing Iran’s oil in December 1952. Government offi cials 
emphasized the importance of Iran to peacetime national security, the 
importance of winning the consent of the British government for US par-
ticipation, and the necessity of reaching an agreement for compensation 
to AIOC. 124 
 The oil majors had no particular desire to move Iran’s oil as they 
had all taken steps to increase their production in other countries when 
Iranian oil stopped fl owing. Diffi culties would result with countries in 
which they had concessions, such as Saudi Arabia, which would be forced 
to cut back production in order to market Iranian oil. To maintain the 
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concessionary arrangement, which the Iranians would “never agree to,” 
an alternative arrangement might be put in place in the form of a man-
agement company to operate properties under a “management contract 
which had [the] same elements of [the] concession.” 125 The concessionary 
arrangement was “politically impossible,” argued Eugene Holman of the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, but a “contract could be worked 
out to have the same effect” under a different name. 126 
 The American government pursued discussions to coordinate with the 
oil companies in a new kind of management contract while at the same 
time assuming a position of neutrality in confronting the British and Ira-
nian governments. Prior to the Anglo-American engineered overthrow 
of the Mosaddiq government in August 1953, the US government was 
unwilling to pursue any explicit change in its position as an “interme-
diary … seeking a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian dispute.” 127 Having 
reached a technical and economic impasse, British and American offi cials 
attempted to resolve the crisis with a political move: the overthrow of the 
intransigent Mosaddiq and his replacement with a more pliable shah and 
prime minister, General Zahedi. 128 The events of the coup itself helped 
manage nationalization by enabling a shift from concessionary control 
to a consortium. In the face of anti-imperialist public opinion, govern-
ment offi cials and oil executives worked together to enroll the new Ira-
nian government in helping to restore foreign control of the nationalized 
oilfi elds. 
 “Ways must be found of ‘dressing up’ the operating contract” to make 
it acceptable in Iran. 129 The fi rst step was to employ a spokesperson to 
resolve the details of percentage participation, production quotas, com-
pensation, and pricing among the oil companies prior to negotiations 
with the Iranian government. The American government chose Herbert 
Hoover Jr., son of the former US president and himself former president 
of the Consolidated Engineering Corporation with years of experience in 
the oil business, as just the man to serve as the new consultant. 130 Hoover 
agreed to take the lead on the condition that the government would guar-
antee the cooperation of the major oil companies in making room on the 
market for Iranian oil and that the Department of Justice would cooper-
ate by not pressing the cartel suit. 131 
 To block the threat of “extreme nationalization,” American and British 
public-private interests were aligned with the position that the “negation 
of the Iranian nationalization proposal was inherent” in any proposal 
that would be put forward. 132 The arrangement was laid out in Hoover’s 
“proposed Iranian consortium plan.” 133 The so-called formula working 
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elsewhere in the Middle East and South America must also work in Iran. 
Iran’s parliamentary approval was “unquestionably required,” however, 
before full-scale operations could commence. 
 Accepting the reality that a British company could not return to Iran 
as the sole operator, British offi cials listened to Hoover’s explanations 
about the difference between a concession and the consortium arrange-
ment. 134 In the “old concession type of enterprise the concessionaire 
had the implied ownership and possession of the subsurface resources.” 
On the other hand, under the “more modern type of ‘contract’ agree-
ment, the operator acted as the agent for production, refi ning and mar-
keting,” whereas the national government “retained title to all subsurface 
resources until they reached the well-head.” 135 
 Hoover used a different approach in his discussions with the shah 
and the Iranian prime minister. The argument worked in strictly technical 
terms along the lines of Levy’s earlier strategy. If Iran were to dispose 
of any “appreciable quantity” of oil and its byproducts, it must use the 
same distribution channels controlled by the seven major oil companies 
moving the rest of Middle East oil. 136 This was the only way to maintain a 
system of limited oil supplies in a period of abundance, when oil supplies 
from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait could easily make up for any loss 
in Iran. 137 In 1974, at the congressional hearings prosecuting the inter-
national oil cartel, Howard Page, Middle East Coordinator for Exxon 
(Standard Oil of New Jersey), denied that the oil companies coerced the 
shah into dealing with the oil majors rather than with independent oil 
companies. To the contrary, Page explained, “the point is that we had 
the outlets for the oil.” 138 Over a half century after the fi rst oilfi elds were 
developed in Pennsylvania, the machinery of the transnational oil corpo-
ration had become an undeniable reality. Oil executives such as Page had 
intended to convey in no uncertain terms that the possibility of pursuing 
alternative arrangements of the energy system, by doing business with 
competitive and independent oil companies, was closed off. 
 Before embarking on negotiations between consortium members and 
the Iranian government, Hoover pursued one fi nal set of connections to 
ensure the stability of public-private American interests in Iran. The Amer-
ican oil majors were reluctant to conduct any concrete discussions with 
either British oil companies or the Iranian government for fear of being 
charged with violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 139 Hoover assured 
oil offi cials that he had established contact with the antitrust chief, Stan-
ley Barnes, at the Department of Justice, and with Herbert Brownell, the 
US attorney general. He requested that American oil majors explore a 
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cooperative agreement among themselves and with British companies so 
long as no actual agreement was signed. In response to similar inquiries 
by the oil companies, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained that 
the State Department for its part had “no objection” to the oil companies 
attending the meeting set up by Fraser, chair of AIOC, at the behest of 
Hoover. 140 Dulles assured American oil company representatives that the 
matter had been “cleared by the Department of Justice.” The attorney 
general confi rmed this, recommending that a representative of the US 
government such as Hoover attend the meetings. 141 
 There were uncertainties involved, however, in excusing the major oil 
companies from antitrust proceedings for the sake of restoring Iranian 
oil to world markets. The attorney general explained that approval by 
the Council of NSC 175 (US policy toward Iran) amounted to adopting 
a policy in the interest of national security, which was contrary to the 
antitrust laws of the United States. 142 As with the boycott, however, the 
provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950 could be deployed to 
safeguard “those involved” from charges of violating antitrust laws in 
the fi rst phase of consultation. 143 As for future phases, “implementation 
of plans would certainly involve violation.” It would be necessary to go 
to Congress “for relief,” argued the attorney general, and decisions might 
specifi cally be directed toward the problem of oil companies and Iran or 
all US companies doing business abroad. The national defense framing 
enabled the recasting of American oil interests as necessary for securing 
“strategic concerns” and the safe fl ow of cheap oil from the Middle East, 
without which “the allies’ economic plans for the postwar reconstruction 
of Europe would have been all but impossible.” 144 The engineering of 
these arrangements out of fl ows of Iranian oil supported American oil 
policy in the Middle East and its expansion. 
 Explanations put forward by the US State Department and oil majors 
about blocking communism and securing the continued supply of Middle 
Eastern oil have been reproduced in the scholarship on oil in the Middle 
East. 145 I am arguing that the problem was not about restoring the supply 
of Iranian oil but impeding and slowing it down to place constrictions 
on the fl ow of oil and income through strategies of delay. The mechanism 
of the consortium arrangement was precisely the means through which 
the control of Iranian oil production levels could be placed in the hands 
of the oil majors and block alternative political arrangements. Such an 
arrangement had to be successfully negotiated with the newly installed 
Zahedi government. 
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 American and British government and oil company interests appeared 
to be in alignment on key issues essential to managing Iran’s oil nation-
alization in a shifting international order. The question of compensation 
was transformed into a government-negotiated issue and the consortium 
delegation negotiated all other company arrangements and daily activi-
ties. This negotiating arrangement ensured that control of the industry 
was not relinquished to militant nationalism. National and local political 
actors—the Majlis, national public opinion, and oil workers—needed to 
be convinced that this particular arrangement of the energy system was 
the solution to resolving the crisis. 
 British government offi cials agreed with their American counterparts 
that stabilizing Iran’s political situation and protecting the country from 
communist infi ltration were more important than compensating AIOC. 146 
The United States hoped to promote political and economic stability by 
providing military and economic aid to expedite the settlement of the 
Anglo-Iranian dispute on terms that “assuaged Iranian nationalism,” pro-
tected the British position, and “squared with the oil agreements that 
US companies were negotiating with governments elsewhere.” 147 Zahedi 
received emergency aid from the United States worth approximately $45 
million but still required revenues from the sale of Iranian oil on the 
international market, which “depended on a successful resolution.” 148 
The Zahedi government resumed diplomatic relations with Britain in 
December 1953. As a “gesture to Iranian nationalism,” Zahedi would not 
allow AIOC to return as the sole operator of the Iranian oil industry, but 
only as a minority member in an international consortium that included 
the major American oil companies. 149 
 To reach a solution, British and US oil companies coordinated the 
exchange of information and policy, as well as reintroducing Iranian oil to 
world markets, which risked disrupting other energy fl ows and triggering 
a cutback in production in other Middle East countries. 150 Coordination 
and consultation between the US and British governments were essential 
to managing transit problems in Syria and Lebanon and imminent price 
talks between Saudi Arabia and Aramco as well as between Iraq and IPC. 
These larger connections to fl ows of oil elsewhere needed to be factored 
into any consortium arrangement with Iran. AIOC and British govern-
ment offi cials discussed their concerns about the Eastern Hemisphere’s 
dependence on Middle East oil in light of the new arrangements worked 
out in various Middle Eastern countries. The Middle East was forecasted 
to supply 90 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere’s oil requirements by 
1958 and 70 percent of Europe’s total requirements. However, there was 
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a lot of uncertainty concerning the pricing of oil in Iraq and Saudi Ara-
bia as these countries were “ganging up” on the oil companies with the 
aim of “extorting every cent they can.” 151 The “Arabs are as greedy as 
the Persians,” claimed British offi cials, “and have not learnt that extor-
tion does not pay.” Pipeline countries such as Syria and Lebanon were 
also demanding some form of 50–50 profi t sharing for transit rights. 152 
Aramco must not yield to Saudi pressure, which would “prejudice the 
position of other British and US Companies in the Middle East.” 153 
 Backed by the Anglo-American installed Zahedi government, Iranian 
negotiators attempted to build connections between fl ows of oil, income, 
and national control differently, but within the framework of a new 
consortium. Abdullah Entezam, the Iranian foreign minister, maintained 
that the return of the former oil company in any future settlement was 
“impossible.” 154 From his government’s perspective, negotiations looking 
toward the sale, transportation, and distribution of oil should be initi-
ated with representatives of “a group of large international companies.” 
This consortium would purchase oil from the NIOC, Iran’s national oil 
company, and undertake to handle its transportation and distribution. 
If other British fi rms wished to join the group, “their total shares must 
not exceed fi fty per cent.” In helping the Iranian oil industry recover, the 
Iranian government expected “considerable fi nancial aid” from the oil 
companies, which would be reimbursed from revenues accruing in future 
years. A settlement must be arranged between the consortium and the for-
mer oil company with “no claim for loss of profi ts … taken into consid-
eration.” Finally, “whenever the price of oil increases,” Iran’s government 
should “benefi t from such increases and its income should at no time 
be less than the maximum which accrues to others.” 155 Iran had learned 
from past disputes over the calculation of royalties and production rates 
to propose formulations that attempted to deconstruct the formulations 
of the new consortium members, but they were in a weaker bargaining 
position. 
 Questions about percentage shares, compensation, management domi-
cile, operational control, production levels, world energy supplies, and 
Iranian public opinion were central to the working out of a consortium 
arrangement in Iran and reaching a fi nal resolution to the nationalization 
crisis. Different sets of interests were at stake for different groups, and 
there was no clear divide between the so-called private interests of the oil 
companies and the public interests of their respective governments. 
 With American oil companies on board, US antitrust laws out of 
the way, and the consent of both the British government and AIOC to 
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American participation, Hoover moved to the complicated task of work-
ing out a consortium arrangement that Anglo-American parties could 
present to the Iranian government. The American government made 
sure that percentage shares of participation were settled before defi ni-
tive negotiations commenced with the Iranian government. 156 The State 
Department and British Foreign Offi ce fi nally agreed that AIOC along 
with the fi ve US oil companies should each hold a 40 percent share in the 
consortium, AIOC with 40 percent and the fi ve others splitting 40 per-
cent equally. The remaining 20 percent would be divided between Royal 
Dutch Shell and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP). 157 The US 
position regarding AIOC’s percentage participation was tied to its par-
ticular oil interests and its goal of bringing stability to Iran, which US 
offi cials continued to argue was crucial in view of the neighboring Soviet 
threat. 158 
 The fi nal agreement saw CFP settling for a 6 percent share, 14 per-
cent to Shell, and 40 percent each to AIOC and the group of fi ve US 
oil majors. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed his gov-
ernment’s unwillingness to see the American share rise above 40 per-
cent as any greater amount would have a damaging effect on the British 
balance of payments. 159 Despite the substantial British shareholding in 
Royal Dutch Shell, Heiss says its 14 percent share did not disturb the 
Americans as much as the 8 percent proposed for CFP, “perhaps because 
the Dutch owned 60% of the company,” or because they saw in Shell an 
“independent partner,” which would help appease the Iranian side. Thus, 
the British share in the consortium came to less than 50 percent, which 
AIOC fi nally agreed to in March 1954. 160 
 The British hoped that by conceding the size of AIOC’s share in the 
consortium, it might earn a “US quid pro quo” on the question of com-
pensation to be paid to AIOC for the loss of its dominant position in Iran. 
This was a key British demand and major sticking point in negotiations 
with Mosaddiq. On the other hand, the British fully understood the dan-
ger they faced from an independent US policy in Iran and the Middle 
East. 161 The American and British governments agreed they should decide 
between themselves how much compensation should be paid to AIOC but 
disagreed on the precise amount Iran should pay. 162 To prevent another 
breakdown of Anglo-American cooperation and due to their weaker bar-
gaining position, British offi cials lessened their demands, arguing that if 
a satisfactory profi t-sharing arrangement could be worked out with the 
Iranians, the British would settle for compensation somewhere between 
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$280 million, fi nally accepted by AIOC, and the mere $5 million pro-
posed by Hoover. 
 An assemblage of Anglo-American government and corporate inter-
ests with differing degrees of strength was taking shape as a set of con-
nections within a larger political project to develop the post–World War 
II international petroleum order on the basis of a particular arrangement 
of energy fl ows, fi nance, labor politics, international regulatory regimes, 
and US dominance. “Dressed up” as nationalization, particularly to the 
Iranian public, the new arrangement was merely a shift from the conces-
sion to the consortium format, in which the worldwide production, pric-
ing, and distribution of oil continued to follow monopoly arrangements 
set up by the largest transnational oil corporations, which NIOC was not 
one of. 
 “APQ” and the Infamous Law of Supply and Demand 
 Consortium members aimed to settle the dispute with the Iranian govern-
ment according to their own plans for compensation, management domi-
cile (nationality), and operational control, production levels, and pricing. 
The working out of these details would enable the largest oil companies 
to reengineer the postwar oil system into one based on placing limits on 
supplies. 163 One weapon to accomplish this involved a formula allowing 
the consortium alone to decide how much oil Iran would produce after 
the third year of the contract, having fi nally set the fi rst three years of 
production at fi fteen, twenty-fi ve, and thirty million tons respectively. 164 
Known as the “Aggregate Programmed Quantity” or APQ, this calcu-
lating technology had been secretly agreed on by the eight participating 
companies in order to implement a secret arrangement to maintain total 
control over oil production levels. 
 In 1954, Herbert Hoover Jr., U.S.-government-appointed spokesper-
son and negotiator at the consortium talks, met with representatives of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, the Gulf Oil Company, 
and the Texas Oil Company. They discussed the “probable terms” of a 
future agreement between the American oil industry, AIOC, and other 
foreign oil companies in which the role of APQ was revealed. First, the 
consortium members “would determine the total production and each 
member would take its proportion (based on capital contributions) of 
the oil and products.” Second, each consortium member was free to sell 
oil to any party and “group members will adjust over and under liftings 
among themselves by special agreement.” 165 Thus, the oil companies used 
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the calculating technology of APQ to ensure that the Iranian settlement 
would not cause trouble with production levels in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and other oil-producing countries. 
 The secret role of APQ in working out the consortium arrangement 
was fi nally made public in 1974. 166 It was the price that American oil 
majors extracted for agreeing to join the consortium. Combined with 
government quotas and price controls in the United States, and cartel 
arrangements to govern the worldwide distribution and marketing of 
oil, the consortium arrangement helped restrict the development of new 
oil discoveries in the Middle East. 167 Along with the secret mechanism 
of the APQ, this set of techniques and controls shaped the development 
of the transnational oil corporation, which emerged as a long-distance 
machinery for maintaining limits on the supply of oil in a period of 
abundance. 
 Consortium members—British Petroleum, Shell, Mobil, CFP, Esso, 
Texaco, Gulf, Socal, and Iricon 168 —voted on production levels, which 
were factored into a “rigid formula agreed to by Consortium participants 
in 1954.” 169 To calculate the APQ, nominations by each company on pro-
duction levels were translated into a production total required to provide 
each company with its desired volume based on its equity share in the 
consortium. Then, the “APQ volume” for the year was decided. Nomina-
tions were listed in descending order of magnitude until a cumulative 70 
percent equity level was reached. Fesharaki explains that the “crude short 
companies” such as Mobil, Shell, CFP, and Iricon consistently voted for 
the highest production levels. On the other hand, Socal, Exxon, Texaco, 
or Gulf, with large production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, usually voted 
lower ( table 6.1 ). 
 US Senate hearings on the international oil cartel and its antitrust 
activities were fi rst conducted in 1974. Jerome Levinson, chief counsel 
for the Senate committee, observed that “the historical APQ tables in 
the Iranian Consortium show that when you go to 70 percent to arrive 
at APQ, in virtually every year we fi nd Exxon, Texaco, Socal, and Gulf 
on the low side.” 170 Such calculations, explains Fesharaki, brought to 
light “some unexpected peculiarities indicating very close collaboration 
between the participants.” 171 British Petroleum was the most important 
force in determining production volumes, and together with any group of 
small equity holders, it could “impose its will on the others.” 
 Senator Frank Church, chair of the Senate hearings, admitted that the 
formula worked by connecting itself to other kinds of political actors 
and interests. Formulas were designed, through the Iranian consortium 
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arrangement, “to counteract governmental pressures” and give compa-
nies a means for “controlling the total lift, oil, crude lift each year.” The 
purpose of the consortium, like other arrangements in the Middle East, 
was to enable companies to “work through formulas mutually agreed 
upon.” More equitable possibilities for oil production were blocked pre-
cisely through this technical work of calculating how to close out situa-
tions in an open market in which “elaborate sharing arrangements and 
production formulas are not involved and the oil is bid for by the various 
companies in a completely free, open and competitive way.” 172 
 Contrary to the laws of supply and demand, the formula’s work 
demonstrated that certain parties among the oil majors with interests in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain sought to minimize the amount of 
the APQ and thus produce the minimum amount of Iranian oil to keep 
prices high and avoid confl ict with their other oil interests in the Middle 
East. In this instance, the Iranian government did not have a choice in the 
defi nition of the formula and its world. Rather, the construction of the 
APQ worked in secret to manage oil supplies and reengineer the terms of 
national control. First, it intervened to manage negotiations among the 
largest Anglo-American oil companies backed by the British and Amer-
ican governments. Second, having secured the incalculability of alterna-
tive arrangements to the energy system, the formula opened the space for 
negotiating a compromise with the newly installed, pro-Western Iranian 
government. 
 As in earlier crises, Iranian government negotiators such as Entezam, 
the minister of foreign affairs, and Ali Amini, the minister of fi nance, con-
tinuously expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposed volumes of 
production. They demanded that a rate be reached within four years that 
totaled one-third of total Middle East oil production. 173 Unaware of the 
APQ arrangement, Entezam argued that the production quantities were 
disappointingly low. In the absence of any further guarantees, he feared 
that the situation would open itself to misrepresentation, implying that 
in view of the consortium’s interests in other Middle East oil-producing 
countries, it was intending to differentiate against Iran. Entezam remarked 
on the very rapid increase in production in Kuwait, which seemed wrong 
considering that Iran’s needs were much greater than those of this small 
state. Mohammad Reza Shah, the ruler of Iran and son of Reza Shah, 
who had abdicated in 1941, eventually came to learn of the APQ when 
the French company, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, expressed its dis-
satisfaction with the consortium’s levels of production and gave the shah 
a copy of the APQ arrangements. 174 
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 The reengineering of national control in the format of an Iranian oil 
consortium was, in part, a battle over the dynamics of a formula as in 
previous concession disputes. What the Iranians did not know, however, 
was that they had also agreed to the secret workings of the APQ formula 
that sought to protect consortium members by managing their collabora-
tive efforts to control world oil supplies and keep prices high. Thus, there 
is an obvious asymmetry here. AIOC appears to have designed formulas 
in the earlier periods to legitimize to the Iranian government the arrange-
ments favored by the oil company. But when the formula becomes secret, 
as with the APQ, it no longer serves this function of legitimization. Ris-
ing American political and economic dominance meant that AIOC was 
now in a position of weakness. The British oil company was unable to 
resume its operations as before and was forced to negotiate the terms of 
Iran’s production levels with the largest transnational oil corporations to 
protect American participation in any future compromise with the Ira-
nian government. This was also a different historical moment, which, by 
the end of World War II, marked the creation of a nation-state system 
and the spread of anticolonial nationalist movements that prevented the 
continued imposition of sovereign power over other countries by Euro-
pean states and colonizing corporations. The role of formulas in con-
tractual arrangements could not be made public because they would 
be seen as acting against the national interests of oil-producing coun-
tries. Consequently, transnational oil corporations of the mid-twentieth 
century did not have the same privileges as the older colonizing cor-
porations from which they originated, yet they continued to use secret 
formulas to redefi ne the post–World War II petroleum order according 
to new monopoly arrangements dominated by the largest American oil 
companies. 
 During the course of each dispute, the Iranian government had con-
tested, at multiple sites domestically and internationally, the decision 
made by the oil companies to limit production. But it was bargaining 
from a position of weakness, confronting the long-distance machinery 
of global monopoly arrangements that had, through a series of private 
agreements among the largest Anglo-American oil companies, con-
cession agreements with other oil-producing countries, and collabora-
tions with national host governments, managed to secure total control 
of oil production, distribution, and transportation networks. Following 
the construction of the APQ has exposed the formula’s connection to 
politics—that is, the technologies, procedures, and tools enabling the col-
laborative efforts of consortium members to block rivals within a set 
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of constraining relationships and to manage Iran’s oil supplies precisely 
through the nationalization of its oil industry. 
 “Right Wording” for Nationalization 
 Iranian ministers assured consortium members that they did not intend 
to intervene in the details of management control, but sought promises 
that proper regulatory functions on their behalf and that of NIOC could 
be effectively implemented. The wording of the consortium agreement 
must be made “palatable to the Iranian Majlis and public.” Consortium 
members proposed that considerations of the right wording could be 
found, defi ning the Iranian government as a “regulator” or “inspector” to 
avoid the suggestion of direct management. 175 Iranian ministers were now 
working to enroll the Iranian government in restoring foreign control of 
its oilfi elds. Amini assured American offi cials that while the reaction of 
the parliament was certain to be explosive, Iranian deputies provided 
every indication of “aggressively supporting” the results of consortium 
negotiations before the Majlis and the public, even though it contained 
a number of “distasteful features.” 176 A satisfactory solution would be 
found shortly, explained Loy Henderson, American ambassador in Teh-
ran, once the Iranians frankly admit that it was “primarily [a] problem 
[of] fi nding words not offensive to Majlis and public.” 177 
 As in earlier disputes, the Iranian state was being molded in import-
ant ways by the struggle over the control and distribution of oil. Stabi-
lizing the mechanism of the consortium arrangement in relation to the 
oilfi elds of southwest Iran was precisely where this power was worked 
out, but it threatened to fall apart in the face of mounting criticism from 
the Iranian public. The Iranian government was “determined to do what-
ever was necessary to outmaneuver any opposition to ratifi cation in the 
Majlis.” 178 For a brief moment, the Majlis threatened to disrupt the con-
sortium arrangement on the question of production levels. Iran’s Mixed 
Oil Committee argued that Article 20 of the proposed plan placed Iran 
at the “mercy of the consortium,” leaving it free to “produce and sell 
just as much Iranian oil as it pleased—3 or 50 million tons—without 
violating contract.” 179 Amini proposed that the consortium write a let-
ter clarifying or interpreting the article by changing the wording to say 
that “after [the] third year there would be adjustments in production 
of Middle East oil so that Iran would be able to sell its fair share.” The 
committee was more likely to ratify the agreement if such clarifi cation 
was made. It would demonstrate to the Iranian public that the committee 
234  Chapter 6
was not a “mere rubber stamp.” Howard Page, representing Standard 
Oil of New Jersey, drafted a letter modifying the wording of Article 20. 
Statements about plans for decreased production and consumption in 
future years were reworded to say that the consortium would treat the 
production and export of Iranian oil “equitably” and in relation to other 
Persian Gulf sources of supply. 180 No mention of the APQ arrangement 
was made. 
 Finding the right wording for nationalization helped transform the 
Majlis into a rubber stamp precisely as the shah, in his ratifi cation of an 
oil agreement, effectively overturned any real nationalization of the oil 
industry. Thus, the Majlis had moved from a relative position of strength 
in 1946–1951, banning contracts with foreign concerns, fi ghting to 
improve the treatment of oil workers, and guaranteeing Iranian control 
over its oil industry through a series of nationalization laws, to a position 
of weakness. This was made possible, in part, by the Anglo-American 
overthrow of the Mosaddegh government and reinstallation of the shah 
and General Zahedi, both of whom supported the return of an inter-
national oil consortium. The Majlis approved the consortium arrange-
ment by a vote of 113 to 5, with one abstention, on October 21, 1954. 
 The fi nal outcome saw a nominally nationalized group of Western 
fi rms with full rights to manage oil output and prices, 181 leaving Iran with 
a formal title to all its oil and a 50–50 division of net profi ts of produc-
tion, but no share of marketing or distribution operations. Consortium 
members approved a second revised version in 1955, which allocated 5 
percent of American participation to independent oil companies. 182 It was 
the price of blocking any future threat of competition and uncertainty. 183 
 The consortium agreement did not come into force until it received 
approval from Brownell, the US attorney general, the eight oil majors, 
and the Iranian Majlis and Senate. 184 Following his earlier support in 
blocking US antitrust proceedings, Brownell approved the planned con-
sortium even though the secret production agreement (APQ) constituted 
a cartel arrangement. Thus, the APQ did the work of protecting the 
monopoly arrangement as before, but under American tutelage instead 
of British. 
 Alongside the secret workings of the APQ, mechanisms of debt and 
Iran’s desire for military and economic aid helped weaken its bargaining 
position. Iran was entering a new relationship among fl ows of energy, 
fi nance, and violence as a new client state of the United States and 
according to a new oil-dollars-weapons arrangement that would help 
organize the international political economy of oil and “reconfi gure the 
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intersecting elements of carbon democracy” in the second half of the 
twentieth century. 185 To help defend the mid-twentieth-century oil order 
against nationalist and popular pressures in the Middle East, the possibil-
ities for a more democratic politics of oil production in Iran were closed 
off, excluding the oil workers who had struggled to build an alternative 
and more just arrangement. 
 New International Petroleum Order 
 The Mosaddiq government’s decision to nationalize AIOC in 1951 
had triggered a boycott of Iranian oil production by the dominant 
Anglo-American oil companies. This led to a restabilizing of world oil 
supplies by increasing production in neighboring Middle East countries. 
The shift in production to neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia 
benefi ted the American oil industry. Thus, American participation in the 
consortium agreement meant that production levels could not be shifted 
back to favor Iranian production. 
 The failure of oil nationalization in Iran entailed the restoration of 
a resoundingly successful Anglo-American consortium arrangement set 
up in terms of 50–50 profi t sharing and production quotas built into 
the managing technology of the APQ. 186 Nationalization helped solidify 
the international oil cartel’s control, also known as the “Seven Sisters,” 
over the oil reserves of the entire Middle East. 187 It was, therefore, an 
overwhelming success for the international oil industry and the American 
and British governments, who managed to enroll the Iranian government 
in helping to restore foreign control of the seven largest oil corporations 
over its oil industry for at least another forty years. 
 The moment also marked the closure of alternative political possi-
bilities for running Iran’s oil operations, as formerly demanded by the 
more militant alliance of oil workers, the communist Tudeh Party, and 
national control. As this discussion and the previous chapter revealed, 
a set of technologies for the management and control of oil—sanctions 
and a boycott, 50–50 profi t sharing, the APQ, the racial-technical orga-
nization of labor, and legal-economic metrology—intervened in the 
dispute to weaken Iran’s bargaining position drastically while enabling 
Anglo-American interests to claim to have stepped outside of local con-
straints. The nationalization dispute unraveled at a critical moment of 
political, legal, and fi nancial rearrangement in the post–World War II 
international order. The oil infrastructure of southwest Iran constituted 
one of the sites in which this complex rearrangement was worked out. 
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Iran’s position suddenly shifted from a position of strength to one of 
weakness as Anglo-American oil companies and governments reengi-
neered mechanisms for protecting the oil-rich and strategically important 
Middle East in terms of a Cold War battle against Soviet expansion, mil-
itant nationalism, and populist politics. 
 Studies of Iran’s oil nationalization crisis and its resolution often 
assume a predetermined set of historical actors that overlook the piv-
otal activities of nonhuman agents such as laws, mechanisms of inter-
national governance, formulas, and the US national security apparatus. 
These technologies of management and control ensured that the central 
issues—production levels, pricing, and percentage participation—were 
rendered nonnegotiable and settled beforehand among the American oil 
majors and then with the British. One effect was to undermine Iran’s 
national sovereignty over its natural resource. As a collective agency, 
oil workers, the Tudeh Party, Iranian technologists, and public opinion 
demanded alternative, more just arrangements of oil, but their bargaining 
positions were gradually weakened and redirected toward other arrange-
ments not necessarily within their control. These efforts shaped the Ira-
nian state in important ways, enrolling the Majlis initially as an opponent 
and subsequently as a supporter of foreign, international control over 
its oil industry. The Iranian government’s decision to enter a consortium 
arrangement plunged the country into a different kind of international 
oil order from before, one that was beginning to rely on a peculiar rela-
tionship between oil, dollars, and the US arms industry, promising further 
closure of political possibilities and demanding new kinds of equipment 
with which to address oil crises to come. 
 The infrastructure of the global oil industry as it was constructed in 
southwest Iran remains active today. The oilfi elds, pipeline, refi nery, staff 
bungalows, and leisure clubs are intact, albeit in need of extensive refur-
bishment. The old town of Abadan and the bazaar are bustling places 
where Arabic- and Persian-speaking Iranians continue to thrive. Many of 
them are employees of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and 
have memories of the company town, passed down from their grandpar-
ents, former employees who still refer to its residential roads as “lanes,” 
a term fi rst used by AIOC’s British imperial architects. The history of the 
collective life that has emerged in Khuzistan is a history of infrastruc-
tural transformation that rather than eliminating technical uncertainties, 
caused sociotechnical controversies to proliferate in the pursuit of alter-
native, petroleum-based political collectives. 
 The previous chapters inquired into the procedural techniques, 
points of vulnerability, opportunity, and control that made the fi rst 
foreign-controlled oil concession in the Middle East operational.  Machin-
eries of Oil has discussed the organizational work involved in transform-
ing the world into a place in which the Anglo-Iranian oil industry would 
survive. The set of remarkable actors that emerged, namely, the conces-
sion contract, formulas, international law, technoscience, and strategic 
ignorance, helped make AIOC a success in the fi rst fi fty years of its exis-
tence, only to end abruptly with its departure in 1954. By contrast, the 
company’s representation of its expert knowledge greatly underplayed 
the role of its organizational work locally. The uncertainty of the energy 
system built into the heart of each oil dispute enabled certain machin-
eries of control to equip actors with the power to reassemble political 
possibilities in unpredictable ways. Starting with a rhetoric that repre-
sented local actors in terms of the economic rationality they lacked, these 
devices were black-boxed over time. The execution of concession terms 
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was all that mattered, not the arguments and equipment that went into 
making them operational. 
 Reassembling the history of BP in Iran has exposed previously unstud-
ied petroleum-based assemblages that managed political outcomes in the 
twentieth century. There are more powerful forces at play that models 
of the rentier state do not take into account when explaining the failure 
of democracy as symptomatic of oil-producing countries. Rather than 
narrowing the focus either to the social construction of the technolog-
ical or to the technological construction of the social,  Machineries of 
Oil has placed the study of oil infrastructure at the center of the anal-
ysis, yet without limiting it to this alone or to what some would call 
its economic and political impact. In doing so, the book has identifi ed 
a  sociotechnical process of simplifi cation by which relations between 
politics and markets in oil are made durable. In Iran, oil infrastructure 
was the site of power struggles and the constructing and deconstruct-
ing of boundaries made between technical and economic issues inside oil 
operations and the politics of property claimants, national sovereignty, 
and striking oil workers outside. These distinctions between what was 
political and what was technical were  the outcome of the sociotechni-
cal process of manufacture under investigation and not the input. Thus, 
the oil infrastructure in the Middle East, as constructed in Iran, was 
constituted precisely by building alliances that did not respect apparent 
divides between material and abstract, technical and social, ignorance 
and knowledge, representation and violence. Each chapter can be seen 
as working through this proliferation of a set of distinctions that at fi rst 
glance appear fi xed and natural, but in practice, are highly vulnerable and 
shape political outcomes. The kinds of problems that emerged in this his-
tory have to do with the specifi city of Anglo-Iranian oil’s sociotechnical 
properties. 
 Undemocratic machineries of oil emerged in the shape of formulas, 
concession terms, and international law, which were among the central 
actors entangled in the history of Anglo-Iranian oil and the Iranian state 
in the fi rst half of the twentieth century. Only by intertwining histories of 
the Middle East with business history and science and technology studies 
has the history recounted in this book been able to open up the dynamics 
of diverse sociotechnical devices and calculating technologies in an inter-
connected process of formulating similar but moving problems within a 
local history. As a business strategy, fi rms such as AIOC made use of this 
equipment as an entry point or fi eld of negotiation that could be used 
advantageously over other devices. Why were these devices so effective? 
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 Depending on markets or industrial relations, the relation between 
politics and economy took on different forms with different strategic 
variables, making it increasingly diffi cult to assemble democratic politics 
out of the production of oil. For example, the issue of volume of produc-
tion was present on multiple occasions regarding profi ts, the company’s 
recruitment policy, and production rates. The importance of the strate-
gic character of formulas turned around one strategic variable, volume 
of production, and the subordination of other parameters to this one, 
making the market in oil predictable. Thus, in each of the disputes, for-
mulas and other sociotechnical devices organized relations between mar-
kets and politics, although this could vary from one dispute to another. 
Different formulas for calculating profi ts, Iranian labor recruitment, and 
the APQ, in particular, were all built around fi gures indicating the notion 
of an extension of petroleum formulas in the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century. 
 Quantitative formulas have played a decisive role in the long history 
of Anglo-Iranian oil but were also used in connection with other types 
of formulas such as international law, which, while claiming universal 
applicability among a community of states, was devised to deal with a 
specifi c type of economic development agreement (e.g., concessions) to 
which new states of the Global South were the primary parties. Formu-
las were decisive even in the organization of the international scientifi c 
community—volume of production was important for scientists in the 
formulation of reserve estimates and other measures. Thus, it is import-
ant to note that the circulation of formulas did occur outside relations 
between governments and fi rms, such as in the scientifi c community and 
in international legal arenas of security and fi nance. Formulas in gen-
eral offered the possibility of clear negotiations and revisions. Formulas 
and other kinds of sociotechnical devices have been so important in this 
history because they equipped actors with varying degrees of agency to 
frame issues advantageously and legitimize their respective negotiating 
positions in each oil dispute. 
 The machineries of Anglo-Iranian oil also served as useful devices to 
control the sensitive question of drawing boundaries between private/
public and secrecy/transparency. Within the variables of mathematical 
formulas and legal and scientifi c formulation, the interests and organi-
zational forms of public (governmental) and private (nongovernmental, 
corporate) entities appeared intertwined from the start. Thus, the history 
of these devices can also be seen as a history of maintaining a distinction 
between secret and private or open and public boundaries. Built into the 
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notion of formulation is the idea of what is said and not said. The circula-
tion of a formula such as the APQ (discussed in chapter 6) could be secret 
for a period of time (in this instance, ten years or so). In pursuing com-
promises, they enabled the calculation of interests—political, cultural, 
technical, and economic—and were therefore helpful in the management 
and calculation of heterogeneous interests, particularly the threat of mili-
tant nationalism allied with striking oil workers and communism. 
 Petroleum devices and formulas were bound up with and shaped by 
competing political projects within the history of Anglo-Iranian oil. These 
specifi c technologies required certain kinds of social worlds to survive. 
AIOC’s conceptions about local political forces in terms of the Western 
civilization/expertise they lacked informed the company’s technological 
choices and were inscribed in its conceptions of legality, valuation, and 
the hierarchical classifi cation of English law terms as superior to those 
in Farsi. Likewise, racial-cultural assumptions about Iranian oil work-
ers as incapable of learning petroleum technology were inscribed in the 
company’s economic decisions about profi ts and recruitment. In practice, 
these modern techniques of power and domination produced concerned 
groups, such as oil workers and the Communist Party, who battled to 
reconstruct the techno-econo-social collectives at the heart of each dis-
pute in advantageous ways to block rivals and represent the many silent 
actors of the worlds they mobilized. 
 AIOC mobilized petroleum devices to limit political possibili-
ties in favor of the cartel and monopoly arrangements of the major 
Anglo-American oil corporations. More generally, these devices did not 
describe a preexisting world, they helped format a world of which they 
were a truer refl ection. 1 Throughout the history of oil in Iran, these calcu-
lative technologies equipped AIOC offi cials with the capacity to redirect 
political outcomes against competing sociotechnical programs put for-
ward by Iranian oil workers, the Communist Party, reformist nationalism, 
and public opinion demanding more equitable forms of oil production. 
Thus, formulas and the work of formulation (legal, economic, scientifi c, 
administrative) can be central actors in the establishment, negotiation, 
and strengthening of sociotechnical assemblages, thus equipping people 
and things with new forms of agency. 
 Reconfi guring historical analysis as a sociotechnical process such as 
this respects the connections, translations, and networking performed by 
the diverse human and nonhuman actors, which led to the constitution of 
the shifting arrangements. In practice, the building of the global oil indus-
try occurred through the formation of a series of technological zones. 
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These zones of qualifi cation, measurement, and regulation involved a 
multitude of international and national bodies, along with experts such 
as private consultants, scientists, and other professionals employed by 
multinationals and institutions of global economic governance. The effect 
was to establish a border over the course of the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century, one whose limits did not correspond to or get determined by 
the existing border of the nation-state, but to a shifting sphere of oper-
ations of companies and of international institutions such as the League 
of Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the World Bank. With 
such borders established, the oil corporation was allowed to step outside 
of local constraints and make universal claims to international guidelines 
and standards. 
 This study has intervened to consider the role of sociotechnical devices 
in the reconfi guration of politics. 2 It has done so by engaging in an anal-
ysis of the historical construction of particular political and economic 
spaces and the specifi cities of the materials, practices, and locations that 
technological zones within the global oil industry in the Middle East 
transform, connect, exclude, and silence. A focus on the technological 
zones of Anglo-Iranian oil has made visible the ways in which the for-
mation of these zones has become critical to the constitution of a dis-
tinction between global/Western political and economic forms and their 
non-Western others. 3 Southwest Iran served as a laboratory for producing 
knowledge about the social and technical worlds of oil, and for hybrid-
izing them. Laboratory work was the infrastructural work of holding 
formulas and oil workers together so that alternative forms of control, 
such as nationalization, would not happen. 
 By recovering the process through which sociotechnical devices were 
constructed and deconstructed in Iran’s history,  Machineries of Oil has 
followed their remarkable role in shaping the powers of the oil-producing 
state and the global oil industry. But the goal of this study has not been 
to unveil the underlying mechanisms of sociotechnical devices in already 
well-known events and policies, for such nonhuman actors have always 
been upfront and on the surface. The world of these devices became 
actual not through the work of numeric, legal, administrative, and sci-
entifi c formulation alone. Rather, they combined with other forces that 
helped assemble the machinery of oil in standardized terms to redirect 
political outcomes and agencies in favor of the multinational oil corpo-
ration. At the same time, engineering political relations out of fl ows of 
oil made certain actors in the history of Anglo-Iranian oil incompatible 
with these devices. This incompatibility created inherent vulnerabilities 
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within the petroleum-based energy system, allowing the possibility for 
alternative political arrangements, events, and worlds to strike back in 
future oil crises. 
 The Iranian oil consortium succeeded in reintegrating Iranian oil 
production into the postwar petroleum order, but the arrangement 
was not long lasting. In the second half of the twentieth century, rival 
petroleum collectives emerged to counter the powers of the Seven Sis-
ters, all of which participated in the consortium. Venezuela and the main 
oil-producing countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and Iraq, coordinated in 1960 to establish a rival cartel, the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), based on the uni-
versal right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their 
natural resources. Their initial goal was to coordinate the control of oil 
production from their fi elds and deconstruct the “posted price” of oil, 
or the unilateral fi xing of prices controlled by the seven oil corporations 
to keep prices artifi cially high. 4 In southwest Iran, protesting Iranian oil 
workers used their specialist knowledge to disrupt oil operations on mul-
tiple occasions with the most transformative action occurring during the 
1978–1979 Islamic Revolution. The oil workers successfully shut down 
specifi c nodes in the energy system to paralyze the Pahlavi shah’s regime. 
The workers linked their action in solidarity with striking teachers and 
called for the release of political prisoners. 5 They again connected calls 
for the Iranianization of the oil industry to improvements in housing 
and work, but their demands were directed at a different political actor, 
NIOC, fi rst established during the oil nationalization crisis of 1953. 
The revolution marked NIOC’s offi cial declaration of the end of Iran’s 
relations with consortium member companies. All exploration and pro-
duction contracts with foreign companies before the revolution were 
declared null and void. The Islamic Republic took control of the oil pro-
duction variable in the pursuit of more democratic forms of control, but 
as discussed in the previous chapters, tools were readily available within 
the energy system to adjust to such disruptions in supply by relying on 
alternative sources and apparatuses of control to protect international 
oil markets. 
 Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC continues to wield its power in the 
twenty-fi rst century as it battles on multiple fronts to shut out indepen-
dent shale oil competitors in the United States and to readjust to the 
return of Iranian oil production to international markets in the aftermath 
of the July 2015 nuclear deal and the lifting of economic sanctions. The 
problem is that many of the giant oilfi elds of Khuzistan, discussed in 
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the previous chapters, are already depleted or nearing depletion, and the 
massive Abadan refi nery is in need of renovation. With the second larg-
est natural gas reserves, Iran now hopes to lure back many of the inter-
national oil companies that it fought hard to evict from its oil industry 
in the last century. But the negative impact of fossil fuel consumption on 
global climate change has triggered an energy shift toward the develop-
ment of renewable sources of energy. A sociotechnical analysis such as 
this offers better tools to address these uncertainties in the pursuit of 
alternative energy systems and collective life. 
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